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The Politics of Inclusive Development
It is now widely accepted that politics plays a signifi cant role in shaping the 
possibilities for inclusive development. However, the specifi c ways in which 
this happens across different types and forms of development, and in dif-
ferent contexts, remains poorly understood. This collection provides a state-
of-the-art review regarding what is currently known about the politics of 
inclusive development. Leading academics offer systematic reviews of how 
politics shapes development across multiple dimensions, including through 
growth, natural resource governance, poverty reduction, service delivery, 
social protection, justice systems, the empowerment of marginalised groups, 
and the role of both traditional and non-traditional donors. The volume not 
only provides a comprehensive update but also a ground-breaking range of 
new directions for thinking and acting around these issues. The book’s orig-
inality thus derives not only from the wide scope of its case-study material, 
but also from the new conceptual approaches it offers for thinking about the 
politics of inclusive development, and the innovative and practical sugges-
tions for donors, policy makers, and practitioners that fl ow from this.
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The Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) Research Centre 
strives to create knowledge that contributes to making states more effec-
tive and committed to achieving social justice. This is a grand goal but our 
partnership of academic and research institutes—across Africa, Asia, Europe, 
and North America—works at local, national, and international levels to 
deepen the understanding of governance in the developing world in ways 
that impact on policies and practices so that peoples’ lives and livelihood are 
improved. Our partnership is multinational, multidisciplinary—and exam-
ines development from a multidimensional perspective!
This book is ESID’s first major academic collection and draws on a large num-
bers of studies that partners have provided (see <http://www.effective-states. 
org> for full details). Its title—The Politics of Inclusive Development—would 
have appeared an oxymoron to earlier generations of those engaged in the 
policy and planning of development. For many involved in development 
when it was focused on foreign aid, ‘politics’ was a catch-all term for the pro-
cesses that stopped detailed technical plans (and the theories underpinning 
them) from achieving their stated goals. It was always a negative force: the 
idea of ‘politics’ delivering growth or human development was risible. But, 
times have moved on. The pretence, and futility, of the assumption that 
‘development’ occurred in some rarefied, apolitical context has been laid to 
rest as growing numbers of studies have demonstrated that ‘politics matters’, 
indeed ‘institutions matter’.
For those of us who spent our early careers at the grassroots level in devel-
opment practice the initial findings of these erudite studies has not been a 
surprise: we had always known that our operational work was embedded in 
political processes that might block achievement but could, when condi-
tions were supportive, facilitate economic and social advancement. What we 
needed was advice and guidance about what could be done to make political 
contexts more responsive to inclusive development (usually labelled as ‘rural 
development’ in those dim and distant days). The research in this book rep-
resents a significant step in making the understanding of development more 
politically savvy by developing the theoretical apparatus and knowledge 




1. a detailed and original theoretical framework that shapes ESID’s work 
and, we hope, that of other researchers;
2. a systematic review of the evidence about the politics of ‘what works’ 
in achieving inclusive development;
3. a set of clear and concise propositions about how to advance such 
knowledge in a policy relevant fashion.
Its editors—Sam Hickey, Kunal Sen, and Badru Bukenya—are to be congrat-
ulated for succeeding in editing a volume that is both grounded in the clas-
sic tomes of social science theory and highly topical.
Over the last ten to fifteen years the context for development has changed 
profoundly and that change continues at a phenomenal rate. The geography 
of wealth is shifting east to Asia. Sub-Saharan Africa, long viewed through a 
lens of Afro-pessimism, is tipped for investors as a future growth pole. The 
majority of the world’s extremely poor people now live in countries classi-
fied as middle-income. Connectivity grows at unprecedented rates, raising 
the prospects for improved transparency of public and private actors—per-
haps, even improved accountability. And, with the rise of remittances and 
new sources of development finance, traditional foreign aid increasingly 
seems like a minor factor in the development arena.
But, not all is good news. Two particular issues stand out. First, economic 
inequality is reaching unimaginable levels, with Oxfam reporting that the 
world’s eighty-five wealthiest people own the same as the three billion poor-
est. Economic power and political influence are increasingly concentrated in 
the hands of small numbers of supranational mega-billionaires far removed 
from contact with the day-to-day problems and opportunities of the major-
ity. Just as alarming, it is clear that the global capitalist system that produces 
and distributes wealth is environmentally unsustainable. The system that has 
underpinned economic growth and human development will have to be trans-
formed if future generations are to have a chance of experiencing a ‘good life’.
In such a context, the theoretical contribution of this book is of particu-
lar significance, as it moves the focus from statics and equilibria to change 
and dynamics. It takes us beyond the ‘new’ new institutional economics 
of growth to understanding how dynamic political settlements shape pat-
terns of accumulation, social provisioning, and social recognition as they 
impact on state capacity and elite commitment (or lack of commitment) to 
development. Building on the work of Douglass North, Daron Acemoglu, 
James Robinson, and Mushtaq Khan, the book’s analytical framework inte-
grates critical additional elements: the role of ideas (alongside incentives); 
the possibility of popular agency; the influence of transnational factors; 
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the opportunity for emerging coalitions to promote inclusive development; 
and the dynamics of political regime change in growth processes. Beneath 
this framework lies the constant interplay of politics and power relations, as 
those with power seek to maintain the status quo and new actors and emerg-
ing coalitions seek change. 
 While this book is a scholarly output, it identifi es implications for policy 
and practice (for ESID outputs targeted on policy audiences, see the Briefi ng 
Papers on our website). The universal prescriptions of the original new insti-
tutionalism—democracy, decentralization, strengthening the demand side, 
and so on—are shown to be double-edged: they may weaken rather than 
strengthen development outcomes. While the volume critiques ‘one size 
fi ts all’, it does not shift to the other extreme—‘context is everything’! It 
identifi es a typology of political conditions that, in the future, will seek to 
generate type-specifi c fi ndings to stand alongside case-specifi c conclusions. 
Whether these fi ndings will be able to overcome ‘the barriers’ that political 
analysis faces in aid agencies remains a question for future analysis. 
 As CEO of ESID, I want to wholeheartedly thank the book’s editors, con-
tributors, and all those who have contributed to its production (ESID and 
BWPI’s excellent support staff, scores of reviewers, research assistants, and 
partners on four continents) for their efforts. I hope you enjoy reading it—
even more, I hope it contributes to deepening your understanding of the 
politics of inclusive development. 
 David Hulme 
This document is an output from a project funded by the UK Aid from UK 
Government for the benefi t of developing countries. However, the views 
expressed and information contained in it are not necessarily those of or 
endorsed by the UK Government, which can accept no responsibility for 
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Exploring the Politics of Inclusive 
Development: Towards a New  
Conceptual Approach
Sam Hickey, Kunal Sen, and Badru Bukenya
Introduction: The Politics of Inclusive Development
The recognition that politics plays a central role in shaping the prospects 
for development in poor countries constitutes one of the most significant 
advances that development theory and practice has made since the turn 
of the millennium. From being a marginal concern that the often techno-
cratic world of international development struggled to deal with (Carothers 
and de Gramont 2013), there is now widespread acceptance that politics is 
critical to both the reduction and reproduction of poverty. This holds across 
all dimensions of development, including the delivery of basic services and 
social protection, the promotion of job-creating forms of growth, the gov-
ernance of resources and the extension of recognition to marginal people 
and places, including women. Politics is now seen as a significant force at 
each stage of the development process, from shaping processes of exclusion 
and inequality to raising awareness and recognition of these as problems of 
(in)justice, and from determining which policies get adopted through to if 
and how they get implemented. Indeed, all of the most influential analyses 
of long-run development to emerge of late have argued strongly that politics 
is the critical factor (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Fukuyama 2011; Khan 
2010; North et al. 2009), albeit with differing approaches as to what ‘politics’ 
might consist of.
This recognition has catalysed a widening and deepening of research into 
the specific role that politics plays in shaping development. In an effort to 
offer a systematic survey of the growing field of politics and development, 
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and to relate this to the emergence of new theoretical approaches, this col-
lection draws from the initial research findings of the Effective States and 
Inclusive Development (ESID) research centre, which exists to identify and 
investigate the kinds of politics that can help to secure inclusive development 
and how these can be promoted.1 Authors were charged with systematically 
exploring the evidence from the available literature on how politics shaped 
the delivery of development in their specific domain, including growth, the 
governance of natural resources, basic services and social protection, the rule 
of law, the politics of recognition, and the influence of transnational factors. 
Alongside this inductive approach, ESID also reviewed the main conceptual 
contributions to understanding the politics of development, both in general 
terms and with specific reference to the concepts of state capacity and elite 
commitment which had been identified as critical in many studies of the 
politics of development. This introduction brings together the main concep-
tual and empirical insights from this body of work, and uses it as the basis 
for suggesting some next steps for building a theoretically informed and 
policy-relevant programme of research that can help take the growing field 
of politics and development forward in coherent ways.
The remainder of this section briefly defines what we mean by ‘politics’ 
and ‘inclusive development’, before the next summarizes the key findings of 
our studies according to the following domains of development: accumula-
tion and growth, including through the exploitation of natural resources; 
the promotion and protection of social and civil rights through basic ser-
vices, social protection, and the rule of law; the recognition of difference 
and inequality; and finally the transnational politics of development. We 
then attempt to synthesize across these findings to identify the broader 
themes and issues that emerge, and to put these into conversation with the 
current literature on how we should conceptualize and theorize the politics 
of development. This involves a critical engagement with the most influen-
tial body of thinking on this at the current time, namely work that seeks to 
go beyond the dominance of new institutionalist thinking over good gov-
ernance debates, including the ‘political settlements’ perspective recently 
developed by Mushtaq Khan (2010), the major contributions of North et al. 
(2009) on ‘violence and social orders’, and also Acemoglu and Robinson’s 
(2012) work on ‘inclusive institutions’. Whilst noting the many points of 
convergence between the findings of our systematic reviews and this new 
perspective, our findings suggest the need to extend these neo-institutionalist 
approaches to incorporate a broader view of how politics shapes development 
agendas, processes, and outcomes. This leads us to tentatively propose the 
1 For more details, see <http://www.effective-states.org>.
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outlines of a new conceptual approach that goes beyond institutional and 
behavioural studies of politics to include a deeper sense of the forms of poli-
tics and power relations that underlie the critical issues of state capacity 
and elite commitment that our chapters draw attention to. The final sec-
tion uses these combined insights to suggest the conceptual and methodo-
logical contours for the next phase of primary research into the politics and 
development.
Some definitional questions first. In terms of ‘politics’, we follow Adrian 
Leftwich’s (2004) definition of politics as ‘all the processes of conflict, 
co-operation and negotiation on taking decisions about how resources are 
to be owned, used, produced and distributed’, although we also consider 
the struggle over ideas (as well as resources) to be a fundamental and sig-
nificant element of politics, an issue to which we return below. We define 
inclusive development as a process that occurs when social and material 
benefits are equitably distributed across divides within societies, across 
income groups, genders, ethnicities, regions, religious groups, and others. 
These benefits necessarily comprise not only economic and material gains 
but enhanced well-being and capabilities as well as social and political 
empowerment being widely experienced. This definition involves at least 
two important moves. The first, and most familiar, is to go beyond a nar-
row understanding of development as a primarily economic process to one 
with an integral focus on the achievement of equity and the rights and 
status of citizenship. This is important here not just in ethical terms but 
also because comparative historical evidence suggests that the forms of 
politics that have underpinned inclusive forms of development (e.g. Evans 
2010; Sandbrook et  al. 2007; Walton 2010), differ in significant respects 
from those associated with economic growth (e.g. World Bank 2008a). 
The second move is to shift the focus beyond ‘poverty’ and ‘the poor’. 
As argued elsewhere (Hickey 2008), this discourse can make it difficult to 
think politically and may distract from a focus on achieving the fuller goal 
of social justice implied by the term ‘inclusive development’. For exam-
ple, people rarely self-identify or organize themselves as ‘the poor’, which 
makes it difficult to appreciate popular agency through a poverty lens. 
Most poverty analysis relies on an analytical separation of the poor from 
the rest of society that tends to become moralized (Rothstein 2002), often 
in ways that cast responsibility for both poverty and poverty reduction on 
the poor themselves and to therefore undermine the case for elite groups 
to support large-scale public action.
However, it is important here to go beyond the notion that ‘inclu-
sion’ is uniformly a ‘good thing’:  a misconception that a good deal of 
critical thinking on poverty analysis has sought to problematize (Green 
2009; Hickey and du Toit 2007; Mosse 2010). It is now acknowledged that 
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being included on adverse terms in dominant political, economic, and 
social orders can be disempowering for weaker groups, including women 
(Jackson 1999) and minority ethnic groups (Masaki 2010), who become 
incorporated on subordinate terms and may be denied the agency that 
can come from operating beyond the confines of hegemonic forma-
tions. The focus on equity and empowerment within the definition we 
adopt represents a relational understanding of how development unfolds 
(Mosse 2010), one that avoids simplistic readings of inclusion and insists 
that sustainable and inclusive forms of development involve progressive 
changes to the power relations that underpin poverty and exclusion. The 
intention, then, is to develop a more encompassing and relational view 
of development that problematizes the workings of societies rather than 
the characteristics of particular groups and involves thinking in broader 
terms around how to achieve social justice, towards which poverty reduc-
tion is an essential but insufficient step. There is also a more instrumental 
argument for focusing on inclusion rather than poverty, in that it enables 
development thinking and strategy to include but extend beyond a focus 
on ‘the poor’ to include the non-poor whose political support may be 
required to sustain broader-based and more sustainable interventions (e.g. 
Nelson 2003). Bringing better-off groups into the equation means includ-
ing those citizens who are often more adept at attracting public goods 
provision and at maintaining a better quality of service delivery through 
social accountability mechanisms.
What Does the Evidence Tell Us about the Politics  
of Inclusive Development in Different Domains?
This definition of inclusive development leads to a focus on at least three 
domains: economic, social, and political, and the collection we present here 
is organized in these terms. Drawing on insights from theories of social jus-
tice (Young 1990; Fraser 2009; Lister 2008), this means we need to under-
stand not only the politics of accumulation and growth, but also of both 
redistribution and recognition. Whilst the former allows us to deal with the 
material aspects of development, the focus on recognition reflects the extent 
to which cultural and political forms of exclusion and inclusion also matter 
for development. Working across these different dimensions and domains 
of development also extends both the range of policy areas the collection 
talks to and enables us to engage with and critically assess recent conceptual 
advances from a greater range of perspectives. This section sets out the key 
findings from each substantive section of the book in turn, starting with 
accumulation and growth.
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The Politics of Accumulation
Compared to other domains, there is a relatively rich literature on the poli-
tics of economic growth and development, most notably around the role 
of developmental states. Although work in this tradition has recently been 
extended to include more social aspects of development (e.g. Evans 2010; 
Leftwich 2008), the main focus remains firmly on economic growth and 
development, usually in the form of industrialization (Evans 1995; Johnson 
1982; Kohli 2004; Leftwich 1995; World Bank 2008a; Vu 2007). Centred 
mainly on the post-war success stories of South East and East Asia, and to 
some extent Latin America, the generic lessons have tended to focus on the 
role of highly competent and committed bureaucrats and political leaders 
with the capacity to deliver certain public goods, to work closely with and 
to discipline capital on the basis of its ‘embedded autonomy’, and to place 
limits on the potentially fragmentary demands of disparate social groups. 
Contextual factors have also emerged as significant, as with the threat of 
violence and disorder from either within or without (Henley 2014; Routley 
2012). More recently, the field has moved to examine some of these features 
in more depth, as with the role of state–business relations in shaping eco-
nomic policy (Sen 2012), and both intra-elite and elite–mass relations (Vu 
2007). However, stronger moves are required in this direction in order to 
attain the level of depth and nuance required to generate more insightful 
and actionable findings. As well as exploring the political factors in more 
depth, there is also a need to disaggregate and differentiate between the 
different types and levels of development involved here, whether in terms 
of the rate and type of growth that is pursued or the domain within which 
growth strategies are located.
For example, Kunal Sen argues in his chapter that the forms of politics 
that are associated with the initial stages of take-off are likely to be different 
to those associated with sustaining growth over a longer period. This chap-
ter is informed by the insight from the development states literature that 
growth often precedes the advent of democracy, and the work of Mushtaq 
Khan (2006) which shows that no countries in the developing world have 
achieved economic take-off as a result of first establishing institutions asso-
ciated with good governance. Rather, what matters more for growth accel-
erations are informal institutions such as patron–client networks that are 
capable of securing credible commitment amongst a limited number of elites, 
rather than more open and formal institutions such as laws and regulations. 
However, for economic growth to be maintained over time would seem to 
require that such deal-making becomes more open and ordered, and also a 
commitment amongst elites to invest in the forms of state capacity that can 
allow for the provision of high-quality public goods that matter for growth and 
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structural transformation (e.g. infrastructure) and the overcoming of coor-
dination failures (Evans 1995). Therefore, while clientelist political settle-
ments (Khan 2010) with predominantly informal institutions would be 
more likely to characterize growth accelerations, hybrid contexts with a mix 
of informal and formal institutions would be more likely to characterize 
growth maintenance. This has important implications for development pol-
icy, and strongly suggests that efforts to implant Western-style institutions 
in developing countries during the take-off phase are misplaced. Sen notes 
that current theoretical contributions to the politics of economic growth, 
including those by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) and Khan (2010) do not 
offer a unified theory of the underlying political dynamics of the ‘stop and 
go’ economic growth that one observes so frequently in developing coun-
tries, or a convincing account of the political drivers of institutional change 
from growth stagnation or collapse to growth acceleration, and then on to 
growth sustenance, and that this should be the key focus for future research 
in this area.
There is also a growing awareness that the main sector/s which stimulate 
growth in particular economies is of great political as well as economic sig-
nificance for inclusive development. This is particularly important in terms 
of shaping the relative levels of labour/capital-intensity associated with 
a growth strategy, which goes a long way to defining how inclusive such 
strategies will be. Recent research has shown that the choice of such strate-
gies is closely shaped by the bargaining power of key economic and social 
actors and the relationships they have been able to forge with the state and 
parts thereof (e.g. see Nattrass and Seekings 2010 on South Africa). Further 
research along the same lines within ESID argues that firms put different 
kinds of pressures on governments to act in particular ways depending on 
the extent to which the firms are producing for domestic or international 
markets, and the availability of rent-seeking opportunities in the relevant 
sector. For example, whereas manufacturing capital may lobby governments 
to invest in infrastructure and human capability-building that requires 
heavy investments in public infrastructure and which has large spillover 
effects for the rest of the economy, rentier forms of capital that rely on 
exports for growth is likelier to request more enclave-based forms of support 
(Werker and Pritchett 2012). In its most extreme form, found most clearly in 
states that rely heavily on natural resources, this can lead to both economic 
and political versions of the resource curse (Ross 2012). Given that growing 
numbers of developing countries have recently discovered often large levels 
of natural resources, it is particularly important to understand the politics of 
natural resource governance.
Tony Bebbington’s chapter analyses the institutional and political rela-
tionships that govern the interactions between natural resource extraction, 
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economy, and society, relationships that will help define the implications of 
resource extraction for democracy and the qualities of growth. With a focus 
on the mining and hydrocarbon sectors, he explores the conditions under 
which these relationships are likely to be reproduced or changed, and the 
ways in which they might mediate the interactions between extraction and 
inclusion. The framework used to understand these processes is grounded 
in two perspectives, the first of which draws on the literature on political 
settlements, contentious politics, and the politics of ideas, placing particu-
lar emphasis on the role of social mobilization and political coalitions in 
processes of institutional change. The second perspective engages with the 
particular relationships of scale, space, and time that characterize the natu-
ral resource sector and give it specificity. He emphasizes that these questions 
of space and time are especially important in influencing how the growth 
of an extractive economy shapes the relationships between growth, redistri-
bution, and the politics of recognition. The implication is that any effort to 
understand the governance of extraction and of its relationships to develop-
ment must be spatially and historically explicit. In light of these arguments 
the chapter closes with a discussion of the conditions that might favour the 
emergence of institutional arrangements under which resource extraction is 
more likely to foster inclusive development.
The focus on coalitions and the linkages across the different domains of 
development also features strongly in Paul Mosley’s chapter on the fiscal 
politics of development, which acts as a bridge between this and the next 
section of the book on social provisioning. Mosley argues that although the 
poor, acting on their own, are politically weak, there are, nonetheless, ways 
in which they can make themselves essential to the elite. The most preva-
lent form of this is through forming coalitions with them that are mutu-
ally beneficial, either through the promise of electoral support or threat of 
unrest. This political process, which for Mosley can be seen playing itself out 
in relation to particular policy processes and through the establishment of 
particular institutions, has enabled poverty in some countries and regions 
(e.g. Ghana, Uganda) to fall dramatically. Informed by his earlier work on 
the politics of poverty reduction (2012), Mosley analyses the distributional 
impact of public expenditure and taxation, with an emphasis on the sectors 
of agriculture and social protection, and on the instruments of input sub-
sidy and ‘progressive’ export taxation. Here direct spending on agriculture 
as well as spending on complementary sectors such as rural infrastructure 
and education have been found to offer critical escape routes out of poverty 
by ‘increasing the productivity of the rural poor in the short term and, in 
the medium term, paving the way for the possibility of small-scale-based 
industrialization for export’. Mosley also tackles the issue of how to make 
taxation pro-poor in low-income countries, inspired by the cases of Uganda 
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and Ghana, where the focus was shifted away from levying taxes on exports 
to imports, thus enabling governments of these counties to shift some of 
the tax burden away from the rural poor and onto comparatively wealthier 
urban consumers. The decision by the Zambian government to impose a tax 
on the profits of mining companies, which was earmarked for social protec-
tion programmes, is flagged as a key strategy for joining up processes of accu-
mulation with progressive forms of redistribution. Such moves send strong 
‘signals’ to poorer groups and facilitates their inclusion within ‘pro-poor 
coalitions’, and reflects the growing sense in which policies play intensely 
political functions in developing countries (Henley 2014).
The Politics of Social and Legal Citizenship: Promoting and Protecting 
the Rights of the Poor?
Although not as extensive as the literature on economic development, a grow-
ing number of studies have examined the role of politics in shaping the provi-
sion of services aimed at protecting and promoting the social and civic rights 
of marginal groups. This has been particularly the case with social service pro-
vision, whether directed at raising human capabilities in general terms (e.g. 
Carbone 2009a; Evans 2010; Nelson 2007), or in relation to specific sectors 
such as education (e.g. Grindle 2004; Kosack 2012; Stasavage 2005) and the 
fast-growing literature on the politics of social protection (e.g. Graham 1995, 
2002; Hickey 2009; Nelson 2003). The literature has become increasingly 
nuanced and also divided in recent years, particularly concerning whether 
processes of democratization help or hinder the delivery of services, between 
bottom-up versus up-down forms of accountability and concerning the cen-
tralized or decentralized shape of the state. Our systematic reviews of the avail-
able evidence engage directly with these debates and show the need to move 
beyond often-redundant conflicts between apparently polarized positions by 
drawing attention to the deeper forms of politics and power relations at play.
Our chapters strongly support the general thesis that politics closely 
shapes the effectiveness and quality of service delivery and social protec-
tion. Claire Mcloughlin reviews eight successful cases of delivery drawn from 
seven countries, namely Bangladesh, Rwanda, Ghana, Ethiopia, Indonesia, 
Malawi, and Peru, and across four sectors: maternal and child health, basic 
education, rural roads, and agricultural marketing. The chapter traces the 
main characteristics of the political environment for these cases at three lev-
els, from the national political context through the politics of sector policy-
making to the micro politics of implementation, and links them directly to 
levels of performance and outcomes at the point of delivery. In their chapter, 
Armando Barrientos and Sony Pellissery examine the significance of politics 
in the rise of social assistance programmes in developing countries in the last 
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decade, and argue that politics has been crucial to the adoption, design, and 
implementation of social assistance programmes. They develop a framework 
for distinguishing the different dimensions of influence, including the role 
of democracy, the bureaucracy, and civil society, which is then applied to 
the development of social assistance in India, Brazil, and South Africa. This 
comparative perspective is particularly helpful in exemplifying the frame-
work from different contextual viewpoints, and contributes new insights 
into the specific forms of politics that shape social assistance.
Both chapters join broader calls for a move beyond the presumption that 
civil society and bottom-up pressures can play a critical role in improving 
the responsiveness and accountability of governments with regards to service 
delivery (e.g. World Bank 2003). So, although the role of civil society and an 
active media was found to be important in catalysing state responsiveness 
in some cases, the available evidence on the political drivers of social provi-
sioning strongly suggests that the often unqualified support for bottom-up 
pressures is misplaced, both in terms of overlooking the role of more top-
down pressures and for obscuring the forms of popular politics that may 
make a difference. In terms of the latter, Mcloughlin suggests that pro-poor 
service provision might occur where there are forms of social accountability 
that draw on moral norms of reciprocity, are locally grounded, and build on 
a culture of participation, rather than being driven by the more professional-
ized and technical worlds of NGOs promoting particular social accountabil-
ity mechanisms or ‘widgets’ (Joshi and Houtzager 2012). Importantly, both 
chapters also point to the significance of more political and top-down driv-
ers of performance. For Mcloughlin, strong top-down authority and lead-
ership are critical in ensuring that policies are carried through from their 
adoption to actual implementation. Barrientos and Pellissery observe that 
the expansion of social assistance from small privileged groups to broader 
target populations in line with universal principles, does not emerge easily, 
and often involves intense political struggles. Whereas civil society actors 
played a key role in expanding social assistance in India, it was political 
parties who were the critical actors in Brazil and South Africa, a finding 
which echoes the wider calls to look beyond civil to political society when 
it comes to the politics of poverty reduction (Houtzager and Moore 2003; 
Hickey and Bracking 2005). Again, coalitions between such actors may be 
required to realign policy adoption and implementation in favour of more 
marginal social groups (Leftwich 2010). Such findings are closely aligned 
with the growing evidence that citizens may lack the power to alter the 
incentives which shape the capacity and commitment of governments and 
elites at both national and local levels (Booth 2005), and support the grow-
ing emphasis on identifying ways of promoting different modes of account-
ability (e.g. Joshi and Houtzager 2012; Deveranjan et al. 2011).
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This debate overlaps to some extent with increasingly contentious discus-
sions concerning the links between democracy and the delivery of social 
services. For example, Mcloughlin draws on recent research into the politics 
of improving maternal health services and outcomes in Rwanda to suggest 
that a powerful and ideologically committed political party or leader may 
be able to enforce high-quality forms of service delivery even in the context 
of limited democratization and bottom-up pressures. This finding is at odds 
with much of the literature on the politics of service delivery which sug-
gests that democratization is a critical factor here. However, this literature is 
itself increasingly split between those who associate the increased regular-
ity of elections with increased levels of social provisioning (e.g. Stasavage 
2005) and those who point out that political party competition can reduce 
the extent to which the voice of marginal groups is influential over public 
policy, and also that political competition in many poor countries has had 
the damaging effect of driving up the intensity of clientelist forms of poli-
tics (Carbone 2009b). Within such contexts, and in line with the chapter 
from Mosley in this collection, it may be that increased social provisioning 
reflects the power of poor groups to present a credible threat to leaders and/
or form a coalition with elites (Kosack 2012). Our contributors find evidence 
to support both sides of this debate. For example, Mcloughlin notes that 
political party competition has driven up provision for child and maternal 
health in Bangladesh, as successive ruling parties attempt to scale up provi-
sion in order to outperform their opponents. However, the downside is that 
increased party control over the distribution of resources has increasingly 
politicized service delivery at local levels and reduced the extent to which 
the bureaucracy is delivering public goods on an impersonal or universal 
basis. What may matter most here are the particular constituencies that a 
regime is seeking to woo. Levels of ‘political will’ for primary education in 
Ghana, for example, have been shown to fluctuate over time according to 
the extent to which the ruling party has been dependent on the support 
of the poor, and the extent to which the interests of the poor were articu-
lated by a political entrepreneur (Kosack 2012). Similarly, Mcloughlin shows 
that agricultural policies gained particular political salience in Ghana and 
Malawi under regimes that courted the support of farmers, and continued 
to be a central source of state legitimacy where they subsequently attracted 
a large basis of citizen support.
This evidence therefore tends to suggest that discussions over top-down 
and bottom-up forms of accountability and between democratic and more 
‘authoritarian’ forms of rule are hinged in the wrong place. What matters 
here is not so much the presence of formal political institutions such as 
parties or elections but rather the underlying forms of politics and power 
relations which shape their operation, driven to some extent by calculations 
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around political returns that are made by political actors at all levels. This 
perspective is gaining ground (e.g. Kjær and Therkildsen 2012), and is 
increasingly summarized in the language of ‘political settlements’, a concept 
we return to below in more depth.
The final issue covered with regards to how politics shapes the deliv-
ery of services and social protection concerns the structural form that the 
state takes, and particularly the degree of decentralization. Barrientos and 
Pellissery argue that the level of decentralization does not appear critical in 
explaining the success or failure of social assistance programmes, a finding 
supported by other work on the politics of social protection (Hickey 2009). 
In some countries, like India and Brazil, decentralization offered great prom-
ise whereas in South Africa it was the centralization of authority that was 
associated with numerous advantages for the programmes there. This obser-
vation means that social protection programmes are likely to be influenced 
by the particular context in which they emerge and therefore likely to pro-
duce dynamics that are difficult to compare across time and space.
Although the majority of the literature in this field to date has focused 
on how politics shapes social provisioning, increased attention has started 
to fall on the political impacts of social provisioning, including on state 
capacity and legitimacy (Bukenya 2013; van de Walle and Scott 2011) and 
the broader social contract (Barrientos 2013; Hickey 2009). The importance 
of this new agenda emerges strongly from our chapters here, and forms a 
central part of the conceptual framework that we propose at the end of the 
chapter. For example, Barrientos and Pellissery show how long-established 
programmes of social assistance have a feedback effect on politics at both 
local and national levels. At the national level for instance, incumbent poli-
ticians and parties obtain significant political support as a result of intro-
ducing such programmes. Similarly, some political elites at the local levels 
have managed to manipulate the programmes to serve their political inter-
ests, suggesting that such programmes may in some contexts deepen regres-
sive forms of politics rather than the more progressive building of social 
contracts.
A rich territory for exploring the forms of politics that underlie and help 
to shape the rules of the game concerns the rule of law, which Deval Desai 
and Michael Woolcock define as a system that informs people of what 
to expect from others through durable and enforceable rules applying 
equally to all constituent members of a given juridical space. In their thor-
ough examination of ‘the politics of what works’ with regard to the rule-
of-law interventions in developing countries, Desai and Woolcock explore 
how contests among elites and between elites and end users shape insti-
tutions through a contested, iterative, and dynamic process that, in any 
given setting, is likely to yield an idiosyncratic outcome borne of a unique 
The Politics of Inclusive Development
14
hybrid mix of local and external inputs. They present the politics of the 
rule of law as deeply complex and inherently multi-directional: elites, for 
example, certainly use the rule of law, but legalization is powerful and can 
be used in unpredictable ways against elites by other elite groups or by 
non-elite actors. They also argue that the political salience, legitimacy, and 
action-ability of such understandings must be negotiated anew in each 
setting, between different epistemic groups (professions, users, policymak-
ers) and across divides of gender, ideology, and class. More broadly, their 
chapter reveals something of the tension between the workings of politi-
cal settlements and how the rule of law becomes established. One of the 
key insights from recent work on political settlements (Khan 2010) and 
limited access orders (North et al. 2009) that we discuss in more detail 
below, is that elites will only agree to the establishment and functioning 
of institutions, including and perhaps particularly around the rule of law, 
if such institutions ensure the distribution of resources and status in their 
direction. To the extent that the rule of law can act as a constraint to elite 
behaviour, then elites may have good reasons to restrict the establishment 
of the rule of law and particularly its progressive roll out beyond the limits 
of the initial elite bargain (cf. North et al. 2009). Much of this interplay 
between the rule of law and the type of political settlement will be deter-
mined within specific contexts, and involve the specific interests and ideas 
that elites have around the rule of law systems, and cannot be collapsed 
into a deterministic or ex ante model.
Our chapters in this section offer important and innovative suggestions 
concerning the role of future research in the field. As Mcloughlin notes, 
the widespread consensus that politics matters for effective service provision 
needs to be matched by studies that systematically integrate political analy-
sis to produce robust evidence that can inform policy and practice. Similarly, 
Desai and Woolcock find that ‘more research’ as conventionally understood 
will only yield marginal improvements in conceptual clarity and to our 
cumulative empirical knowledge of the dynamic relationship between rule 
of law, politics, and development. Rather, they offer concrete ideas on how 
the rigour and relevance of rule-of-law interventions from both an ana-
lytical and practical standpoint could be enhanced. First, they propose the 
need, by scholars and practitioners, to invest in richer data-gathering exer-
cises, in empirical tasks that de-homogenize people based on conceptual as 
well as material differences. Secondly, they suggest that more investment 
in the monitoring and real-time evaluation of rule-of-law interventions is 
needed. Third, and cognizant of the fact that rule of law reform is inherently 
a site of contestation among social groupings, they recommend that greater 
effort needs to be extended to invigorating programmes by supporting the 
construction of spaces for public engagement and discursive participation.
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The Politics of Recognition
Whilst the material aspects of development might be delivered through 
more inclusive forms of growth and the redistributon of goods and oppor-
tunities through social provisioning, this does not guarantee that resources 
will be distributed equitably amongst different socal groups or that each will 
acheive a full or equal range of human capability development. As feminist 
theorists of social justice argued some time ago (Young 1990; Fraser 1995), 
addressing issues of inequality and exclusion involves engaging with the pol-
itics of recognition as well as the politics of redistribution. ‘Poverty’ involves 
deprivations in terms of status and powerlessness (Mosse 2010) and it is now 
broadly recognized that any fuller sense of human flourishing needs to take 
into account the right to have a voice and be represented. This is particularly 
important in countries where there is a high degree of bivalence (Kabeer 
2000) or ‘intersectionality’ (Collins 2000) across different forms of disad-
vantage, such as where cultural forms of identy overlap with markers of class 
as with lower caste groups in India and most indigenous groups in Latin 
America. In response to social movement (and other) pressures around these 
issues, there has been an increasing tendency to promote the political repre-
sentation of marginal groups—whether through quotas for representatives 
of marginal groups in legislatures at local and national levels, constitutional 
changes and anti-discrimination legislation, the creation of new states or 
provinces for marginal regions, or the creation of specific government agen-
cies to act on behalf of marginal groups (e.g. ministries of gender). These 
forms of ‘descriptive’ representation are seen both as rights in themselves 
and as important means through which the status and resources associated 
with citizenship can be re-allocated and redistributed, thus achieving ‘sub-
stantive’ representation (Waylen 2007).
The conditions under which the politics of recognition becomes recog-
nized and instituted, and the impact that this has on both inclusive devel-
opment policies and outcomes, remain poorly understood. Taking the case 
of women, who not only constitute the vast majority of the world’s poor 
but who also continue to face serial injustices across multiple dimensions of 
development (Jackson 1999), Sohela Nazneen and Simeen Mahmud explore 
women’s political empowerment, drawing on a selection of country cases 
to analyse the gendered nature of political and policymaking processes 
and identify the different contextual and structural factors that promote 
gender-inclusive development policies and outcomes. In terms of gaining 
political representation for women, they find that the political history of 
countries matters here, with women’s political entitlements often secured at 
key moments of state formation. This could result from the role played by 
women’s movements in anti-colonial struggles or by women in the conflicts 
The Politics of Inclusive Development
16
that lead to new regimes being installed. The commitment of political lead-
ers to support women’s political rights, for instrumental and/or ideologi-
cal reasons, is often a critical factor here. Although increasing attention is 
now falling on whether the increased participation of women in politics has 
had any direct impacts on processes of governance and development (e.g. 
Agarwal 2011), the evidence base here is particularly weak. Few analyses of 
when gender-equity policies become adopted and get implemented include 
an analysis of the politics involved in these processes. From what little we 
do know, Nazneen and Mahmud conclude that coalitions involving multi-
ple actors (movements, politicians, bureaucrats/‘femocrats’) are required to 
overcome resistance to promoting gender equity, and that transnational dis-
course and actors can also help create the political and policy space required 
to promote gender equity policies. The informal modes of politics that often 
prevail within developing countries, including clientelism, tend to disad-
vantage women who may lack the resources and connections to play the 
patronage game effectively. Women’s representatives face particular chal-
lenges in contexts where traditional leaders and dominant ideologies per-
petuate patriarchal notions of gender roles. In general, our findings support 
the suggestion that enquiries into what shapes the politics of gender equity 
needs to be framed in terms of broader state–society relations (Htun and 
Weldon 2010).
Still less is known about what, if any, institutional effects unfold once 
the politics of recognition becomes institutionalized within political sys-
tems. Much of the broader literature on this question tends to assume a 
negative relationship between the politics of difference and the capacity of 
states to effectively deliver development, whether specifically in terms of 
the way in which systems of affirmative action may undermine the capac-
ity of the state to deliver public goods (Gerring et al. 2005) or the more gen-
eral sense that polities based on multiple identities find it harder to achieve 
effective forms of governance (Alesina et al. 1999). In their chapter, Prerna 
Singh and Matthias vom Hau show how scholars have developed sophis-
ticated arguments about how variations in the quality and reach of state 
services have shaped ethnic-based identification and mobilization (Fearon 
and Laitin 2003; Yashar 2005), and that there is now a large and growing 
literature on how ethnic identities influence state capacity outcomes. Most 
prominently, a large and influential body of scholarship argues that eth-
nic diversity undermines public goods provision, with Banerjee, Iyer, and 
Somanthan (2005, p. 639) claiming that the negative relationship between 
ethnic fractionalization and public goods provision constitutes ‘one of the 
most powerful hypotheses in political economy’.
Singh and vom Hau directly challenge these assumptions and argue that 
the politics of recognition, in the form of collective ethnic mobilizations, 
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may actually increase rather than diminish the capacity of the state to pro-
mote development. Drawing on a systematic review of the available liter-
ature, they argue that the current literature is flawed in several respects, 
including its simplistic definition of what constitutes ethnicity and a confla-
tion of state capacity with public goods provision. They instead propose an 
alternative analytical framework which incorporates a variety of different 
conceptualizations of ethnicity (cognitive, behavioural, and institutional), 
shifts the analytical focus from public goods provision to state capacity, and 
draws on a broader variety of causal mechanisms that detail how ethnicity 
might influence state capacity.
The Transnational Politics of Development
The tendency within most of politics and development literature to cast devel-
opment as an essentially national project reflects a limited understanding of 
the multiple ways in which the capacity of states and commitment of elites to 
deliver development is closely shaped by transnational factors. Not only has 
the politics of the post-colonial world always been heavily transnationalized, 
from imperialism through to the creation of ‘governance’ states under influ-
ence of global governance institutions (Harrison 2004), these processes have 
both deepened and extended since the first wave of developmental states in 
the South emerged in the 1950s and 1960s. The deepening of global flows—of 
capital, labour, ideas—has meant that the strategic choices available for devel-
oping countries today are closely shaped by prevailing global orders, both 
material and ideological. Examining the politics of development in devel-
oping countries thus necessarily involves looking at how transnational pro-
cesses, factors, and ideas shape politics, not least as the international context 
also produces a number of drivers of bad governance in developing countries 
(Unsworth and Moore 2006). Elites may face few incentives to build effec-
tive bureaucracies or promote inclusive development in conditions where, for 
example, banking systems, tax havens, and the arms trade encourage forms 
of corruption and extra-state violence that undermine state-building pro-
cesses. Importantly, whilst development studies has tended to presume that 
aid and international development agencies are the key ‘external’ factors we 
need to explore the broader range of transnational actors and processes that 
constitute and shape the politics of development. The new ‘Rising Powers’ are 
busy reshaping this context, bringing in new resources and ideas around how 
development can be done and new modalities of engagement. Traditional 
donor agencies remain a part of this picture, but their mixed record of pro-
moting good governance (World Bank 2008b) and the ways in which rising 
powers have introduced new drivers of governance and development (Power 
et al. 2012) means we must include but also look well beyond the role of aid.
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In their chapter Arjan De Haan and Ward Warmerdam set out to analyse 
the relationship between aid and state capacity for development along four 
dimensions. Given that corruption is frequently cited as the most pressing 
political problem that has stalled development, their first task is to explore 
the causal relationship between aid and levels of corruption. However, the 
available literature is unclear on this, and points to a number of contested 
and/or untested assumptions regarding the potential role of aid to reduc-
ing corruption without offering enough conclusive evidence either way. 
On the one hand, the rules and conditionalities associated with aid may 
deter public officials from engaging in corrupt practices and the presence of 
donor aid may enhance governments’ ability to pay regular salaries, which 
may in turn reduce the corruption of public officials. However, there is also 
evidence to support the view that higher levels of aid have the potential 
to create ‘Dutch Disease’, and some which suggests that community-driven 
models of aid delivery tend to undermine the role and accountability of the 
state. Given the lack of systematic empirical research that directly relates 
specific types and levels of aid to specific governance indicators, we are left 
with a contested and often untested set of assumptions.
Looking beyond corruption, there are grounds for claiming that donor 
practices may be undermining the capacity of states to deliver develop-
ment. The most commonly identified issues include claims that: donor pro-
cedures tend to be cumbersome and time-consuming; aid flows are often 
unpredictable and often follow the financial cycles of donors rather than 
those of recipients; there are too many donor agencies working in uncoor-
dinated ways, while donor priorities also change frequently; and that aid is 
not always driven by developmental objectives but rather motivated by a 
variety of factors, including being used as an instrument of foreign policy 
and geo-strategic purposes. The impact of aid on state capacity depends on 
several factors, including the levels and modalities of aid delivery as well 
as the duration of aid dependency. In particular, project-mode aid delivery, 
which remains the most popular among donors, has been heavily criticized 
in the literature for reasons such as constraining opportunities for scaling 
up of good practices, the proliferation of projects, and possible drain on 
local administrative capacity. De Haan and Warmerdam also highlight ‘real’ 
determination to achieve change on the part of partners and a strong donor 
understanding of local context as critical conditions for successful (institu-
tional development) projects.
Inspired by the observation that China is the major ‘new’ player in Africa 
and therefore likely to impact on development and politics in numerous 
ways, Giles Mohan sets out to identify the channels through which China 
engages with African development and the role the African state plays in 
mediating these interactions. Recognizing the importance of context, 
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and particularly the extent to which different political systems shape the 
encounter with China (Alden 2007), Mohan examines the role of China in 
three different types of state in Africa, namely pariah states (Sudan), illib-
eral regimes and weak democracies (Angola), and democratic countries with 
diversified economies (Ghana). His analysis reveals that China impacts on 
African development in multiple ways that go well beyond aid and cuts 
across contexts, regardless of the nature of the African state. A key feature 
of this engagement is inter-elite brokerage which tends to bypass domestic 
channels of accountability and potentially undermines good governance 
by serving to entrench existing forms of patrimonialism, although this has 
increasingly been challenged by civil and political society actors in Africa 
through the promotion of transparency. China’s emphasis on supporting 
high-profile infrastructure projects promises to deliver gains for both devel-
opment and the state, in terms of enhanced legitimacy in the eyes of its 
citizens. Its preferred mode of delivery, namely the project-based approach 
criticized here by De Haan and Warmerdam for its negative effects on gov-
ernance, may actually offer greater control over corruption than other forms 
(including general budgetary support) since there is less free-floating cash 
to be siphoned off. Another source of controversy around Chinese projects 
has been around the importation of labour and the environmental effects of 
such investments. Following Chen and Orr (2009), Mohan argues that the 
evidence around investment and labour suggests that labour importation 
varies according to the nature of the project, the Chinese firm involved, 
and the labour market conditions in Africa. As far as the environment is 
concerned, Mohan finds that the environmental impacts of Chinese activi-
ties in Africa are poorly understood since much focus has been on a few 
high profile cases. Generally, and whereas the African state is often reflected 
in the literature as vulnerable in face of the powerful international actors, 
Mohan is careful not to rule out African countries’ room for manoeuvre. He 
notes that, in particular, the discovery of strategic minerals in several coun-
tries has given them a degree of space to negotiate or even play donors and 
investors off against one another.
Broader Lessons from the Politics of What Works: From 
Evidence to Theory-testing
What, then, can we draw out from across these systematic reviews of the 
available evidence on how politics shapes development? Clearly, there are 
significant risks involved in trying to draw out cross-cutting findings from 
such a broad range of work. The forms of politics associated with delivering 
growth may be very different from those aligned with developing human 
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capabilities (Evans 2010; Khan 2005), and the problem may be even more 
fine-grained than this. As Sen argues here, different forms of growth are 
associated with different political drivers. Mcloughlin (2012) similarly argues 
that the forms of politics that matter for social provisioning will differ by 
sector. Importantly, the evidence that could be drawn on by our authors 
came from a wide variety of sources, contexts, and perspectives, and not 
all of it had thoroughly integrated a political perspective. Furthermore, the 
cases available to our authors were chosen on what they could reveal about 
the politics of what works rather than on rigorously comparative grounds 
in terms of their contextual setting, a point we return to below in propos-
ing a methodological as well as conceptual way forward. As such, rather 
than seeking to aggregate insights from this diverse evidence base, we find 
it more useful here to put these findings into conversation with the most 
recent conceptual and theoretical developments within the field of politics 
and development, and to explore the extent to which our findings fit the 
prevailing wisdom on this issue. This theory-testing approach (George and 
Bennett 2004) is intended to be both critical and constructive in that it 
should also suggest the conceptual groundings for a rigorous and coherent 
research agenda on the politics of development moving forward.
The New Turn to Politics within Mainstream Development Theory
In recent years there has been a significant shift within the mainstream of 
development theory and policy towards taking politics more seriously. In 
part, this can be characterized as a shift away from the dominance that new 
institutional economics had over the good-governance agenda throughout 
the 1990s and for much of the early 2000s. For critics, this conceptual focus 
on ‘the rules of the game’ (North 1990) only ever offered a limited and often 
technocratic understanding of how politics shaped development (Harris et 
al. 1997). It has been notable, then, that the most influential recent stud-
ies of long-run development to emerge in the past few years have placed 
politics at the heart of the story (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Fukuyama 
2011; Khan 2010; North et al. 2009), in an apparent recognition that what 
lies behind the emergence and functioning of institutions is the complex 
world of politics and power relations, a finding that historical institutional 
thinkers had already come to in their framing of institutions as crystalliza-
tions of (past) power struggles and key to the maintenance of power distribu-
tion in society (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). There is a particular focus here 
on the role of inter-elite relationships as a causal factor that underpins the 
emergence of stability and functioning institutions. For North et al. (2009, 
p. 159) ‘political and economic development result from creating more 
sophisticated and durable institutions to structure elite relations within the 
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dominant coalition’; as such, the differences between developed and devel-
oping countries is attributable to ‘the pattern of social relationships’ in each, 
but particularly within the elite. This move from institutions to politics and 
certain forms of power relations marks a potentially significant ontologi-
cal shift within mainstream analyses of governance and development, and 
chimes closely with other recent advances highlighted here, including the 
revival of relational approaches within studies of developmental states and 
state capacity (Evans 2010; vom Hau 2012; Vu 2007) and those emphasizing 
that state–society relations are critical to shaping the politics of develop-
ment (IDS 2010; Sandbrook et al. 2007; Walton 2010).
The notion that institutional functioning and the underlying condi-
tions for development are established first and foremost by the character of 
intra-elite relations forms the central concern of both Mushtaq Khan’s work 
on ‘political settlements’ and North et  al.’s (2009) idea of ‘limited access 
orders’ and how they might become ‘open access orders’.2 The ‘ “political 
settlement” refers to the balance or distribution of power between contend-
ing social groups and social classes, on which any state is based’ (di John and 
Putzel 2009, p. 4). Arrived at through a process of struggle and bargaining 
between elite groups, this settlement establishes the basis for institutional 
arrangements to take shape. Critically, institutions must be arranged to dis-
tribute enough resources to powerful organized groups in society, other-
wise ‘these groups will strive through different means including conflict to 
change institutions till they are satisfied or they give up’ (Khan 2010, p. 4). 
This resonates with North et al.’s (2009) explanation that social order can 
only exist once elites have reached an agreement amongst themselves over 
the centralization of violence and the operation of institutional constraints 
around a limited set of property rights.
Taken together, these approaches suggest two main and inter-related trans-
mission mechanisms through which political settlements and limited access 
orders shape developmental forms of state capacity and elite commitment. 
The first flows from the stability of institutional arrangements, the second 
from the nature of ruling coalitions. Political stability and order is critical 
not only for the simple reason that it allows institutions to function but also 
because stability enables elites to engage in the type of long-term thinking and 
planning required for growth to emerge (Kelsall et al. 2010).3 Where elites are 
2 Despite important intellectual differences between the two approaches, they derive from 
similar ontological priors, particularly concerning their shared rational-actor perspective on 
political behaviour, and are more complementary than contradictory to each other.
3 The resolution of conflict, particularly in ways that offers the emerging ruling coalition 
the legitimacy to make difficult decisions and the space to do so without significant opposition 
(generally made more possible under conditions of elite polarization rather than elite compro-
mise, see Vu 2007).
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constantly struggling to assert the legitimacy of a prevailing order, the incen-
tives are to undertake short-termist measures designed to maintain order and 
keep the regime in power. In a context of personalized deals between elites, 
this involves both creating rent-seeking possibilities for potentially trouble-
some elites and securing their support for ‘limited access’ (and usually clien-
telist) institutional arrangements that can help offer greater returns than they 
could attain through violent means (North et al. 2009).
A more distinctive contribution concerns the role played by coalitions 
in shaping state capacity and elite commitment. In terms of state capacity, 
political settlements analysis suggests that state organizations are unable to 
act effectively unless the nature of the political settlement within which 
they are located permits them to do so: from this perspective, the political 
coalitions at the heart of political settlements are thus historically and logi-
cally prior to the emergence of state capacity, which in turn precedes the 
effective formulation and delivery of policies. The capacity of the state to act, 
and whether or not effective state institutions get built and are allowed to 
function, is therefore determined by the character of the players, coalitions, 
and agreements made around the operation of power—not about formal 
Weberian forms of state capacity per se. So, it would be feasible to imagine 
a state with high levels of bureaucratic capacity and infrastructural power, 
but which was prevented from acting in certain policy domains due to the 
lack of an agreement between dominant groups. For Khan, what is particu-
larly important in shaping the capacity and commitment of governments to 
deliver development is the need within ruling coalitions to maintain certain 
types of relationships both horizontally (with other elite factions) and verti-
cally (with organized social groupings) in order to preserve regime stability 
and survival will create strong incentives to act in particular ways. For Khan 
(2010, p. 64): ‘The relative power of productive interests and their techno-
logical and entrepreneurial capabilities can determine the incentives and 
opportunities of ruling coalitions to pursue particular institutional paths’. 
This focus has strong echoes of recent work on state–business relations (e.g. 
Sen and te Velde 2009) and of earlier work on the ‘embedded autonomy’ of 
developmental states (Evans 1995; Routley 2012; vom Hau 2012), including 
the focus on whether patron–client politics tend to be predatory as opposed 
to productive in particular contexts. Even within clientelistic political settle-
ments, the presence of a political leadership with long-term time horizons, 
in alliance with centralized control over rent-seeking, can enable patrimo-
nial settlements to be developmental, whereas a tendency towards decentral-
ized rent-seeking and short-term exigencies within the political settlement 
is likely to be predatory and unproductive (Kelsall et al. 2010).
To date, there have been fewer efforts to extend this approach beyond 
issues of conflict and economic growth and productivity to the delivery of 
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social and political rights. Aside from vague assertions that elites will extend 
benefits to non-elite groups once they are satisfied with the division of spoils 
amongst themselves (Khan 2010; North et al. 2009), or when elites perceive 
it to be essential for regime survival (Bates 2005; Whitfield and Therkildsen 
2011), there remains a gap in the literature concerning the role of political 
settlements in shaping the politics of social provisioning.
A political-settlements perspective offers some powerful insights regard-
ing the emergence of developmental forms of capacity and commitment, 
many of which resonate with other recent work on the politics of devel-
opment. In particular, the idea that ‘the overall causality runs from con-
flicts to coalitions to state capacity’ (vom Hau 2012, p. 11) is increasingly 
popular within studies of state capacity, and, as we argue below, resonates 
with the findings we present in this collection. In terms of elite commit-
ment, political settlements research is aligned with recent research into the 
politics of development (IDS 2010) in framing this question primarily in 
terms of incentives, whereby the underlying distribution of power generates 
incentives that shape elite behaviour. However, it is in this insistence that 
incentives are all that matters, a perspective which locates political elites as 
purely instrumental actors working to secure their own interests, that the 
limitations of the political settlements (or limited access orders) perspective 
become most apparent, and where our own findings start to diverge from 
where a pure political settlements approach would lead us. As discussed 
below, our chapters suggest that ideas matter as well as interests, and also 
that both the ‘incentives’ and the ‘ideas’ that shape elite behaviour are not 
necessarily endogenous to the political settlement but may derive from fur-
ther afield, including the arena of transnational flows.
Our Findings: From Coalitions to Commitment and Capacity
Our chapters offer strong evidence that the processes of elite bargaining, 
informal politicking, and coalitional dynamics play a key role in shaping 
the capacity and commitment of the state and elites to deliver development 
in specific domains. In terms of growth, Kunal Sen argues that whereas a 
‘deals’ environment can offer the groundings for the take-off of economic 
growth, a movement to a ‘rules’-based institutional environment, or at least 
a context of ‘ordered deals’, is likely to be required for growth to be sustained 
(Pritchett and Werker 2012). The arrangements governing the exchange of 
power within different political settlements can directly shape social pro-
visioning, including a distinction that can be drawn between the relative 
power and stability accorded to dominant leaders who may be committed 
to delivering development over the long run as against the often short-
term horizons engendered by intense political party competition within 
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clientelist contexts (Levy 2012). Mcloughlin shows how these dynamics can 
strongly shape the delivery of public goods such as health and education, 
particularly in terms of the quality of these services. The inclusion of poor 
and marginal groups in ruling coalitions is deemed critical in Mosley’s work 
on how the links between fiscal and social policy play out in practice, whilst 
Nazneen and Mahmud’s chapter on the gendered politics of development 
argues persuasively that much of the gap between women’s political inclu-
sion and their influence over pro-women policies can be explained by the 
workings of the political settlement, particularly in terms of how informal/
patronage-based forms of politics weaken the power of female agency in the 
political realm. It is perhaps Tony Bebbington’s chapter on natural resource 
governance which illustrates most clearly the convergence of our findings 
with that of the political-settlements approach, whilst also revealing some 
important points of divergence.
Bebbington offers a clear and current example of Poteete’s (2009) insist-
ence that the emergence and building of coalitions is of both chronologi-
cally and analytically prior to the development of institutions and policies, 
and shows that how the politics of coalition-building plays out has impor-
tant implications for the prospects of inclusive development. In the case of 
El Salvador during the mid-1990s, mining companies had begun to conduct 
geological explorations, largely with the complicity of a coalition of national 
economic and traditional political elites and in the context of a pro-business 
government. Mining companies were progressing their activities in ways 
that outstripped the capacity of the state to regulate mining investment, 
ensure environmental protection, establish tax and royalty systems, and so 
on. It was only when rural groups in the affected areas started to protest 
against these activities, and to build a coalition with sympathetic national 
and international actors, that the government suspended all activities, before 
its more left-wing successor went further and set in place a process through 
which El Salvador could develop the institutional capacities required to gov-
ern the mining industry before any further exploitation could take place.
For Bebbington, this ‘reflect(s) the importance of understanding the 
institutional relationships through which resource extraction is governed 
as endogenous to an existing political settlement, while also exploring the 
processes through which both endogenously and exogenously driven insti-
tutional change might occur’. This implies a more dynamic view of how 
political settlements emerge and might be transformed than is often the 
case in the current literature, one where change can be driven from those 
excluded from power and from transnational as well as national actors. It 
also implies a greater role for agency than the path-dependent approach 
which characterizes much current political-settlements analysis, whereby 
policy coalitions involving a range of actors (including popular ones) can 
Exploring the Politics of Inclusive Development
25
have an important influence on the prospects for inclusive development 
(Leftwich 2010) rather than this simply being read off the structural nature 
of the political settlement or the incentives within ruling (or political) coali-
tions. Importantly, it also shows the importance of ideas, both in terms of 
the ideological persuasion of governments and the ideas that both drive the 
activities of civil society and transnational actors and are used by them to 
win certain political struggles. This and other chapters therefore start to 
reveal the limitations of relying on a political-settlements approach alone, 
without taking account of the role played by ideas, popular actors, and 
transnational factors, three issues that we return to shortly.
Which Forms of State Capacity Matter Most?
Our findings thus chime with perhaps the most consistent message to come 
from the growing literature on the politics of development over the past 
decades, which has centred on the centrality of state capacity and elite com-
mitment in securing inclusive development outcomes. High levels of state 
capacity have been a central feature in all successful cases of long-run devel-
opment witnessed in the post-Second-World-War era, across all domains 
of development. In terms of economic growth, the initial findings of the 
developmental-states literature on this have been further strengthened by 
the rise of new economic powers, all of which have involved a central role 
for a capable, committed, and credible state (World Bank 2008; also Vu 
2007). In terms of redistribution, ‘the state remains the only entity with the 
legitimacy and capacity to capture and redirect the wealth that society pro-
duces’ (Sandbrook et al. 2007, p. 253), including through social provisioning 
(Leftwich 2008; Walton 2010). Finally, it has also become clearer that the 
state also closely shapes the possibilities for political inclusion and empow-
erment amongst citizens (Houtzager and Moore 2003; IDS 2010). Given that 
states can be highly capable without necessarily being committed to devel-
opment, the commitment of political elites to delivering development has 
also been identified as a critical element of the politics of what works (Booth 
2011d; Hossain 2005; Leftwich 1994; Vu 2007).4
Our findings largely concur with these conclusions, and, in linking 
this to the underlying role of politics and power relations through the 
political-settlements perspective, starts to suggest how the conditions 
within which developmental forms of state capacity and commitment 
4 For example, Vu’s seminal (2007) comparative study of developmental states in Asia dis-
tinguishes between the ‘structure’ of the state and state–society relations that is required to 
generate the capacity to deliver development and the ‘role’ that elites chose to play in commit-
ting to this.
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might emerge, and to reveal the specific types and forms of capacity and 
commitment that matter. Drawing on vom Hau’s earlier (2012) work, Singh 
and vom Hau define state capacity as ‘the ability of states to apply and imple-
ment policy choices within the territorial boundaries they claim to gov-
ern’, and comprises three distinct, but interrelated dimensions:  the state’s 
embeddedness with non-state actors; the organizational competence of state 
agencies; and the territorial reach of state institutions (vom Hau 2012). This 
approach goes beyond standard Weberian approaches and situates the state 
as a more relational phenomenon that is embedded within the broader soci-
ety, albeit with varying degrees of autonomy (Evans 1995). Several of our 
contributors identify one or more of these dimensions as critical. For exam-
ple, and in terms of the politics of accumulation, the capacity of the state 
to govern its relationships with capital (both national and transnational) 
in the national interests is critical, both in general (Sen) and in the specific 
case of natural resources (Bebbington, Mohan). The relational dimension 
of state capacity also shapes the politics of social provisioning, particularly 
concerning the depth and extent of relationships between civil and politi-
cal society (Mcloughlin, echoing Evans 2010). In terms of the politics of 
recognition, Nazneen and Mahmud argue that ‘the state remains the critical 
institution for the promotion of women’s rights and gender justice in the 
contexts of poverty, global financial flows, and rising religious fundamental-
ism’. Again, the state’s relational capacities are essential here, in terms of the 
links between political actors, key bureaucrats, and women’s movements.
Political Commitment: From Incentives to Ideas?
As suggested earlier, the ability of the political-settlements approach to gener-
ate clear insights into the emergence of elite commitment is more limited.5 
Although the role of interests in shaping elite behaviour is clearly important, 
our sense is that to position development as purely a survival strategy for 
elites to maintain regime continuity in the face of elite competition and/or 
the threat of disturbance from popular groups (Henley 2014; Whitfield and 
Therkildsen 2011) is too limited a perspective. Barrientos and Pellissery argue 
strongly that to focus only on the incentives that elites respond to is much too 
limited: social contracts and pacts, key events, ideology, and knowledge are 
important too. In particular, our authors suggest that ideas also matter a great 
5 Political commitment has proved a tricky concept to define. In a narrow sense, one 
approach is to simply define it as ‘the extent of committed support among key decision makers 
for a particular policy solution to a particular problem’ (Post et al. 2010, p. 569). However, this 
remains an under-theorized and loosely defined concept, with our studies unable to draw out 
of the existing literature a strong sense of the underlying drivers of this commitment and how 
it becomes sustained over time.
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deal here, including the different ideological standpoints of regimes concern-
ing the governance of natural resource governance, with more social demo-
cratic regimes willing to both exert stronger control over capital and consider 
linking natural resource extraction more clearly to social provisioning than 
more market-friendly, conservative regimes (Bebbington, also Mosley). How 
resources should be accumulated and redistributed is thus shaped by particu-
lar ideas around development that are linked to the maintenance of particular 
coalitions but which are not reducible to them. Nazneen and Mahmud simi-
larly emphasize the extent to which discourses of women’s right and gender 
equity, often drawn from transnational debates and mobilized in partnership 
with global civil society actors and agencies, have been influential in secur-
ing women’s empowerment. For Mohan, the capacity of elites to govern their 
relationships with external forces may depend on their vision of the national 
interest as well as any bargaining power derived from more material sources.
The Transnational Politics of Development
Whereas most of the political settlements literature remains tightly focused 
to the nation state as the primary focus of analysis, our chapters suggest 
that developing countries in particular need to be framed in broader, more 
transnational terms. This is perhaps particularly the case in countries with 
new natural resource finds, and which find their national political commu-
nity subject to particularly deep forms of transnationalization via the role 
of oil companies (Watts 2004) but also global regimes of transparency and 
accountability. Although still critical in several respects, aid agencies are 
increasingly finding themselves displaced in such contexts, as aid depend-
ency is reduced and aid replaced by flows associated with oil and gas finds 
and related investments. This not only reduces the influence of aid efforts 
to restructure and reform the state (de Haan) but also introduces new play-
ers such as China whose modes of engagement seem different in both form 
and effect. As Mohan points out, there is often more heat than light in such 
debates. However, there is growing evidence that China’s emphasis on sup-
porting the sovereignty of states around their political orientation and their 
backing for the type of major infrastructural projects often preferred by 
national political elites is introducing different kinds of incentives and ideas 
when it comes to the capacity and commitment to deliver development.
The Importance of Popular Agency
Our final point of divergence concerns the somewhat exaggerated empha-
sis that the political settlements approach, and perhaps particularly North 
et al.’s work on limited access orders, places on the elite-led nature of 
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politics and development in developing countries. Our chapters on the 
rule of law, gender, and natural resources show how popular movements 
play a critical role in establishing and driving the kinds of coalitions which 
are required for inclusive forms of development to become seen as pos-
sible and to be delivered. This accords with recent comparative insights 
into the historical process through which developmental regimes emerge, 
and includes but also goes beyond the sense in which popular uprisings, 
or at least the threat of them, can also shift elite commitment towards 
more popular concerns (e.g. Slater 2010; Henley 2014). Concerned specifi-
cally with how social democratic regimes have developed in the global 
periphery, Sandbrook et al. (2007) identify an earlier role for subordinate 
groups in accessing and shaping the political settlement. Critical here is 
the emergence of new configurations of class power as a result of processes 
of capitalist development, particularly the displacement of landed elites 
by lower- and middle-order classes.6 This is clearly not an easy process. 
Barrientos and Pellissery observe that the expansion of social assistance 
from small privileged groups to broader target population, in line with 
universal principles, does not emerge easily but can involve intense politi-
cal struggles, something perhaps belied in the limited attention given to 
precisely how and why regimes move from ‘closed’ to ‘open access orders’ 
(North et al. 2009).
Overall, then, our findings resonate strongly with the new literature on 
political settlements, particularly in terms of the significance of coalitions 
in shaping the capacity and commitment of governments to deliver devel-
opment. Importantly, this holds across each of the domains we investigate 
here. However, our findings also suggest that there are serious shortcom-
ings with the political-settlements approach and suggest numerous ways in 
which our conceptual basis moving forward needs to be both broadened 
and deepened to take adequate account of the ways in which politics shapes 
the prospects for inclusive development. This includes adopting a more 
dynamic and transnational perspective, and recognizing the importance 
of ideas and ideology as well as the more instrumental drivers of political 
6 This move beyond intra-elite relations to take greater cognizance of links with broader 
social groupings helps move the focus onto the broader realm of thinking around state–society 
relations (e.g. Migdal 1988). This includes work within the social contract tradition, which 
for some is a more useful term than ‘political settlements’, particularly when taking popular 
agency more seriously and including social as well as economic aspects of development. For 
example, Michael Walton’s (2010) essay on the politics of human development over the long 
run also examines the importance of both intra-elite relations and state–society relations as 
establishing ‘political equilibria’ or ‘social contracts’ and comes to much the same conclusion 
as Mushtaq Khan concerning ‘a central channel of causation, from underlying social, economic 
and political processes through social contracts and institutions to human development out-
comes’ (Walton 2010, p. 38).
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behaviour. The final section seeks to move us from these insights into a 
more holistic and integrated conceptual and methodological way forward 
for future research on the politics of development.
Moving Forward: Beyond the ‘New’ New Institutionalism
The theory-testing enabled by this interplay of our evidence base and recent 
thinking within politics and development inevitably falls short of generat-
ing a clear theoretical route forward. What it offers instead is a stronger 
sense of the range of variables, relationships, and processes that are likely 
to matter, which in turn can be mapped into a broad conceptual framework 
for understanding the politics of inclusive development. Figure 1.1 lays out 
the main variables and relationships that we consider to be worthy of inves-
tigation; it does not constitute a model, still less a theoretical explanation of 
how things actually work. It simply sets out the key variables that need to be 
tracked in order to test which offers the greatest traction on the outcomes to 
be explained, but without (at this stage) over-specifying the precise relation-
ships and mechanisms at play. Later work by ESID will, we hope, elaborate 
this more fully.
Under this schematic representation of the links between politics and 
development, the underlying conditions for development are established 
by formation of particular types of political settlements, a process which 
occurs in a continuous interplay with institutions, changes in the politi-
cal economy and also the initial conditions within any given society. This 
draws on Khan’s (2010) emphasis on how capitalism shapes political settle-
ments but also Sandbrook et al.’s (2007) findings on the initial conditions 
that are required for social democracy to emerge, including insertion within 
the global political economy and state formation. This places the relation-
ship between state capacity and political settlements as central to deter-
mining the underlying conditions for development, with further empirical 
research required to establish the precise sequencing involved here. Moving 
rightwards, the diagram seeks to make explicit the ways in which underly-
ing power relations shape the more proximate worlds of policymaking and 
implementation, as mediated through the work of policy-level coalitions 
that can involve a range of actors: elite and popular, from state, civil society, 
and the private sector, and from transnational as well as national contexts. 
Such coalitions form a critical bridge between the underlying and proxi-
mate politics of development and closely shape the possibilities for inclusive 
development. The driving force for such coalitions can come from beyond 
the ruling coalition, including the ways in which certain civil society move-
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coalitions by building relationship between local communities, bureaucrats 
and local politicians (e.g. through the co-production of services, Mitlin 
2008). Transnational actors such as donor agencies may be closely involved 
in policymaking coalitions, from the role of international financial institu-
tions in establishing macroeconomic strategy through to the promotion of 
social protection strategies and interventions. Transnational and national 
forms of capital are often closely entwined in both formal and informal 
relationships with political elites, in ways that can have different impacts 
on state capacity and commitment to deliver development according to the 
characteristics and sectoral location of particular firms. Indeed, the influ-
ence of transnational factors are emphasized throughout the approach, 
including the ways in which colonialism helps establish initial conditions, 
the character, and timing of how countries are inserted into the global capi-
talist political economy and the influence of transnational flows of ideas.
Finally, the diagram is also intended to capture the dynamism that char-
acterizes the politics of development, including through the identification 
of critical feedback mechanisms. For example, when governments build 
roads they are also effectively building state capacity, particularly in terms 
of its ‘infrastructural power’. State legitimacy matters for economic growth 
(Engelbert 2002), and the effective delivery of basic services both requires 
and helps to build political legitimacy. Perhaps most important is the extent 
to which development outcomes, particularly in terms of growth and eco-
nomic transformation,7 will reshape class configurations and the size and 
character of the formal economy in ways that may re-order existing political 
settlements and introduce new or newly empowered players into coalitions 
at different levels. One of the more important contributions made by the 
political-settlements work of Khan has been to remind us that these forms 
of structural transformation may be required to establish the conditions 
through which more effective and legitimate forms of governance arise.
There are also important methodological issues to address, and we would 
argue that the shift from theory-testing to theory-building proposed 
here can be achieved most persuasively through comparative case-study 
research. This is generally considered the most robust and insightful means 
of both testing the veracity of particular theories within and across differ-
ent cases, and also building new theories through examining the inter-
play of particular variables within and across particular contexts (George 
and Bennett 2004). Such an approach, based on a carefully selected set of 
7 See Sandbrook et al. (2007), also Poteete (2009, p. 546): ‘Economic growth generates struc-
tural changes, increases the variety of interests in society, and opens up possibilities for new 
coalitions. Likewise, constraints and opportunities change with regional political and global 
economic developments’.
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countries, should enable the building of mid-level theoretical generaliza-
tions that have relevance to policy actors working across different contexts. 
This in turn requires the development of a typology capable of classifying 
different contexts as representatives of specific types of political settlement, 
from which comparative cases can be selected (e.g. Levy 2012). Inspired by 
telling insights that have been generated from recent research on the poli-
tics of development that has adopted a comparative perspective (e.g. Kohli 
2004; Henley 2014; Vu 2007), ESID is adopting this approach in its work and 
will be sharing the results in future volumes.
Conclusion
The understanding that politics shapes development processes and out-
comes has become a commonplace within development theory and prac-
tice. This collection offers a wide range of insights into the ways in which 
politics matters within and across several domains of development, from 
growth through basic services, social protection and justice to recognition, 
and at multiple levels, including the transnational. Although much of what 
we find chimes with recent conceptual developments that place politics 
at the heart of new understandings of how long-run development comes 
about, our evidence also reveals some shortcomings in such accounts. The 
burgeoning field of politics and development research has reached a stage of 
conceptual development which demands that influential theoretical propo-
sitions are thoroughly and critically tested across a range of contexts and 
different domains of development, and through a mixture of different epis-
temological, disciplinary, and methodological perspectives. It is not possible 
at this stage to predict which approaches, or mixture thereof, will generate 
the strongest insights into the politics of development, and this may well 
vary across the broad range of phenomena we propose to investigate. What 
matters is that future research seeks to leave the field of politics and devel-
opment not only more empirically rich and theoretically robust than it cur-
rently stands, but also, and in so doing, to generate a more useful guide to 
building routes towards social justice.
Part II





The Political Determinants of Economic 
Growth: An Analytical Review
Kunal Sen
Introduction: The Politics of Growth
This chapter is an analytical review of what we know about the political econ-
omy determinants of economic growth. The process of economic growth and 
why there are such significant differences in living standards across coun-
tries is one of the most important and challenging areas of research in devel-
opment studies. An early tradition in the very large literature that exists on 
the determinants of economic growth mostly focused on understanding the 
proximate determinants of economic growth, and in particular, the role of 
human and physical capital accumulation, technological change, and pro-
ductivity growth in explaining economic growth. However, as North and 
Thomas (1973) noted, such proximate determinants or correlates of economic 
growth ‘are not causes of growth; they are growth’ (p. 2). In the theoretical 
literature on the determinants of economic growth, institutions—defined as 
‘the rules of the game or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction’ (North 1990, p. 3)—are now widely regarded 
as the fundamental cause of economic growth, the fundamental cause being 
‘the factors potentially affecting why societies make different technology and 
accumulation choices’ (Acemoglu 2009, p. 20). This literature argues that bet-
ter functioning regulations and laws provide firms with incentives to invest 
in productive activities and to develop new goods and production technolo-
gies, which lead to greater factor accumulation and technological change that 
bring about economic growth (Hall and Jones 1999; Acemoglu et al. 2005).
Parallel to the developments in our theoretical understanding of the 
causes of growth, there has been a realization in recent years that the 
emphasis in the previous growth empirics literature on long-run growth or 
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levels of income (such as in the report of the Commission for Growth and 
Development, 2008) is not compatible with the ‘stylized facts’ of economic 
growth (Pritchett 2000). As Jones and Olken (2008, p. 582) point out:
Almost all countries in the world have experienced rapid growth lasting a dec-
ade or longer, during which they converge towards income levels in the United 
States. Conversely, nearly all countries have experienced periods of abysmal 
growth. Circumstances or policies that produce ten years of rapid economic 
growth appear easily reversed, often leaving countries no better off than they 
were prior to the expansion.
Long-run growth averages within countries mask distinct periods of success 
and failure, and while the growth process of all ‘developed’ economies is 
well characterized by a single growth rate and a ‘business cycle’ around that 
trend (at least until the recent crises), this is not true of most countries in the 
world (Kar et al. 2013a, 2013b). Massive discrete changes in growth are com-
mon in developing countries, and most developing countries experience 
distinct growth episodes:  growth accelerations and decelerations or col-
lapses (Jerzmanowski 2006). The recent empirical literature has highlighted 
the need to differentiate between different phases of growth in a particular 
country—that is, our understanding of the causes of growth needs to take 
into account the fact that the causes of growth accelerations may well be 
different from the factors that maintain growth, once it has ignited in the 
country (Rodrik 2004).
The chapter is structured as follows. As a prelude to our review of the 
theoretical and empirical literature, we sketch out in the next section a 
conceptual framework by which to understand the political channels of 
economic growth, where we view economic growth as switches between 
growth regimes, differentiating between the determinants of growth accel-
erations and of growth maintenance. In the third section, we review the 
recent contributions to the theoretical literature on the politics of economic 
growth through the lens of our conceptual framework. Similarly, the fourth 
section discusses the empirical literature on the political determinants of 
economic growth. The chapter concludes with a section presenting a set 
of research questions that can help guide future research on the politics of 
economic growth.
The Political Channels to Economic Growth
As the recent empirical literature on economic growth shows, economic 
growth in many developing countries involves discrete and quantitatively 
massive transitions between periods of high growth, periods of negative 
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growth, and periods of stagnation. To fix our ideas on transition paths 
around growth regimes, we provide a simple sketch of these transition paths 
in Figure 2.1. Using a rough-and-ready way to demarcate growth regimes, 
we classify growth regimes into four categories: i) a growth regime which we 
call ‘miracle growth’ where the average increase in per capita income is 5 per 
cent per annum or more; ii) a growth regime which we call ‘stable growth’, 
where the average increase in per capita income is between 0 and 5 per cent 
per annum; iii) a growth regime which we call ‘stagnant growth’, where the 
average increase in per capita income is around 0 per cent per annum; and iv) 
a growth regime we call ‘growth crisis’ where the average change in per capita 
income is negative. Figure 2.1 makes clear that a complete characterization of 
the growth process in any particular country needs an understanding of the 
factors that lead to growth acceleration—that is, the transition from stagna-
tion or crisis to stable growth or miracle growth—as well as the factors that 
lead to the avoidance of growth collapses and the maintenance of positive 
growth—that is, the ability of the country to stay in stable growth or miracle 
growth in period t+1 per cent if it has experienced the same in period t. It 
is not obvious that the factors that lead to growth acceleration will lead to 
growth maintenance as well—as Rodrik (2004, p. 3) argues:
Igniting economic growth and sustaining it are somewhat different enterprises. 
The former generally requires a limited range of (often unconventional) reforms 
that need not overly tax the institutional capacity of the economy. The latter 
challenge is in many ways harder, as it requires constructing a sound institu-
tional underpinning to maintain productive dynamism and endow the econ-


















Figure 2.1. Transition paths between growth phases
Source: Author.
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In our view, the key research problem on the political drivers of economic 
growth should be to understand the political dynamics around the tran-
sition from one growth regime to another, and the political economy 
determinants of growth accelerations, growth maintenance, and growth 
declines/collapses. The overarching research question then is: what determines 
the political transitional dynamics around growth regime traverses—that is, the 
move from one growth regime to another growth regime? In this section, we 
sketch out a framework which makes an attempt in this direction and that 
we will use as a way to embed our review of the theories and empirics of the 
politics of growth within the context of the overarching research question.
We identify three distinct political channels to growth. The first is credible 
commitment by the state. That is, the state needs to credibly commit to poten-
tial and current investors that it will not expropriate most or all of the prof-
its that may accrue from the production process or the means of production 
themselves. Credible commitment can be both motivational and imperative. 
Credible commitment is motivational if it is in the interest of both the state 
and the investor to adhere to the rules (both formal and informal)—that is, 
the state will commit to not expropriating rents over and above which may 
be considered to be ‘fair’ if it wants to make sure that investors commit to the 
investment decision and engage in production, so that rents can be gener-
ated through the production process. This commitment needs to be seen as 
credible by investors in that they believe that the state will not renege on its 
implicit or explicit promise not to expropriate all or most of the rents accru-
ing from the production process in the future, especially after investment 
decisions involving sunk costs in fixed capital have been taken. Investors also 
need to commit to share a part of their rents to the state (or its constituents, 
such as politicians) and when states raise revenues from taxes, to pay the state 
the necessary taxes. Credible commitment can also be imperative if politi-
cians bind themselves to certain rules (both formal and informal), and there 
is a reputational cost for reneging, such as a weakening in the state’s legiti-
macy, or a loss in the support of important factions that may support the state.
Credible commitment can be seen as both a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for capital accumulation to take place or for entrepreneurs to make 
the necessary investments in productivity enhancing changes in their enter-
prises. Most investment activities take time and there are lags between the 
time period when investment in land and machinery is made, and the time 
period when profits can be obtained from the sale of the product in the mar-
ket. Investment decisions are by their nature lumpy and may have large sunk 
costs—that is, the costs of certain investments cannot be recovered in full if 
the investment decision turns out to be less profitable than anticipated. By 
credibly committing ex ante to not extracting most of the proceeds from the 
investment decision, the state provides the incentive for the entrepreneur to 
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make the investment and production decision and can extract a part of the 
proceeds from the investment ex post. In this sense, credible commitment 
is incentive-compatible both for the state and the entrepreneur. However, it 
follows from the nature of credible commitment that the state has to take 
a reasonably long view in that reneging on the commitment not to fully 
extract the rents from investment in one period can lead to a loss in cred-
ibility on the part of the state, and for investors not to trust the state when 
it comes to future investment decisions, leading to a fall in investment, and, 
consequently, in rent extraction in future periods.
Credible commitment can, however, be obtained through both formal 
and informal institutions. Formal institutions such as laws which prohibit 
the expropriation of private property (which investors believe will be imple-
mented), courts that provide sanctions against the firm’s customers when 
there is a non-payment of dues, and bankruptcy procedures which protect 
financiers such as bondholders when a firm enters into bankruptcy are all 
examples of formal institutions of credible commitment.
But informal institutions such as kinship structures, social norms, and 
patron–client networks can also act as institutions of credible commitment, 
especially in environments where formal institutions do not exist or are not 
well functioning. For example, in a patron–client network, where the patron 
is the politician and the client is the domestic entrepreneur, the politician 
may protect the entrepreneur and provide him or her with access to funds 
and certain privileges (such as licenses for production or imports) in return 
for the rents that accrue from production which may be used in part for 
financing the political machinery. Entrepreneurs too will have an incentive 
to find political patrons who may be keen to protect them, in exchange for 
economic and political support. Therefore, the existence of informal institu-
tions of credible commitment can be both necessary and sufficient for an 
episode of growth acceleration, especially in a low-income country where 
formal institutions have not developed or do not function effectively. As 
long as the informal institutions that exist can address at least in part the 
credible commitment problem in the investment decision, entrepreneurs 
will be willing to invest, and economic growth will result.
A second political channel to economic growth is the provision of public 
goods. Among the determinants of economic growth that have been identi-
fied in the empirical growth literature are public goods such as primary and 
secondary education and provision of health services that are both available 
to a broad cross section of the population, and infrastructure such as roads 
and electricity, that are seen as being crucial enabling factors for economic 
growth to occur. The literature on the provision of public goods generally 
sees these goods being produced when the state has enough capacity both to 
raise taxes to finance large-scale provision of public goods and to administer 
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the effective delivery of these goods. The dimensions of state capacity that 
may matter here are bureaucratic and infrastructural power—the capacity of 
the state to implement decisions and exert its authority over the national ter-
ritory. Clearly, the more capable the state is in its ability to raise taxes (which 
is also a function of how legitimate the state is perceived to be in the eyes of 
its citizens) and in its ability to use these taxes to provide high-quality ‘pro-
ductive’ public goods to the majority of the population, the larger will be the 
growth-enhancing effects of public goods provision (and arguably, the more 
broad-based economic growth will be). But bureaucratic and infrastructural 
power need a certain degree of bureaucratic professionalism, and it is more 
likely that the formal institutions that underpin such bureaucratic profes-
sionalism (such as meritocratic recruitment and merit-based promotion) will 
emerge later in the growth process. Therefore, the provision of public goods 
will be less important as a political channel to growth accelerations and may 
be more important for growth maintenance. However, not all public goods 
need a critical level of bureaucratic professionalism for their provision, and it 
is possible that some local public goods which may be important for growth 
take-offs such as the creation of an export processing zone or an industrial 
estate (that allows for pockets of growth to develop in the economy) and 
the infrastructure associated with these public goods can be provided even 
within clientelist and neopatrimonial contexts (Kelsall et al. 2010).
The third political channel to growth is the overcoming of co-ordination 
failures in investment decisions. These coordination failures often result from 
the high costs of collecting and processing information for new products, 
technologies, and industries in low-income countries. By investing in new 
information collection and processing and making information about the 
relevant new industries freely available to firms, the state can play a facilitat-
ing role in the introduction of new products and the move to new industries, 
and as a consequence, in bringing about structural change and technologi-
cal upgrading in the economy (Lin and Monga 2011). Coordination failures 
also result from the fact that private returns to investment in sectors that 
offer the potential of dynamic comparative advantage in low-income coun-
tries may be less than social returns, as firms need to go through a learning 
process to build the capabilities to become competitive in new industries 
(Whitfield and Therkildsen 2011). Since this learning process may involve 
substantial financial losses at least at the initial stage, the private return to 
such investment may well be negative, even the investment may lead to sig-
nificant positive spillover effects and the building up of social and human 
capital. Risk-averse entrepreneurs with low wealth endowments may not be 
willing to invest in such investments that have high sunk costs and prefer 
to invest in activities with a high short-term possibility of profits but which 
offer fewer possibilities for technological upgrading.
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The divergence of the private and social returns to investment may 
be particularly evident in more modern manufacturing activities or in 
knowledge-based services as compared to unskilled labour-intensive manu-
facturing or primary commodity production. As the economy moves into 
these modern sectors, economies of scale and scope become more impor-
tant, and there is a greater reliance of firms on highly skilled labour and 
access to long-term finance to make the lumpy investments in equipment, 
working capital, and export financing. Thus, there is a need for the state 
to play a coordinating role in directing scarce investible funds and limited 
foreign exchange (to purchase imported capital goods and technology from 
abroad) to the most productive firms and facilitate the upgrading and diver-
sification of individual firms (Lin and Monga 2011).
But the overcoming of coordination failures needs both a political elite 
that is committed to a long-term vision of economic development (since 
the growth pay-offs to technological upgrading and industrial diversifica-
tion may take time to occur) and the presence of an economic bureaucracy 
that is staffed by relatively competent individuals who are insulated from 
the pressures of special interests. Such bureaucracies are characterized by a 
high degree of well-institutionalized and organizationally consistent career 
ladders which bind them to corporate goals while simultaneously allow-
ing them to acquire the expertise necessary to perform effectively (Evans 
1995). The relative autonomy of the bureaucracy allows them to intervene 
selectively in favour of certain firms, sectors, and industries in a market-
conforming way and to provide incentives to capitalists and to discipline 
them (Harriss 2006). Based on the East Asian successes in how governments 
in these countries successfully overcame coordination failures, Evans (1995) 
has argued that another important attribute of bureaucracies in these coun-
tries that allowed them to address coordination failures effectively was their 
‘embeddedness’, that is, ‘the dense set of concrete interpersonal ties that 
enabled specific agencies and enterprises to construct joint projects at the 
sectoral level’ with local capitalists (Evans 2011, p. 47). Both embeddedness 
and autonomy were essential features of the state’s ability to address coor-
dination failures effectively in the East Asian ‘growth successes’. As Evans 
(2011, p. 47) argues, ‘avoiding capture and being able to discipline entre-
preneurial elites is a defining feature of the “embedded autonomy” of East 
Asian developmental states, distinguishing them from less successful states 
in Asia and Africa’.
How important would the overcoming of coordination failure be as a 
political channel to growth across different growth regimes? Our discussion 
of how coordination failures may arise in developing countries indicates 
that it is more likely to be evident in the later stage of structural transforma-
tion when the economy has started the transition from activities that are 
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less human-capital intensive and technologically less sophisticated to more 
complex activities. Thus, the state’s role in overcoming coordination failures 
will be more important when growth has already ignited than in a context 
where growth is yet to accelerate. Further, as we have argued earlier, the 
level of capacity and autonomy of the bureaucracy that may be needed to 
address the complex interventions necessary for resolving all but the most 
basic coordination failures would be more likely to emerge at a later stage 
of the growth process. A possible hypothesis is whether the lack of ability 
of the state to resolve coordination failures plays a causal role in why some 
states cannot successfully transform their economies to more productive 
and technologically advanced activities. This may also explain why some 
countries are able to maintain high growth if they are able to successfully 
transform their economies, while growth dies out in other countries which 
cannot manage this transformation.
To summarize, in this section, we have sketched out a framework of 
analysis that has related the three political channels that we consider to be 
key to economic growth to different phases of economic growth. We have 
argued that the first political channel we discuss—institutions of credible 
commitment—may be a necessary and sufficient channel to growth accel-
erations while contributing to growth maintenance as well, and that infor-
mal institutions of credible commitment may play a more important role in 
growth accelerations, as opposed to formal institutions which may be more 
important in growth maintenance. We also argued that the second political 
channel we discuss in this section—the provision of public goods—would 
be more important in growth maintenance and in the avoidance of growth 
collapse, though it can also play some role in growth accelerations. Finally, 
we argued that the third political channel we discussed—the overcoming of 
coordination failures—would be more important in growth maintenance, 
and can be expected to play an insignificant role in growth acceleration.
Reviewing the Theories on the Politics of Growth
In this section, we will review the major theoretical and empirical lit-
erature on the politics of economic growth, and assess the strengths and 
weaknesses. We will deliberately be selective in our review, concen-
trating on recent contributions which help us to understand the political 
determinants of economic growth across different phases of growth. The 
three major theoretical bodies of literature that we will discuss are the work 
of: i) Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (Acemoglu and Robinson); ii) 
Mushtaq Khan (and the work of the Africa Power and Politics programme, 
which draws some of its central propositions from Khan’s work); and iii) the 
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set of literature on coalitions and development leadership (including the 
work of the Centre for the Future State). We begin with a review of the work 
of Acemoglu and Robinson.
The Politics of Growth Maintenance: Acemoglu and Robinson
As with much of the recent literature on the politics of economic growth, 
Acemoglu and Robinson (AR)’s starting point is the work of Douglas North, 
who brought into the literature on the determinants of economic growth 
the key insight that institutions are the fundamental cause of economic 
growth (Acemoglu et al. 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson 2008, 2012). The set 
of institutions that matter for broad-based economic growth, according to 
AR, are inclusive economic institutions and inclusive political institutions. 
Inclusive economic institutions are secure property rights for the majority of 
the population (such as smallholder farmers and small firms), law and order, 
markets that are open to relative free entry of new businesses, state support 
for markets (in the form of public goods provision, regulation, and enforce-
ment of contracts), and access to education and opportunity for the great 
majority of citizens. Inclusive political institutions are political institutions 
that allow broad participation of the citizens of the country and uphold the 
rule of law, and place constraints and checks on politicians along with the 
rule of law. AR argue that together with political pluralism, some degree of 
political centralization is also necessary for the states to be able to effectively 
enforce law and order. In contrast to the growth-enhancing effects of inclu-
sive economic and political institutions, AR argue that extractive economic 
institutions such as insecure property rights and regulations that limit entry 
to markets and extractive political institutions that concentrate power in 
the hands of a few, with limited checks and balances, are not likely to lead 
to broad-based and sustained economic growth (i.e. growth can occur for 
some time under these institutions but is not likely to last and will benefit a 
narrow set of elites rather than the majority of the population).
But what determines the set of economic and political institutions pre-
vailing in the country at a particular point of time? Economic institutions 
are not distribution neutral: they not only determine the aggregate growth 
potential of the economy but also the distribution of resources in the coun-
try. This implies that economic institutions are politically determined, as the 
prevalent power relations will determine which set of economic institutions 
are more likely to emerge. A similar argument can be made for political insti-
tutions, and AR argue that these are determined by the political power of 
different groups in society. Political power can be both de jure and de facto. 
De jure political power refers to power that originates from the political insti-
tutions in society. De jure political institutions determine the constraints on 
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and the incentives of key actors in the political sphere and could be both 
formal (i.e. whether the political system is democratic or autocratic) or infor-
mal (i.e. the set of informal constraints on politicians and political elites). De 
facto political institutions, on the other hand, originate from the possibility 
that important social and political groups which hold political power may 
not find the distributions of benefits allocated by de jure political institutions 
and by economic institutions acceptable to them, and may use both legal 
and extra-legal means to impose their wishes on society and try to change 
these institutions (e.g. they may revolt, use arms, co-opt the military, or 
undertake protests).
AR argue that the degree of de facto political power originates from the 
ability of some groups to solve their collective-action problem and from the 
economic resources available to the group (which determines their capacity 
to use force against other groups). In the ultimate analysis, therefore, the 
initial distribution of economic resources and the nature of de jure political 
institutions determine both de jure and de facto political power and these in 
turn determine the set of economic institutions and political institutions 
that are likely to emerge in the economy, which in turn determine economic 
performance and the distribution of resources that are compatible with the 
distribution of political power. This can be seen in the schematic representa-
tion in Figure 2.2.
While AR do not directly invoke the concept of political settlement in 
their discussion of how political factors determine the form and function-
ing of economic institutions, and by doing so affect economic growth, they 
introduce the concept of political equilibrium which is similar to the manner 
in which the concept of political settlements has been used in the litera-
ture, particularly, as we will see later, by Mushtaq Khan. According to AR, 
the political equilibrium is the set of political and economic institutions 
compatible with the balance of de facto political power between groups. 
The key point here is that it is the political equilibrium that determines the 





















Figure 2.2. The evolution of political and economic institutions 
in Acemoglu and Robinson
Source: Acemoglu and Robinson (2008).
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institutions function. Therefore, as AR argue, ‘making or imposing specific 
institutional reforms may have little impact on the general structure of eco-
nomic institutions or performance if they leave untouched the underlying 
political equilibrium’. An example of this was in Argentina during the impo-
sition of Washington Consensus-type economic reforms in the late 1980s 
when Menem and the Peronist party after 1989 recognized that the policies 
of the Washington Consensus could be bent to function as ‘politics as usual’, 
and there was little change in the underlying political equilibrium even 
though the instruments that the Peronists used after 1989 were different 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2008). AR point out that the reason the reforms 
failed was not due to the nature of the reforms but that the political equilib-
rium would have to change if the reforms were to succeed.
An important implication of AR’s theory is that bad political equilib-
rium that leads to poor economic performance may persist over time, and 
economic growth may stagnate in a country for many years as a conse-
quence. Since the distribution of political power determines the evolu-
tion of economic and political institutions, political elites who hold power 
will always have an incentive to maintain the political institutions that 
give them political power, and the economic institutions that distribute 
resources to them. Furthermore, the initial distribution of resources ena-
bles elites who have access to these resources to increase their de facto 
political power, allowing them to push for economic and political institu-
tions favourable to their interests, reproducing the initial disparity in polit-
ical power (Acemoglu et al. 2005). Therefore, there will be a persistence of 
extractive economic and political institutions in societies with such insti-
tutions, since the elites who benefit from these institutions would have 
no incentive to change them. Conversely, inclusive and political institu-
tions will be more likely to prevail, once they emerge, as the emergence of 
such institutions (e.g. democratization and secure property rights for the 
majority of the population) will be likely to result in strong economic per-
formance, reinforcing the welfare-enhancing effects of these institutions 
and allowing states to become more credible via greater legitimacy to the 
commitment of these institutions.
But what explains the switching from one growth regime to another; say, 
from stagnant growth to miracle growth? AR argue that while bad politi-
cal equilibrium tends to persist, change is possible. With time, institutional 
drift may occur, leading to a critical juncture where there may be institu-
tional divergence. This is shown in Figure 2.3.
Many factors can contribute to this divergence. For example, new eco-
nomic elites may emerge who challenge the existing balance of power and 
demand change in economic institutions from extractive to more inclusive 
institutions. There is also the possibility of revolt from citizens excluded 
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from current political institutions, and the elite may respond with greater 
political pluralism. AR view these critical junctures as ‘stochastic’ and there-
fore, to a large extent, exogenous, and they state that it is not clear ‘under 
what circumstance political equilibria that lead to economic growth will 
arise’ (Acemoglu and Robinson 2008, p. 10). Therefore, it is not clear how a 
country will move from a bad political equilibrium associated with growth 
stagnation/crisis to a good political equilibrium associated with stable or 
miracle growth, where the political drivers of this move are endogenously 
determined, and not due to external events or to exogenous factors.
The political channels that are evident in AR’s theory of growth are formal 
institutions of credible commitment (as in the rule of law that leads to the 
security of property rights) and public goods provision. There is less recogni-
tion in their theory of the important role the state can play in overcoming 
coordination failures, and that the emergence of formal institutions of cred-
ible commitment and the provision of high quality public goods may not be 
enough to bring about the structural transformation that has been evident 
in the successful cases of economic growth in East Asia. Notwithstanding 
this omission, AR’s theory is more a theory of growth sustenance (and by 
association, also a theory of long-term growth stagnation) than a theory 
of growth acceleration or of growth collapse. Once growth has ignited in 
a country, the emergence of inclusive economic and political institutions 
may lock in the growth process, and also by implication, broaden the pro-
cess of growth to make economic growth inclusive. Also, while AR do not 
directly state that the inclusive economic and political institutions they take 
to be correlated with sustained economic growth are formal institutions, the 
specific examples they provide of inclusive economic institutions, such as 
contract enforcement and state regulation of markets, and inclusive politi-
cal institutions, such as the rule of law for all citizens, suggest that these 
are more likely to be formal institutions. This also suggests that AR’s theory 
of growth may be more relevant in the understanding of growth mainte-
nance rather than growth acceleration, as the formal institutions that AR 
take to be crucial to economic growth need a sufficient level of state capac-
ity for enforcement and for their effective functioning, and these enforce-
ment capabilities (and the commitment of the ruling elite to enforce these 





Figure 2.3. Institutional change in Acemoglu and Robinson
Source: <http://economics.mit.edu/files/7850>.
The Political Determinants of Economic Growth
47
growth when growth has begun to accelerate. To understand the political 
drivers of growth acceleration, we need a theory that can help us understand 
how economic growth occurs even without the presence of well-functioning 
formal institutions. We now discuss the work of Mushtaq Khan which, as we 
will argue, provides such a theory.
The Political Foundations of Growth Accelerations: Mushtaq Khan
Like AR, Khan starts with the proposition that institutions are the funda-
mental cause of economic growth (Khan 2010). Also like AR, Khan takes 
institutional performance to be a function of the distribution of power 
between important groups in society. Khan (2010, p. 4) argues that the polit-
ical settlement—defined as ‘the interdependent combination of a structure 
of power and institutions at the level of a society that is mutually “compat-
ible” and also “sustainable” in terms of economic and political viability’—is 
the key determinant of institutional performance and consequently, eco-
nomic growth. While there are strong similarities here in Khan’s notion 
of political settlement and AR’s concept of political equilibrium (both take 
political power and institutions to be interdependent and both take insti-
tutional form and functioning to be determined within the political settle-
ment/equilibrium), there are differences as well—Khan’s treatment of the 
way a political settlement emerges suggests a more dynamic view of how 
elites come to a settlement on the type of institutions that are compatible 
with the balance of power, and how these institutions may be enforced. 
In Khan, a political equilibrium which leads to very poor economic per-
formance is not likely to last, and there would necessarily be a move to an 
equilibrium which is compatible with an institutional configuration that 
delivers better economic performance. In this sense, Khan truncates the set 
of AR political equilibria if ordered continuously from bad to good equilibria 
(from left to right) on the left—bad equilibria, while a theoretical possibil-
ity, is not likely to persist, and therefore, not an equilibria in the dynamic 
sense. Khan does not define what the minimum level of economic viability 
for a political settlement may be, which suggests that the difference between 
the two concepts will not differ greatly in empirical terms (and as AR would 
argue, bad political equilibrium has shown a tendency to persist for a very 
long time in history).
In Khan’s notion of political settlements, institutions and the distribu-
tion of power have a circular and interdependent relationship. Khan defines 
power as holding power—that is, ‘how long a particular organization can 
hold out in actual or potential conflicts against other organizations or the 
state’ and where holding power is ‘a function of a number of characteristics 
of an organization, including its economic capability to sustain itself during 
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conflicts, its capability to mobilize supporters to be able to absorb costs and 
its ability to mobilize prevalent ideologies and symbols of legitimacy to 
consolidate its mobilization and keep its members committed’ (Khan 2010, 
p. 20). The relationship between holding power and institutions is two-way. 
The configuration of holding power at the level of society is supported by 
a range of formal and informal institutions that reproduce and sustain the 
specific configuration of relative power between organizations by enabling 
a consistent set of economic benefits to be created and allocated. In turn, 
relative power determines which institutions emerge, whether institutions 
are enforced, and what their effect is on economic performance. If the dis-
tribution of benefits by a particular institution is not accepted by groups 
who have high holding power, there would be opposition to the introduc-
tion of the institution or its enforcement would be contested, leading to a 
possible increase in political instability, even though the institution may be 
growth-enhancing.
An important contribution of Khan is the primacy he accords to informal 
institutions in the beginning of the growth process. Khan argues that the 
inherited distributional power cannot be supported by the incomes gen-
erated by formal institutions alone, and that ‘informal institutions play a 
vitally important role in all developing countries because informal institu-
tions are the only feasible mechanism for sustaining economic benefits for 
powerful groups who would otherwise have lost out’ (Khan 2010, p. 26). The 
reason why formal institutions play a less important role in developmental 
transitions is that those with holding power will have few of the capabilities 
that could benefit from protection of property rights and the rule of law, 
and would therefore have little interest in enforcing these institutions. It is 
informal institutions, then, that are compatible with the incentive structure 
of powerful elites, who can use these institutions to have continued access 
to incomes through ‘political accumulation’.
Khan defines a clientelist political settlement as a political settlement 
where significant holding power is based on sources outside the incomes 
generated by formal institutions. Khan contrasts this with a capitalist politi-
cal settlement, where capitalist profits are the dominant source of holding 
power, and argues that clientelist political settlements are likely to be the 
type of political settlement prevailing in developing countries, where the 
formal sector tends to be small, and much of the holding power of impor-
tant groups are held outside the formal sector. While capitalist political set-
tlements are more of a heuristic device for Khan since they are not likely to 
emerge in most developing countries until a late stage of economic develop-
ment, it is more realistic to see political settlements in developing countries 
as hybrid in nature, with a combination of elements of both clientelist and 
capitalist settlements. This is for two reasons—one, in many developing 
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countries, there are already existing productive formal sectors for reasons 
of history (due to colonization strategies and past import-substituting indus-
trialization policies), and two, with some economic growth occurring, there 
would be demand for formal institutional change (or the enforcement of 
formal institutions where they exist) originating from many new agents in 
the productive sectors of the economy.
However, clientelist political settlements are more likely to characterize 
growth accelerations. Under these settlements, patron–client networks—
informal relationships or organizations that involve individuals with dif-
ferent degrees of power—are likely to provide the institutional context 
within which credible commitment problems to do with investment can be 
addressed in an environment where formal institutions of property rights 
are either not there or are not likely to be enforced. In a typical patron–cli-
ent network, the patron (who could be a politician or a local mafia, for 
instance) is an organizer of power who organizes group of clients ‘who offer 
their organizational support in exchange for the benefits that the patron 
offers’ (Khan 2010, p. 60). Patron–client networks can operate as informal 
networks or be within formal organizations such as political parties. Khan 
suggests that patron–client networks can be organized as pyramids, with an 
individual or faction being a patron of one network and client of another 
network. The hierarchical structure of these networks and the elements 
of control exercised in each level of the pyramid allows for patron–client 
networks to be self-sustaining and therefore credible to productive entre-
preneurs in the sense that the rents from the investment process will not 
be completely expropriated. Therefore, patrons in the network offer local 
enforcement and dispute resolution activities to their clients—the inves-
tors—in return for political support and the rents that accrue from the pro-
duction process.
But why do patron–client networks not degenerate into predatory net-
works, where the level of rent extraction is so high, that investors have lit-
tle incentive to invest, or where patrons expropriate the productive assets 
of investors (or where investors fear that expropriation will occur at any 
point in the production process). Khan extends his analysis of patron–cli-
ent networks and clientelist political settlements in two important ways to 
address this issue. Firstly, Khan argues that the structure of the ruling coa-
lition is important in explaining why some patron–client networks have 
greater enforcement capabilities than others. Two dimensions of power 
matter in understanding these capabilities. First, the horizontal distribu-
tion of power, which is the power of the ruling coalition relative to the 
power of excluded coalitions. Second, the vertical distribution of power, 
which is the relative power of higher- compared to lower-level factions 
within the ruling coalition.
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The most favourable combination in terms of the enforcement capabilities 
of the ruling coalition is when the ruling coalition faces low opposition from 
excluded factions so as to take a long-term view, allowing patron–client net-
works to be self-sustaining and growth focused. With limited power from 
lower-level factions, the ruling coalition is able to exercise control across the 
entire pyramidical structure of the network to make sure that the network 
does not turn predatory. A concentrated horizontal distribution of power 
coupled with dispersed vertical distribution of power leads to a vulnerable 
authoritarian coalition that is always in the danger of being overthrown, 
while a concentrated vertical distribution of power coupled with dispersed 
horizontal distribution of power leads to a weak dominant party that may 
be growth oriented, but is unable to obtain ‘buy-in’ from the different lower-
level factions in using rents productively for growth. Finally, dispersion in 
both horizontal and vertical distribution of power can lead to ‘competitive 
clientelism’, prompting cycling of factions in power and the shortening of 
the time horizon of patrons, leading to possible predation and a lack of eco-
nomic growth.
The second way Khan explains why some patron–client networks are 
growth conforming while other networks are not is to do with the capabili-
ties and organizations of emerging capitalists. There are two dimensions of 
organizational capability that matter here—the technological and entrepre-
neurial capabilities of the emerging capitalists and the holding power of pro-
ductive investors. Khan argues that investors with high capability can drive 
accumulation if they are politically networked, and who are able to use their 
political power to gain access to resources or government contracts such 
that they are able to accelerate their accumulation and technology acquisi-
tion strategies. On the other hand, high-capability entrepreneurs who do 
not have significant holding power are more amenable to discipline by a 
developmental coalition, allowing for effective industrial policy to be imple-
mented, as in Korea in the 1960s to 1980s. Entrepreneurs with low to moder-
ate capability who are politically networked can drive accumulation in the 
early stages, especially in low-technology industries. Finally, entrepreneurs 
with low to moderate capability and who are politically weak are the ones 
who will face most constraints on accumulation, and growth occuring in 
this context would depend on whether a developmental ruling coalition is 
in place or not.
While Khan provides a powerful theory on why patron–client networks 
can be growth enhancing, and not degenerate into rent-dissipating entities 
as often viewed in the governance literature, there are also some limitations 
in Khan’s theory of economic growth. Firstly, it is not clear how a dominant 
ruling coalition which has both significant vertical and horizontal power 
would necessarily be growth oriented. What prevents the coalition from 
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using its considerable power to use extractive institutions for its own ends 
and to maintain an optimal rate of rent extraction which may not lead to 
a growth collapse, but will not lead to stable/miracle growth as well? The 
sanction mechanisms here are weak in the absence of a third-party enforcer 
and the ability of the ruling coalition to be growth oriented would depend 
on the coalition’s own long-term self-interest to maximize wealth, or in the 
vision of long-term development among the elites who constitute the coali-
tion (and, therefore, exogenous to Khan’s theory). Secondly, it is not obvious 
why competitive clientelism—that is, the cycling of factions in power—
would necessarily lead to poor growth outcomes if it is a high-expectations 
political equilibrium, where citizens expect certain critical public goods 
such as education and health to be provided, regardless of the faction in 
power, such as that occurred in the state of Kerala in India, leading to high 
rates of pro-poor growth (Besley et al. 2006). Thirdly, it is not clear how tech-
nological upgrading and the overcoming of coordination failures can take 
place in pure clientelist political settlements when the ability of the state 
to ‘pick winners’ and to monitor the performance of firms needs a certain 
degree of bureaucratic capacity, and a relative autonomy of the state from 
the investor class (Evans 1995). It is more likely that the character of the 
political settlement underpinning economic growth changes from a pure 
clientelist political settlement to hybrid political settlements where formal 
institutions (e.g. the setting up of joint economic councils between the busi-
ness sector and the government) and formal organizations (both an effec-
tive economic bureaucracy and well-organized and representative business 
associations) are increasingly important in resolving coordination failures 
(Bräutigam et al. 2002). Finally, Khan downplays the role of high-quality 
public goods provision (including a literate and skilled workforce and no 
infrastructure constraints) that have been seen as important determinants 
of economic growth in the empirical growth literature, and it is difficult to 
see how public goods such as education, health, and infrastructure can be 
provided through patron–client networks which by their very nature are 
exclusionary.
The above discussion suggests that Khan’s theory of the politics of growth 
is a more convincing theory of growth acceleration than it is a theory of 
growth maintenance. Informal institutions and patron–client networks may 
be crucial in igniting growth and formal institutional reform may have little 
growth-enhancing effect in clientelist political settlements. But as economic 
growth progresses, hybridity would be a feature of political settlements, and 
there would be an interplay of both formal and informal institutions in the 
growth maintenance process. While clientelist political settlements with 
predominantly informal institutions would be more likely to characterize 
growth accelerations, hybrid political settlements with a mix of informal 
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and formal institutions (along the lines of AR’s notion of inclusive economic 
and political institutions) would be more likely to characterize growth 
maintenance.
Developmental Patrimonialism
Recently, a set of scholars working in the Africa Power and Politics Programme 
(APPP) has argued that neo-patrimonialism, a system of personal rule held 
together by the distribution of economic rents to clients and cronies, can be 
developmental in that neo-patrimonialism can be compatible with rapid pro-
poor economic growth, and under certain conditions, may even help the cli-
mate for business and investment (Kelsall 2011b). The work of the APPP may 
be seen as an application of Khan’s theory in the African context (though 
with some important modifications as well). The central hypothesis of the 
APPP is that a personalized system to manage rents centrally and to orient 
rent-generation to the long term can bring about strong economic perfor-
mance, along with other enabling factors such as a strong, visionary leader, 
a single or dominant party system, a competent and confident economic 
technocracy, a strategy to include (at least partially) the most important 
political groups in some of the benefits of growth, and broadly pro-capital-
ist pro-rural policies (Kelsall et al. 2010). Like Khan, the APPP stresses the 
importance of centralized rent-management built around patronage systems 
as key to economic growth, in contexts where formal institutions are yet to 
develop or are not well-functioning, and Weberian bureaucracies are yet to 
emerge.
However, many of the features that the APPP considers to be character-
istics of development patrimonialism are also seen as features of predatory 
states, such as a high degree of concentrated political power and economic 
discretion, and the undermining of formal or customary political processes 
by endemic corruption. The key variable that seems to distinguish preda-
tory states from developmental patrimonialism is the long-term vision of 
the ruling elite which is absent in the former regime and present in the latter 
regime (see Bavister-Gould 2011 and Bratton and Masunungure 2011 on the 
typology of predatory states and a case study of Zimbabwe). It is not clear 
from the APPP’s work what factors explain the stretching of the time hori-
zon of the ruling elite to the long term—is it the level of produced output 
(i.e. the size of the productive economy) such as those not obtained from 
natural resources or foreign aid but from manufacturing and agriculture? Is 
it the lengthening of the discount rate of the ruling elite if they see them-
selves as less vulnerable to a coup or revolt in the country? Is it the temporal 
characteristics of the production process—that is, the longer the timescale 
of production (such as the production of tree crops like coffee), the fewer 
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the incentives of the elite to engage in predation? Is it the nature of the 
technology in productive sectors—that is, the more sophisticated the tech-
nology, the more difficult it is to master that technology and consequently, 
the less is the incentive of ruling elites to expropriate output in the short 
term? Further sharpening of the hypothesis on how long-termism in elite 
commitment to the productive economy may occur would provide a better 
sense of how long-termism may emerge in specific contexts, and help one 
understand under what conditions a long-term vision would not depend on 
the specific qualities of the leader in charge but would be institutionalized, 
and so would be self-sustaining.
Coalitions and Developmental Leadership
A recent strand of work has stressed the importance of developmental lead-
ership, understood as the political processes that mobilize people, organi-
zations, and resources through collective action, as important catalysts for 
economic growth (Leftwich 2010). An earlier literature by scholars such 
as Deborah Bräutigam has also highlighted the role of ‘growth coalitions’, 
which are coalitions of business and political elites that are underpinned 
by synergistic relations and which mobilize institutions and resources for 
economic growth, in explaining the growth successes of countries such as 
Mauritius in the African context (Bräutigam et al. 2002).1 More recently, 
Abdel-Latif and Schmitz (2010) look at sectoral differences in investment 
and growth outcomes in Egypt and find that the key contributory factors to 
making alliances between business and policymakers growth-oriented and 
not predatory was: i) common interest in the sector’s growth; ii) common 
understanding of its problems; and iii) translating willingness into an ability 
to take action. They find that growth alliances were often rooted in informal 
linkages between economic and political elites, though there were differ-
ences in how these linkages came out in pre-existing sectors such as the 
food industry where most of the linkages were built around strong social ties 
coming from the same extended family, school, or city, while in emerging 
sectors such as communications, information, and technology, the roots lay 
in a more common professional background. The finding of Abdel-Latif and 
Schmitz supports the proposition that informal institutions are going to be 
1 One important criticism of the growth coalitions and developmental leadership literature is 
that it pays insufficient attention to issues of causality—do growth coalitions and development 
leadership cause economic growth, or do they tend to emerge once economic growth acceler-
ates due to institutional reforms and exogenous factors such as changes in the world trading 
regime (Brady and Spence 2009)? Jones and Olken (2005) address this issue by using death of 
leaders as a source of exogenous variation in leadership and find robust evidence that leaders 
matter for economic growth. They also find that the effects of leaders are strongest in autocratic 
settings where there are fewer constraints on a leader’s power.
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more important in growth accelerations, and especially in bringing about 
‘pockets of growth’ in an otherwise stagnant economy.
The literature on coalitions and developmental leadership contributes to 
our understanding of the politics of economic growth in two important 
ways. Firstly, it provides us with micro-level reasoning that is missing to a 
large extent in the work of AR and Khan. As Bates points out in his review 
of North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009), an emphasis on agency in a theory 
of growth allows one to ‘be introduced to active agents, be they politicians, 
merchants, farmers or kinsmen’, and to be ‘informed about the problems 
they faced, the constraints they encountered, the beliefs they entertained 
and the strategies they devised’ (Bates 2010, p. 755). Such micro-level rea-
soning allows a more nuanced and sophisticated understanding of how 
elites behaved in particular contexts, and what their responses and strategies 
were when faced with a ‘critical juncture’—a threat or challenge, both inter-
nal and external—which may explain the political processes around growth 
accelerations and the prevention of growth collapses. Secondly, an under-
standing of the political processes around effective state–business relations 
and growth coalitions allows us to understand why growth accelerations and 
growth collapses occur in some countries and not in other countries with 
very similar initial conditions. That is, a focus on the actions of agents and 
organizations—the players of the game—allows us to trace out in sharper 
detail the move from one to another political equilibrium that may occur in 
a growth regime switch.2
Reviewing the Empirical Literature of the Politics  
of Economic Growth
A recent set of papers in the empirical growth literature has tried to go 
beyond the proximate determinants of economic growth (such as macro-
economic stability and trade openness) to study the fundamental causes of 
2 There is a danger is some of the literature on coalitions to overstate the case for the char-
acteristics of political coalitions as a sufficient explanatory variable for economic growth. For 
example, using Botswana as an example, Poteete (2009) gives primacy to the nature of the 
political coalition over structural factors as the key explanatory variable for economic growth 
to occur, particularly in resource-rich countries. That is, according to Poteete, the inclusivity 
and stability of the coalition was important to Botswana’s economic growth in the immediate 
post-independence period. However, Poteete underplays the role of institutional pre-conditions 
and the manner in which the structure of the economy was aligned with the incentives of polit-
ical elites to invest in the productive sector at the time of independence (cattle farming), while 
in Zambia, with a similar economic structure, this did not occur (Robinson and Parsons 2006). 
Furthermore, it is arguable how important are characteristics such as inclusive and stability of 
coalitions to explain economic growth—as Haber et al. (2003) show, after the fall of the Porfirio 
Diaz dictactorship in 1911 in Mexico, there was significant political instability but also strong 
economic growth—and the experience of Indonesia during the oil price boom years shows 
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economic growth across countries, and in particular, the importance of eco-
nomic and political institutions.
Much of this literature has mostly focused on the determinants of long-
run per capita income differences and less on determinants of why countries 
switch from one growth phase to another. Starting with the seminal piece by 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson—AJR—(2001), the empirical literature in 
this tradition shows that institutional quality matters for long-run economic 
growth, more than other ‘deep determinants’ of economic growth such as 
geography or culture. However, while measures of institutional or govern-
ance quality used in this body of work may be strong, positive correlates of 
long-run per capita income, they appear to be less important in explaining 
why some countries experience economic growth and not others. As Khan 
(2012) notes, for the same level of institutional quality, we see very different 
growth experiences among developing countries. Since the measures of insti-
tutional quality used in the AJR genre captures in essence how well formal 
institutions are functioning, what the cross-country econometric work in the 
AJR tradition establishes is the strong positive relationship between the qual-
ity of formal institutions and long-run economic growth, but not necessar-
ily of growth transitions within countries. The implication of this literature 
from our perspective is that while well-functioning formal institutions may 
not be important determinants of growth accelerations, these institutions 
may be important in the growth-sustenance process, and in the long-run 
evolution of per capita incomes.
Finally, it is worth noting that while the cross-country econometric lit-
erature on the institutional determinants of economic growth have gone 
beyond the earlier focus on proximate determinants of growth such as mac-
roeconomic stability, trade openness, and human-capital formation, and 
have been able to bring in an emphasis on economic and political institu-
tions as the fundamental cause of economic growth, they still leave open 
the question: what is the underlying political equilibrium/settlement that 
generates growth-enhancing institutions, and are there specific characteris-
tics of settlements within which growth-enhancing institutions emerge? To 
address this question, it will be necessary to both deepen the cross-country 
quantitative research by analysing the political equilibria around growth 
regime traverses and to complement the quantitative research with histori-
cal case studies that analyse the changes in and within political settlements 
around growth regime switches, with a specific focus on the political process 
that shapes the emergence of growth coalitions.
that a narrowly based ruling coalition (led by Suharto) can deliver significant pro-poor growth 
as a significant proportion of the oil revenues were channelled into a major school-building 
programme that had a significant poverty reduction impact (Hill 2000).
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The Political Determinants of Growth Regime Switches
What do we know about the political drivers of growth regime switches? 
An emerging literature has examined the determinants of growth accelera-
tions, and why some countries maintain high growth while growth declines 
in other countries. With respect to growth accelerations, Hausmann et al. 
(2005) find that standard growth determinants such as major changes in 
economic policies, institutional arrangements, political circumstances, or 
external conditions ‘do a very poor job of predicting the turning points’ (p. 
328). They argue that growth accelerations are caused predominantly by idi-
osyncratic and often, small-scale changes, and suggest that further research 
is needed to identify the common elements in these idiosyncratic elements. 
Pritchett (2000) points out that slow moving determinants of growth such 
as improvements in the quality of institutions or time-constant factors 
such as geography (land-lockedness, distance from the equator), resource 
endowments (e.g. minerals), ethnic diversity, culture, and colonial experi-
ence are less likely to explain the frequent shifts from one growth regime to 
another that we observe in many developing countries and the wide vari-
ations in within-country economic growth. Jones and Olken (2008) show 
that growth accelerations are accompanied by increases in productivity and 
not investment, and with increases in trade, suggesting that reallocation of 
resources from less productive to more productive uses are an important 
part of growth accelerations. Growth declines, on the other hand, are associ-
ated with monetary instability and increases in inflation, along with higher 
frequency of military conflict, and trade does not play an important role 
in growth declines as it does in growth accelerations. Jones-Olken also find 
changes in institutions are not associated with either growth accelerations 
or declines, where institutional quality is measured by a lower level of cor-
ruption and the rule of law. However, they find that growth accelerations 
and declines are more likely to occur in autocracies than democracies, and 
in political interregnum or transition periods. On the other hand, Berg et al. 
(2012) find that growth duration (i.e. the avoidance of growth collapses) is 
positively related to the presence of democratic political institutions in the 
country, along with the degree of equality of income distribution. Finally, 
Jerzmanowski (2006) finds that better institutional quality improves the 
possibility that a country will remain in a stable or miracle growth phase 
and will be less likely to suffer a growth collapse.
The findings from the empirical literature reinforce the conclusions that 
we have drawn from the theoretical literature, and support the proposition 
that the political drivers of growth acceleration are different from the politi-
cal determinants of growth maintenance. But it still leaves open the ques-
tion: how does a country move from the set of institutions that are causal to 
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a growth acceleration to the set of institutions that allow growth to be main-
tained, and given the high number of growth-acceleration episodes which 
do not sustain, why do countries exhibit differential success in the transi-
tion path from one growth regime to another? In the concluding section, 
we attempt to draw both the theoretical and empirical literature together to 
develop a set of research questions around the political dynamics of such 
transition paths that can help explain the stylized facts of economic growth.
Conclusions and a Set of Research Questions
In this chapter, we provided an analytical review of the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the politics of economic growth. We noted that 
the focus in much of the literature on rates of average growth of per capita 
income has obscured the fact that most countries observe dramatic fluc-
tuations in growth of per capita income—most developing countries tend 
to observe stop–go growth episodes, with growth accelerations followed by 
growth decelerations or collapses. Thus, to understand the political driv-
ers of economic growth, we need an explanation of the political dynamics 
around the transition from one growth regime to another, and the political 
economy determinants of growth accelerations, growth maintenance, and 
growth declines/collapses.
We then sketched out a framework that can take us closer to an under-
standing of the political determinants of growth regime traverses. We pro-
posed three key political channels to economic growth—institutions of 
credible commitment, provision of public goods, and the overcoming of 
coordination failures. We argued that these three channels play out differ-
ently across different phases of economic growth. Institutions of credible 
commitment—may be a necessary and sufficient channel to growth accel-
erations while contributing to growth maintenance as well, and that infor-
mal institutions of credible commitment may play a more important role in 
growth accelerations, as opposed to formal institutions which may be more 
important in growth maintenance. The provision of public goods would be 
more important in growth maintenance and in the avoidance of growth 
collapse, though it can also play some role in growth accelerations. The 
overcoming of coordination failures would be more important in growth 
maintenance, and can be expected to play an insignificant role in growth 
acceleration.
We then reviewed the two dominant theories of the politics of growth—
the theories of Acemoglu and Robinson (AR) and Mushtaq Khan. We argued 
that there are strong similarities in both theories in their emphasis on the 
political settlement/equilibrium as the key political driver of economic growth. 
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However, the theory of AR, with its emphasis on inclusive economic and 
political institutions, may be more relevant for growth maintenance, 
while the theory of Khan, with its emphasis on informal institutions and 
patron–client networks, is more relevant for growth acceleration. We also 
reviewed the literature on coalitions and developmental leadership and 
argued that they contribute to our understanding of the politics of growth 
in two important ways: by providing micro-level reasoning on how politi-
cal settlements arise, and how they relate to economic growth, and by 
allowing for the possibility that not all switches in growth regimes can be 
attributed to incentive structures and power relations, but can be due to 
agential factors as well.
The empirical literature on the political and institutional determinants 
of economic growth complements the main conclusions that we have 
drawn from the review of the theoretical literature. While the cross-country 
econometric literature on institutions and growth suggest that there is a 
positive relationship between institutional quality (usually measured by 
the quality of formal institutions such as Weberian bureaucracies) and the 
level of income, there is less support for the proposition that better formal 
economic and political institutions or a good property rights regime or the 
prevalence of democracy are either necessary or sufficient to obtain growth 
accelerations.
Our review of the literature on the determinants of growth accelerations 
and growth maintenance also support this conclusion—these studies find 
that reforms in formal economic institutions do not seem to be associated 
with growth accelerations, and that the latter is more likely in a country 
with a non-inclusive political institution such as autocracy. However, this 
literature finds that a country which has witnessed growth acceleration is 
more likely to stay in a high-growth regime and not suffer a growth decline 
if better quality formal institutions were to emerge and develop in the 
growth process.
We end with a set of research questions that we suggest can frame future 
research on the politics of economic growth:
• What are the political drivers of growth accelerations? Are these more 
related to informal institutions/patron–client networks, development 
patrimonialism, and clientelist settlements?
• What are the political drivers of growth sustenance and 
growth collapses? Are these more related to the emergence (or 
non-emergence) of inclusive institutions and hybrid settlements? 
Do growth maintenance processes need the emergence of Weberian 
characteristics in bureaucracies?
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• What explains the transition from political settlements characterizing 
growth accelerations to political settlements characterizing growth 
sustenance? To what is the transition endogenous? To what extent is 
the transition exogenously determined?
• What role do growth coalitions and developmental leadership play in 
growth accelerations and growth maintenance? Are the formation of 
growth coalitions and developmental leadership causal to the growth 
process, or are they enabling factors?
•  How do growth coalitions and development leadership emerge, and 
how are they sustained? What are the structural factors and initial 
conditions that explain developmental leadership from predatory 
leadership?
•  How do institutions interplay with coalitions and leadership in 
bringing about political equilibria conducive to economic growth?
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The Politics of What Works for the Poor  
in Public Expenditure and Taxation
Paul Mosley
Making States Developmental and Pro-poor:  
The Evolution of Thinking
‘What forms of state capacity and political commitment are required to 
underpin sustainable levels of growth and employment?’ asks the prospec-
tus of the Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) research pro-
gramme (University of Manchester 2011, p.  i). This chapter is concerned 
with the state’s fiscal capacity—its ability to raise revenue and to spend it in 
a way that sustains growth and eliminates poverty—which is certainly one 
of the key functionings required to enable a state to work. We are concerned, 
in particular, with the political feasibility dimension of fiscal policy.
The first section of this chapter presents a brief historical review of approaches 
to these issues. This section exposes three key building blocks related to the 
construction of the fiscal component of an effective state on which our knowl-
edge is still insufficient. These building blocks, examined in the remaining 
sections, are, first, how to make public expenditure and taxation pro-poor, 
second, how to build effective pro-poor coalitions, and finally, how to build 
tax structures which facilitate escape from a low-tax, weak-state equilibrium. 
In these sections, we seek to highlight gaps in research that need to be filled.
The Politics of Pro-poor Fiscal Policy: The Evolution  
of Thinking and Policy Priorities
During the second half of the nineteenth century, we see for the first time 
fiscal policy being used, particularly in what were then the newly industrial-
izing countries of Germany, Russia, and Japan, not just to meet governments’ 
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financial requirements, but as a developmental instrument designed to 
transform the structure of the economy, and specifically to overcome mar-
ket imperfections which prevent the economy from evolving in the way 
desired by the government. Amongst the activist fiscal policy instruments 
used to achieve this objective, four are particularly important: government 
investment in strategic sectors, especially infrastructure; subsidy for specific 
inputs (notably loanable funds) for which markets are missing or at any rate 
not providing the necessary support for re-equipping the economy; develop-
ment of new sources of finance to overcome a government financing con-
straint, such as the tax on the value of unimproved land implemented by 
the Japanese government in 1870, which financed much new infrastructure 
construction; and not least, infant-industry protection, first given its devel-
opmental rationale by the German political scientist Friedrich List in 18411 
and since then possibly the commonest and certainly the most controversial 
instrument of pro-developmental fiscal intervention. An important ration-
ale for this more interventionist stance after 1850 was the belief that, in the 
new world where many players were competing for control over the global 
economy, the old laissez-faire approach to policy and to finance could, in 
the absence of such purpose-built intervention, no longer deliver industri-
alization in the manner that had worked for Britain and the United States 
(Gerschenkron 1959).
After the First World War, indeed from the 1920s right through to the 
1970s, this activist approach to fiscal policymaking in emergent countries 
received considerable support from comparative economic development 
experiences. During the inter-war depression Brazil under President Vargas, 
notably, joined the group of countries practising activist fiscal policies for 
industrial development, and as a consequence was able during that period 
to record higher rates of economic growth than any country except Russia, 
now itself implementing five-year plans within a completely socialized 
economy (Hilton 1975). After the Second World War, in defiance of a liber-
alizing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade agreed within the Bretton 
Woods agreement of 1944, what has become known as the dirigiste (‘control-
ling’ or ‘directive’) approach to economic policy (Lal 1983) was expanded 
to encompass a majority of developing countries. Especially in the fields of 
input subsidy and export taxation, as well as orthodox protectionism, we see 
the state’s fiscal role being expanded in pursuit of faster development.
By the mid-1970s it was clear that this pattern of interventionist fiscal 
policy was impacting on developing countries in two radically different 
ways. In one group of countries, principally the ‘tigers’ of South East Asia 
1 A  good account of List’s political economy is provided by Payne and Phillips (2010, 
pp. 37–43).
The Politics of Inclusive Development
62
(South Korea, Taiwan, and later Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia), but 
also including Brazil and arguably northern Mexico, non-traditional, and 
in particular manufacturing, exports expanded rapidly through the 1950s 
and 1960s, and this fed through into a rapid growth in the economy as a 
whole. In these countries and northern India, a green revolution was also 
beginning, enabling them to achieve self-sufficiency in food. And as a con-
sequence of both these trends, tax revenue was able to grow in a broad-based 
manner and escape the straitjacket imposed on all poor countries by the 
dominance of taxes on foreign trade,2 revenue from which is unstable and 
constrained by the long-term adverse trend in the terms of trade of primary 
commodities. In these countries, a positive interaction between policymak-
ing and the diversification of the economy had become visible, leading their 
governments to become celebrated as ‘developmental states’—most of them, 
at this stage, not democratic, still less corruption-free, but nonetheless able 
to manage a break-out into autonomous self-sustained development such as 
Japan and their other nineteenth-century predecessors had achieved. In the 
other group, comprising at this stage all other developing countries includ-
ing India and China, neither a break-out into the development of manufac-
tured exports nor the development of a fiscal base which would enable this 
break-out to take place was occurring. There were numerous reasons for this 
bifurcation, but one of them—the tendency for state intervention to be used 
in many countries not to promote development but to protect the special 
interests of ‘rent-seekers’—emerged from the shadows at this time, notably 
in the work of Little et al. (1975) and Krueger (1979).
At this point, we become able to fit poverty, on which we are beginning to 
have usable data, into the picture. Policymakers had always been aware that 
objectives other than growth of output, and in particular individuals’ stand-
ard of living, were relevant to development; but in early global development 
policy manifestos, such as the very first (United Nations 1951), low standards 
of living are equated with unemployment, and the assumption is made that 
a combination of policies which achieve high growth and policies which 
will achieve low unemployment will be enough. By 1973, however, it was 
clear that they were not enough. In Ethiopia and Bangladesh, after a quarter 
of a century in which the world had hoped that it might have been freed 
from starvation,3 famine had once again recurred, and in many parts of the 
2 In the 1970s, revenue from taxes on foreign trade in developing countries averaged about 
40% of total domestic revenue (World Bank, WDR 1979, appendix tables). But in many coun-
tries the proportion was far greater than this. In Uganda, export taxes on coffee alone accounted 
through the 1970s for more than 80% of total domestic revenue (Bowden and Mosley 2011, 
using Uganda Annual Trade Reports).
3 The horrifying Chinese famine of 1958–62, which killed between thirty and fifty million 
people, was not known to the world until the 1990s.
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world growth was leading to inadequate, indeed in some places near-zero, 
increases in productive employment. The World Bank’s chief economist, 
Hollis Chenery, estimated that ‘a decade of rapid growth in underdeveloped 
countries has been of little benefit to perhaps a third of their population’ 
(Chenery et al. 1975, p. xiii).
This awareness brought about a reappraisal of development policy—in 
the Bank under its new president, Robert McNamara; amongst like-minded 
donor agencies, and amongst governments and, incipiently, NGOs in devel-
oping countries. This reappraisal (much of the intellectual substance of 
which is to be found in the World Bank/IDS document Redistribution with 
Growth (Chenery et al. 1975)) had two main axes, which correspond to 
the two dimensions of pro-poor action delineated earlier. In terms of the 
optimality criterion, we encounter through the 1970s a shift towards ‘pro-
poor spending policies’, especially in favour of agriculture and in particular 
smallholder agriculture, implemented through new modalities such as inte-
grated rural development projects—but also, in urban expenditure policies, 
a recognition of the economic importance of the informal sector and a shift 
towards policies for the benefit of low-income people such as site and service 
housing schemes. However, the Bank, correctly acknowledging the impor-
tance of the political–economy dimension, also took the further step of ask-
ing under what circumstances pro-poor expenditures and tax policies would 
be feasible (Bell 1975). Bell noted two important channels, beyond altruism, 
why a self-interested elite might wish to adopt pro-poor policies, namely the 
desire to buy off a rebellion of the dispossessed and the need of an insecure 
elite to bolster its position by finding allies—who might in some cases be 
found amongst the poor (Bell 1975, pp. 54–5)—motives which we character-
ize respectively as the precautionary and the reactive motivations for pro-poor 
action (Mosley 2013). In practical terms these ideas were embodied into 
the Bank’s spending programmes through measures such as land reform, 
especially in Latin America, and financial support for the informal sector 
(Chenery et al. 1975: especially  chapters 4, 6, and 7). These ideas have abid-
ing relevance to the construction of an inclusive, pro-poor fiscal research 
programme.
Much, though not all, of the pro-poor thrust of the 1970s was aborted 
by the global recession of the 1980s, and by the tide of liberalization and 
retrenchment that stemmed from it. But the retreat from the ‘poverty 
focus’ policies of the McNamara era, of course, proved to be only tempo-
rary. What began in the 1980s as a protest against the social costs of adjust-
ment (Cornia et al. 1987) was to grow into one of the most influential of the 
World Development Reports (World Bank 1990), which rested its analysis of 
poverty on a ‘three-legged stool’—labour-intensive policies, investment in 
the human capital of the poor, and social safety nets. This was no ordinary 
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humanitarian manifesto, but eventually grew, through the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), into a global anti-poverty crusade (Hulme 
2010). The idea of poverty reduction, or putting it more positively ‘inclusive 
development’ remains, twenty years later, the primary goal of international 
development efforts.
What Types of Expenditures and Taxation Will  
Have the Strongest Effect on Poverty Reduction?
Public Expenditure
Appended to the World Bank’s 1990 World Development Report (WDR) was a 
new wave of analytical work on poverty reduction, of which a particularly 
significant component was Ferroni and Kanbur’s paper (1990) on ‘Poverty-
Conscious Restructuring of Public Expenditure’. Ferroni and Kanbur divide 
the ‘poverty impact’ of a specific anti-poverty initiative, or expenditure 
on a specific sector, into three elements: gross impact, poverty focus (the 
proportion of persons affected who are poor), and the social valuation (the 
assessor’s weighting between different criteria of well-being). Ferroni and 
Kanbur’s work signals a new stage in the analysis of distributional impacts of 
expenditure, with gross impact decomposed into production and consump-
tion components, the pathways of impact formally specified and, even at 
the beginning of the 1990s, sensitivity shown to the existence of multiple 
poverties each of which might require a different response. The commonest 
way of developing this approach has been not to look at public expenditure 
as a whole, but to focus on a particular anti-poverty idea, from malaria eradi-
cation to agricultural extension to village savings and loan associations, or 
a particular expenditure programme, or sector of the economy, and apply-
ing some variant of the Ferroni–Kanbur analysis to that. In what follows we 
shall concentrate on studies of the developmental and poverty impact of 
four sectors of expenditure: agriculture; human capital (health and educa-
tion); social protection and subsidy; and military expenditure. In conclusion 
we shall summarize the studies which compare across different categories of 
public expenditure.
Agriculture
Because most of the poorest people live in rural areas and derive livelihoods 
only from agriculture and agriculture-related labour, it follows almost axi-
omatically that the major route to poverty reduction in most areas (except-
ing Latin America, where much poverty is urban rather than rural) is an 
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increase in agricultural productivity, and expenditures which will make that 
possible. This was acknowledged by the first great development economist, 
Arthur Lewis (1953), in a report on the industrialization of Ghana which can 
be read as a forewarning of the flaws in Ghana’s own import-substituting 
industrialization strategy;4 it was reiterated in Ferroni and Kanbur’s review 
of poverty-conscious expenditure strategies, which argues that ‘agriculture 
is a key sector to be promoted, since no other sector is capable of compara-
bly participatory growth’ (1990, p. 5); and more recently it has been given 
quantitative teeth by a series of studies mounted under the auspices of the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), which focus on India 
and China (Fan et al. 2000; Fan et al. 2004; Fan 2008). The IFPRI study of 
India by Fan et al. (2000) finds that investment in rural roads and in agricul-
tural research achieve far and away the most significant impacts on poverty, 
with education in a fairly distant third place and ‘other investments, includ-
ing irrigation, soil and water conservation, health, and rural community 
development, achieving only modest impacts on growth and poverty per 
additional rupee spent’ (Fan et al. 2000, p. 1038). Feeder roads and agricul-
tural research, Fan et al. argue, achieve big impacts because they impact 
on poverty through multiple channels: by increasing food production, by 
reducing the price of food grains to urban consumers, and by improving 
the distribution of income (Fan et al. 2000, p. 1040). In China (Fan et al. 
2004) the results similarly show that the impact of agricultural research on 
poverty is crucially important, especially in the remote western areas where 
the worst poverty still persists. However, by contrast with India, they find 
education to be an even more powerful way of reducing poverty in rural 
areas. As in India, investment in irrigation and in dedicated area-based pov-
erty reduction programmes are found to have an insignificant effect on pov-
erty. The only African country investigated by the IFPRI studies is Uganda, 
and there also (Fan and Rao 2008) agricultural research is the dominant 
poverty-reducing influence, with feeder roads and education once again 
significant negative influences on poverty, although with a much less dra-
matic effect than research spending.5 Because of data problems, studies of 
the impact of public expenditure in Africa are relatively sparse by compari-
son with Asia and Latin America. However, across four case-study countries 
of Africa (Uganda, Ethiopia, Malawi, and Zimbabwe), Mosley and Suleiman 
(2007) find, in similar vein to the IFPRI studies, that infrastructure and 
4 ‘The surest way to industrialise the Gold Coast would be to multiply by four or five the 
resources available to the [Agriculture] department for fundamental research into food produc-
tion’ (Lewis 1953, para. 24).
5 The number of poor reduced per million Ugandan shillings of public expenditure is given 
as follows: agricultural research and development, 58.39; feeder roads, 33.77; education, 12.81 
(Fan and Rao 2008, pp. 82–3).
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education spending are an important influence on rural poverty in addition 
to direct spending on agriculture. In addition, the Mosley and Suleiman 
study finds that the stability of pro-agriculture expenditure, as well as its 
level, is a significant influence on rural poverty levels.
Health and Education
Since the Redistribution with Growth studies of the 1970s the World Bank has 
been enthusiastic about human capital spending as a potential route out 
of the ‘Baldwin trap’,6 providing, in principle, both a way of increasing the 
productivity of the rural poor in the short term and, in the medium term, 
paving the way for the possibility of small-scale-based industrialization for 
export (e.g. Chenery et al. 1975, chapter IV). Reflecting this, aid donors have 
moved a large part of their incremental disbursements in pursuit of the 
MDGs away from project aid (physical capital) and towards human capi-
tal, in the shape of technical assistance expenditures designed to build the 
human capital of the poor. Both in relation to education and health, how-
ever, the Bank has warned that in order to achieve maximum rates of return, 
as well as in order to reduce poverty, it is necessary to slant the pattern of 
public spending towards primary education and health, and away from uni-
versities and referral hospitals (e.g. World Bank 1990, 1991, 1995a7). Health 
and education also were included in the IFPRI comparative review of pub-
lic expenditure and poverty (Fan et al. 2004), which finds that the Bank’s 
warnings were well founded. ‘The distributional effect of expenditures is 
low’, they report (Coady 2008, p. 125). The benefits of public expenditures 
were found to be progressive in only three or four out of twelve countries 
analysed (i.e. Argentina, Uruguay, Malaysia, and Chile). However, where 
education and health were administered, as especially in Latin America, 
through means-tested conditional cash transfers (e.g. Oportunidades, for-
merly PROGRESA, in Mexico and Bolsa Familia in Brazil), the results have 
been promising (Coady 2008, pp. 128, 136; de Britto 2008).8 The impact 
6 The ‘Baldwin trap’ is named after the path-breaking analysis of Robert Baldwin (1963), who 
argued that the two main strategies for development from a subsistence level both suffered from 
fatal flaws: mining generated potential spin-offs into industrialization but was capital-intensive 
and therefore generated few income opportunities for the mass of the population; whereas, 
conversely, smallholder agriculture generated multiple income opportunities for the mass of 
the population but few technological spin-offs.
7 The World Bank’s 1990 WDR (World Bank 1990, box 5.2) found the rate of return to pri-
mary education to be 26% across the developing world as a whole, compared with a return of 
16% to secondary education and 14% to tertiary education. Across a sample of two industrial-
ized and ten developing countries, the Bank’s 1991 WDR (table 3.2) finds that an additional 
year of schooling raises male wages by an average of 9% and female wages by an average of 13%.
8 In recent years a specialized literature has emerged on the form of the conditional cash 
transfer, with a particularly lively advocacy of school feeding programmes (Powell et al. 1998; 
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of conditional cash transfers in Latin America is also considered in detail by 
Haggard and Kaufman’s comprehensive study of welfare spending in mid-
dle-income countries (Haggard and Kaufman 2008, p. 216). The inference 
seems to be that in a number of developing-country environments, as in 
industrialized countries (where the principle is known as ‘Director’s Law’),9 
political pressures cause the benefits of health and education spending to 
be concentrated on the middle class and the poor to remain marginalized, 
unless effective targeting procedures are implemented. How these pressures 
arise and can be circumvented calls for more research, and we consider them 
further in the third section of this chapter.
Social Protection and Subsidy
Here we consider three kinds of public expenditure on subsidy, or transfer 
payment. Food subsidies, as shown by the Ferroni and Kanbur study and also 
by Coady (2008), emerge as not only an inefficient but not even an equita-
ble instrument of social protection, which have a deterrent effect on food 
production, and generally fail to reach vulnerable groups, partly because as 
in Côte d’Ivoire they are awarded principally on commodities such as wheat 
and rice which are not salient in the consumption of the poorest people. 
Other instruments of social protection expenditure are also examined by Coady 
et al. (2004), Barrientos and Hulme (2008), and Coady (2008), including 
social funds, cash transfers, and rural public works. In Coady’s sample, the 
average degree of targeting effectiveness, or poverty focus, which as we have 
seen was 0.93 for food subsidies, is measured as 1.2 for social funds, 1.4 for 
cash transfers, and 1.85 for public works. Thus, in these cases, social protec-
tion expenditures were at least doing their fundamental job of redistributing 
from richer to poorer, and in the case of cash transfers some of the reasons 
for this relative success have been examined above. But the most successful of 
all are an ancient expedient, public works, used indeed by industrialized coun-
tries to avert famine in the nineteenth century.10 An important reason for the 
targeting effectiveness of such schemes is that they make abundant use of 
what is often the only thing that poor people are able to sell—labour. Because 
Daelmans et  al. 2003; De Britto emphasizes that, although conditional cash transfers are a 
valuable expedient, they do not reduce poverty on their own, and complementary actions to 
stabilize the macroeconomy and remove deeply rooted inequalities are often also necessary 
(2008, p.191)).
9 After the American political scientist Aaron Director, who ‘almost a decade ago . . . pro-
posed a law of public expenditures: Public expenditures are made for the primary benefit of the 
middle classes, and financed with taxes which are borne in considerable part by the poor and 
rich’ (Stigler 1970, p. 1).
10 For example, several of the main roads of northwest Scotland such as that from Dingwall to 
Ullapool were ‘destitution roads’, built in the late 1840s, an extension of those built by Thomas 
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the wage offered on such schemes is low, they are able to ‘self-target’—only 
the poor wish to take up such employment offers, and therefore no expen-
sive arrangements are required to achieve effective targeting. Public works 
programmes are particularly useful in addressing vulnerability and at times 
of emergency. As Coady (2008b, p. 153) notes, ‘community involvement has 
been found to be important in increasing overall effectiveness’, and this of 
course raises issues of intra-community political motivation and incentives. 
We return to this issue in the third section of this chapter.
Input subsidies have, as discussed in our historical review, been used since 
the nineteenth century both as an instrument for accelerating the rate of 
industrial development and, indeed, for rebalancing the whole pattern of 
growth from consumption towards investment. Rigorous studies of the spe-
cific developmental effectiveness of input subsidies are surprisingly scarce, 
but it appears likely that, especially among smallholders, they played an 
important part both in accelerating the rate of adoption of new technology 
by smallholders and thereby in reducing rural poverty in South East Asia.11 
In Africa, growth has been less than in Asia, fiscal constraints bite more 
tightly and subsidy is a less feasible option failing the possibility of collu-
sion with aid donors, and largely for this reason12 less use has been made 
of agricultural-input subsidy as an instrument of raising productivity and 
reducing poverty. Two places where this instrument, exceptionally, has been 
employed are Ghana and Malawi, and we believe that a great deal can be 
learned from both experiences. In both cases the input subsidized has been 
fertilizer, a key element in agricultural productivity.
The political and economic contexts differ greatly between the two cases. 
In Ghana, fertilizer subsidy is only available for growers of the country’s 
main cash crop, cocoa. Cocoa productivity, especially during the middle 
2000s, has increased sharply; and poverty during the period 1990 to 2005 
has halved, in large part because of increased labour demand driven by this 
expansion of cocoa production (Nsowah-Nuamah et  al. 2010). However, 
even though fertilizer subsidies in Ghana are now targeted through the use 
of a voucher system, with the intention of progressivity,13 and even though 
Telford in the earlier part of the century, to obviate the risk of a famine amongst rural subsist-
ence cultivators such as had occurred in Ireland in 1846. See Devine (1995) and Richards (2002).
11 On the role of subsidies in bringing about growth with equity in South East Asia see World 
Bank (1990); on subsidies and agricultural development strategy in China, see Fan, Zhang 
and Zhang (2002); on South Korea, see Moore (1985); on Indonesia, see Djurfeldt and Jirstrem 
(2004,  chapter 4); specifically on BIMAS, the programme of multiple input subsidies adopted by 
the Indonesian government in the 1970s, see Barker et al. (1985).
12 But also for political reasons, including the greater persistence of ‘urban bias’ (South Africa 
is a notable example, but Ghana is also a case in point).
13 ‘Almost all . . . fertiliser subsidies of the 21st century pronounce goals of being targeted to 
poor farmers’ (Banful 2011, p. 1168).
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Ghana has been spectacularly successful in making the transition to democ-
racy and reducing many dimensions of corruption, some observers see the 
allocation of fertilizer vouchers as having been politicized14 and, as a conse-
quence, still inefficient (Branoah-Banful 2011).
In Malawi, by contrast, subsidized fertilizer is applied principally to maize, 
the country’s main foodcrop, again in the form of vouchers which entitle 
the user to one 50kg bag of 23:21:0 (nitrogen: phosphate: potassium) basal 
fertilizer and one 50kg bag of urea, as part of a ‘Starter Pack’ input package, 
comprising new seeds as well as fertilizer, and designed to launch the small-
est-scale and most vulnerable farmers into the market (Harrigan 2003). The 
introduction of Starter Pack, prima facie, was highly effective, as it led to a 
sharp increase in production; the three-year average of maize yields has now 
risen to around 2 tons/hectare, or about twice the African average (Mosley 
2012,  chapter 5). The need to import maize has diminished greatly, with an 
export surplus in 2006/2007, providing additional food security; however, at 
the same time, the price of maize has increased, which has altered the pro-
file of poverty, decreasing it for producers but increasing it for consumers, 
especially consumers who do not have jobs or assets to draw on15 (Dorward 
and Chirwa 2011, p. 232). At the time of writing, Malawi had experienced 
major governance problems in 2010 and 2011 which put aid flows, and thus 
the continuance of the fertilizer subsidy, at risk, but there is hope, with the 
election of a new president in 2012, that these problems may have been 
resolved.
In both these cases, there is non-rigorous evidence that even the subsi-
dies currently in position have had an important role in raising produc-
tivity and, thereby, reducing poverty. However, in both cases political 
factors have had a leading role in the design of the subsidy package and 
some commentators have stated outright that the new, targeted, systems 
of input allocation by voucher are still politically tainted. We therefore 
believe that there is a strong case for a study of the political and economic 
rationale for agricultural-input subsidies, which examines the possibilities 
for increasing the effectiveness of input subsidies by making them ‘smarter’ 
and in particular by making them performance-based in a way that is con-
scious of the distortions which have entered the new voucher systems. Just 
as performance-based subsidies helped to create the developmental states 
of South Korea and Indonesia in the second half of the twentieth century, 
so we feel that the proto-developmental states of Africa in the twenty-first 
14 In particular, Banful (2011, p. 1166) alleges that ‘more vouchers were targeted to districts 
that the ruling party has lost in the previous presidential elections and more so in districts that 
had been lost by a higher percentage margin’.
15 Especially this has caused suffering in the south of the country in districts such as Ngabu, 
where a quasi-South Asian problem of landlessness is beginning to emerge.
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could be assisted by a better understanding of what this instrument of eco-
nomic policy has achieved and could achieve.
Taxation
The incidence of taxation on the poor has been very thinly studied: a 2001 
report to DFID (Gemmell and Morrissey 2001, p. 1) records that ‘poverty 
and/or inequality considerations have received little if any attention in 
LDC tax reforms’, and indeed there exists something of a conventional 
wisdom, with which we disagree, which suggests that fiscal redistribution 
should only be carried out on the expenditure and not on the tax side. 
Some of the few studies of this issue that have been done, both officially by 
the IMF (e.g. Cubero and Hollar 2010, on Central America) and by NGOs 
(e.g. Lashari and Sharpe, 2011, on Pakistan) suggest that the incidence of 
taxation as a whole is regressive, for familiar political reasons: the rich in 
developing countries, because of their control over power-structures, global 
reach, and knowledge, are very good at tax evasion, and more broadly 
at manipulating governments so that they are not even required to pay 
taxes. The valuable work on taxation of the two DFID RPCs so far estab-
lished, the Centre for the Future State (CFS) and the Crisis States Research 
Centre (CSRC), does not get to grips with this research gap. Here, we take 
a case-study approach to five countries comparatively: three African cases 
(Ghana, Uganda, and Zambia) and two Latin American cases (Bolivia and 
Argentina). The thrust of the argument is that although, indeed, there is a 
tendency for LDC tax systems to be regressive, this tendency has been suc-
cessfully resisted in a number of countries through the incorporation into 
elite bargains of a number of imaginative ideas which suggest that it may 
be good politics to be pro-poor.
African Cases: Uganda, Ghana, and Zambia
In Uganda, Ghana, and indeed all the African countries which developed on a 
basis of African smallholder exports,16 the colonial authorities originated in the 
1930s and 1940s, as described earlier, the practice of diverting a portion of the 
on-farm price of export crops away from farmers and into the country’s treas-
ury to finance development—a practice which was continued after independ-
ence in the 1960s. The proportion thus retained varied according to the state 
of the international market but in some boom years rose to over 90 per cent of 
the export price. This rake-off was never described by governments of the time 
16 ‘Peasant export economies’ as described by Myint (1976); this economic structure also 
developed in Malaysia, Indonesia, and other countries of South and South East Asia.
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as a tax, rather as a ‘development levy’ or equivalent phrase,17 but so effectively 
did it function as one that, in Uganda at the end of the 1980s, three-quarters 
of the government’s total public revenue was accounted for by export duties on 
coffee alone. All exports other than coffee were wiped out by this export taxa-
tion,18 which at the same time, being targeted on labour-intensive and mostly 
low-income rural producers, was highly regressive.
In 1991, Uganda grasped the nettle of eliminating the export tax and cre-
ating in its place a structure of import duties, initially at high rates which 
were then gradually lowered over the later part of the 1990s. In the pro-
cess, the structure of taxation has been shifted from one almost exclusively 
targeted on smallholder rural producers, the majority of whom were poor 
at the beginning of the 1990s, to one much more oriented towards urban 
consumers, a good number of whom are well off. Thus not only has the 
‘tax trap’ been sprung, but sprung in a pro-poor manner: Chen et al. (2001) 
show that the tax changes of the 1990s led to an increase in the progressiv-
ity of the tax system in Uganda.19 In Ghana, the process of liberalization, 
again by contrast with Uganda, has involved not the total removal of the 
export tax but rather its gradual easing to a level of about one-third of the 
export price, by comparison with 80 per cent at the beginning of the 1980s. 
Notwithstanding this, there has been a distinct reduction, since the end of 
the 1980s, of Ghana’s dependence on primary exports for its revenue and a 
reduction in particular of the fiscal pressure on the cocoa producer, which 
suited well the political imperatives bearing on the PNDC (later NDC) gov-
ernments of Ghana in the 1990s, namely above all to capture and retain 
support in rural areas.20 Much more than in Uganda, the diversification of 
tax revenue has been not just into the building up of VAT revenue but also 
into collections of direct tax from individuals as well as companies.21 There 
17 Governments still using this system of taxation in the 1980s included, in addition to 
Uganda and Ghana, Cameroon, Benin, Togo, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Congo, and Congo DRC; 
see Mosley and Chiripanhura (2009).
18 ‘For example, tea production fell from a peak of 20,000 tons in the early 1970s to around 
2,000 tons by the early 1980s, and cotton production fell from 87,000 tons to 2,000 tons’ 
Reinikka and Collier (2001, p. 31).
19 See Chen et al. (2001). Liberalization of taxes on smallholder exports has in other African 
countries with a similar productive structure (in particular Cameroon, Benin, Togo, Madagascar, 
and Côte d’Ivoire) had a much lesser impact on poverty. We investigate this difference in pov-
erty impacts in Mosley and Chiripanhura (2009) and give, provisionally, three reasons for 
it: better infrastructure, enabling the benefits of crop-price liberalization to be transmitted to 
small-scale producers; better chemistry with the aid donors, enabling a more stable and produc-
tive flow of aid money; and, deriving from this, a more pro-poor expenditure pattern, which 
built upon a pro-poor asset structure inherited from colonial times (Bowden and Mosley 2012).
20 ‘The NDC . . . was aware that it was not especially popular in the cities where structural 
adjustment had produced the greatest pain, but it also knew that the elections would be won 
and lost in the countryside’ (Nugent 2001, p. 410).
21 In 2003, tax collections from the personal sector in Uganda were 19 billion shillings out of 
total direct tax revenue of 276 billion shillings, or 6.8%. In Ghana they were 1,535 million cedis 
out of total direct tax revenue of 3,401 billion, or 45% (Mosley 2012, table 5.6).
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has even been a broadening of taxation into previously untapped bases such 
as the informal sector (Joshi and Ayee 2008).
By contrast with Uganda and even Ghana, Zambia’s economy and there-
fore its tax system is much more heavily dependent on mining. The President, 
Levy Mwanawasa, imposed a new windfall tax in 2008 on the profits of 
the copper companies, explicitly earmarked to be spent on social protection 
expenditures (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2009, p. 65; Lungu 2009), which 
was suspended in 2009 and then restored in 2011 in the form of a 3 per 
cent duty on mineral royalties, proceeds from which were earmarked 20 per 
cent for government spending on health and education22 and 20 per cent for 
local councils, with the balance going to community development. In other 
words, Zambia, having embarked on a promising quasi-Latin American path 
(some Latin American cases are considered below) of linkage between wind-
fall export taxes and social protection, now appears to be experiencing a 
‘mineral taxation political business cycle’. It would clearly be to the advan-
tage of investment and poverty reduction if this cycle could be stabilized, 
and we believe that a great deal can be learned from the experience of Latin 
American countries, including Argentina, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador, 
which have also experimented with export taxation partly or wholly ear-
marked for progressive expenditures and in particular social protection. Taxes 
of this sort have for the last decade been an important element in providing 
an economic and social basis for the anti-neoliberal, left-of-centre political 
movement known in Latin America as neodesarrollismo: of course they repre-
sent a direct challenge to the ‘Washington Consensus’ which is based on the 
opening of closed economies and, since exports are seen by the Consensus 
as the key to growth, on the removal rather than the imposition of taxes on 
exports. Much more covertly and with less use of anti-Washington rhetoric 
than Latin America, several African countries have also experimented with 
earmarked export taxes of this sort, again with progressive and sometimes 
also with decentralizing intentions. These countries include Zambia, as dis-
cussed above; Ghana, whose attachment of cocoa export duties to ‘new-style’ 
import subsidies was also earlier described; and Mauritius, where taxes on 
sugar exports until the 1990s23 played a major part in achieving the tran-
sition from a primary product-based economy and tax system to a more 
diversified economy (Bräutigam 2008,  chapter 6). Bräutigam describes the 
political and governance advantages of the Mauritian export taxes as follows:
Although the sugar industry benefited from extensive rents . . . these rents never 
became a resource curse, because they were earned by the tens of thousands of 
22 The Courier, issue no. XXIII (May/June 2011).
23 In 1994, the sugar export tax was replaced with a value-added tax on consumption.
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sugar planters, collected by the government through the export tax and used 
to build capacity in the state and in society. The export tax helped the private 
sector to organise, and it built their capacity to interact with the government. 
It helped both state and society to solve some of the collective action dilem-
mas they faced in building skills and supporting research on sugar. It served to 
underpin the demands by taxpayers for voice and for state employment, leading 
to a state that was unusually democratic and with an unusually high propor-
tion of local officials at independence. (Bräutigam 2008, p. 158; emphasis in 
original)
The significance of this achievement, of course, does not relate to tax struc-
tures only. Mauritius is the closest thing to a developmental state in Africa: 
much closer than the more analysed cases of Botswana and South Africa, 
neither of which has been able to achieve a breakout into export-based 
manufacturing. These results have not been achieved by adherence to the 
Washington Consensus, but through a structure of performance-based pro-
tection which closely approximates the model of the East Asian develop-
mental states (Gulhati and Nallari 1990). Indeed, although most progress 
towards the remaking of the ‘Washington Consensus’ has consisted of a 
broadening of the range of policy instruments rather than of new theory, we 
believe that if it turns out to be possible, under this programme, to design 
‘smart’ export taxes which deal with the revenue problem, the distributional 
problem, and the incentive problem at the same time, orthodox trade theory, 
which outlaws export taxes, will have to be remade. Of course, the politics 
associated with export taxes on minerals, as in Zambia and Latin America, 
differs from the politics associated with export taxes on primary exports, as 
in Ghana and Mauritius. We develop this point further later.
Although the general political advantages of export taxation of this sort 
have been discussed by a number of commentators,24 no study of any coun-
try, to our knowledge, has yet analysed their distributional impact, nor has 
any study examined the potential trade-offs between short-term political 
and distributional impact and long-term impact on distribution and growth, 
and whether this trade-off can be finessed in any way.
We may summarize this discussion of pro-poor expenditure and taxation 
options as follows:
1. The main sectors of public expenditure where there is evidence of 
high leverage on poverty globally are agriculture (and specifically 
24 In particular, the IMF has become very interested in the issues associated with export taxa-
tion of minerals including oil (Hossain 2003; Sala-i-Martin and Subramaniam 2003; Daniel 
et al. 2010; IMF 2011: appendix VII). But in general, its analysis is of taxation only, and not of 
taxation linked to public expenditure; nor are the political consequences of different incidences 
of taxation and expenditure, and their political impacts on political stability, factored in.
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agricultural research and development), rural infrastructure (and spe-
cifically rural roads, including emergency social protection expendi-
ture), and primary education. Increases in military expenditure have a 
negative impact on poverty.
2. Putting these things together, pro-poor expenditure has a positive 
impact on poverty and aid effectiveness. Research is needed to under-
stand the way in which input subsidies can be configured in a ‘smart’ 
manner so as to reduce poverty in a targeted manner whilst at the same 
time maximizing investment.
3. The instability of expenditure, as well as its composition, impacts 
on the well-being of the poor. Research is needed on how elements 
of public expenditure and the influences on it, such as overseas aid, 
impact on expenditure instability, and on how such instability could 
be mitigated.
4. Information on the distributional impact of taxation is particularly 
thin. In some cases, precisely because the political thrust of taxation 
in colonial and post-colonial times was urban-biased and anti-poor, 
the reforms of the 1990s can be seen even without elaborate analysis as 
pro-poor.
5. The imposition of taxes on large-scale corporations, and the removal 
of exemptions, is, providing that it does not damage investment, 
good for poverty reduction; as illustrated by reductions in poverty 
consequent on amendments to the export tax regime both in Africa 
(Ghana, Uganda, and Zambia at least) and Latin America (Argentina, 
Bolivia, and Ecuador). In the case where these corporations deplete 
non-renewable natural resources, such taxes provide an environmental 
as well as a poverty dividend.
6. Building on point 5 of this list, it is important to research the impact 
of linkages between export taxation on large companies and the kind 
of targeted pro-poor payments described above, and the implications of 
‘smart’ export taxes of this sort for trade and development theory.
How Do Pro-poor Coalitions Form and Hold Together?
The very idea of ‘pro-poor political action’ is a little paradoxical because, 
as individuals, poor people have little ability to change the world by influ-
encing others; nor, as we have discussed, do they anywhere form a coher-
ent or united class with an idea of their common interests and the ability 
to advance them as a group (Bell 1975, p. 53; Haggard et al. 1996, p. 120). 
Often, indeed, as recent surveys have pointed out, the interests of different 
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groups within the poor are in fact opposed.25 And yet, political action on 
behalf of the poor has often been successful, witness the dramatic fall in 
poverty that has occurred over the last twenty years,26 which has benefited 
not only the urban groups where development theories of the 1960s and 
1970s assumed that power in developing countries was concentrated (Lipton 
1977), but poor rural people also. How has this happened?
Our story emerges from the two answers originally given by Bell (1975, p. 53):
1. The precautionary motive: the elite may fear that, unless they incorporate 
the poor in their policymaking, they will be pushed out of power. As DFID 
note (2011, p. 13) ‘exclusionary politics are associated with high levels 
of violence and poor development outcomes’, and the elite, perceiving 
this, may choose to pre-empt such outcomes by means of inclusive pol-
icies. However, if inclusion is wise and exclusion is foolish, even from 
the point of view of self-preservation, the question then arises why so 
many elite leaders opt for exclusion rather than inclusion (amongst 
twenty-first-century examples, Indonesia under Suharto 1997–2000, 
Bolivia under Sanchez de Losada 2003, and now Libya, Egypt, and 
Syria 2011–13 are relevant cases). As shown by Hesselbein (2011) the 
elite bargain is by no means always an inclusive one, and the decision 
to be inclusive is a gamble; we need to understand better why those 
who take the conciliatory rather than the hawkish option choose to do 
so.
2. The reactive motive: the elite may be weak, unable to govern on its own with-
out support, and look to the poor for support. In cases where (1) does not 
apply, a weak elite may nonetheless decide that a coalition is the best 
bet since they reason that otherwise they cannot hold on to power,27 
and this focuses our attention on when it is a low-income group that 
is sought out to be a member of that coalition, and what enables coali-
tions with low-income groups to endure rather than collapse.
Most of the literature which speaks to these hypotheses is of a case-study, 
rather than a globally comparative, nature28—there is still very little material 
25 The most eloquent demonstration of this is by Anirudh Krishna (2009, p. 954), who shows, 
with the help of data from Andhra Pradesh, that the entrepreneurial poor who expect to escape from 
poverty soon tend to make fiscal demands on the state which correspond to their expected future 
livelihood (including demands for education, transport, and other infrastructure such as irrigation), 
whereas the newly poor make different demands, in particular for better health care, whereas the 
chronic or persistent poor make demands which are different again, in particular wage labour.
26 See Hulme (2010).
27 As noted by DFID (2011, p. 64): ‘It is usually broad based coalitions, not just “the poor” or 
“civil society” that bring about change.’ The remarks by Krishna about variations in motivation 
amongst the poor are also relevant here.
28 Case-study literature which examines the scope for forming pro-poor coalitions includes 
the essay on Tanzania by Therkildsen (2008) which argues that the ruling party, CCM, can be 
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on what causes weak elites to look to poorer groups to consolidate their posi-
tion, and what factors successfully enable them to do that.29
In Mosley (2012) we show that elites, even if they do not directly identify 
with the interests of lower-income groups, may still see them as enough 
of a threat (Indonesia and Russia) or a potential asset (Uganda, Bolivia, 
Argentina, Ghana) to implement policies which have those lower income 
groups’ interests in mind. We also know that, in some cases, recent experi-
ence of conflict (Uganda, Bolivia, Argentina, and Indonesia) or simply of 
economic underperformance and political turbulence (Ghana) can serve as 
a salutary shock which crystallizes a decision by the policy authorities to 
work within a more inclusive institutional and decision-making framework. 
However, the sample from which our observations are drawn is quite small, 
and biased towards countries who have been successful in learning from 
experience, which argues for caution in making inferences.30
However, one gap in our knowledge is pretty clear. This is that, although 
Argentina, Bolivia, Uganda, Ghana, and Indonesia may have learned effec-
tively from misery in the 1990s and 2000s, other countries confronted with 
identical shocks have not done so, and we do not yet know why. Within the 
fiscal area, we therefore need to research why elites, confronted with a chal-
lenge to their authority:
– sometimes ‘take the risk’ of sending tax and expenditure signals which 
are intended to be inclusionary, and sometimes not;
– sometimes send institutional signals (e.g. the creation of the 
Argentinian Mesa de Dialogo, and the Bolivian Asemblea Constituyente) 
which are intended to be inclusionary, and sometimes not.
To send a signal, of course, is not a guarantee that it will be accepted, and if we 
are to understand why coalitions form, we also need to understand not only 
why representatives of low-income groups, on receiving such a signal, decide to 
regarded as ‘a pro-poor distributional coalition’, and this author’s essays on politics of poverty 
reduction (Mosley 2012, 2013).
29 Studies which have attempted to generalize concerning the factors which cause weak elites 
to look to the poor for support remain uncommon. One study which does attempt this is the 
paper by Moore and Putzel (2001), which insists that there is scope to increase the political 
capabilities of the poor at the macro (central government), meso (sectoral or regional), and 
micro (project) levels, and in particular emphasizes that the poor and middle-income strata 
often have common interests. This point has been taken up by observers especially in Latin 
America, such as Schneider (2004), who additionally argues that innovation in the formation of 
coalitions is more likely to come about in circumstances of economic crisis ‘because the status 
quo is seen as intolerable’, an observation borne out by our discussion of the cases of Argentina, 
Bolivia, and Uganda below. On Latin America, see also the papers by Birdsall et al. (2011) and 
Lopez-Calva and Lustig (2010).
30 A particular merit of Hesselbein’s analysis of elite bargains (2011) is that she examines cases 
of states which have fallen apart, such as Afghanistan and the DRC, as well as the usual cast of 
success cases.
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accept it or reject it. In other words, our research needs to try and understand the 
bargaining process which leads to a political settlement, and thereby to frame 
workable generalizations about what kind of atmosphere leads to an inclusive 
political settlement in which fragile coalitions can become stronger. In terms of 
likely explanatory variables, this requires us to investigate the role of:
1. Inequality, ‘especially horizontal’, as stated by DFID’s review of politics 
and governance research (DFID 2011, p. 34). Langer (2009, pp. 544–5) 
shows that the possibility of violent political mobilization in north-
ern Ghana was obviated by the efforts made by successive (southern-
based) regimes to conciliate the north and in particular to encourage 
the political inclusion of the northern elites. He draws an explicit par-
allel with Côte d’Ivoire, where the northern elites were excluded rather 
than coopted and where there has been severe conflict from 2002 to 
the beginning of the current year (Langer 2009, p. 545).
2. Democratic political institutions. Ghana and Mozambique are the 
prime African illustrations of this, and the theme connects in an obvi-
ous way to institutions and legitimacy.31
How Can Bottom Billion Countries Escape from the 
Low-tax, Low-income, Weak State Trap? (And the Role  
of Aid in this Trap)
We conclude by examining the politics of the ‘tax trap’, which is the prob-
lem that weak states have weak tax systems, and so cannot easily afford 
the spending which is required to strengthen the state. As shown by Moore 
(1999) the lowest-income (‘bottom billion’) group of countries have not only 
the lowest tax ratios but also, very possibly because they dare not embark on 
the politically risky measures required to increase them, the lowest rate of 
increase of tax revenue. Without escape from this trap, of course, there is no 
possibility of building a developmental state.
However, escape from the trap is possible. We have seen this in the sec-
ond section of this chapter, in our discussion of Ghana and Uganda. These 
countries, in spite of being low-income countries with an average per capita 
income of around $500, nonetheless managed to more than double their 
tax ratios between 1990 and the present,32 and then to convert that into a 
31 DFID, however, warn (p. 14) that ‘elections may not be an effective vehicle to achieve last-
ing elite bargains’.
32 The tax ratio of Uganda was just under 5% in the late 1980s, but increased from this to a 
stable level of about 12% by the mid-2000s, at which point it has stalled (as discussed further 
below). In Ghana, the tax ratio increased from 11% to 22% between 1990 and 2007. Data from 
IMF Government Expenditure Statistics.
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pattern of public expenditure which yielded rapid pro-poor growth (Osei 
et  al. 2005; Stotsky and Woldemariam 1997; Gupta 2007). What enabled 
them, and other such exceptional cases, to do this? In particular, did they 
confront the political risks associated with increasing the ratio of tax rev-
enue to national income, or did they find a way of finessing those risks?
In Table 3.1, we categorize developing countries by income and tax ratio. The 
poorest countries, on average, have the lowest tax ratios (about 13 per cent, by 
contrast with almost twice that in the upper-middle-income category), but the 
dispersion around the average tax ratio in the bottom income group is con-
siderable, and we now focus on the ‘outliers’ in the lowest-income group: the 
ones who, although poor, have been able to escape from the low-tax trap. 
These include, in addition to Ghana and Uganda, Kenya and Zambia.
A key determinant of success for the poorest countries has been ability to 
escape from a limited tax structure dominated by trade taxes. In colonial times, 
the revenue base of developing countries was derived mainly from duties 
on exports and imports, which were the simplest revenue source to admin-
ister. Forty years after the end of colonialism, revenue from trade taxes still 
accounts for around half of all state revenue in many bottom billion countries, 
and this has been a major constraint on development, as the commodities 
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which are most salient in the trade of developing countries have low income 
elasticities, hence revenue from them cannot be expanded rapidly as the 
economy expands; also, because their prices are volatile, tax revenue derived 
from this source is unstable, which is damaging both for the effectiveness of 
public expenditure and for political stability (Greenaway and Milner 1993). 
Therefore, a crux for expanding the tax base is the ability to diversify out of 
trade taxes into a broader mix of revenue sources, in particular taxes on sales, 
income, and capital. This structural shift was more effectively achieved by 
the four ‘outliers’ than by low-income countries as a whole. (It still has a long 
way to go: e.g. in most of low-income Africa and Latin America, taxation on 
capital assets has made very little progress.)
The ‘outliers’, of course, like the rest of the world, had to find a way round 
political opposition to the introduction of new taxes, and the fascinating 
question for future research is how this was achieved. We have already 
observed three ways in which this was done:
– sequencing of new taxes so that they were brought in at times when 
taxpayers were, as much as they would ever be, in a receptive mood 
because they have just received broad-based cuts in real income, some 
of them consisting of cuts in trade taxes. Thus, there was little political 
opposition to the wide diffusion of value added tax (VAT) in Uganda 
and Ghana in the 1990s, because at the beginning of the decade 
producers of export crops (cocoa in Ghana and coffee and cotton 
in Uganda) had received a substantial dividend from an increase in 
on-farm prices consequent on reduction in export taxation on those 
crops. This in turn derives from the fact that Uganda and Ghana, 
in the late 1980s and 1990s, achieved political settlements in which 
smallholder producers were very well represented;
– earmarking of taxes to expenditure, in particular to social security 
(Argentina, Bolivia, Zambia, also Mauritius, which made the link 
between tax payment and the receipt of benefits visible and justifiable 
to taxpayers);
– introduction of a progressive rhetoric and ethos into the tax system which 
encouraged compliance (the approach previously described as ‘tax 
signals’, in which the link between tax payments and the benefits 
derived from expenditure is publicized and illustrated, and the social 
contract between taxpayers and the state is presented as a necessary 
part of the construction of a developmental state).
In addition to these three approaches, experiments have been made in tap-
ping new taxes by initiating a dialogue between taxpayers and government, 
as described for the case of the Ghanaian informal sector by Joshi and Ayee 
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(2008). Beyond changes in tax rates and bases, complementary policies are 
relevant to explaining these levels of tax effort, for example, exchange rate 
flexibility: African countries with flexible rates have been much more suc-
cessful than countries with fixed rates in generating increases in tax rev-
enue. Equity is also as a background factor which encourages compliance, 
just as it encourages the achievement of political stability (see third section 
of this chapter).
In many cases, the heavy lifting that made possible an increase in tax effort 
was achieved by reforms of institutional structure rather than by changes in 
policy. For example, the creation of independent revenue authorities, as we 
saw from our Latin American cases in the second section, have been asso-
ciated with increases in tax ratios. In Africa, the introduction of internal 
revenue authorities is more recent but is also making progress especially in 
‘outlier’ cases (Zambia, Uganda, Ghana; see Table 3.1). In addition, where 
closing of loopholes permitting rich people and corporations to go tax-free 
has been politically feasible (Kenya since 2002, Ghana), that has been very 
important not only in increasing revenue but in building a pro-compliance 
ethos (or social contract) that has facilitated further governance reforms.
So, on the evidence of Table 3.1, a part of the story is that in the coun-
tries we have identified as outliers, governments have escaped from the tax 
trap by finding it in their long-term interest to vary both the structure of 
taxation and its administrative environment. As part of the strategy used 
to achieve this, some agricultural taxation, as in Ghana, Uganda, and other 
countries based on smallholder exports, was radically cut. The pill of an 
increased average tax burden was sugared both by policy and administrative 
devices, and in both cases the establishment of an ethos of fairness was, we 
argue, of great importance.
But the question remains, why did some countries find it in their interest 
to broaden the tax base in this way, and others not? Underlying this question 
are two political developments of great importance of the last thirty years: 
the ability of some states (the ones conventionally treated as proto-develop-
mental states) to adopt a long-term time perspective, which acknowledges, 
for example, the value of building up a domestic tax base to finance devel-
opment expenditure rather than depending on aid flows; and the ability of 
these same states to construct elite bargains which, being broad-based, are 
able to stand up to rather than surrender to the special, often urban-based, 
interests whose dominance makes the state weak. These issues have been 
investigated on a case-study basis by, for example, Bräutigam et al. (2008), di 
John (2008), Hesselbein (2011), and Mosley (2012). However, there exists as 
yet no general story concerning the politics of building developmental states 
out of weak low-income states.
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Part of this process, of course, is the transformation of aid donors from 
a liability into an asset for the government revenue base, and this is by no 
means easy. In Bräutigam and Knack (2004) it is suggested that increased 
aid flows are associated not only with lower tax receipts but also with worse 
levels of another indicator of state capacity, namely the ICRG index of cor-
ruption. Grossman (1992) has also suggested that ‘by making control of the 
government a more valuable prize, aid may even increase political instabil-
ity’ (quoted in de Haan and Everest-Phillips 2007, p. 10). The line of thought 
that emerges from all this is that aid flows, whatever good they may do 
in the short term, may do harm in the long term by undermining institu-
tions. An argument of this sort can be used to underpin some disturbing 
recent findings about aid impact, for example the contention of Rajan and 
Subramaniam (2008) that aid and growth are not correlated, whatever the 
length of lag that is used.33 Indeed, the whole horizon of aid-effectiveness 
studies has recently become clouded, in part by this suggestion that aid may 
in some inescapable way undermine governance.
Does aid in fact undermine long-term fiscal capacity in this way? If this 
question could be answered this would contribute not only to our under-
standing of what determines tax capacity but to our broader understanding 
of the causes of poverty. In the background paper, Mosley (2011), we begin 
from one of the fundamental insights of the Haggard and Kaufman (2008) 
study—that tax capacity determines the ability of governments to finance 
social programmes and thus reduce poverty. To that idea we add two find-
ings from earlier on in this paper, namely that expenditure composition 
is important in determining poverty impact (2008, pp. 6–12) and that, as 
just discussed, the composition of taxation and in particular the ability of 
governments to diversify out of their traditional dependence on trade taxes 
may be important for determining governments’ ability to expand public 
revenue. These ideas can be assembled to generate Figure 3.1.
In common with de Haan and Everest-Phillips (2007) we feel it is impor-
tant to see donors as political agents, and we would add on the basis of the 
preceding discussion that it is important to see taxpayers also as political 
agents in order to understand the possibilities for escape from the tax trap 
and in particular the reasons why some very poor countries, in spite of the 
temptation to substitute aid for tax effort, spurn that temptation and man-
age to escape. We find that various political–economy factors, including 
the shock of recent conflict, the inclusiveness of the elite (as previously dis-
cussed) and the quality of the technical-assistance relationship with the IMF 
and other parties, help to determine tax effort, which in turn determines 
33 We stress that Rajan and Subramaniam do not use this argument to explain their findings. 
In Rajan and Subramaniam (2009) they suggest instead a Dutch-Disease causal mechanism.
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expenditure possibilities, which determines growth and the effectiveness of 
aid as in Figure 3.1. Our analysis, still highly provisional, indicates the fol-
lowing preliminary conclusions (Mosley 2011, tables 2–4):
1. Growth and poverty reduction capacity are influenced by the composi-
tion, as well as the level, of expenditure flows (following the argument 
of the second section of this chapter).
2. Expenditure capacity is influenced by revenue generated, holding con-
stant other determinants of expenditure ceilings including macro-
budget constraints, democracy, and strategy factors determining the 
ability to government to chart a palatable way around the inevitable 
opposition to increased taxes.
3. Tax revenue is determined, following the argument of this section, by 
tax composition and administrative capacity. It is also influenced by 
aid; however, the impact of aid on tax is much more complex than the 
simple crowding-out effect visualized by Bräutigam and Knack. The 
relationship is a two-way, interactive one, and its outcome is deter-
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Figure 3.1. Causal links in a model of aid, expenditure, and taxation
Source: Author.
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by the magnitude of two more positive impacts, namely the direct 
effect of technical assistance by donors into tax design, the strategy 
factors discussed in point 2 of this list, and the indirect effect of aid on 
tax revenues via growth.
4. Therefore, the size and composition of taxation and their consequent 
impact on public expenditure are crucial to understanding the impact 
of aid on growth, including that part of the impact which works 
through the link from aid to tax revenue. As it happens, we arrive, 
using plausible lag-structures, at a more optimistic estimate of the 
impact of aid on growth than do Rajan and Subramaniam. In com-
mon with other commentators such as Arndt et al. (2009) and Minoiu 
and Reddy (2010), we find a mildly positive long-run effect of aid on 
growth.
However, the crucial issue is not this soundbite, but the dependence of the 
size of the impact on fiscal behaviours. We hope that our exploration of 
these behaviours can help make aid donors, including DFID, more effective 
in their operations.
Conclusion
A key challenge within international development is how to identify the 
political processes which will enable developing countries to achieve 
improved access to services, and more committed and accountable states. 
This chapter has focused on the fiscal element of those processes, and has 
identified three major territories needing to be researched: effective target-
ing of public expenditure, the creation of coalitions which include the poor, 
and ways of exiting from the ‘low-tax, weak-state’ trap. Within these territo-
ries we have identified, having regard to ongoing complementary research, 
eight pieces of work which fill gaps in that research. Below we list these tasks 
in the form of propositions needing to be tested, and show how they emerge 
from the existing literature.
In the first territory, making public expenditure and taxation more pro-poor 
in their impact, we have seen that where markets for critical inputs fail, sub-
sidies which make those inputs available have been a critical tool in creat-
ing the developmental states, first of Japan and Brazil in the first half of 
the twentieth century, and then in the Far East in the second half. In bot-
tom billion countries, subsidies have been less effective; but they are now 
proving their worth. The challenge for the future (task 1) is to design them 
in forms which strengthen the state by allocating subsidy in forms which are 
‘smart’, that is, improve equity and efficiency at the same time. Another strand 
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we have observed in the expenditure literature is that, as noted in the case 
of Malawi, expenditure instability damages effectiveness and indeed may 
make the state itself more fragile. A part of making the state more stable 
in a political sense, indeed, consists (task 2) of making it more stable in an 
economic sense by reducing the volatility of government expenditure. Since, in 
bottom billion countries, a large part of public spending is financed by aid, 
this task inevitability brings the issue of controlling aid volatility into play.
In the last ten years there has been a great upsurge of literature on taxation 
and its role in securing the state and making it developmental. However, very 
little of this literature has been explicitly devoted to the redistributive role of 
taxation. The recent experience of Latin America in particular, has shown 
that export taxes, however, can both be revenue-increasing, progressive, and 
at the same time ‘smart’, by introducing appropriate efficiency incentives. 
A main research challenge facing this research consortium (task 3) is to find out 
whether this can in fact be achieved. If that can be done, the possibility on the 
horizon is that contributions can be made not only to political economy but 
to development economics, by defining a set of principles by which export 
taxes can contribute both to equity and to a more competitive economy.
In the second proposed research territory, reinforcing pro-poor coalitions, the 
literature has profusely observed that poor people, not anywhere constitut-
ing a cohesive interest group with its own strategy for advancing the inter-
ests of the poor, risk being politically marginalized. The experience of the 
last twenty years suggests in fact that pro-poor coalitions do often form. But 
we have few systematic findings on what initial conditions cause such coali-
tions to form, and our first recommendation within this territory (task 4) is 
that research of this kind, to explain the ways in which pro-poor coalitions form 
is needed as a precondition for good policy design, probably involving a larger 
sample of study countries than simply the case-studies referred to here.
The next question is what (fiscal) incentives can be provided to encourage 
pro-poor coalitions to form? Here also we are on uncertain ground. However, 
one possible way forward is to focus on the composition of public expenditure. 
Our paper Hudson et al. (2011) argues that every variation in the composition 
of public expenditure changes the balance between those who gain and those 
who lose from the continuance of current policies—and thereby the likelihood 
of both conflict and poverty reduction. This yields the concept of the social effi-
ciency wage—the rate of social wage, or public spending, which most effectively 
buys off the risk of conflict and political instability—and the related concept of 
pro-poor expenditure—the level and mix of public spending which maximize the 
poverty-reducing impact of public expenditure.34
34 As the political leverage of the poor increases, so the level of the social efficiency wage 
converges on pro-poor expenditure.
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This raises the issue of the mechanisms through which variations in the 
expenditure, or taxation, mix can be used to deliver changes in well-being 
and in state cohesion. To make a preliminary distinction, a change in the 
fiscal mix (say a shift from spending on military purposes to spending on 
agricultural research, or a change from taxation on the rich to taxation on 
the middle class) has an obvious economic impact, through its influence on 
demand, employment, and thence on well-being, and at the same time a 
political impact by altering the balance between interest groups. We believe 
that the impact of expenditure and tax mixes, both through economic impacts (task 
5) and through political and institutional signals (task 6), on state capacity repre-
sents an unexplored territory for development research, and would hope to investi-
gate it further under the ESID (Effective States and Inclusive Development) research 
programme, using not only standard qualitative and quantitative methods but 
also experimental methods. These have proved valuable in explaining the 
influence of conditional cash transfer programmes on trust and intracom-
munity relationships in Colombia (Attanasio et al. 2009). A particular way 
in which they add value is by showing that conventional incentives (provid-
ing more money) are often ineffective and may be counter-productive as 
fiscal incentives intended to change behaviour (Bowles 2008).
In the third research territory, Escaping from the low-tax trap, we build on 
ground broken for us by, in particular, the Centre for the Future State (CFS) 
and the Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC). More research is needed to 
build on this experience, and indeed use it for capacity-building purposes. 
We propose (task 7) to examine the role of institutional changes (such as independ-
ent revenue authorities), sequencing of tax and expenditure reforms, equity-based 
reforms (such as closing of tax loopholes), and innovative new tax bases in escaping 
from the tax trap, using both case-study evidence from escapees and cross-country 
evidence. This research strategy has not been used, in the form of compara-
tive quantitative analysis, by either CFS or CSRC.
Finally, aid donors have been argued by some studies (including one 
from CFS) to contribute to the ‘low-tax, weak-state’ problem, by reducing 
the incentive to governments to build up tax revenue, because aid flows 
with lower political costs are always there as an alternative. Some commen-
tators have expanded this approach into a broader critique of the ‘institu-
tional damage’ done by aid flows to the recipient country state, arguing 
that aid increases corruption as well as weakening the tax base. This may 
connect with recent empirical work which suggests an insignificant cor-
relation between aid and growth. Our proposal (task 8) is to tackle these ideas 
head-on by examining the relationship between tax structure and level, expendi-
ture composition and level, aid and ultimate development indicators (growth and 
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Introduction: The Resource Curse as a Primarily  
Political Phenomenon
The extraction of minerals and hydrocarbons lies at the core of modern 
economic and social development. Coal mining was central to the industrial 
revolution, and the labour consciousness and organization which it inspired 
became, so Mitchell (2012) has argued, constitutive of modern democracy. 
More recently, mineral extraction has driven economic growth and social 
investment in countries as diverse as Canada, Chile, Botswana, and Australia. 
And in a general sense, oil is at the very centre of contemporary capitalism 
(Huber 2009). The consequences of extractive industry have not, however, 
always been felicitous. As Michael Ross (2012) has recently shown, perfor-
mance across oil dependent polities and economies has been very uneven. 
A quick sampling of The New York Times or The Economist would similarly 
reveal cases where resource extraction comes coupled with lost opportuni-
ties, poor economic and social indicators, democratic failure, and civil strife: 
the so-called ‘natural resource curse’ (Auty 1993, 2001).
There is a cottage industry of scholarship that attempts to confirm, refute, 
or explain the existence of this ostensible resource curse. The purpose of 
this chapter is, however, different. It focuses on the institutional and politi-
cal relationships that govern the interactions between resource extraction, 
economy, and society. More specifically, it outlines elements of a framework 
for analysing these relationships, the conditions under which they are likely 
to be reproduced or changed, and the ways in which they might mediate the 
relationships between extraction and inclusion. The chapter grounds this 
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framework in two perspectives. The first of these draws on a more general lit-
erature dealing with the politics of institutional change. The second engages 
with the specific relationships of scale, space, and time that characterize the 
natural resource sector and give it its specificity. The implication will be that 
any effort to understand the governance of extraction and of its relation-
ships to development must be spatially and historically explicit.
The framework is inspired by three claims. The first is Terry Karl’s insist-
ence (2007, p. 256) that ‘the “resource curse” is primarily a political not an 
economic phenomenon’, and that therefore the institutional and political 
distortions that characterize many extractive economies ‘cannot be undone 
without a huge coordinated effort by all the stakeholders involved’ (Karl 
2007, p. 258). Second is the assertion that any political economy of extrac-
tion must deal explicitly with the materiality (and therefore spatiality) of 
the resource in question (see Bridge 2008; Bakker and Bridge 2006). Third is 
the argument of Mahoney and Thelen (2010) that path-dependency argu-
ments should be combined with theories of institutional change that attend 
to both endogenous and exogenous sources of such change. Taken together, 
and applied to the particular case of natural resource governance, these 
claims point us towards the analytical centrality of politics, space, and time.
In the course of elaborating this framework, the chapter makes the fol-
lowing arguments. First, prior political settlements and coalitions structure 
the forms taken by an expanding extractive economy but are subsequently 
shaped by this expansion. Second, a critical factor determining how this 
subsequent shaping occurs is the extent to which social mobilization and 
shifting political coalitions drive institutional innovation and the extent to 
which institutional learning (in the private, public, and civic sectors) occurs 
such that social conflict can be turned into institutional change. Third, 
the actors involved in these processes operate at subnational, national, and 
transnational scales, and there are important interactions among these 
scales. Actors operating at transnational scales include companies, multi-
lateral bodies, and civil society networks. These actors influence patterns of 
investment, social conflict, and institutional learning and make clear that 
a political-settlements and political-coalitions approach to natural resource 
governance cannot focus on the national level alone (e.g. Khan 2010; 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).
The chapter is organized as follows. Following a summary review of how 
resource curse debates have converged on the centrality of governance, 
I  outline an approach to institutional continuity and change that draws 
on notions of political settlement and political coalition. I then link these 
insights to a discussion of the centrality of space, scale, and time for analys-
ing the politics of natural resource governance. Finally, and in light of these 
concepts, I  explore institutional arrangements through which resource 
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extraction might foster inclusive development and the conditions under 
which these institutions might emerge.
Settlements, Coalitions, and the Politics  
of Governing Resource Extraction
The issues raised by large scale natural resource extraction go well beyond 
‘resource curse’ arguments about the extent to which such extraction is, or 
is not, associated with disappointing levels of growth and human devel-
opment performance (Collier and Venables 2011; Fahr-Weber 2002; ICMM 
2006). The growth of investment in mining and hydrocarbons also fuels 
discussion of the implications this holds for human rights, environmen-
tal security, democracy, sovereignty, social conflict, and regionalism (e.g. 
Perreault 2013; Watts 2004; Dunning 2008; Mitchell 2012). However, the 
evolution of resource curse debates has been helpful in that it has debunked 
deterministic arguments regarding the necessarily adverse effects of resource 
extraction and has instead focused on the importance of institutions and 
governance in mediating the relationships between extraction and devel-
opment (Bebbington et  al. 2008; Humphreys et  al. 2007). In particular, 
whether mineral expansion triggers the resource curse effect or instead fos-
ters growth is deemed to depend on the quality of macroeconomic man-
agement, on whether a fiscal social contract exists or not, on degrees of 
transparency, and on the overall quality of governance (Fahr-Weber 2002, 
p. 14). This convergence on institutions, however, begs other questions: how 
can the institutional arrangements governing extraction at any one point 
in time be explained? In what contexts might exclusionary institutional 
arrangements change? And under what conditions, and through what pro-
cesses do inclusive institutional arrangements emerge (or fail to emerge)?
One approach to the first of these questions is through the language of 
political settlements. Di John (2009, p. 290) defines political settlements as 
‘historically specific bargains over institutions’ while for Khan (2010, p. 1) 
a ‘political settlement emerges when the distribution of benefits supported 
by its institutions is consistent with the distribution of power in society, 
and the economic and political outcomes of these institutions are sustain-
able over time’. These definitions insist that societal institutions exist in a 
relationship of co-constitution with power relations in society. This claim is 
very similar to Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2012) conceptualization of politi-
cal equilibrium as a distribution of political power and political-economic 
institutions that can co-exist. These arrangements persist over time to the 
extent that: a) they deliver a level of economic growth that can satisfy the 
expectations of different groups across the distribution of political power; b) 
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they are consistent with prevailing notions of what constitutes a politically 
legitimate—or at least acceptable—state of affairs; and c) relatively disad-
vantaged actors do not accumulate sufficient power that they become able 
to destabilize the settlement through force, electoral processes, or discursive 
shifts that introduce new ideological challenges to dominant settlements.
These conditions of existence draw attention to themes raised in other lit-
eratures on institutional change.1 First, while institutions might be institu-
tionalized, their stability and reproduction cannot be taken for granted and 
instead depend on factors that are both endogenous and exogenous to these 
institutional arrangements. Second, institutions do not ‘self-reproduce’ even 
when they reflect apparently consolidated asymmetries of power. Instead, 
the reproduction of institutions takes a great deal of work (Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010)—investment of resources, crafting of supporting ideologies, 
monitoring in order to pre-empt resistance, investment in means of vio-
lence, and so on. Third, if the maintenance of existing institutions reflects 
the power of particular coalitions, then shifts in coalitional politics may 
be one route towards institutional change (Hall 2010). In this approach, 
accounting for the natural resource governance institutions persisting at any 
one point in time would therefore require a characterization of the political 
settlement allowing for the continued existence of these institutions. The 
language of political settlements appears less helpful, however, when the 
analytical challenge is to explain how such governance institutions might 
change. Other literatures suggest that social mobilization, shifting political 
coalitions and policy networks might play important roles in this regard.
The role of social mobilization and contentious politics in institutional 
change is well documented. Tilly’s work is especially important here in that 
it draws attention to this relationship over the long sweep of European his-
tory (Tilly 2004, 1998, 1990). Contention—though also war (cf. North et al. 
2009)—emerges as playing an important role in the emergence of democ-
racy (in Tilly’s language) and open-access social orders (in North et al.’s 
terms). Mahoney and Thelen (2010) refer to a similar phenomenon in their 
discussion of ‘insurrectionary’ agents as one potential source of endogenous 
institutional change. While not all aspects of these authors’ arguments are 
the same, they each draw attention to the role of contention in institutional 
change. In no instance, however, is the relation linear. This implies that 
analysis must also trace the intervening variables that mediate the effect of 
force on institutions, increasing, decreasing, and/or translating the ways in 
1 I am very grateful for Clark University graduate student participants in my seminar 
‘Governing Development’ for helping think through the arguments in the following pages, as 
well as my collaborations with Rimisp, Latin American Centre for Rural Development where I 
have also worked on some of these ideas in the conceptualization of rural territorial dynamics 
(Berdegué et al. 2012).
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which demands expressed through force become re-expressed as new insti-
tutional models.
Explanations of how such mobilization occurs vary in the literature, 
though three sets of factors are recurrently important: the role of changes in 
the political opportunity structure and how they create new possibilities for 
mobilized political expression; the role of changes in the resources (finan-
cial, informational, human, and so on) that actors are able to mobilize; and 
the role of discourse in framing identities through which people feel able to 
organize and express collective political demands (Crossley 2000). In any 
one instance, the relative role of each of these factors will vary, though ade-
quate accounts must attend to each.
A variant on the mobilization theme is expressed in accounts that stress 
the role of social and political coalitions in institutional change. Analysing 
the Botswanan case, Poteete (2009) argues that key to the explanation of pat-
terns of institutional emergence, change and stasis is the nature of the domi-
nant political coalition—be this the actual political coalition controlling the 
state, or the modified coalition that those currently in control of the state 
need to re-engineer in order to sustain this control. Di John (2009) frames a 
similar argument for Venezuela, while Thorp et al.’s (2012a) multi-country 
discussion from Latin America argues that—in addition to questions of tim-
ing, sequencing, leadership, and the nature of the resource—the governance 
of extractives depends on elite politics and commitments. ‘[W] e see the role 
of competing elites as fundamental in shaping the state, from within and 
without. We see the state as gaining or losing degrees of autonomy from spe-
cific elite interests with time, and the role of the bureaucracy as important 
in this’ (Thorp et al. 2012, p. 5).
These interpretations, however, beg further questions regarding the fac-
tors that might lead these coalitions and elite commitments to change. 
Bebbington (2012) brings together authors exploring the extent to which 
social conflict might explain such shifts in dominant coalitions and insti-
tutional forms (though again this demands explanation of the genesis of 
such social mobilization). Poteete (2009) suggests that changing coalitional 
politics might also drive change, and she relates these coalitional changes 
to the emergence of new economic activities and new social actors. Thorp 
et al. (2012) also place some weight on political leadership as an important 
factor in molding coalitional politics, as well as the effect of certain taken-
for-granted ideas (or what might be called ‘political cultures’).
For Peter Hall (2010, p. 207) ‘[t] he [general] premise is that institutional 
change is best understood by integrating coalitional with institutional 
analysis’. Some foci of coalition analysis frame it, in practice, as a process 
of parallel institutional formation (Hall 2010) in the sense that, if existing 
institutions reflect the equilibrium results of the coordinated work of those 
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interests that endorse these institutions, then new institutions would reflect 
the results of the coordinated work of a differing set of interests brought 
together in the coalition promoting institutional change. Other approaches 
would understand coalitions in more identity-based and discursive terms, 
emphasizing the extent to which discourse (a set of ideas, imaginaries, and 
aspirations) is a condition of existence of a coalition, giving it identity and 
vision and helping bring it into being by providing an axis around which 
various actors can come together, perceive alignment of their interests, and 
act collectively (Birner et al. 2011; Hajer 1995). Other approaches (Flora et al. 
2006) are more instrumental and focus on how coalitions serve as advocates 
for change.
As Hall’s (2010) observations imply, there is no necessary relationship 
between coalition formation and progressive changes in natural resource 
governance. Coalitions also emerge to advance already dominant and exclu-
sionary interests. This is evident in the reading of the less-than-successful 
cases brought together in collections such as Collier and Venables (2011) and 
Thorp et al. (2012). Sometimes these coalitions pursue new opportunities 
and sometimes they defend dominant institutions and groups. However, 
in other instances emergent coalitions for progressive resource governance 
can displace those pursuing different visions. In yet other cases the process 
may involve processes of gradual learning and calculation within a coalition 
such that the coalition itself begins to see the need for institutional change 
and slowly shift its own discourses on the governance of the environment 
(cf. Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; and more generally the work on social 
learning—Social Learning Group et al. 2001). This learning might be led by 
particularly powerful actors in these coalitions who transmit this learning 
to others. Indeed, an argument can be made that some transnational extrac-
tive industry companies have learnt the need to engage local populations 
and environments in new, more open, ways and have sought to convey this 
learning to national elites in the private and public sector, albeit with greater 
and less success (Sagbien and Lindsay 2011). More generally the learning 
occurring within the industry group ICMM or through initiatives like the 
EITI might be seen as instances of transnational actors seeking to lead a 
range of national coalitions along paths towards behavioural and institu-
tional change (however limited and unsatisfactory these may seem to activ-
ists and critical scholars: Benson and Kirsch 2010, 2009).
Any account of the role of coalitions in institutional change must also 
explain how they resolve collective action challenges. Indeed, many of the 
same concepts needed to explain social movement emergence in conflicts 
over resource extraction (Bebbington et al. 2008) are relevant to explaining 
coalition emergence. How do coalitions emerge if (as is almost always the 
case) incentive structures mean that the potential net gains of forming a 
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coalition are greater for some actors than for others (in ways that will dif-
fer by gender, class, generation, ethnicity, and so forth)? How do coalitions 
mobilize the resources necessary to keep the coalition going? How do actors 
within coalitions negotiate the institutional change that they will demand 
collectively if (as also will almost always be the case) different alterna-
tives imply different distributions of costs and benefits among actors (Hall 
2010)? How, in the case of coalitions that bring together local and exter-
nal actors, are collective commitments to particular forms of environmen-
tal regulations, social redistribution, and political recognition negotiated? 
And finally, if ‘equity’ or ‘sustainability’ are cultural rather than absolute 
constructs (Humphreys Bebbington and Bebbington 2010), how do actors 
within a coalition arrive at shared conceptions of equity and sustainabil-
ity towards which the institutional change they demand will lead? These 
latter questions emerge as particularly significant—and thorny—in the 
negotiations that can occur among aboriginal peoples, NGO activists, and 
reformist government bureaucrats who at one level may be part of the same 
resource governance coalition, but at another level see the world in very 
distinct ways (Blaser 2010). The tensions that can arise from this, and the 
extent to which they can frustrate the emergence of new resource govern-
ance institutions, have been made palpably clear in the conflicts within the 
coalition seeking to pass new legislation in Peru on free prior and informed 
consultation/consent.
These questions imply that an adequate analysis of coalitional emergence 
must address incentives, issues of identity, ideas, and even world view (when 
involving aboriginal groups), and a detailed analysis of the diverse actors 
that make up the coalition. Indeed, to the extent that incentives are per-
ceived in ways that depend on the ideas about fairness, rights, costs, and 
benefits, and given that these ideas may not be the same across members of 
a coalition, then identity, ideas, and intra-coalitional dynamics must bear 
more of the causal burden than do incentives: as Hall notes, ‘the politics of 
ideas is intrinsic, rather than epiphenomenal, to the processes of coalition 
formation that underpin institutional change’ (Hall 2010, p. 213).
The centrality of ideas brings us to the third social vehicle through which 
change in resource governance institutions may occur:  the operation of 
epistemic communities. Epistemic communities are best understood as ‘a 
network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a 
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge 
within that domain or issue-area’ (Haas 1992, p. 3). These networks can be 
both national and transnational (Keck and Sikkink 1998), and while Haas’s 
notion of epistemic communities focused especially on networks of profes-
sionals whose ideas help frame policy debates, this process of framing dis-
courses and then ushering them into policy formation often includes actors 
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with other identities—supportive politicians, movement and civic cadres, 
business people, bureaucrats, and so on (c.f. Fox 1996). Among other things, 
epistemic communities can play important roles in framing the ‘viable mod-
els’ of new institutions noted earlier, as well as in framing core ideas around 
which coalitions and mobilizations might emerge. They may also contribute 
to the identities that can derive from these ideas. A Latin American exam-
ple of this might be that of the policy, intellectual, and technocratic net-
works that have worked for so many years on indigenous peoples’ territories 
and have subsequently become involved in debates on extractive industry 
governance. It is also reasonable to argue that scholarly work on natural 
resource extraction and development has become part of such networks—
Collier’s work on the natural resource charter, or the interactions among 
Soros, Revenue Watch International, and scholars such as Joseph Stiglitz 
and Michael Ross would be examples here, as also would the links between 
Mines and Communities and scholars such as Stuart Kirsch. As with discus-
sions on development, scholarly discussions on extraction need to be treated 
as endogenous to the very political processes which they are analysing.
Such epistemic communities can serve as agents of resource governance 
change themselves, as they ‘subversively’ (in Mahoney and Thelen’s lan-
guage) seed policy and public discussions with concepts and ideas that 
become sufficiently persuasive that they elicit institutional change (whether 
at national, subnational, or international levels). This in turn demands 
explanation of what might make ideas ‘persuasive’, especially given that 
the determination of dominant discourses on resource extraction generally 
happens in contexts characterized by asymmetries of power in which those 
more powerful have clear preferences for particular ideas. Such persuasive-
ness might derive from: palpable environmental changes that undermine 
the cogency of previously dominant ideas; the arrival of new information 
that adds credibility to new sets of ideas (cf. North 2006); or shifting calcu-
lations on the parts of elites as to forms of resource governance that might 
best suit their interests (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2008; Tilly 
1992). More often, though, such ideas become influential when they are 
bundled with movements and coalitions.
Theoretically, these observations imply that an adequate account of 
changes in the institutions of natural resource governance must explain 
how such mobilizations, coalitions and policy networks emerge in the first 
instance, how they articulate with existing institutional arrangements, 
and how they are translated into the final effects that they ultimately have. 
At the core of this explanation must be an account of how incentives, 
ideas and identities influence the emergence of actors promoting change 
in extractive industry governance, and of the models for new regulations 
that will be the basis of such change. Such accounts must explain why 
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mobilization, coalitions, or policy networks emerge to play this role in 
some contexts rather than others.
Visualizing the Framework
The foregoing arguments are summarized visually in Figure 4.1. At the core 
of the framework is the co-constitution of economic development, politi-
cal settlements, and political coalitions as outlined by Khan (2010) and 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). Offsetting the tendency of settlements lan-
guage to ‘feel’ static, the framework introduces two elements of dynamism. 
First, and following authors such as Boix (2008), is the argument that pat-
terns of economic development ultimately modify class structures in ways 
that cannot be easily controlled by dominant coalitions. This modification 
can take a variety of forms—the creation of new marginalized and disen-
franchised populations, the emergence of new capitalist classes, the emer-
gence of modernizing middle classes (as per Boix 2008). Each of these forms 
serves to destabilize existing settlements. This destabilization can be both 
Economic
development (more








(more or less)   
Transnational factors
Changes in class structure
(modernizing middle class)
Figure 4.1. A schema for analysing political settlements, coalitions, and the politics 
of resource extraction
Source: Author.
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incremental or abrupt (involving mobilizations) but either way it consti-
tutes forms of conflict that put pressure on existing institutions and has 
the potential to lead to institutional change. Such change itself contributes 
to further modification of the forms of economic development occurring. 
In the case of extractives this might be, say, because it involves new tax 
regimes, new land-use planning guidelines, or new forms of ownership.
Thus far the framework treats institutional and governance change as 
endogenous to the relationships among settlements, coalitions, and the 
economy. However, the change process can also be affected by exogenous 
factors and actors. This is especially the case for the political economy of 
extraction which is characterized by an important presence of international 
companies, multilateral agencies, international advocacy networks, and 
transnational nongovernmental organizations, as well as by international 
commodity price volatility which can also elicit domestic coalitional and 
institutional change. One example of this would be the dramatic effects of 
the collapse of tin prices on the power of miners’ unions in Bolivia and their 
political coalitions with the state and parties. Another example would be 
the cumulative influence that transnational advocacy around free prior and 
informed consent has had on domestic politics and regulations governing 
consultation and participation.
A contemporary process of institutional contention in the politics of 
mining governance in El Salvador illustrates some of the relationships 
outlined in this framework. In response to policy reforms in the mid-
1990s, mining companies had begun to conduct geological exploration in 
El Salvador. By 2005, the activities of several companies were beginning 
to generate serious social conflict, such that by 2007/8 the conflict had 
become so severe that even the pro-business government ARENA placed a 
de facto moratorium on mining activity. When a social democratic FMLN 
government came to power in 2008 they inherited this moratorium, along 
with much pressure from movements to convert it into law. However, the 
FMLN also inherited the fall-out of the moratorium. By 2009 two mining 
companies whose projects had been put on hold were using the provisions 
of the US-Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) to sue the 
government of El Salvador for recovery of all their expenditure to date, for 
future lost profits and for losses due to falls in their share value (as well as 
the costs of taking legal action). While one of these cases was dropped in 
2011, the other is still being considered by the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) albeit no-longer under the rules 
of CAFTA-DR.2
2 For more on this see Bebbington (2012).
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In this context, the FMLN government has been caught between two pres-
sures. Social movement organizations, along with parliamentarians and the 
political bases of the FMLN, are not happy that an ostensibly left-of-centre 
government would not ban hard rock mining once and for all given that it 
had committed to do so during the electoral campaign. They are pressuring 
the government to follow through on these electoral promises. Yet at the 
same time the government feels the pressure of fiscal imperative. On the one 
hand, some officials wonder whether mining might generate tax and royalty 
revenue for government programmes, while on the other hand these and 
others worry that ICSID will find against the government and impose fines 
on the scale of a hundred or more millions of dollars. The corollary fear is 
that this would open the door to a slew of legal suits from other companies, 
especially if the moratorium were converted into law. Meanwhile informal 
political pressure from the embassies of investor countries has also contin-
ued (personal communications from senior government officials).
The government’s response was to buy time and conduct a Strategic 
Environment Assessment (SEA) of the mining sector, with a view to craft-
ing a policy on the basis of that SEA—the calculation being that if a policy 
restricting mining were based on an independent SEA, it would offer more 
legal protection against future lawsuits from other companies with conces-
sions and exploration projects. That SEA came to the view that environ-
mental vulnerabilities (primarily related to water quantity and quality) were 
so severe, social risks (primarily related to conflict, violence, and divisions 
dating back to the civil war) so acute, and government capacities so limited, 
that prior to any promotion of mining it was imperative to build capacity 
within government to regulate mining investment, ensure environmental 
protection, establish and enforce no-go areas, create early warning systems 
for identifying conflict, establish tax and royalty systems, and so on. This 
was then translated by the government into a proposal for legislative change 
that would suspend all mining activities until a raft of other capacities and 
policies had been established. This proposal is currently (at the time of writ-
ing) under review in the Salvadoran congress.
Here, then, is an example of political coalitions in the 1990s supporting 
the rise of mining investment in a way that was largely unchecked. This 
invisibility of early mining investment in turn reflected the nature of the 
post-war political settlement in the country, dominated as it was by national 
economic and traditional political elites. However, as the changes triggered 
by this early mining activity became visible they were perceived as threaten-
ing certain groups in rural society. These groups—in coalition with other 
national and international actors—steadily organized in a process that gener-
ated levels of conflict that upset the existing settlement, leading to a distanc-
ing between parts of ARENA and the mining sector. The coalition between 
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the subsequently elected FMLN government and movements, however, was 
in turn challenged by different transnational interventions (involving min-
ing companies, foreign embassies and ICSID). This in turn has triggered 
another experiment at institutional change in the form of the SEA and pro-
posed legislative change. The fate of that proposed law, however, will depend 
on ongoing coalitional dynamics within the Salvadoran Parliament.
Space and Time in the Governance of Extraction
The coalitional politics, social mobilization, and policy networking dis-
cussed in the previous section all occur somewhere and sometime. The where 
of these political processes occurs within other geographies: the geographies 
of resources themselves (where they are located, where they are transported, 
and so on); the interactions between resource geographies and geographies of 
human settlement, water, economic activity, and so forth; and the uneven and 
politically symbolic geographies of cities and regions, of metropolitan areas and 
aboriginal territories, and of national, subnational, and international jurisdic-
tions. Meanwhile the now of extraction is characterized by institutions and 
power relationships inherited from the past, as well as memories of that same 
past. Indeed, the literature on the extractive economy has become increasingly 
aware that where subsoil natural resources are located and when they are discov-
ered and developed each matter a great deal for the quality of resource govern-
ance and in particular for the relationships between extraction and patterns of 
development (Thorp et al. 2012). This section discusses different ways in which 
space and time need to be addressed in any effort to understand the politics of, 
and the institutions that govern, natural resource extraction.
Space and the Politics of Resource Governance  
and Development
Flows, Scales, and Territories
The mining and hydrocarbon sectors can be understood as global pro-
duction networks (Bridge 2008; see also Ferguson 2006) in which a range 
of actors come together to extract, transport, transform, and sell natural 
resources, and to channel the flows of capital (investment and profit), com-
modities, materials, information, and people that make the extraction and 
valorization of natural resources possible. Many of these flows reach beyond 
national jurisdictions, though some flows (e.g. of taxes and royalties, of 
labour, or of water) occur at a national and subnational scale.
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Many of these flows have their own governance arrangements. Some of 
these are governmental or multilateral. Thus, international (e.g. World Bank, 
IFC) and bilateral (e.g. EXIM Bank, KfW) financial institutions govern con-
cessionary loan and grant flows linked to extraction through decisions on 
loan conditions as well as through the conduct of public reviews such as the 
Extractive Industries Review. Global/international regulatory bodies (ILO, 
UNDRIP, NAFTA, free trade agreements, and so on) govern obligations and 
rights that are attached to these flows. For instance, ILO 169 attaches obliga-
tions regarding free, prior, and informed consent, and free trade agreements 
attach rights to seek redress against national decisions by presenting cases 
to multilateral bodies such as ICSID. Grant-giving by non-profits working on 
extractive industry can be subject to public regulations, as can their infor-
mation work. Likewise when extractive industry raises capital (perhaps espe-
cially speculative capital) on specialized stock exchanges such as the TSX or 
AIM this can also be subject to public regulation.
Other arrangements are voluntary and private (Auld 2012; Cashore et al. 
2004). In the commercial private sector, examples would include CSR, certi-
fication, and labelling of various sorts. In the civic private sector, examples 
would include decisions over grant-giving, strategies of information pro-
vision, and so on. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
which attaches obligations related to transparency on tax payments, is a 
combination of voluntary, private, and public in that participation is vol-
untary, but many governments as well as companies and NGOs participate.
These different mechanisms for governing flows can themselves induce the 
emergence or attention of other private actors that seek to influence these 
arrangements. There are many examples of this: Revenue Watch International’s 
work on transparency, Oxfam’s work on corporate standards, Mining Watch’s 
work on the flows associated with Canadian mining companies, and so on. In 
many instances these private responses combine the efforts (or at least names) 
of organizations that operate at subnational, national, and international lev-
els. Such governance mechanisms also often induce (or can grow out of) the 
work of researchers or think tanks that seek to challenge and frame ideas so as 
to influence how extraction is governed. Some of these challenges can be con-
tentious, as for instance in the arguments that occurred among public bodies, 
the World Bank, and civil society organizations over the Extractive Industries 
Review—all of which, ultimately, were arguments seeking to influence how 
the Bank would govern and attach conditions to multilateral capital flows 
for extractive industry. However, for the most part struggle over the design of 
institutions to govern flows tends to be less contentious and takes the form of 
negotiation, legal proceedings, coalition-building, and lobbying.
While institutional arrangements such as these are not a-spatial (meet-
ings, arguments, negotiations, and so on, always occur somewhere, and 
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that where is significant), they are generally not bound by territorial units. 
They govern flows, not spaces. However, extraction is also governed through 
spatially defined institutions which often (though not always) focus on the 
spatialized consequences and contexts of extraction: environmental impacts, 
infrastructure-building, the spending of geographically targeted royalty trans-
fers, land-use ordinances, and so on. Many such territorialized mechanisms 
are public, defined by the jurisdictions of government. Others, though, are 
private (e.g. territorially defined social organizations, such as communities, 
that seek to exert control over the space they occupy) and more generally a 
range of territorially defined actors emerge to negotiate and contest this level 
of governance (e.g. geographically defined federations of water users, aborigi-
nal peoples, peasants). These contestations are much more prone to conten-
tion, including violent contention (Bebbington and Bury 2013), though there 
is also plenty of coalitional politics at play (Poteete 2009).
Understanding the governance of natural resource extraction and the forms 
that it takes within particular countries and locales thus requires analysis of 
how both flows and spaces are governed and how these institutions of govern-
ance are stabilized and changed through combinations of contention, coali-
tional politics, and arguments over ideas. Such analysis also must consider 
the conditions under which one domain of governance might supplant or 
interact with another. For instance, countries’ mining and hydrocarbon codes 
(which reflect a form of territorial governance at a national scale) can come 
to be defined by capital flows linked to international financial institutions 
(as when countries adopt World Bank recommendations for mining laws). In 
some instances, though, countries might seek to undo codes that were pro-
moted by international institutions and replace them with domestic codes 
(as has happened, for instance, when resource nationalist positions come to 
power). In many instances (as Kaup 2010 notes for Bolivia) the resulting codes 
end up becoming some form of uneasy combination of these positions. In 
this sense, processes of institutional change often involve a politics of scales 
in which actors reach across scales at the same time as they seek to redefine 
the scale at which an extractive industry problem is defined (Bulkeley 2005).3
Space and Contention in the Governance of Extraction
The simple fact that natural resource extraction is a point-source activity, 
and that the geographies of extractive activities are relatively immutable, 
produces particular challenges for the governance of resource extraction and 
3 There are many examples of this. One simple example would be struggles to define whether 
a mine’s approval is a local, regional, national, or global governance issue, and thus to define 
who should and should not be involved in decisions over the mine’s fate.
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not infrequently underlies much of the contention surrounding it. Space, 
therefore, has to be treated as endogenous to any analysis of the interactions 
between institutions and politics. We discuss how this is so in the follow-
ing domains: the relationships between space, externalities, and contention; 
the relationships between space, rents, and contention; the awkward rela-
tionships between rents, national redistribution, and a spatialized politics of 
recognition; and the ways in which these spatialized politics of extraction 
mean that political settlements around its governance are inherently unsta-
ble as a result of tensions between different national and subnational actors.
Resource extraction, even when as ‘clean’ as technologically conceivable, 
produces significant externalities. In the ‘clean’ version these externalities 
are limited to dramatic landscape transformation, significant increase in the 
movement of heavy machinery and heavy loads, increases in noise pollu-
tion, the presence of large-scale installations on previously rural landscapes, 
and the arrival of new sources of ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ in the landscape 
(in the form of large-scale tailings ponds that might breach, pipelines that 
might leak, waste-waters that might escape, and so on). In the ‘dirty’ version 
of extraction, the externalities can involve adverse impacts on water qual-
ity and quantity; careless management of tailings, waste rock, and waste 
waters with implications for pollution; and adverse social impacts (prostitu-
tion, night-life, new diseases) in human settlements near sites of extraction. 
In either version it is probably also the case that there are localized effects 
on the political economy—with inflation of land and labour costs (with 
typically adverse effects for local labour-intensive agriculture, as well as for 
general patterns of access to housing as it becomes more expensive) and 
increased opportunities for criminal activities. There is ample evidence of 
this latter effect, whether in the form of ‘tapping’ of oil pipelines in Nigeria 
(Watts 2004; Kashi and Watts 2008) or of mafia presence in the economy of 
service provision to sites of extraction (Arellano-Yanguas 2012). This locali-
zation of externalities typically induces new sources and forms of conflict 
motivated by perceptions and experiences of loss, by manoeuverings for 
compensation, or by efforts to gain access to employment and economic 
opportunities (Bebbington et al. 2013).
It also merits note that exposure to these externalities varies spatially within 
a locality. Some human settlements are more or less affected by noise, water, 
or landscape impacts; some economic agents are more adversely affected 
than others by increased labour costs; some benefit more than others from 
the increased circulation of cash in a local and micro-regional economy; 
and some fall within what companies define as their zone of direct influ-
ence while others do not (which means that potential access to compensa-
tion and CSR activities is unequally distributed, with some persons included 
and others not). These locally varied exposures to costs and benefits have 
Governing Natural Resources for Inclusive Development
101
implications for patterns of inclusion and exclusion, and also for the possi-
bility that local coalitions for changes in resource governance might emerge 
(Bebbington et al. 2013; Humphreys Bebbington and Bebbington 2010).
At the same time, the localization of extraction inevitably produces ten-
sion over the socio-spatial distribution of rents. On the one hand, subsoil 
resources are more often than not vested in the nation with the state being 
responsible for the ‘trusteeship’ and management of these resources (which 
is why it is the central state that grants licenses and concessions and approves 
projects). Furthermore, this central state often sees in these minerals a source 
of revenue to finance national social and infrastructural programmes (or, 
in patrimonialist versions, private gain for governing elites). On the other 
hand, the resources are physically extracted from a particular region, and 
subnational groups typically make some claims on these resources because 
of their spatial origins. These claims may take various forms: an aboriginal 
population may claim that the resources are coming from their territory and 
that this territory is constituted by both the surface and subsurface, regard-
less of the formalities of national law; a regional government may claim 
that the resources are a subnational resource that should be a revenue base 
for regional development plans; municipal or customary authorities may 
argue much the same; and so forth. The socio-spatial distribution of rev-
enues deriving from extraction is therefore inevitably a source of spatialized 
political tension in ways in which the geographical location of manufactur-
ing or agriculture is not.
Which of these sources of tension—over the spatialization of externali-
ties or over the spatial distribution of rent—is more significant likely varies 
across cases. Recent econometric work in Peru has concluded that the major-
ity of contemporary social conflicts over extraction derive from struggles 
over the amounts, management, and distribution of fiscal transfers back to 
the regions of extraction (Arellano-Yanguas 2011, 2012). More important is 
to recognize that these different catalysts of conflict are generally all present, 
mobilize different interests, interact with each other, and are all inevitable 
consequences of the spatially uneven nature of extraction and the materi-
alities of the resources involved. Furthermore, the attempt on the part of 
‘regions of extraction’ to secure significant transfer of benefits pits them not 
only against central government but also against other subnational authori-
ties who do not enjoy significant fiscal transfers and who also want access 
to resource rents.
The national ownership of subsoil resources, coupled with their subnational 
existence and the different spatial scales at which a politics of recognition are 
made manifest, present further axes of latent or open contention surround-
ing the governance of extraction. While all natural resources might have 
symbolic resonances, it is probably only the subsoil that has been powerful 
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enough to lend itself to feelings of resource nationalism. While this ‘nation-
alism’ is usually supported by constitutional provisions that vest ownership 
of the subsoil in the nation, it is also fuelled by the sense that more than 
being ‘owned’ by the nation, the subsoil is actually part of a nation, and its 
control by any other than national government is cast as a problem of sov-
ereignty and national integrity (Coronil 1997; Perreault 2013). The subsoil 
thus becomes the subject of intensities of protest and levels of nationaliza-
tion that are not as apparent in other sectors. This national symbolism has 
also meant that the subsoil becomes bundled with languages of citizenship 
in ways that can lead populations to argue that they have the right to make 
very specific claims on the subsoil and the revenues that might derive from 
it (Perreault 2013). The generation of wealth from the subsoil often induces 
the emergence of national subjects (‘the people’, ‘the poor’) claiming that 
this wealth should be redistributed to them, as well as political movements 
offering such redistribution in return for political allegiance.
However, these resources exist in, and are extracted from particular territo-
ries, and this process can lead to conflicts between different uses of the land 
(traditional vs. extractive) and different modes of governing this land—for 
example, conflicts in which company governance of space becomes pitted 
against customary forms of governance associated with particular social and 
political identities (‘indigenous’, ‘tribal’, and so on). Consequently extrac-
tion also interacts with a different politics of recognition—not this time 
the recognition of rights of the national citizen deserving of redistribution, 
but instead of the subnational identity-based group deserving of substantial 
compensation or bearing particular governance rights. In the process, not 
only are these identity-based claims set against the claims of the extrac-
tive enterprise, but they also become set against the claims of the national 
subject demanding ‘extraction for redistribution’. This situation complicates 
coalition-building and the consolidation of political settlements. Indeed, 
this has arguably been the case in the Andean countries.
These three considerations (externalities, rents, recognition) mean that the 
spatialized governance of extraction presents immense challenges and is 
itself also an axis of contention. From the perspective of extractive indus-
try companies, the concentration of conflict in the spaces in which they 
operate, and the relative vulnerability of their physical operations to sabo-
tage (precisely because of their spatial extensiveness, typically remote loca-
tion and geographical fixity), means that they place a premium on securing 
these spaces. It is this idea that underlies Watts’ (2003) notion of govern-
able spaces, drawing on his own experience in the Niger Delta where com-
panies seek to make the spaces of their operation governable (from their 
point of view), while other actors also seek to render them governable 
from their point of view. The same notion is present in Ferguson’s (2006, 
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p. 204) characterization of the spaces of operation of extractive industry as 
‘enclaved mineral-rich patches efficiently exploited by flexible private firms, 
with security provided on an “as-needed” basis by specialized corporations’, 
and more generally in his claim (2006) that contemporary development can 
be read as a set of ‘transnational topographies of power’ in which trans-
national networks link and govern non-contiguous spaces across the globe 
in ways that render the governance of some spaces categorically different 
from that of other spaces within the same nation state. Thus, in the case 
of extractive industry, spaces of company operation become governed in 
ways that are transnationalized and quite distinct from other subnational 
spaces. From Ferguson’s viewpoint this difference inheres in the crafting of 
less-than-transparent deals between companies, security services, and state 
elites. Meanwhile national and transnational activists, as well as extra-legal 
interests in some instances, try to muscle in on and usurp these practices of 
governance.
As a consequence, national-subnational settlements around the govern-
ance of extractive activities and revenue transfers tend to be very unstable. 
Extreme versions of this instability are manifest in the sorts of armed con-
flicts and secessionist movements that Collier and Hoeffler (2005, 2004), 
Ross (2008), Le Billon (2001), and others have considered. Less extreme vari-
ants are the chronic tensions between national and subnational authorities 
and elites in countries such as Bolivia, Peru, or Nigeria. The few cases where 
this national–subnational relationship is less tense and unstable (e.g. Chile, 
Botswana) appear to be characterized by:  a spatially circumscribed geog-
raphy of extraction (e.g. Botswana); a geography in which extraction and 
human settlement do not overlap significantly (Botswana, Chile, Norway); 
and an early agreement that revenues should be controlled by central 
authorities and redistributed through national programmes rather than spa-
tially earmarked transfers (Botswana and Chile). The reasons for such early 
agreements vary—in one instance appearing to be a result of strong and 
respected centralized bureaucracies (Chile), in the other a calculation on the 
part of subnational elites that this was in their favour (Botswana) (Poteete 
2011; Thorp et al. 2012; Battistelli and Guichaoua 2012).
Given the extent of the rents in question, and the gravity of the conflicts 
to which they can give rise, these apparently subnational problems can spill 
over into national politics. Indeed, the point-source nature of the extrac-
tive economy can produce powerful actors because of the scale of rents and 
externalities at play as well as the potential resonance of the political dis-
courses that can be mobilized in struggles over these rents and externalities. 
Some of these powerful actors can be of the warlord or armed insurgent 
variety, but more ‘mundanely’ they can and have been regional politi-
cal and civil society leaders who on the backs of conflicts over extraction 
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become national political figures. In this same process subnational narra-
tives on extraction (regarding taxation, environment, territory, indigenous 
rights) can become parts of national debates over extraction. The politics of 
extraction and struggles for different types of inclusion can thus be vehicles 
through which the framing of national political debates and the composi-
tion of national political settlements are altered. This being so, national–sub-
national dynamics need to be central to any analysis of the ways in which 
extraction, governance, and inclusion relate to and co-constitute each other 
(Arellano-Yanguas 2011, 2012).
Time and the Politics of Resource Governance
History as Sequence
Historicized approaches to the relationships between resource extraction 
and development identify three primary senses in which ‘history mat-
ters’: the particular sequences in which institutions become ‘layered’ (Thorp 
et al. 2012); the nature of international commodity and credit markets at 
the time that resources begin to be exploited or governed in particular 
ways (Ross 2012; Paredes 2012); and the timing of when resources are dis-
covered in relationship to the dynamics of political settlements within a 
country (Battistelli and Guichaoua, 2012). However, ‘[t] hat “history mat-
ters” does not equate to “original conditions rule” ’ (Thorp et al. 2012, p. 4) 
and so these reflections are not arguments for the existence of entrenched 
path-dependent effects. However, this emphasis on history does recognize 
path-dependent tendencies whose change requires particularly significant 
forms of agency (or serendipity)—or, in Karl’s already quoted terms, ‘a huge 
coordinated effort by all the stakeholders involved’ (Karl 2007, p. 258).
One of the most deliberate attempts to engage such historical questions 
is that of Thorp et al. (2012) for whom ‘the challenge is to take the analysis 
sufficiently far back in time to detect the key decisions and influences that 
shaped institutions and competences, and the role of resource abundance 
at these points’ (p. 6). In this spirit, their comparative study of Botswana, 
Niger, Nigeria, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru frequently digs back into the late 
nineteenth century for the Latin American cases and the late colonial period 
for the African cases. Orihuela (2012) explains the success of Chile’s gov-
ernance of copper in terms of ‘the way the layering of institution building 
allowed the country to resist later periods of great instability and boom’ 
(Thorp et al. 2012, p. 214). The origins to this story, he argues, lie in the 
nitrates boom in the latter nineteenth century. Certain aspects of this boom 
reflected resource curse features—in particular while nitrates were taxed 
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heavily, other forms of domestic taxation fell (‘from 20% in the 1840s to 
almost nothing in the years 1895–1905’ Orihuela 2012, p. 24). This nitrate 
revenue gave the executive considerable autonomy and power from soci-
ety. However, other changes in Chilean society—the emerging strength of 
unions, a prior commitment to bureaucratic technocracy—meant that other 
checks on the state increased, limiting the extent to which the executive 
could use this rent in a way that was completely autonomous of society. 
They do not argue that the nitrates boom was a success story, but nor did it 
lead to a complete distortion of public institutions. Then, when the copper 
boom followed in the mid-twentieth century, it was managed technocrati-
cally. Indeed central to Orihuela’s (2012) explanation of Chilean success is 
the existence of a long history of publicly motivated, competent bureaucracy 
and technocracy that served to keep the polity in check, but in some sense 
also infused the culture of dominant elites. If this is so, then it means that 
the instruments of the Chilean success are not easily copied—for Chile’s suc-
cess does not lie in the instruments it created (e.g. copper funds and the like 
for the countercyclical management of resource rents) but rather in the fact 
that these instruments grew out of a far longer historical commitment to 
technocracy that guaranteed the independence of these funds from politi-
cal raiding (Collier and Venables 2011). This historical layering of institu-
tions (understood both as organizations and routinized norms) is therefore 
important to understanding Chile. A similar layering—albeit of less histori-
cal depth—is, Thorp et al. argue, part of the Botswana success in diamond 
governance. In that instance, a commitment to central government institu-
tions pre-dated the discovery of diamonds, reflecting instead a commitment 
to cattle-owning elites as well as the recognition that a strong, competent 
central state was essential in the face of potential South African interference. 
So here, a combination of layering and straight serendipity helped explain 
the good management of diamond revenues.
Different forms of layering can have converse effects. Nigeria’s discovery 
of oil came right after the Biafra war in a context of acute social and politi-
cal fragmentation and a collapse of any centralized political authority in the 
Niger Delta. Oil became a means of managing competition among regional 
elites in a context in which a post-war, chronically weakened civil society 
and public sphere negated any prospect of checks and balances and account-
able government. The rest is history—or tragedy (Watts 2003, 2004; Kashi 
and Watts 2008). In an equally adverse ‘layering’, uranium had been discov-
ered in Niger prior to independence, and so even though formal political 
authority passed to the post-colonial state, France was uninterested in ceding 
control over and access to Niger’s mineral deposits—not least because France 
itself was developing a consolidated nuclear industry as part of a domestic 
energy policy, creating a further political imperative to secure access to this 
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uranium (Guichaoua 2012). There is a clear parallel here (albeit on a smaller 
scale) with the relationship between domestic, hydrocarbon-based energy 
policy in the USA and the equal determination of the US to sustain control 
over oil supplies around the world regardless of the institutional distortions 
that this might create in supply countries (Mitchell 2012). In these analyses 
two sets of institutional layerings, one in the resource-consuming country, 
the other in the resource-supplying country, couple to co-constitute adverse 
relationships between extraction and development.
A different sense in which history matters is in the time periods used 
to identify the presence or absence of the ‘resource curse’. Breaking down 
time-series data into particular segments, Michael Ross (2012) argues that 
the resource curse is actually a feature of a specific historical period, and 
moreover of a specific set of institutional contexts within that historical 
period. In his analysis, the oil-specific version of the resource curse (what he 
calls ‘the oil curse’) is a feature of the post-1970s period in those countries 
which nationalized their oil industries. He says:
As a global phenomenon, the political ailments caused by oil and gas production 
seem to be limited to both a certain set of countries . . . and the post-1980 period. 
Before about 1980, there was little or no global association between oil wealth 
and either less democracy, less work for women or more frequent insurgencies, 
and the oil states had impressively faster economic growth. (Ross 2012, p. 227)
This is not to say—he notes—that things were rosy prior to this period: one 
only needs to read socio-environmental histories such as Santiago’s (2006) 
brilliant Ecology of Oil on Mexico to recognize this. However, the political 
distortions that Ross associates with the oil curse (less democracy, more 
insurgency, gender inequity) have become more systematic over the last 
three decades. In an argument that begins to look similar to that of Thorp 
et al. Ross concludes that these distortions are especially apparent when oil 
is discovered in contexts of autocratic rule or weak democracies (i.e. democ-
racies with poor ‘pre-existing checks on the executive branch’ and weaker 
civil societies (Ross 2012, p.  229).4 In such circumstances, patrimonial 
management of oil revenue is much more likely as—consequently—is the 
emergence of regional armed secessionist movements contesting regional 
exclusion from the benefits of oil. Meanwhile transitions to democracy are 
less likely: ‘No country with as much oil as Libya, Bahrain, Oman, Algeria, 
or Iraq has ever made a successful transition from authoritarian to demo-
cratic rule’ (Ross 2012, p. 234).
4 Echoing Orihuela’s interpretation of Chile, Ross suggests that oil did not strengthen the 
hands of autocrats in Latin America nearly so much because of the region’s ‘prior experience 
with democracy and labor unions’ (p. 229).
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One problem with Ross’s analysis is the question of why such autocratic 
leaders have no interest in introducing forms of oil wealth management that 
would allow more stable economic management or in building institutions 
for volatility management (also noted as a critical institutional capacity by 
Collier and Venables 2011). He argues that:
To enact . . . countercyclical policies, politicians must be able to forgo the short-  
term political benefits of immediate spending for the long-term ones of sus-
tainable growth. These trade-offs are easier to make when incumbents believe 
they or their party is likely to stay in office long enough to profit from future 
gains; when the government is more constrained by checks and balances; when 
citizens are both well-informed and have confidence in their government; and 
when they are not sharply divided into competing factions that seek to exclude 
each other from future benefits. (p. 230)
However, autocrats with weak civil societies are presumably likely to believe 
that they will stay in office for a long time. The weaker autocrats who have 
to play competing factions off against each other are those who do not nec-
essarily have such certainty. This brings the analysis back to the question 
of political settlements, suggesting that fragile settlements orchestrated by 
non-democratic leaders in weak civil societies are the most likely to manage 
natural resource wealth in ways that do not elicit sustained (and diversify-
ing) growth with inclusion.
History as Memory
Historical memory is also important in the governance of resource extrac-
tion. Indeed the ways in which history is recounted and remembered can itself 
constitute an important variant of how ideas matter in struggles over the gov-
ernance of extraction. Memories and histories can be used to frame political 
debates over natural resources, as well as to articulate political coalitions seek-
ing particular sorts of institutional change. At a national level, memories of 
extraction and of war have interacted with resource governance (and have been 
consciously mobilized by political actors in order to make them interact with 
resource governance). In Bolivia, for instance, memories of the war with Chile 
have been critical to mobilizations around the governance of gas in the last 
decade, leading directly to the demise of plans to export gas to, or through, 
Chile (Perreault 2008, 2006). More generally, historical memories of colonial 
control can favour the emergence of resource nationalisms: ‘Postcolonial socie-
ties are likely to produce forms of resource nationalism and re-interpret collec-
tive memories around the issue of resource ownership and control’ (Thorp et al. 
2012, p. 7). The continuing resonance among activists of Galeano’s Open Veins 
of Latin America (1979/1998) is a prosaic indicator of this more general claim.
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At a subnational level, historical memories of marginalization and disad-
vantage have also affected politics surrounding extractive industry. This can 
take many forms, with regional, ethnic, and racial identities being variously 
mobilized in the process. Ross (2008) identifies a number of such examples 
that have spilt over into violence—such as Aceh, the Niger Delta (see also 
Watts 2003), or more recently Bagua in Peru (Bebbington and Humphreys 
Bebbington 2011). This is not to say that memory necessarily feeds into acute 
conflict. More often it is a point of reference, leading resident populations 
to associate extraction with prior moments of repressive dispossession and 
to therefore be both circumspect but also immensely pragmatic in how they 
negotiate the arrival of extractive industry (as Humphreys Bebbington 2010, 
has shown for the Chaco of Bolivia). And, of course, at times the memories 
can be ones of boom and employment, inspiring support for new rounds of 
investment in resource extraction.
Grappling with History
If these insights suggest that the politics of natural resource extraction must 
be understood historically and with much sensitivity to time, sequences, 
and memories, they also leave hanging a series of questions. How far does 
an analysis need to go back in time? Thorp et al. (2012) take some of their 
analyses back more than a century—and of course Putnam’s famous study 
of Italian political and social institutions reached back many centuries to 
find the sources of uneven regional performance (Putnam 1993). Few stud-
ies can afford such luxuries, but perhaps a rule of thumb is to reach back at 
least to the last natural resource boom in order to understand how politi-
cal coalitions and institutions were fashioned then and see how far and in 
what ways they trace through to contemporary governance arrangements. 
As Thorp et al.’s analysis makes clear, this does not imply falling into his-
torical determinism. Instead the approach would involve working forward 
from that starting point and analysing, at subsequent critical junctures, the 
options that were open to actors and the reasons for the political decisions 
that they subsequently took (or did not take).
Ross’s analysis also poses a methodological challenge—how to select the 
time periods into which one would break up the analysis of cycles in the 
governance of extractives. Ross opts for periods defined largely by interna-
tional factors (e.g. significant price changes), though at a national level an 
equally salient argument could be made for breaking up periods by regime 
cycle on the grounds that regime changes suggest shifts in dominant politi-
cal coalitions. While a general rule for analysis cannot easily be defined, 
the implication is that it is worth looking for significant sub-periods within 
longer-term processes of political and institutional change in the extractive 
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sector, and to recognize that the politics of governing extraction may change 
significantly between these periods.
Finally, the issue of historical memory raises the question not only of 
what is remembered, but also what is not remembered about prior phases of 
resource extraction. Thus, while methodologically it is important to attend 
to the ways in which key ideas about the past are framed and mobilized 
in contemporary politics of extraction, it remains important to keep ask-
ing why other parts of extractive industry history are erased from political 
discourse.
Governing Resource Extraction for Inclusive Development
Bonnie Campbell, an expert on mining governance, has argued that the 
effects of mining on inclusion and poverty reduction in Africa have been 
so disappointing in part because policy has focused on designing codes for 
mining itself rather than on governing the interactions between mining 
and development (Campbell 2008a). Of course, the discussion in the pre-
ceding two sections would suggest that such bias itself would reflect the 
dominant political settlement and the absence of coalitions, social move-
ments, and policy networks with the power to induce policies and institu-
tions much more oriented toward the promotion of inclusion. This section 
discusses different ways in which extractive industry might foster inclusive 
development and the sorts of coalitions that might induce institutions pro-
moting such inclusion.
Channels of Inclusion
The channels through which resource extraction might foster inclusive 
development can be separated very simply between those channels that 
are directly related to the ways in which the extractive enterprise governs 
and organizes itself (channels 1 to 4) and those that derive from the way 
extractive industry as a sector is regulated by third parties, above all the 
state (channels 5 to 8). Each of these is important. We note the following 
channels:
1. Employment:  populations can be included in or excluded from the 
political economy of extraction depending on the direct and indirect 
employment effects of mining, oil, and gas investments.
2. Supply chain management: companies can manage their supply chains 
in ways that offer more, or less, opportunities for local and regional 
populations to be included in their activities.
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3. Corporate social responsibility and transparency: company approaches 
to employee and community well-being, to redistribution of prof-
its through company-sponsored social programmes, and to financial 
transparency are all additional influences on who is and is not included 
in the benefits of extraction.
4. Ownership: though this occurs much less frequently, companies can 
also include populations and the workforce in the ownership structure 
of the extractive enterprise, either as shareholders or joint owners.
5. Public ownership: a number of extractive enterprises, particularly in 
the hydrocarbons sector, are publicly owned and as such allow for some 
sort of social inclusion in their operations, even if in practice such opera-
tions generally run as enterprises owned and organized by government.
6. Planning and consultation: populations can be included or excluded 
depending on practices and rules governing how resource extraction 
is planned for, who is consulted and how, and how far the voice of 
those consulted can affect the unfolding of the extractive economy 
(and relatedly, how far consultation and participation is managed such 
that it does little more than legitimate decisions and project designs 
already made (Li 2009)).
7. Taxation and social expenditure:  how far populations are included 
in access to the financial resources generated by extractive industry 
depends entirely on the ways in which the sector is taxed and the 
extent to, and means through which this fiscal revenue finds its ways 
into social investment and other development programmes.
8. Environment: the potential for adverse environmental effects is high 
in the extractive economy. To the extent that environmental damage is 
a mechanism through which contemporary and future generations are 
excluded from (net) benefits, then the governance of environmental 
impact is important for social inclusion.
These different channels make clear that inclusion can take different forms. 
While inclusion is often taken to refer to access to the benefit flows associ-
ated with resource extraction, ‘inclusion’ can also refer to the incorporation 
of particular ideas and valuations in the planning and regulatory processes 
surrounding extraction. In addition, inclusion might also occur through 
involvement in decision-making processes—whether these are land-use 
planning and zoning processes, or processes linked to the management 
of the actual extractive enterprise. Inclusion can, then, have economic, 
socio-cultural, and political components, and these are not necessarily 
co-present. In the following, and for reasons of space, we focus on inclusion 
in the material opportunities generated through employment and taxation.
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Inclusion through Employment and Taxation
It is frequently argued that one of the least significant mechanisms through 
which resource extraction fosters inclusion is employment. This is because 
the capital-intensive nature of modern operations restricts job creation, and 
furthermore tends to skew job creation toward higher-skilled positions. There 
are two important caveats to this observation. First, extractive industry com-
panies and their associations have argued that such claims understate the 
indirect employment effects of the mining, oil, and gas industries. Indeed, 
indirect employment effects can be significant when companies endeavour 
to make them so, as Langton has recently noted in her 2012 Boyer Lectures 
(Langton 2012). Second, the observation is relevant only to large-scale min-
ing: artisanal and small-scale mining generates far more employment (and 
much less, or no, tax revenue) and so might be deemed to be very inclusive 
in immediate livelihood terms (Hilson and Bancharigah 2009; Maconachie 
and Hilson 2011).
There is more general agreement that the channel which has the greatest 
potential significance as a means of promoting inclusion is that which runs 
from taxes and royalties to social expenditure (Hujo 2012; Arellano-Yanguas 
2012; Bebbington 2012). This claim underlies contemporary policies in coun-
tries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela that have sought to capture greater 
shares of revenue through increasing tax and royalty rates or through full or 
partial nationalizations, though it is also an argument used in more ortho-
dox, neo-liberally inclined regimes as well as by extractive industry companies 
themselves as an argument to justify the expansion of resource extraction. The 
channels linking extraction and social inclusion in this model run as follows:
extraction → taxes and royalties → social spending (social policy,  
social protection: targeted and non-targeted).
This, however, can be a relatively short-term view of the potential role of 
fiscal resources generated by extractive industry insofar as it emphasizes tax 
take as a means of increasing financing for social spending in the here and 
now. Such short-termism can be driven by government concern to use social 
spending to elicit political support, offset unrest, or seek alliances with cer-
tain subnational (formal and non-formal) authorities. Likewise it can be 
driven by the pressure of popular demands for rapid evidence of redistribu-
tion. Tax and royalty revenue can, however, be linked to social spending and 
social inclusion in a medium- to long-term sense if this revenue is used to 
manage both the asset portfolio of a country (e.g. through strategic invest-
ment in certain forms of infrastructure or human capital) and the structure 
of production through mechanisms that seek to manage revenue in ways 
that do not damage other sectors of the economy (e.g. via Dutch Disease 
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effects) and/or promote diversification beyond natural resources (Collier and 
Venables 2011; Thorp et  al. 2012). Such potential effects on growth con-
stitute a medium term pathway to social spending and inclusion insofar 
as growth generates future revenue for redistributive social investment. In 
this rendition the longer-term pathway from extraction to inclusion runs as 
follows:
extraction → taxes and royalties → sovereign wealth funds/national 
development banks → economic development and diversification → 
employment and tax generation → taxes for social policy.
Inevitably there are trade-offs between the short-, medium-, and long-term 
channels between extraction and social spending (Ascher 2012). The more 
tax and royalty revenue that is committed to immediate social spending 
reduces that which is available for saving in sovereign wealth funds, or for use 
in national development banks, infrastructure investment, and so on. There 
are also complex relationships among policies that save revenue in order to 
avoid the Dutch Disease and the promotion of economic diversification. First, 
if efforts to avoid currency appreciation are only partially successful, then the 
opportunities for diversification are constrained due to the combined effects 
of cheaper imports and more expensive exports, as appears to have happened 
in Chile, notwithstanding its success in keeping resource wealth off-shore 
and spending it counter-cyclically (Fuentes 2011; Guajardo 2012). Second, 
even when exchange-rate appreciation is successfully managed, other domes-
tic factors can still inhibit diversification, such as small domestic markets, 
environmental constraints, and so on (as perhaps is the case in Botswana: 
Battistelli and Guichaoua 2012). An interesting exception in this regard is that 
of Indonesia, and this may indeed be partly because its far larger internal mar-
ket facilitated diversification. Also the proportionately smaller weight of oil in 
its economy meant that the potential exchange-rate effects were far smaller 
(see an interesting discussion of the Indonesia case by Ascher 2012).
While there may be trade-offs between shorter and longer channels between 
extraction and inclusion the more important question regards the determi-
nants of these trade-offs. One current in the literature notes the importance 
of technocratic factors. For instance, oft commented in the Indonesian case 
was the important role that the technically strong and politically protected 
Ministry of Finance played in managing revenues for the long term, and of 
avoiding political pressures that would distort policy oriented to long-term 
growth (Hofman 2007; Ascher 2012). Indeed, in some sense the strength and 
proven independence of the Ministry provided the credible commitment 
(Sen 2012) that investors needed to see in order to invest in ways that had 
the effect of diversifying the economy. Ascher (2012) also makes the inter-
esting observation that the commitment to technocratic independence was 
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somehow (causally?) entangled with a particular approach to corruption in 
which the only corruption that was allowed in Indonesia was that which 
would not have systemic growth and diversification inhibiting effects (i.e. 
corruption that gave particular favours and market opportunities to members 
of the Suharto family). What was not allowed was corruption of the sort that 
would demand ‘growth suppressing macroeconomic policies (protectionism, 
overvalued exchange rates, distorted interest rates)’ (Ascher 2012, p. 250).
The mere existence of technocratic mechanisms that offer the prospect 
of strategic long-term management of resource extraction revenues is not, 
however, sufficient. Among the mechanisms for saving resource generated 
in the eight country cases presented in Collier and Venables (2011), only 
two of these (Malaysia and Chile) actually withstood political interference 
and raiding. Furthermore, they claim, the ostensibly best-designed fund 
(Cameroon’s oil fund) was the one that succumbed most easily to raiding 
(2011, pp. 11–17).
Raiding of such revenues (whether in the form of sovereign funds or regu-
lar government finances) can occur for many reasons each of which relate to 
the dominant political settlement and its relative stability. Most obviously 
raiding occurs because of unchecked corruption and theft, for which there 
are many cases: Nigeria, Angola, Cameroon, and so on. That such raiding 
happens and that resource revenues can be managed with impunity and 
complete lack of transparency reflects the existence of narrow settlements 
that are sustained through the use or threat of force and tight networks of 
loyalty somewhat akin to mafias and more generally the structures to which 
the literature on the ‘dark-side’ of social capital has drawn attention (Putzel 
1997). However, ‘raiding’ can also occur when the settlement is one that 
incorporates groups (or at least elites representing groups) with capacity to 
mobilize and/or withdraw critical political support when they conclude they 
are not receiving an appropriate share of benefits. Such raiding may not be 
of existing funds but more ‘pre-emptive’ in the sense that political claims 
are made on resource revenues even before they are transferred to central 
government. This circumstance is perhaps more characteristic of populist 
settlements—and populist forms of resource nationalism—in which a set-
tlement is consolidated precisely because it is predicated on redistribution. 
This may characterize contemporary circumstances in countries such as 
Venezuela and Bolivia. (It would not characterize a situation such as that of 
Norway because, while the settlement there is also predicated on redistribu-
tive social spending, it is also predicated on an acceptance of high tax rates—
that is, resource revenues do not replace income or sales tax.) In this sense 
the settlement determines the relative political feasibility of these different 
channels from extraction to social inclusion—and also by implication the 
relative sustainability of the social inclusion that accompanies extraction.
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Coalitions for Inclusion
As noted earlier, the extent to which these different channels of inclusion 
are present at both local and national scales varies greatly. Some companies 
in some countries manage supply chains to foster employment, others do 
not; some countries have institutionalized mechanisms of consultation and 
participation, others do not; and so forth. In the language of earlier sections 
of the chapter, this variation would be understood in terms of differences 
among political settlements and political coalitions across space and time. 
This in turn raises the question as to what sorts of coalition and settlement 
might foster greater inclusion.
One hypothesis in this regard might be that company-level initiatives to 
enhance inclusion are more likely to constitute responses to narrow coali-
tions, while changes in government regulation of the sector might reflect 
responses to the demands of broader-based coalitions. Indeed, it is possible 
to find cases of companies operating more inclusively in some contexts than 
others and to explain this difference in terms of the varying degree of social 
protest and mobilization that the company encounters across these sites. 
Likewise it is possible to encounter some companies that are generally more 
inclusive than others within any given country, and to explain this dif-
ference in terms of their differing subjection to pressures from watchdogs, 
activist shareholders, and public debate in their home countries. In these 
instances, while change is induced it is explained by the existence of narrow 
coalitions: the absence of a broader coalition means that such change is not 
likely to scale up beyond the operation or company in question.
Conversely the emergence of public institutions fostering enhanced 
inclusion might be expected to derive from broader-based coalitions (the 
broader base being necessary to counter special interests that would other-
wise favour less inclusive modes of governing the extractive economy). In 
some instances this broader base will not include the industry itself. The 
Salvadoran example discussed earlier would be one instance of this, while 
another would be the Bolivian experience in which the coalition embodied 
in the Movement Towards Socialism government of Evo Morales secured 
legislative change that increased state involvement in and taxation of the 
hydrocarbon sector. In other cases, such broader coalitions may well include 
at least some parts of the extractive sector itself. An example of the latter 
scenario would be the coalition that pushed for a change in tax distribu-
tion rules in Peru in the early 2000s. In this case, tax transfer rules were 
changed so that 50 per cent of the taxes paid by extractive enterprises would 
be returned to regions where extraction was occurring. In this case the coa-
lition seeking this change included mining companies who believed that 
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such transfers would reduce criticism of, and protest against, companies 
(Arellano-Yanguas 2012).
The dynamics of such coalitions are likely to be complicated by the fact 
that in many instances, moves towards one form of inclusion can involve 
the relative exclusion of other interests. The clearest instance of this is the 
scenario discussed in the second section of the chapter in which the expan-
sion of the extractive frontier is a vehicle for increasing government rev-
enues earmarked (at least rhetorically) for national-level social investment 
policies. In these instances, the inclusion of a large part of the citizenry 
(through social policy funded by revenue from resource extraction) requires 
the existence of institutions that would prevent populations living in areas 
of resource extraction from blocking expanded investment in the sector. 
A similar scenario is that where efforts to increase central government tax 
take from extraction in order to finance national policies would imply 
reducing regional governments’ revenues from the same source. In instances 
such as these, whether the coalition is able to induce change or not depends 
on the extent to which these excluded blocks have the necessary ‘holding 
power’ to prevent such change.
While a range of other scenarios can be imagined, these hypothetical and 
actual examples reflect the importance of understanding the institutional 
relationships through which resource extraction is governed as endoge-
nous to an existing political settlement, while also exploring the processes 
through which both endogenously and exogenously driven institutional 
change might occur. More specifically, focusing on cases where institutional 
change has fostered inclusion can serve as a basis for identifying the types 
of coalitional dynamic through which exclusionary settlements might be 
destabilized. This in turn would suggest the types of political process that 
might be supported with a view to increasing the likelihood that resource 
extraction might contribute to inclusive development.

Part III
The Politics of Social and Legal 
Citizenship: Promoting and Protecting 




The Politics of What Works  
in Service Delivery
Claire Mcloughlin
Introduction: The Debate on the Politics of Service Delivery
The pervasive failure of governments in developing countries to provide ser-
vices that meet the basic needs of their population has been largely, though 
not exclusively, attributed to problems of weak capacity. At the same time, 
there is now resounding consensus in aid circles that politics matters, insti-
tutions ‘rule’, and development agencies need to understand (even if they 
are not fully able to engage with) the political aspects of reform (Leftwich 
and Wheeler 2011; Unsworth 2010). It is not that politics has been absent 
from the debate about the under-provision of vital public services, just that 
in practice it has rarely been systematically examined as the principal cause.
It is well understood, at the conceptual level at least, that politics often 
underlies or exacerbates capacity constraints (Booth 2011a). The idea of 
public services as an inherently political undertaking, intimately bound to 
the nature of the state and the genesis of the social contract, has enjoyed 
both a long tradition in scholarly enquiry and a recent revival alongside 
the rise of state-building in development discourse (OECD 2008). The cen-
tral message from the seminal World Development Report 2004—that poor 
services are a measure of the failure of representative democracy to secure 
the ‘long-route’ of political accountability—remains deeply influential. 
Empirical studies likewise continue to document how political actors, based 
on calculations of political returns (attracting votes), often prefer to allo-
cate goods and services to certain social groups rather than pursue inclu-
sive, broad-based provision (Collier 2007).1 In practice, aid interventions 
1 See, for example, Andre and Mesple-Somps (2009); Burgess et al. (2010).
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designed to address so-called ‘political market imperfections’, typically 
through enhancing transparency or user participation, implicitly embody 
assumptions about how political actors’ incentives are created, maintained, 
and ultimately can be altered in favour of inclusive provision (Keefer 2007; 
Gauthier and Reinikka 2007).2
At the point of implementation, where policies often encounter vested 
interests and falter, whether and how services are delivered may depend 
in particular on the structure of incentives facing providers and recipients 
(Pritchett and Woolcock 2004; Collier 2007). Specifically, service delivery 
is likely to face problems to do with the motivations of frontline staff, the 
heterogeneity of customer needs and demands, and the difficulty of meas-
uring and monitoring performance (Collier 2007). The principal–agent 
problem has been a central framework for understanding why behav-
iour in service delivery organizations so often ‘fails to correspond to the 
expected pattern’ (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006, p. 14).3 As Pritchett 
and Woolcock (2004, p. 196) explain, because the provision of services 
is key, discretionary, and transaction intensive, with multiple principals 
and agents, delivering them through the public sector may well be ‘the 
mother of all institutional and organizational design problems’. In devel-
oping countries, the bureaucratic arena is itself highly politicized, inter-
connected with societal interests, and often forms the basis of patronage 
(Batley 2004).
In spite of recent conceptual advancements in analysing the politics of 
service delivery, technical studies and evaluation reports seeking to explain 
how public services perform are often entirely disconnected from political 
economy questions about actors and their incentives. Moreover, where poli-
tics is considered in the diagnosis of performance, it is typically cast in a 
constraining rather than an enabling role or, worse, confined to unconvinc-
ing, unexplained categories like ‘political will’, or ‘patrimonial politics’, or 
‘weak incentives’ (Hickey 2007). As Crook (2010) concluded in his review 
of the literature examining civil service reforms in Africa, ‘lack of political 
commitment’ is the favourite catch-all term for failure, and politics remains 
the ‘poor cousin’ among a group of better-understood, capacity-based expla-
nations. In sum, the widespread consensus that politics matters has not 
been matched by rigorous research into how different forms of politics are 
likely to determine whether and how well services perform.
2 Incentives are ‘the rewards and punishments that are perceived by individuals to be related to 
their actions and those of others’ and can be material or non-material (Ostrom et al. 2002, p. 36).
3 The ‘principal–agent’ model draws attention to the difficulties that citizens (as ‘principals’) 
face in ensuring the actions of self-interested politicians (the ‘agents’) are aligned with their 
purpose, and the problem that governments (as ‘principals’) face in constraining the behaviour 
of their bureaucracies (as ‘agents’) (Batley 2004).
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In seeking to address the need for more systematic, variegated analy-
sis of the politics of service delivery, this chapter departs from the main 
thrust of recent studies in two ways. First, it focuses exclusively on the 
role of politics, broadly interpreted,4 in accounting for service delivery 
performance. Second, it explores how politics has enabled, as opposed to 
constrained, that performance. To this end, the chapter traces the forms 
of politics that underpinned eight cases of relatively successful deliv-
ery, drawing on evidence from a range of country contexts and sectors 
(roads, agriculture, health, education) where independent evaluations 
demonstrate improved outcomes. In this way, the focus is explicitly on 
understanding the politics of what works. Specifically, the task is to iden-
tify the characteristics of the political environment in which these cases 
evolved: from the micro politics of implementation, to the politics of sec-
tor policymaking, to the macro political context. Piecing together these 
layers of politics is constrained by the fragmented nature of the literature, 
which often treats them as disconnected. Nevertheless, the findings illus-
trate that it is possible to trace the connections between performance at 
the point of delivery, and the main forms of politics operating at local, 
sector, and national levels.
The cases under scrutiny here, as Bebbington and McCourt (2007) observed 
in their own search for ‘success’, often emerge against the odds, and are never 
wholesale triumphs. As Grindle (2005) puts it, success, like development in 
general, is a moving target. Even policies that produce good results may over 
time ‘go bad’, ceasing to be effective or, worse, producing unintended con-
sequences. Setbacks, missteps, and reversals are characteristic of any path of 
reform (Benequista and Gaventa 2011). While these constitute good reasons 
to be cautious about labelling cases as ones that ‘work’, there is nevertheless 
a general openness to the idea that tracing success, or progress at least, might 
be a useful learning exercise (ODI 2011). Accordingly, new research into the 
politics of service provision is turning its attention towards explaining vari-
ation and exception in the face of overwhelming poor performance (Booth 
2011b), identifying institutional arrangements that are comparably better 
at dealing with some of the problems that arise in public service provision 
(Besley and Ghatak 2007), and understanding why some cases run against 
the general patterns of institutional failure or corruption (Leftwich 2010). 
Like these studies, the purpose here is not to provide a blueprint for success 
elsewhere, but rather, to understand how politics has enabled inclusive ser-
vice delivery in particular cases.
4 Politics is here understood to encompass ‘all the activities of conflict, cooperation and 
negotiation over decisions about institutions and rules which shape how resources are used, 
produced and distributed’ (Leftwich 2010, p. 10).
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Case Studies of the Politics of What Works
Important conceptual advances in understanding the politics of basic ser-
vice delivery have centred on the role of actors, incentives, and institutions 
in enabling or constraining reform. However, empirical research is lag-
ging, offering little present scope for systematic learning or policy uptake. 
Comparative studies of the political factors that account for variation in 
service outcomes, either between sectors within a country, or across regions 
within a sector, remain rare. This review also revealed a paucity of cases 
subjected both to political analysis and technical impact evaluation. More 
critically, these two approaches rarely cross paths in the service delivery liter-
ature (as elsewhere). Political analysis is typically pitched at the macro level, 
or alternatively provides highly localized insights into specific blockages to 
reform at the sector level, with few connecting the two. Impact evaluations 
offer largely technical accounts that sometimes struggle to accommodate 
politics in a meaningful way.
The above limitations, partly a reflection of the broader dichotomy 
between the received wisdom that ‘politics matters’ and the reality that 
capacity is easier to document and measure, present a practical challenge 
to studying the politics of service delivery. The implication for this study 
is that the cases analysed in this chapter were pieced together retrospec-
tively, connecting available, sometimes contradictory, technical material 
with academic research, grey literature, and political analysis. Because of 
the post hoc nature of this process, the cases should be read as indicative, 
rather than comprehensive or conclusive accounts of the political determi-
nants of what worked.
In so far as the literature allows, the cases carefully unpick the macro, 
meso, and micro political conditions in which human development out-
comes were improved through service delivery. The selection presents an 
opportunity to consider the influence of politics in both ‘social’ (health and 
education) and ‘productive’ (roads and agricultural marketing) sectors in 
diverse country settings: Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda, Indonesia, 
Malawi, and Peru. In each case, independent impact evaluation verifies the 
progress made, and moreover that improvements have been sustained over 
the long term (minimum five years). The selection also aimed to show vari-
ation between different organizational arrangements for delivery—ranging 
broadly from direct state, to contracting out, to co-production, to state–NGO 
collaboration.5 This variety is shown in Table 5.1.
5 In practice, no case fits neatly into a single category, partly because the complexity of organ-
izational arrangements is not often captured in the literature, and partly because a particular 
service may be provided through bundles of modes operating at different levels or points in the 
production and delivery process.
The Politics of What Works in Service Delivery
123
Maternal and Child Health in Rwanda
A number of sources have recently drawn attention to the progress made in 
the Rwandan health sector since 1994 (Pose and Samuels 2011a; Basinga et 
al. 2011; Brinkerhoff et al. 2009). Although the genocide virtually destroyed 
the country’s health infrastructure, available data indicate nearly all health 
indicators have been restored to pre-genocide levels, and Rwanda is now on 
track to meet the child and maternal health MDGs. This follows a striking 
decrease in the maternal mortality ratio between 2000 and 2005 (30 per 
cent), and a sharp reduction in under-five and infant mortality between 2005 
and 2007 (32 per cent and 28 per cent, respectively). Progress is expected to 
continue as the number of women giving birth in health facilities, and the 
number of births attended by skilled personnel, increases (Pose and Samuels 
2011a, pp.11, 15–16).
The scale and timing of this progress is intimately connected to the excep-
tional context of the post-genocide period and the nature of the ensuing 
post-war political settlement. Pose and Samuels (2011a) trace the evolution 
of health sector reform in Rwanda along the same timeline as wider pro-
cesses of stabilization and social reconciliation in the country. Planning 
was initially hampered by a period of stagnation in the late 1990s, during 
which time the country, governed by the interim Government of National 
Unity, was reliant on emergency humanitarian aid and characterized by 
sporadic conflict. Only when the period of political reconstruction began 
in the early 2000s could reforms begin to be designed and piloted, but still, 
national-level implementation could not fully get underway until after the 
first multi-party elections of 2003 (Pose and Samuels 2011a, p. 7).
Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2011, p. 15) argue that the shock and chal-
lenge to national survival presented by the genocide helped install a 
leadership determined to pursue nation-building, noting that President 
Kagame is widely regarded as ‘both visionary and determined to the point 
Table 5.1. Case studies of the politics of what works
Sector Country Main mode of delivery
Maternal and child health Rwanda Performance-based financing
Bangladesh Decentralized state provision
Basic education Ghana Complementary (state–NGO 
collaboration)
Ethiopia Decentralized state provision
Rural roads Indonesia Decentralized state provision
Peru Contracting out
Agricultural marketing Malawi State-run
Ghana State-run
Source: Author.
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of ruthlessness’. They conclude that, in several respects, the regime since 
2000 has been characterized by ‘developmental patrimonialism’:  that is, 
the ruling elite has successfully centralized rents and deployed them with 
a view to the long term—as formally articulated in Rwanda’s Vision 2020. 
Furthermore, because the regime has been free from the need to create rents 
to generate political support, policy has been driven almost exclusively by a 
genuine commitment to economic and social development as an antidote to 
a legacy of ethnic division (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2011). Morgan (2010) 
notes that the near-complete destruction of infrastructure and human capi-
tal appears to have enabled policy innovation free from the constraints of a 
historically entrenched system.
At the technical level, Rwanda’s achievements in health are widely attrib-
uted to a package of health reforms that simultaneously address the supply 
and demand side (Kalk et al. 2010).6 On the supply side, the Performance 
Based Financing (PBF) initiative—a form of ‘contracting in’ piloted in 2002 
and rolled out nationally in 2006—is a prominent mode of provision.7 The 
initiative provides financial incentives to public- and NGO-managed district 
hospitals to increase utilization and quality of care, based on performance 
against a set of indicators (Pose and Samuels 2011a). Supplementary fund-
ing is allocated by central government acting in a stewardship role, and 
the initiative receives financial and technical contributions from the World 
Bank, WHO, and a number of bilateral aid agencies.8 High-level backing 
from the Rwandan government was cemented in 2006 after rigorous evalua-
tions revealed positive impacts on the availability and utilization of services 
(Soeters et al. 2006). Notwithstanding ongoing academic debates regarding 
the effects of PBF on long-term worker incentives (Meessen et al. 2006; Kalk 
et al. 2010), a recent multi-donor impact evaluation of outcomes across 166 
districts found improvements in both the use and quality of maternal and 
child health services (Basinga et al. 2011).
Echoing the wider observations about the role of determined leadership 
in Rwanda’s broader developmental success, several authors note that strong 
political leadership, from the President down to village level, has been criti-
cal in providing the impetus for health reform in the post-genocide period 
(Pose and Samuels 2011a; Brinkerhoff et  al. 2009). The effects of leader-
ship style have also been notable in the implementation of PBF. Morgan 
(2010) analyses how the government’s will and firm commitment to the 
6 This includes decentralization, community-based provision, and, on the demand side, 
the well-known community health insurance—the Mutuelle de Santé—a scheme providing a 
national subsidy for those too poor to pay for health.
7 The approach is sometimes referred to as ‘paying for performance’ (P4P).
8 Funding is coordinated through an Inter-Agency Working Groups on Results Based Financing, 
affiliated to the International Health Partnership (Kalk et al. 2010).
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programme meant it was able to push the initiative forward in spite of an 
initial cool response from donors. Others similarly note government com-
mitment was critical to steering a course through the diverging views of the 
multiple stakeholders at the implementation stage (Rusa and Fritsche 2007). 
Morgan (2010) cites the example of government champions being able to 
hold together a commitment from donors to not introduce PBF in the ‘con-
trol areas’ during the pilot evaluation stage of the programme. This capacity 
to assertively engage donors is indicative of the wider observation that, in 
spite of being heavily aid dependent, Rwanda has been able to pursue its 
own agenda, acting as a ‘true partner’ and encouraging the coordination of 
aid at central and local levels (Pose and Samuels 2011a).
Leadership is closely linked to strong top-down incentives, and this 
is another factor that features prominently in accounts of the success of 
performance-based financing in Rwanda. Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2011, 
p. 16) argue that the Rwandan civil service scores highly on vertical coor-
dination and technocratic integrity—essential instruments for regimes 
to effectively implement their policy vision. They further argue that the 
legitimacy and integrity of the Rwandan regime, evidenced in the com-
plete absence of high-level political corruption, affords it considerable moral 
authority (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2011).
At the national level, as Pose and Samuels (2011a) describe, the adminis-
tration has strategically revived the deeply embedded Rwandan cultural val-
ues of imihigo and guhiga, requiring mayors, village chiefs, local leaders, and 
civil servants to sign annual performance contracts on which they have to 
swear an oath. Some authors observe synergy between this wider emphasis 
on performance, which Brinkerhoff et al. (2009) describe as ‘front and cen-
tre’ in the Rwandan public sector, and the success of PBF. At the technical 
level, Meessen et al. (2006) note that deploying values and social norms of 
integrity and honesty lowers the transaction costs of command-and-control 
mechanisms like PBF. Pose and Samuels (2011a) conclude that Rwanda is an 
example of how formal standard-setting, evaluation, and feedback mecha-
nisms can be successfully deployed alongside more traditional, culturally 
embedded means of enforcing contracts, accountability, and obligations.
Maternal and Child Health in Bangladesh
Bangladesh has achieved what the World Bank (2005b) has described as 
a ‘spectacular rate of progress’ on health indicators since its independ-
ence in 1971, most notably in reducing fertility, but also in increasing the 
use of antenatal and postnatal care. Pose and Samuels (2011b) similarly 
cite ‘extraordinary improvements’ in infant and maternal mortality in 
the country, including a 44 per cent decline in the maternal mortality 
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rate between 1990 and 2001 (Mridha et al. 2009, p. 1). This progress has 
occurred alongside sustained growth in health infrastructure:  from a 
very low base of virtually no health facilities at independence, to now 
substantial numbers of district hospitals and local community clinics 
(Mridha et al. 2009). The country has used successive five-year develop-
ment plans to move from a narrow urban-based delivery system to a more 
broad-based rural programme capable of reaching vulnerable groups (Pose 
and Samuels 2011b). Much of the literature acknowledges that in spite 
of the impressive gains made in maternal and child health, inequalities 
remain between regions and between ethnic and socioeconomic groups 
in access to services (Mridha et al. 2009; World Bank 2005b; Hossain and 
Osman 2007).
Several observers note that success in Bangladesh is surprising, paradoxi-
cal even, given the country’s poor record on governance and the prevalence 
of corruption (Mridha et al. 2009; Pose and Samuels 2011b). In explaining 
this paradox, some point to Bangladesh’s consistent commitment to prior-
itizing maternal and child health in spite of a swathe of policy shifts made 
by successive regimes (Hossain and Osman 2007; World Bank 2005b; Pose 
and Samuels 2011b). The nature of the post-independence political settle-
ment, as Parks and Cole (2010) argue, is relatively stable, and patterns of elite 
competition and cooperation remain predictable and consistent, though the 
actual coalition in power changes every few years. Some analysts have sug-
gested electoral competition and the perceived political capital to be gained 
from service provision have played an important role in driving social sector 
reform in Bangladesh. Hossain and Osman (2007, p. 39) note strong party 
competition between 1991 and 2006 has driven health reform, as successive 
ruling parties have attempted to scale up their efforts in order to outperform 
their predecessor. This, they argue, is mirrored in the local politicization 
of services; characterized by increased party control over the distribution 
of resources. Mahmud et  al. (2008) observe that since the 1980s, govern-
ment has gradually withdrawn from the productive sectors to concentrate 
more on providing public services, partly because politicians perceive social 
spending as a political win-win that provides political credit alongside busi-
ness opportunities.
It has also been suggested that electoral politics have determined the 
nature of the reforms undertaken, based on the type of popular support 
they have been able to attract. Hossain and Osman (2007) describe how 
achievements made during the 1990s were mainly limited to reforms to 
improve access—a type of reform that typically enjoys political support 
and is rarely administratively complex. They observe that ‘the objectives 
of the reform were broadly aligned with the conditions of governance, 
which therefore did not present a major obstacle to their achievement’ 
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(2007, p. 39). Further, reforms to increase access were popular with citi-
zens and service-providers, specifically doctors, attracting the support 
of local and central political elites and the donor community. Similarly, 
Mahmud et  al. (2008) argue that, broadly speaking, successive govern-
ments have pursued the path of least confrontation, adopting reforms that 
were relatively easy wins accomplished by ‘a stroke of the pen’. Since the 
2000s, much-needed quality reforms have yet to make it onto the policy 
table, reflecting the perceived difficulties of tackling the interests of the 
now well-organized professional public servants whose political clout was 
strengthened through the expansionary reforms of the 1990s (Hossain 
and Osman 2007).
At the local level, effective state-NGO collaboration has been important 
(Pose and Samuels 2011b), alongside the role of the decentralized public 
health system (Mridha et al. 2009). Public health in Bangladesh is deliv-
ered through a tiered structure of facilities at tertiary (division), secondary 
(district), and upazila (sub-district) levels. While there are no available 
country-wide evaluations of the decentralized mode of provision, Faguet 
and Ali’s (2009) micro-level study of health outcomes across two upazilas— 
one successful, one unsuccessful—provides an insight into the local struc-
tural, political, and institutional factors that may account for the varia-
tion in indicators across localities. The study found that while the health 
‘hardware’ (infrastructure, administration, staff) of the two upazilas was 
similar, the successful upazila was in closer proximity to the capital, had 
a history of sustained NGO involvement, and a relatively open, tolerant 
religious tradition.
Even more important than these structural factors, Faguet and Ali 
(2009) argue, was the ability of ‘local leaders’ to promote changes in 
health behaviours. This was made possible because they were embedded 
in a dense ‘web of relationships’ between citizens, legal authorities, and 
service providers that conferred on them local authority and legitimacy, 
making the local population more susceptible to their messages. This net-
work of relationships also underpinned a higher degree of accountability 
by public servants in the successful upazila. The authors argue, therefore, 
that ‘if services are to respond to a population’s particular—and chang-
ing—needs, and be credible in the eyes of the population, the elected 
representatives of that population should be involved in their produc-
tion (Faguet and Ali 2009, p. 216). They conclude that, in order to under-
stand success and failure in public service delivery, we need to dig down 
beneath the ‘rules of the game’: that is, to look beyond the organizations, 
institutions, and informal rules and conventions that govern incentives, 
to examine the underlying beliefs, understandings, and dispositions that 
drive behaviour.
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Complementary Education in Ghana
Ghana has made substantial progress in increasing access to basic education 
since the post-colonial period:  the net enrolment ratio in primary school 
increased from 60 per cent to 77 per cent between 1999 and 2008 (UNESCO 
2011, p. 117). In spite of this achievement, the 2011 Education Monitoring 
Report warns that based on current levels of public education expenditure, 
and in light of sharp cuts in the education budget in response to wider fiscal 
crisis, the country is unlikely to meet its MDG targets without a substantial 
increase in aid (UNESCO 2011). Little (2010, p. 44) is similarly cautious, not-
ing that enrolments remain well below the Education for All (EFA) goals, 
and completion rates are problematic, with only 63 per cent of children 
making it to their fifth year of primary school. Furthermore, there are signs 
progress has levelled off since the early 2000s, partly because of the dif-
ficulties of reaching the last 20 per cent of primary-age children, particu-
larly in the north of the country, where the great majority of children do 
not complete the compulsory nine years of primary education (Little 2010; 
Casely-Hayford and Hartwell 2010, p. 529).
A number of studies have analysed the relationship between Ghana’s 
uneven progress on education over the past three decades, and the level of 
‘political will’ exhibited by successive regimes (Little 2010; Pedley and Taylor 
2009; Kosack 2009). These studies provide similar accounts of why the 
country invested relatively more in primary education in the periods before 
1966 and after 1986, whereas the intervening period was characterized by 
structural decline. Little (2010) and Pedley and Taylor (2009) both observe 
that governments that prioritized access to education—namely, under the 
Convention People’s Party (CPP) (1951–65) and the Provisional National 
Defence Council (PNDC) (1982–92)—were driven by a need to actively court 
the support of the masses. Kosack (2009) develops this further, arguing that 
the fluctuating levels of political will correlate with whether or not the two 
‘vital constituencies’ in education reform—poor families and employers—
were mobilized by a ‘political entrepreneur’. In contrast, regimes under 
which access to education declined owed their power base to the urban mid-
dle classes and therefore tended to stress improving standards (Little 2010, 
p. 44). Pedley and Taylor (2009) note that, while governments in the demo-
cratic era since 1996 have committed to ‘Education for All’, elite and middle-
class interests continue to influence a focus on secondary education.
Against this background of inconsistent progress, resource constraints, 
and the continuing challenge of reaching underserved populations, the 
important contribution of complementary education in Ghana is increas-
ingly being recognized (Casely-Hayford and Hartwell 2010). The School for 
Life (SfL) programme, piloted and rolled out across the north of the country 
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since 1995, is considered one of the few successful examples of complemen-
tary education (Rose 2009). The programme provides accelerated learning to 
underserved populations through a form of co-production whereby formal 
organizations and communities or service recipients both make resource 
contributions; for example, volunteer facilitators (teachers) are recruited 
from within the community, trained by the Ghana Education Service (GES), 
and paid by the community in food, small amounts of cash or household 
labour.9 The programme is highly adapted to local preferences:  schedules 
work around children’s local work demands, the curriculum is simplified, 
and instruction is in the mother tongue.
A recently completed impact assessment found SfL had reached 85,000 
children and over 4,000 rural communities across twelve districts, with close 
to 90 per cent of these children completing the programme and becoming 
functionally literate, and almost 70 per cent transitioning to the formal edu-
cation system at upper primary levels. The integration of SfL students into 
the formal system was shown to have had a positive impact on the over-
all gross enrolment rate for public primary schools in the north.10 The pro-
gramme also improved gender equality (at least 40 per cent of those enrolled 
in SfL were female) and helped diffuse messages about the importance of 
good-quality education (Casely-Hayford and Hartwell 2010).
Much of the literature examining SfL points to the role of a supportive 
government–NGO relationship as an enabling factor in the overall success 
and sustainability of the programme. While the programme is exclusively 
donor-funded, with no public finance, government has been encouraging 
in its stewardship role, increasingly recognizing the contribution of com-
plementary education at the policy level since 2003 (Casely-Hayford and 
Hartwell 2010). At the implementation level, SfL is managed through col-
laborative arrangements between donors, non-state actors, and government 
agencies. Central and local government, donors, and NGOs sit together 
on its Executive Board, providing policy advice and appointing senior 
staff (2010, p. 528). The legitimacy of SfL has been acknowledged at the 
lowest tiers of government, where several District Education Offices have 
signed Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) with SfL. Casely-Hayford 
and Hartwell (2010) argue that in turn SfL has influenced the state sector’s 
notions of quality provision, and has begun training formal public sector 
teachers in its native language and community-based literacy approach. 
Batley and Mcloughlin (2010, pp. 144–5) argue that this type of informal 
mutual agreement, based on independent contributions by the partners and 
9 This definition of co-production is based on Joshi and Moore (2004).
10 Specifically, the evaluation found that SfL increased access to primary education by 14% 
in the North; from a gross enrolment rate of 69%, to 83% (Casely-Hayford and Hartwell 2010).
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non-hierarchic relationships between them, allows for joint learning, relies 
on the accumulation of human capital, and may extend through processes 
of imitation, example, and institutional replication.
Some of the literature examines more closely the actors and incentives 
behind the government–NGO relationship in the case of SfL. It is broadly 
accepted that donors have been instrumental in encouraging the govern-
ment’s collaborative stance towards complementary education in general, 
and SfL in particular. Rose (2009) observes that donors are often the ones 
promoting the inclusion of NGO provision within education plans. In the 
specific case of SfL, Casely-Hayford and Hartwell (2010) note that the pro-
gramme gained public visibility, and increased government recognition, 
only after USAID included complementary education within its education 
strategy and began financing it in 2005. But as Kosack (2009) points out, 
aid has generally only been effective in Ghana where donor goals coincide 
with those of the government. There are indications that government incen-
tives may be positively aligned with donors in this instance because of the 
particular dynamics and funding arrangements of SfL. Rose (2009, p. 230) 
notes that experience in Ghana is indicative of a wider pattern whereby gov-
ernments are happy to include NGO provision in education plans provided 
the provision is supported by external resources rather than competing with 
formal government schooling.
Primary Education in Ethiopia
Despite being historically one of the most educationally disadvantaged 
countries in the world, having seen poor enrolment and educational attain-
ment in the adult population in the early 1990s, Ethiopia has achieved a 
‘rapid and equitable’ expansion of access to primary education since the 
end of the civil war in 1991 (Engel 2011). The 2011 Global Monitoring 
Report observes the country now has a real prospect of achieving Universal 
Primary Education by 2015, having reduced the number of children out of 
school from 6.5 million to 2.7 million from 1999 to 2008 (UNESCO 2011). 
Notwithstanding continuing concerns over quality, there is evidence that 
this rapid expansion has been accompanied by reductions in geographic and 
socioeconomic inequalities in access (in particular, a narrowing of the gen-
der gap), alongside growing rates of primary school completion (Teshome 
2008; Engel 2011). Accordingly, Ethiopia has recently been described as hav-
ing ‘the most pro-poor budget in Africa’ (Engel 2011, p. 15).
The literature examining the progress made in education in Ethiopia 
draws attention to the strong ideological commitment to pro-poor reform 
and equality of access reform exhibited by the ruling political party, the 
Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Brown and 
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Teshome (2007) explain how this ideology is linked to the party’s military 
history, its experience of mass mobilization in resistance to the Dergue, 
and the fact that the poor are its key political constituency. Likewise, Engel 
(2011) argues that the political legitimacy of the EPRDF rests on its identity 
as a ‘vanguard movement of the poor’, and that education has been regarded 
by the regime as a central pillar of the post-war nation-building project, as 
a means of addressing past sources of instability (2011, p. 14). This is illus-
trated by Teshome’s (2008, p. 58) description of successive education poli-
cies as being ‘loaded’ with references to democratic values, human rights, 
and citizenship, and conveying explicit aims ‘to produce good citizens who 
understand, respect and defend the constitution’.
Chanie (2007) and Engel (2011) argue that decentralization in Ethiopia 
has been central to the ruling party’s political survival, and arose from an 
urgent need to resolve struggles for power and resources between ethnic 
political elites, and to accommodate the various ethnic groups’ specific geo-
graphical features, economic activity, and social and cultural values. In the 
education sector, central government finances services through intergov-
ernmental transfers, but retains control over curriculum and overall poli-
cymaking while other aspects of the stewardship role—namely, planning, 
standard-setting and accreditation, evaluation, monitoring, and allocat-
ing local discretionary budgets—are devolved to woreda education offices 
(Garcia and Rajkumar 2008).11 A 2008 World Bank study found that in spite 
of sub-optimal arrangements for funding, planning, and role allocation, 
decentralization improved service delivery, and disproportionately favoured 
poorer, more remote, food insecure, and pastoral areas, narrowing the gap 
in attainment between disadvantaged and better-off woreda (Garcia and 
Rajkumar 2008, p.  ix). While acknowledging the problems in attributing 
sector outcomes to decentralization, Dom et al. (2010, p. 51) support this 
finding, arguing that decentralization has had positive redistributive effects, 
and has coincided with steeper upward trends in a number of education 
indicators.
There are mixed signals about the relative roles of top-down versus 
bottom-up accountability and participation in the decentralized system of 
education in Ethiopia. On the one hand, Brown and Teshome (2007, p. 45) 
argue that the ruling party’s Marxist roots which underlie its commit-
ment to pro-poor policymaking have also engendered a top-down, com-
mand approach to implementation. At the formal level, and Dom et  al. 
(2010) describe in detail how decentralization has been tempered by strong 
top-down influences and constraints on local government autonomy. At the 
11 Levels of government in Ethiopia are: zones, woredas (districts), and kebeles (community 
councils) (Garcia and Rajkumar 2008).
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informal level, Chanie (2007) has argued that intergovernmental transfers 
in practice centre on informal, patron–client relations characterized by an 
imbalance of power between strong central and weaker regional political 
parties. These dynamics sustain upward accountability, central domination, 
and regional fiscal dependence (2007, p. 361).
On the other hand, some studies have suggested that decentralization in 
Ethiopia has generated positive social capital and collective action around ser-
vices (Engel 2011). Dom et al. (2010, p. 46) find decentralization has allowed 
woredas to raise local awareness of national strategies and more effectively 
mobilize community participation and resources. Engel (2011) similarly 
notes increased community willingness to dedicate scarce resources to edu-
cation, indicated by the fact that community contributions frequently make 
up between 10 and 20 per cent of the woreda budget (Garcia and Rajkumar 
2008, cited in Engel 2011, p.  20). There is also some suggestion that the 
government’s decision to allow teaching to be delivered in local languages, 
using locally relevant curricula, has contributed to more active participation 
in the teaching–learning process (Engel 2011, p. 18). Smith (2008), however, 
conveys a more mixed message, noting that while there may be gains in 
terms of increased local pride, self-identity, and social capital, the impact of 
the education policy on long-term national unity remains unknown.
Rural Roads in Indonesia
Indonesia has recently been lauded as a democratic success story, having in 
a relatively short time made the transition from a centralized authoritar-
ian regime to a democratic state that has pursued what Harris and Foresti 
(2011) describe as an aggressive programme of ‘big bang decentralization’. 
While problems of corruption and neo-patrimonialism remain pervasive, 
decentralization is considered to have enabled progress towards increased 
accountability, as well as allowing citizens to express their preferences in the 
delivery of public goods at the local level (Harris and Foresti 2011).
As part of its ongoing decentralization reforms, the Indonesian gov-
ernment has, since 1998, adopted what is considered to be an innovative 
approach to the provision of small-scale infrastructure and rural roads 
development under the national Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) 
(World Bank 2010).12 In this community-driven development approach, 
central government devolves an annual block grant to sub-districts to fund 
infrastructure projects chosen by villages, of which roads are the most popu-
lar (Olken 2010). Projects are facilitated and managed by local NGOs, which 
12 The programme now comes under the remit of the National Program for Community 
Empowerment (PNPM).
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are responsible for managing funds, sourcing materials from the private sec-
tor, and building the roads through local labour (Guggenheim et al. 2004). 
The World Bank funds the programme and government, NGOs, and donors 
collaborate in monitoring and oversight at local level. Available data indi-
cate that by October 2009, the programme had built or rehabilitated over 
62,000 km of roads, with wider positive impacts in reducing household vul-
nerability and decreasing unemployment (World Bank 2010). Evaluations 
have found the technical quality of the vast majority of the infrastructure 
to be ‘good’ to ‘very good’, the method of building more cost effective than 
equivalent government contracts, and the roads to be well maintained by 
communities (Olken 2010; Guggenheim et al. 2004).
There is some consensus that the incentives for the post-1998 democratic 
state to adopt a community-driven approach to development derived in part 
from the underlying socio-economic conditions in the country (World Bank 
2010; Guggenheim et al. 2004; Chowdhury et al. 2009). In analysing the 
origins of the KDP in particular, the World Bank (2010) emphasize that the 
context of rural poverty, political upheaval, and financial crisis—namely, 
the East Asia crisis and the sudden downfall of President Suharto—provided 
an impetus for government to deliver programmes that could ‘bypass the 
graft-prone top layers of government’ in an effort to ‘increase the people’s 
trust’. Guggenheim et al. (2004) similarly argue that this ‘major institutional 
transition’ weakened the appeal of centralized, top-down development in 
favour of more populist approaches like the KDP. In spite of this, they con-
tend the programme did not in fact represent a reactionary or wholesale 
shift of political will in response to socio-economic crisis. Rather, it was 
a continuation of Indonesia’s long-standing political commitment to rural 
economic development that had its origins in President Suharto’s personal 
quest to address food insecurity. They describe how in practice, therefore, 
the KDP was not an entirely new mode of delivery, but was able to build on 
pre-existing institutions for local participation (Guggenheim et al. 2004). 
Chowdhury et al. (2009) argue that the political appeal of direct transfers 
to the poor has been the same for Indonesia’s authoritarian and democratic 
regimes alike; that is, they have an immediate and visible impact on recipi-
ents, and can be ‘pitched’ as confirmation of the government’s commitment 
to poverty reduction.
Sources acknowledge that the success and sustainability of the KDP model 
of provision is at least partly attributable to its demand-led, participatory 
nature (World Bank 2010; Guggenheim et al. 2004; Chowdhury et al. 2009). 
Chowdhury et al.’s (2009) comparative study of local infrastructure before 
and after the introduction of KDP concluded that the programme did 
improve the overall availability of local public roads, as well as better reflect-
ing local, and in particular women’s preferences for roads as opposed to 
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other types of infrastructure. The World Bank (2010) notes that the partici-
pation of women and poor people in the programme has been high (average 
45 per cent and 60 per cent respectively). Olken’s (2010) study of the effects 
of participation in the programme across forty-nine villages concluded that 
overall participation did help increase the programme’s legitimacy, and 
that the process and mechanism of participation mattered more than the 
actual outcomes (i.e. the type of project selected). Where community deci-
sions were taken through plebiscites (direct democracy), as opposed to a 
deliberative meeting, the community (particularly women) were more likely 
to be satisfied with the projects chosen, and more likely to perceive them 
as legitimate, regardless of whether the outcome matched their preference 
(Olken 2010). Gibson and Woolcock (2008) found that in the KDP’s delib-
erative forums, rights-based claim-making was the preferred ‘currency of 
exchange’, and allowed marginalized groups to challenge elite dominance 
over decision-making.
The literature provides varying accounts of the relative merits of bottom-up 
versus top-down accountability in addressing corruption in the case of the 
KDP. Guggenheim et al. (2004) argue that strong top-down control and joint 
government–World Bank monitoring at local level helped curb the potential 
for elite capture, noting the collaborative local effort between the Ministry 
of Home Affairs and local community NGOs in exposing corrupt officials. 
Field experiments by Olken (2007) found that in practice, bottom-up and 
top-down controls over corruption were operating together, with different 
effects. Whereas citizen engagement was able to act as an effective check 
on the potential for shirking by community labourers, it was not an effec-
tive check on missing materials, and only increased government audits were 
able to reduce ‘missing’ expenditures. Olken’s study concludes that grass-
roots participation in monitoring is only effective where there are limited 
free-rider problems and limited elite capture. These observations chime with 
the findings of studies of accountability systems across other sectors which 
indicate that success requires a combination of bottom-up and top-down 
pressure (Unsworth 2010).
Rural Roads in Peru
Peru has recently made significant progress in improving access to roads 
in rural and mountainous areas, where some of the country’s most vulner-
able populations live. Since 1995, the Peru Rural Roads Program (PCR)—a 
national programme run by government and jointly funded by the World 
Bank and Inter-American Development Bank—has rehabilitated and main-
tained some 15,000 km of rural roads and 7,000 km of paths (used primar-
ily by women and children) (McSweeney and Remy 2008). A number of 
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evaluations have demonstrated improvements in local economic productiv-
ity and increased investments in health and education as a result of the 
programme (Valdivia 2010). A 2005 study found the programme led to an 
8 per cent increase in school enrolment, a 55 per cent increase in number 
of visits to health centres, a 16 per cent increase in use of agricultural land, 
and a 20 per cent increase in rural household income (Simatovic 2008, p. 7). 
The programme has also been noted as a promising approach to addressing 
gender in transport, with some sources highlighting how the programme 
has particularly increased women’s access to markets and school enrolment 
(Bravo 2002).
Much of the literature attributes the success of the PCR to a number of 
‘innovative’ institutional design characteristics that, as Valdivia (2010) 
argues, set the right incentives for the agents. Under the programme, local 
governments and communities that live adjacent to the roads identify pri-
ority projects according to the level of local demand. Women and men are 
consulted separately to enable women to fully make their voices heard. The 
local government then issues performance-based contracts to Routine Road 
Maintenance Microenterprises (MEMVRs), formed by local people, to carry 
out the required work.13 The state requires that at least 30 per cent of the 
employees of the MEMVRs be women, reflecting a broader commitment to 
gender equality, as seen at national level in the gender quota for political 
candidates (Simatovic 2008). Several authors have argued that the PCR’s 
inclusive mode of provision has enabled genuine local ownership, helped 
insulate it from local capture, and ultimately underlies its sustainability 
(Simatovic 2008; Valdivia 2010). Valdivia (2010) argues the programme 
has avoided corruption because outputs are highly observable, and because 
monitoring is carried out jointly by local government and community asso-
ciations. McSweeney and Remy (2008) point out that the MEMVRs have 
incentives to be accountable and to perform well because they are formed 
from, and embedded in, local communities that live close to the road, and 
therefore have a direct stake in maintaining them. In this way, the case sup-
ports the point made elsewhere that accountability may work best when it is 
genuinely locally anchored.
Simatovic (2008) argues that the programme’s participatory and inclu-
sive design characteristics have in turn strengthened democracy and citi-
zenship, and altered state–society relations, in rural areas. In her evaluation 
of the programme’s effect on citizenship, she concluded that the decentral-
ized model, the mainstreaming of citizen participation, and the engage-
ment of local users in the maintenance of the roads, had increased political 
13 As of 2008, 650 MEMVRs had been created, generating 4,800 permanent jobs and some 
35,000 temporary jobs (Simatovic 2008, p. 25).
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participation, strengthened democracy and local civil society, strengthened 
new leaders, improved local management skills, and aided political inclusion 
(2008, p. 3). She also argues that participatory institutions increased the level 
of trust between local actors and the state, ‘thereby breaking down the effec-
tive distance between the rural population and the state, altering a tradition 
of vertical relationships, little respect for social organizations, and the discre-
tionary authority of personnel’ (2008, p. 24).
In contrast to this, Wilson (2004) has provided an account of road-building 
in the Peruvian Andes that reveals more contested relationships. She argues 
that road–building in Peru has at times been characteristic of the state’s ‘ter-
ritorialising project’, that is, making claims to political/social space, and 
exerting control over people and resources at a distance, which often involve 
strategies of persuasion, force, and seduction, and transplanting local offices 
and administrative districts. She notes that roads may have different connota-
tions to rural communities; in some instances, they may be seen as a path into 
the wider economy, polity, and society; in others, they might be considered a 
threat to autonomy, and communities might evade ‘incorporation’. In some 
cases, roads in Peru have become a site of elite resistance to ‘modernity’, and 
been bogged down in acrimonious disputes between local elites over access to 
resources and local labour. In the Peruvian case, Wilson (2004, p. 535) con-
cludes that, overall, while the Peruvian state has oscillated between prioritiz-
ing and neglecting road-building, the most successful cases have generally 
occurred where there was ‘consensus reached between state and population 
that roads-building was the way forward to modernity and progress’.
Wilson’s (2004) account adds thick description to the conceptualization 
of services as the point where the state becomes ‘visible’ to citizens and, 
reflecting Migdal (2001), one among other means through which the state 
establishes its own ‘rules of the game’ as dominant over other social norms. 
As a real and symbolic aspect of people’s daily survival strategies, services 
can act as an effective means for the state to achieve social control and 
compliance. In this way, the Peru case supports the view that basic services 
can be understood as tools for state- and nation-building; whereby the state 
may use service provision to establish its control and authority over territory 
(‘penetration’), to create a common culture (‘standardization’) and to resolve 
disputes, create political loyalty, and bind critical populations to the state 
(‘accommodation’) (Van de Walle and Scott 2011).
Cocoa Marketing in Ghana
For the past twenty-five years, Ghana has consistently achieved annual 
growth rates of above 5 per cent, making it one of the fastest growing agri-
cultural economies in the world (Wiggins and Leturque 2011). In analysing 
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this remarkable progress, Wiggins and Leturque (2011) note that the coun-
try’s agriculture sector, and in particular its cocoa marketing system, has 
been particularly successful in connecting smallholder farmers with domes-
tic and export markets. In this system, the government acts in a stewardship 
role through the state-run marketing board, Cocobod, which oversees the 
production of the crop and maintains a monopoly over its export. Farmers 
sell their cocoa beans to Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs), and the cocoa 
is moved to ports and exported by the government-owned Cocoa Marketing 
Company. Studies have shown that Cocobod has performed impressively 
over the past decade: produce is of premium quality, farmers receive a rela-
tively large share of exports, and the system is surprisingly corruption-free 
(Williams 2009; Hubbard 2003). This success makes Cocobod somewhat 
exceptional when viewed in the context of its own history of corruption in 
the period prior to the 1980s (Williams 2009). Moreover, it goes against a 
wider pattern of poor performance in comparable systems across developing 
countries, many of which have been difficult to reform due to vested inter-
ests and rent extraction (Hubbard 2003; Williams 2009).
Several analysts have noted that strong leadership has been an important 
factor in ensuring that the Ghana cocoa marketing system has been effec-
tively insulated from political interference (Williams 2009; Shepherd and 
Onumah 1997). As Williams (2009) argues, the charismatic and motivated 
political leadership of J. J. Rawlings was instrumental in pushing through a 
series of ‘well-directed’ reforms to the system during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Wiggins and Leturque (2011) note that agricultural growth took off after 
Rawlings came to power in 1981, and has since been sustained in part by 
the regime’s consistent commitment to agricultural development during a 
period of relative political and economic stability. Williams (2009) argues 
that the authoritarian nature of the regime made it well positioned to be 
able to push through genuine economic reforms.
Others have observed that, although reforms to the cocoa marketing 
system were financed by donors under structural adjustment, the govern-
ment has been able to retain a sense of local ownership over the system, 
and to resist donor pressure for full liberalization (Hubbard 2003; Wiggins 
and Leturque 2011). As Hubbard (2003) concludes, the nature of the reforms 
adopted by government balanced efficiency with national ownership, 
thereby satisfying the donors as well as Ghanaian nationalists. Some argue 
that the effects of this strong leadership, and in particular the government’s 
commitment to quality, have trickled down to the organizational level. 
Williams (2009) argues that the system’s relative insulation from corruption 
is partly explainable by the Cocoa Marketing Company’s almost Weberian 
standards of organizational performance; with high levels of professional-
ism, merit-based appointments, and reliable salaries.
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There is some indication that the incentives behind the government’s 
long-term commitment to cocoa marketing are at least partly derived from 
a political impetus to court the support of cocoa farmers, and that this 
political imperative has transcended authoritarian and democratic regimes. 
Wiggins and Leturque (2011) describe how Rawlings built this constitu-
ency of support among cocoa farmers through a combination of personal 
charisma, authoritarianism, and the fragmented nature of the opposition. 
Remnants of the influence of cocoa farmers as a source of state legitimacy 
are still perceptible, and reforms to increase farmers’ share of exports gained 
added momentum after democratization in 1992, in response to widespread 
dissatisfaction at the low price of cocoa. Williams (2009) argues that since 
democratization, the government of Ghana has faced political pressure to 
respond to the demands of cocoa producers, partly because of the scale of 
the cocoa industry and the noticeable weight of cocoa interests in demo-
cratic politics, and partly because producer prices are a frequent topic of 
discussion in the media.
Agricultural Input Subsidies in Malawi
Malawi has recently come to be regarded as a relatively successful case 
of economic progress, poverty reduction, and human development in 
sub-Saharan Africa. In acknowledging this, Vandemoortele and Bird (2011) 
note that, although questions remain regarding the sustainability of recent 
growth in the country, overall progress is undeniable. Between 2004 and 
2009, the country achieved an above-average annual GDP growth of 7 per 
cent, much of which was driven by the agricultural sector, estimated to con-
tribute around 39 per cent to the economy (2011, p. 11).
The introduction in 2005 of the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP)—a 
government-funded programme that increases poor smallholder farmers’ 
access to agricultural inputs—has been seen as key driving factor behind 
Malawi’s recent economic progress (Chinsinga 2008; Dorward and Chirwa 
2011; Vandemoortele and Bird 2011). Through this programme, the gov-
ernment provides vouchers (or coupons) for maize fertilizer to farmers 
who are considered to be ‘productive but otherwise resource constrained’ 
(Chinsinga 2008). Targeting and distribution is devolved to district and 
local levels, undertaken in consultation with traditional authorities, local 
government, and Village Development Committees (VDCs) (Vandemoortele 
and Bird 2011). Notwithstanding ongoing concerns and emerging evidence 
that the programme has been prone to local elite capture (Eggen 2011), 
several studies have recorded positive impacts. A recent evaluation con-
cluded that it had ‘substantially increased national maize production and 
productivity, contributing to increased food availability, higher real wages, 
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wider economic growth and poverty reduction’ (Dorward and Chirwa 2011, 
p. 232). Similarly, Chibwana et al. (2012) argue that dramatic increases in 
maize outputs have had wider positive effects on national and household 
food security.
In examining the political incentives behind the government’s adop-
tion of the FISP, much of the literature has emphasized that, for a number 
of reasons, food security is now a highly salient political issue in Malawi. 
Furthermore, agricultural inputs have over time accrued a large basis of pop-
ular support. Several authors attribute this at least partly to the sheer domi-
nance of agriculture in Malawi’s economy, and to the fact that an estimated 
85 per cent of the workforce is employed by it (Chirwa et al. 2006). Others 
note the country’s history of chronic food insecurity (Chinsinga 2007; 
Vandemoortele and Bird 2011). Devereux (2009) argues fertilizer subsidies 
were politicized under the patronage-based rule of President Muluzi (1994–
2004), whose political power base was concentrated in the densely popu-
lated and food-insecure south of the country. Either way, Chinsinga (2007, 
pp. 10 and 15) concludes that food security has become intimately bound 
up with the very legitimacy and survival of regimes in Malawi. Underlying 
this, she argues, is an implicit social contract that government will provide 
citizens with agricultural inputs as a social safety net in times of need.
While there is some debate about whether the origins of the underlying 
political salience of agricultural input subsidies in Malawi derive from pop-
ular pressure or patronage politics, or both, there is consensus that elec-
tions played a catalytic role in the introduction of the FISP in 2005. As 
Chinsinga (2008) explains, these elections were preceded by two periods 
of severe hunger in the early 2000s that prompted both political parties 
to pledge to introduce universal subsidies if elected in 2005. Following the 
elections, opposition parties in parliament were able to put pressure on the 
ruling party to stick to its pledge to adopt a universal subsidy, in spite of 
the President’s reservations about financing. Birner and Resnick (2010) note 
that the characteristics of fertilizer distribution—specifically, that it is vis-
ible, short-term, and targeted—make it particularly appealing to politicians, 
since it allows for greater political returns relative to other, longer-term agri-
cultural investments (e.g. training, new crop research). In what appears to be 
a confirmation of this, Dorward and Chirwa (2011) have noted that the FISP 
was a high-profile aspect of the President’s successful re-election in 2009.
Some of the literature analyses the relationship between donors and the 
government of Malawi in the case of the introduction of the FISP as being 
indicative of local ownership of the programme. Vandemoortele and Bird 
(2011) have argued that a key factor in Malawi’s recent success has been 
increased government assertiveness towards donors, coupled with long-term 
vision and development planning. Many donors were initially sceptical of 
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the FISP; others were in total opposition, based on concerns about market 
distortions, the risk of wiping out the private fertilizer sector, and concerns 
that the programme might not efficiently target the poor (Chinsinga 2008). 
Chinsinga (2008) argues that donors only changed their positions once it 
became clear that government had made a political decision that was closely 
linked to its legitimacy. She concludes that, where there is strong govern-
ment leadership backed up by a democratic mandate, there must be a ‘cul-
ture of pragmatism, negotiation and compromise among donors’ (2008, 
p. 27). Birner and Resnick (2010) argue that it is important to understand 
these contestations in terms of broader ideological differences, which are 
often neglected in accounts of agricultural policymaking. Even in this case, 
where policy has been heavily driven by internal politics, the effects of the 
post-Washington Consensus can be seen, specifically with regard to the 
framing of the inputs as ‘market-smart subsidies’.
Synthesis: The Recurring Politics of Success?
An important finding from the case studies is that the robustness of the evi-
dence linking aspects of politics to outcomes should not be overstated. While 
progress in each case is validated by rigorous impact evaluation, the relation-
ship between these outcomes and the pervasive forms of politics operating 
at different levels is more often implied than proven. Notwithstanding these 
caveats, a number of themes about the forms of politics that underpin suc-
cess recur across the case studies, suggesting there is some merit in pursuing 
them as lines of enquiry in future research.
Periods of Crisis and Adjustment
Overall, the case studies support the theory that major sectoral reforms are 
often instigated and designed in the wake of periods of major crisis or politi-
cal upheaval, during which time the normal rules of the game are thrown 
into flux (Batley 2004, p. 39). This finding is demonstrated most clearly in 
the case study on Indonesia, where the community-driven development 
mode of provision gained momentum after the economic crisis and the fall 
of Suharto, which weakened the appeal of a centralized state. In the after-
math of crisis, determined leaders may seize the opportunity to frame ser-
vices as nation-building projects, as indicated in the case of Rwanda, where 
improvements in health were seen as an important pillar of reconstruction 
following the genocide. Similarly, in Ethiopia, commitment to education 
was envisaged and actively promoted as a means of generating good citizen-
ship as part of a wider programme of nation-building. This supports the 
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view that ‘political junctures’ (e.g. elections, moments of crisis, post-colonial 
settlements) can persuade regimes to renegotiate the social contract between 
state and citizens (Hickey 2006).
Political Settlements and Variation across Regime Type
While not often explicitly framed as such, there are examples in the case 
studies of how the nature of the political settlement influences the policy 
choices states make with regard to service provision. In Bangladesh, for 
example, a stable political settlement has been seen as a key factor in con-
solidating the state’s credible and consistent commitment to health delivery 
in spite of periods of regime change. In a similar vein, Rwanda’s long-term 
vision and remarkable achievements in health have been at least partly attrib-
uted to its particular form of ‘developmental patrimonialism’. The cases also 
support the view that while elections may catalyse state responsiveness, the 
influence of formal political systems cannot be understood independently 
of the role of other institutions (Hickey 2007; Carbone 2009). The extent to 
which social contracts are articulated by an active civil society and through 
debate in the media may be key in this regard. In Malawi, for instance, while 
the political imperative to provide subsidies and the choices the state made 
were almost certainly catalysed by elections, the formative social contract 
that pitches food security as a key source of state legitimacy may have been 
a more important driver of the states responsiveness to its citizens. Likewise 
in Ethiopia, the ruling party’s ideology and its particular identity as a move-
ment of the poor has been seen as a more important underlying driver of 
commitment to pro-poor spending in education than elections per se.
Calculations of Political Returns
The cases also emphasize that political actors make policy choices that ben-
efit poor people on the basis of calculations of high political returns. The 
(perception of) returns may be greatest not only where provision is a poten-
tial or existing source of state legitimacy, but also where the service is partic-
ularly politically salient, and/or is targeted towards the main constituency 
of support of the ruling party. Echoing studies from the wider literature, 
the cases illustrate that the imperative for broad-based provision may derive 
from political actors pursuing ‘political entrepreneurship’, that is, courting a 
mass constituency of the poor in the service of their political careers. Levels 
of ‘political will’ for primary education in Ghana, for example, have been 
shown to fluctuate over time according to the extent to which the ruling 
party has been dependent on the support of the poor, and the extent to 
which the interests of the poor were articulated by a political entrepreneur. 
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Similarly, agricultural policies gained particular political salience in Ghana 
and Malawi under regimes that courted the support of farmers, and con-
tinued to be a central source of state legitimacy where they subsequently 
attracted a large basis of citizen support. Overall, the cases advance the 
hypothesis that pro-poor provision is more likely where the state derives or 
seeks to enhance its legitimacy through the provision of a particular service 
(Di John and Putzel 2009).
Top-down Control and Embedded Accountability
There is some evidence in the case studies in support of recent thinking, by 
Leonard (2008) and Crook (2010), that organizations can be effective—even 
in clientelist settings—where they are insulated from political interference 
by strong, top-down authority and leadership carried through to the level 
of implementation. This is explicitly demonstrated in the corruption-free 
bureaucracy of Cocobod, and also in the bureaucratic arena in Rwanda, 
which is characterized by strong, top-down performance incentives. The 
Rwanda case indicates that top-down incentives and bureaucratic control 
may be reinforced where the state is perceived as legitimate and has moral 
authority, and where top-down control draws on culturally embedded norms 
of accountability. But while the role of top-down accountability comes out 
strongly in Rwanda and Ghana, in other cases there is evidence that a com-
bination of top-down and bottom-up accountability can drive progress, as 
in Indonesia, where they worked in tandem but to different effect. The case 
studies therefore support the move in wider literature towards examining 
top-down and bottom-up accountability as complementary as opposed to 
being an ‘either or’ proposition (Joshi 2012).
The cases also illustrate findings made elsewhere that pro-poor service provi-
sion might occur where forms of social accountability draw on moral reciproc-
ity, are locally grounded, and build on a culture of participation (Booth 2011a; 
Hickey 2006; Hossain 2010). For example, the accountability of local leaders in 
the health sector in Bangladesh depended on the extent to which those leaders 
were ‘embedded’ in local networks of relationships between local authorities, 
citizen groups, and service providers. In Peru, the fact that agencies contracted 
to build and maintain roads were formed from local communities increased 
local ownership and therefore generated incentives for good performance.
The Political Salience of Sectors
The cases demonstrate that the characteristics of a particular service affect 
its political salience and in turn the calculations of political returns made by 
political actors. Specifically, the findings reinforce the point made elsewhere 
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that the extent to which a service is targetable, ‘visible’, measurable, and 
easily credited may determine the likelihood of state responsiveness (Mani 
and Mukand 2007; Mcloughlin and Batley 2012; Pritchett 2002). For exam-
ple, direct transfers for roads in Indonesia were appealing because roads 
are highly visible and direct transfers are easily creditable. In Bangladesh, 
progress in health reform is at least partly attributable to the nature of the 
reforms—namely improving access rather than quality—which ultimately 
pursued the path of least resistance. This supports the theme raised earlier 
that anticipation of resistance by interest groups may explain why some 
reforms are pursued and others are not, and different types of reform attract 
different types of politics (Grindle 2005).
The Micro-politics of Modes of Provision
The cases also indicate that particular modes of provision may influence the 
extent to which citizens can engage in collective action. In both of the roads 
cases—Peru and Indonesia—the participatory approach was considered to 
have enabled services to be more adapted to local preferences, and particu-
larly to women’s preferences. In Peru, participatory institutions had effects 
(both positive and negative) on notions of citizenship and interactions 
between the state, society, and elites at a local level. Similarly, decentraliza-
tion in Ethiopia—a mode of provision essential for accommodating diver-
sity in the context of high ethnic fragmentation—has in turn generated 
positive social capital and enabled collective action. However, it is not pos-
sible to conclude on the relative success of modes from the evidence avail-
able. It seems likely that the performance of modes is very context specific. 
Moreover, the cases make it clear that modes are not simple categories (e.g. 
direct state versus contracted-out provision); most real-life cases are compos-
ites of more than one mode and include both formal and informal elements 
(Joshi and Moore 2004).
At the micro-level politics of implementation, the cases highlight that 
the terms of collaboration between the actors engaged in delivery may ena-
ble or constrain service outcomes. The Ghana School for Life study indi-
cates that whether or not public services are delivered effectively depends 
on the extent to which there is mutual agreement and positive, reciprocal 
relationships between state and non-state actors. This supports the find-
ings from the relatively small body of research suggesting that effective 
and enduring—less brittle—forms of collaboration between government 
and non-government service providers seem to arise where the relationship 
has evolved rather than been created, rests on mutual agreement, and pre-
serves the financial autonomy of partners (Batley 2011; Rose 2011). Similarly, 
Olivier de Sardan (2010) has argued that whether or not public services are 
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delivered effectively depends on the precise terms on which collaboration 
occurs, the co-ordination between actors, and the personal relationships 
between them.
Conclusion
The studies presented in this chapter support the prominence given in the 
wider literature to the nature of the political regime and the origins of elite 
incentives as important determinants of inclusive service delivery. They 
additionally illustrate that the state, or governing political party, may pur-
sue inclusive provision where a particular service or good has historically 
been viewed as a key source of its legitimacy and an expression of the social 
contract. The chapter has also shown how calculations of political returns 
on the part of political actors, linked in some cases to the pursuit of political 
entrepreneurship, are an important source of credible political commitment. 
Moreover, this commitment is affected by and formative of the characteris-
tics of different sectors, in particular their political salience. In some of the 
cases, strong, top-down accountability reinforced by an ostensibly legitimate 
state with some degree of moral authority has facilitated inclusive delivery, 
particularly where top-down control has ‘insulated’ delivery systems from 
negative political interference. However, other cases illustrate the positive 
effects of social accountability systems, where these are genuinely locally 
grounded in moral and cultural norms.
While there is convergence here and elsewhere around recurring themes 
on the politics of service delivery, significant gaps in understanding remain. 
Overall, there are very few documented cases of progress that combine an 
objective assessment of outcomes with systematic analysis of the political 
determinants of those outcomes. It is evident that resources alone do not 
determine outcomes on the ground:  politics intervene (in either an ena-
bling or constraining role) between policy intention and implementation. 
However, it is striking that there has been more focus on the politics of 
policymaking—specifically, the state’s and elite actors’ incentives to choose 
pro-poor policies, and how these choices are mediated through (in most 
cases distorted by) formal political institutions and interactions between 
voters and politicians. The point of implementation, where formal policies 
most often fail and where ‘real’ policies emerge from the interplay of inter-
ests and incentives, has been relatively neglected. Similarly, two key aspects 
of service delivery—the characteristics of sectors and their mode of deliv-
ery—have more often been treated as managerial rather than political con-
cerns. More than just technical factors, these aspects influence the relative 
power of principals and agents, providers and consumers of services.
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Future research might usefully incorporate a ‘bottom-up’ perspective—
that is, a focus on those institutions, incentives, and actors that are effective 
at the point of delivery, rather than on those that in the formal scheme of 
things are supposed to set the institutional and policy framework govern-
ing implementation. This implies greater attention to the point of contact 
between citizens (as users) and the state, and adding meaning to the con-
cept of the social contract, which is frequently described as central to the 
politics of services, but often left without explanation. To this end, modes 
of provision could usefully be examined as a theatre of politics—that is, the 
space where politics is ‘realized’ in decision-making structures and where 
the state is experienced by citizens. This approach would be particularly 
appropriate and timely given the growing recognition that, in practice, ser-
vice delivery is often facilitated through informal, ad hoc arrangements that 




Political Factors in the Growth  
of Social Assistance
Armando Barrientos and Sony Pellissery
A large expansion of social assistance programmes has taken place in devel-
oping countries in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Large-scale 
anti-poverty transfer programmes providing direct transfers to households 
in poverty have spread to a majority of middle-income countries in the 
South. In low-income countries, the growth of social assistance has been 
slower and more speculative, due in part to delivery capacity and finan-
cial constraints. Impact evaluation studies indicate that, taken as a whole 
and in combination with economic growth and basic service infrastructure, 
well-designed anti-poverty programmes can make an important contri-
bution to the reduction of global poverty and vulnerability (Lopez-Calva 
and Lustig 2010).1 Social assistance has become an important component 
of poverty reduction and development strategies in the South. There is a 
fast-growing literature on anti-poverty transfer programmes in developing 
countries (Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Grosh et al. 2008; Hanlon et al. 2010). 
To date, the focus of this literature has been on issues of design and impact. 
It is widely acknowledged that politics does matter for the adoption, design, 
and implementation of anti-poverty transfer programmes, but this remains 
a substantially under-researched topic (Hickey 2008b). The main objective 
of this chapter is to review and assess the scarce literature on the politics of 
social assistance, with a view to identifying relevant approaches, knowledge, 
and knowledge gaps.
1 They can also make a marginal contribution to the reduction of inequality. A recent cross-
country study on declining inequality trends in Latin America identifies two main explana-
tions: (i) a fall in the premium to skilled labour; (ii) the impact of higher and more progressive 
government transfers. See (López-Calva and Lustig 2010).
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There is a degree of uncertainty around terminology in the context of 
international development, thus we start with some definitions.2 Social 
policy includes the provision of basic services—in the main, education 
and health care, but also water and sanitation in low-income countries—
and social protection. Social protection includes three main components: 
social insurance, social assistance, and labour market interventions. Social 
insurance covers contributory programmes covering life-course and work-
related contingencies. Social assistance comprises tax-financed programmes 
managed by public agencies and addressing poverty and deprivation. It has 
become commonplace to distinguish ‘passive’ from ‘active’ labour market 
policies, with ‘passive’ interventions aimed at securing basic rights in the 
workplace and ‘active’ interventions enhancing employability.
Our chapter focuses on social assistance or anti-poverty transfer pro-
grammes, that is, tax-financed programmes directed by public agencies with 
the objective of reducing, preventing, and eventually eradicating poverty 
(Barrientos 2007). Programmes in low-income countries are sometimes 
financed from international assistance. They are tax-financed but the taxes 
are collected in a different jurisdiction.
There is huge diversity in the design of social assistance in developed 
and developing countries. In high-income countries, social assistance has 
an income maintenance design, providing income transfers aimed at fill-
ing in the poverty gap. In developing countries (Barrientos et  al. 2010), 
social assistance includes a variety of programme designs, including pure 
income transfers, as in non-contributory pensions or child grants and allow-
ances; income transfers combined with asset accumulation and protection, 
as in human development conditional transfer programmes or guaranteed 
employment schemes; and integrated anti-poverty programmes covering a 
range of poverty dimensions and addressing social exclusion. There is also 
diversity in scale, scope, and institutionalization in social assistance across 
countries, and across programmes within countries.
This chapter conceptualizes the politics of social assistance in develop-
ing countries as a two-way process. On the one hand, social assistance is 
shaped by political processes. The extension of anti-poverty transfer in the 
South reflects growing attention to poverty reduction. In many countries 
in the South, social policy, but particularly social protection and assistance, 
has risen in importance in political and policy discourse and debate. Lula’s 
re-election in 2006 is credited by many to the success of Bolsa Familia (Zucco 
2008). In India, the re-election of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) in 
2009 is largely credited to the introduction of the National Rural Employment 
2 Uncertainty over terminology and scope is greatest in international policy debates.
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Guarantee Act (NREGA) in their first term (Yadav and Palshinkar 2009). The 
first important set of issues and questions revolve around the influence of 
politics on the shape of social assistance in the South. On the other hand, 
social assistance programmes feed back into politics at the national and 
local levels. Social assistance programmes have the potential to enhance the 
political participation of groups in poverty at the local level, align electoral 
support, and change policy priorities and the effectiveness of service deliv-
ery.3 At the national level, social assistance programmes have the potential 
to lock in left-of-centre or populist coalitions, and perhaps generate wider 
changes in policy. A  discussion of these feedback processes would throw 
light upon potential issues of dependency and political manipulation by 
elites. A  second important set of questions and issues revolve around the 
significance and orientation of these feedback processes.
The existing literature on the politics of social assistance is scarce and 
country or programme specific. A full review of the literature will not 
be attempted here, but relevant studies will be referred to and integrated 
throughout the chapter. There is a fast-growing literature focusing on the 
micro-level interaction of social assistance and politics. This literature is 
country or programme specific (De La O 2006; Giovagnoli 2005; Pellissery 
2008; Zucco 2008). There is a scarce literature examining the macro or 
structural political factors facilitating or restricting social assistance (Hickey 
2008b, 2009). The most significant gap in the literature relates to concep-
tual frameworks capable of explaining the politics of poverty reduction 
programmes. The existing literature draws from the conceptual frameworks 
developed to study the politics of redistribution.4 This framework provides 
interesting insights, but there are few gains in collapsing processes of pov-
erty reduction into processes of redistribution. For high-income countries, 
Esping-Andersen has provided the most influential framework for examin-
ing the production of welfare in advanced capitalist countries,5 but efforts to 
adapt the framework to the examination of developing countries have not 
paid sufficient attention to politics or social assistance. Particularly the chal-
lenges to develop an appropriate framework arise from the issues of incor-
porating different forms of democracy (since democracy has seen uneven 
development in the global South), identity politics that shapes participation 
3 A good case in point is NREGA introduction in India. With the introduction of the pro-
gramme, poor people got the opportunity to interact at the sites of work location, and to 
organize themselves as ‘NREGA workers’. Some state governments facilitated this potential 
opportunity to bring accountability in to the work systems and to improve governance by using 
the feedback from the NREGA workers (Pellissery and Jalan 2011).
4 See, for a recent survey, Robinson (2010). The classic source is Meltzer and Scott (1981).
5 Politics and social assistance played a larger part in his earlier work (see Esping-Andersen 
1990). Attempts to adapt the framework to developing countries have focused on institutions, 
and ignored politics (see Gough and Wood 2004).
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in political processes and limited accountability that many of the authoritar-
ian states possess. Our attempt is to address these issues which are neglected 
in the literature on politics of social protection.
Given the vast ground to be covered and the absence of comprehen-
sive approaches to the issue under investigation, it is important to set out 
the approach and methodology adopted in this chapter at the outset. It is 
beyond the scope of the chapter to try to cover all programmes, countries, 
and regions. It is necessary to be extremely selective on these. Our chapter 
will focus on three countries: Brazil, India, and South Africa. The justifica-
tion for selecting these three countries is straightforward. They are three 
large middle-income countries with a rich experience of social assistance 
innovations. They are leading countries in their respective regions. Together 
they provide a range of approaches to the extension of social assistance 
and also demonstrate the diversity of political institutions. The country 
selection will inevitably influence the discussion in the chapter.6 It can be 
argued that the three countries selected have conditions which have led to 
a rapid growth in social assistance, conditions which are hard to replicate 
elsewhere. The point of the country selection is to learn about the role of 
politics in social assistance, not necessarily to ensure representativeness of 
conditions in the South. The analysis in this chapter will provide insights 
and perspectives valuable to other developing countries, and the framework 
presented should enable one to assess the strength and weaknesses of the 
relevant institutions and to identify feedback effects from, and to, political 
processes in those contexts.
Our methodological approach will be twofold. A comparative study of the 
politics of social assistance in the three countries selected will help identify 
inductively key issues and questions. This will be preceded by a discussion of 
how best to model the interaction of politics and social assistance in devel-
oping countries. This discussion will help give shape to the main features 
of an appropriate deductive framework. A process of triangulation will help 
achieve the main objectives of the chapter: to identify key approaches, find-
ings, and knowledge gaps.
6 The selection of cases can also get complicated when we note that different programmes 
within a single country can show different levels of political support. Indonesia has introduced 
large-scale social protection programmes since the financial crisis in 1998 to help families cope 
with the effects from financial shocks. They include food subsidies (Raskin), Unconditional 
Cash Transfer (Bantuan Langsung Tunai), Conditional Cash Transfer (Program Keluarga 
Harapan), Cash for Work and School Assistance. Among these, unconditional cash transfer 
programmes have been the least politically acceptable both at local level and national level, 
primarily due to targeting errors (see Bambang Widianto ‘The Political Economy of Social 
Protection in Indonesia’, a paper presented during the international conference on ‘Reforming 
Social Protection Systems in Developing Countries’ held 20–1 October 2011 at the Institute of 
Development Research and Development Policy, Rurh Universitat Bochum, Germany).
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The rest of the chapter is divided into three main sections. The second 
section introduces and discusses a framework for examining the politics 
of social assistance. The third section presents the main findings from the 
three country case studies and draws out the main differences and similari-
ties. The final section goes back to the main research question and discusses 
whether politics matter for the growth and effectiveness of social assistance 
in developing countries, and draws out the main conclusions.
Approaches to the Politics of Social Assistance
As noted there is scarce literature on the politics of social assistance. By 
far the most widely used approach assumes a situation in which politicians 
compete for support among voters, and voters exercise preferences in line 
with their interests and advantage. Politics in this context has the func-
tion of aggregating voter preferences.7 In conditions of an inclusive fran-
chise and a single-issue policy, the preferences of the median voter signal 
the direction of policy. Applying this perspective to social assistance would 
suggest that highly unequal societies with high poverty incidence would opt 
for more generous forms of social assistance (Alesina 1999). In conditions 
where low-income groups are a minority, coalitions including the middle 
classes would be required to support greater expenditure on broad-based 
social assistance (Gelbach and Pritchett 1995). Social assistance would be 
weakest in conditions of greater equality and low poverty incidence. These 
predictions are at odds with the facts of the expansion of social assistance in 
developing countries, and fail to explain both its timing and scale.
An issue is that several features of political systems in developing coun-
tries differ from the assumptions of the median-voter model. Political com-
petition is imperfect in situations where the franchise is restricted, or where 
patrimonial or identity politics filter the aggregation of preferences in favour 
of elites. In these contexts, politics reflects more directly the concentra-
tion of power and influence as opposed to the calculated preferences of the 
population. The greater the concentration of wealth and power, the weaker 
will be the policies addressing poverty. In situations where identity politics 
dominate, the design and implementation of social assistance is likely to 
be fragmented and unequal (Keefer and Khemani 2003a). Imperfect politi-
cal competition gives greater autonomy to politicians representing powerful 
interests and elites.
7 ‘What institutions or policies a political system generates depends on the distribution of 
power in society and how political institutions and mobilized interests aggregate preferences’ 
(Robinson 2010, p. 39).
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The role of public agencies charged with implementing social programmes 
becomes more significant after programmes are legislated for and adopted. 
The degree of autonomy of civil servants, and the nature of their linkages 
to political elites, can have implications for the reach and effectiveness 
of social assistance programmes (Alesina and Tabellini 2004; Besley and 
Ghatak 2007; Mookherjee 2004). In particular, in countries with federal 
structures, the links between public agencies and local politicians is of some 
significance for the evolution and implementation of these programmes 
(Giovagnoli 2005).
Even this brief discussion highlights the complexity of the political influ-
ences over social assistance and the variety of potential approaches to study-
ing these influences. Small variations in political structures can have large 
effects on the direction and relative weight of the predicted effects.
To address this complexity, the chapter develops a phased approach to this 
issue. Table 6.1 provides a summary. The framework presented in Table 6.1 
should be approached as a means of separating out the different dimensions 
of social assistance to highlight the political influences specifically relevant 
to a specific dimension. The most productive way of approaching the frame-
work as an analysis tool is to imagine the different columns as sections of a 
concertina. In practice it is hard to separate out the different political influ-
ences on social assistance, and their variation across countries and across 
time, but by extending the concertina, it is possible to highlight the political 
issues of greatest relevance in specific dimensions. Once that work is done, it 
becomes possible to bring all the influences together.
The first two rows define which political factors are included and excluded. 
The first column assumes direct democracy, voters exercise their preferences 
directly through the political process. Political representatives, government, 
and civil society are assumed to follow voter preferences. They have no 
influence over decision-making. The main function of the political process 
is to aggregate voter preferences. This simple account of the political process 
is relevant to the adoption of social assistance strategies and programmes. 
The clearest examples of direct democracy in shaping social assistance 
arise in contexts where social contracts are being renewed. The new 1988 
Constitution in Brazil, for example, was the outcome of a popular decision 
at the end of twenty years of dictatorship from 1965 to 1985, to reconsider 
the basis for citizenship in the country. The Constituent Assembly discus-
sions led to the inclusion of a right to social protection based on citizen-
ship, as opposed to the contributory principle which had dominated the 
development of social insurance.8 The right to social protection based on a 
8 For a discussion of the citizenship and contributory principles in the context of social pro-
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citizenship principle has become embedded in government policies aimed at 
securing a minimum guaranteed income for all residents in Brazil (Mesquita 
et al. 2010). This provided the basis for the expansion of social assistance in 
Brazil. In fact a procedural definition of a social contract can be described 
in terms of the intervention of direct democratic processes. In practice, 
single-event social contracts, like the Brazilian experience, are rare. Social 
pacts and dominant coalitions might lead to the same policy outcomes, but 
without the presence of direct democracy.9
The important point about direct democracy and the extension of social 
assistance is this: where political processes revert to the simple function of 
aggregating preferences, social assistance institutions are likely to emerge. Of 
course, social assistance can also emerge in conditions where direct democ-
racy conditions are absent. It would be interesting to consider the implica-
tions from this point of departure, both in terms of design and scale.10 This 
will involve collecting and evaluating single events leading to the expansion 
of social assistance. In the context of the development of social assistance in 
low-income developing countries, the role of international partners adds a 
complication to the aggregation of preferences with important implications 
for social assistance outcomes in these countries.
The second column in Table 6.1, entitled representative democracy, envis-
ages preference aggregation through political representatives. This ensures 
a focus on attracting and sustaining electoral support. The priority given 
to anti-poverty policy then plays within the political processes selecting 
representatives and endowing their decisions with legitimacy. This level of 
abstraction is particularly relevant to issues around the design, reach and 
incidence, and budget-setting for social assistance programmes. The last two 
are intimately related. In most developing countries, parliamentarians set 
the budget for anti-poverty programmes with direct implications for the 
scale of the programmes.
There are specific features of political processes which have particular 
relevance at this level of abstraction. The need to build and sustain coali-
tions often influences the scale and location of anti-poverty transfer pro-
grammes, as well as the distribution of programme budgets (de Janvry et al. 
2009; Giovagnoli 2005). Historically, rural interests and their representa-
tives show a preference for broad-based, tax-financed programmes, while 
urban interest and their representatives have a preference for occupational 
9 The ‘War on Poverty’ in the USA in the 1970s or the building of welfare states in European 
countries in the post-Second World War period provide examples of an expansion of social 
assistance based on the emergence of a broad consensus across governing coalitions but with-
out originating in a single event. Rawls’s ‘veil of ignorance’ is an abstract construct which can 
be interpreted as a counterpart to direct democracy (see Rawls 1971).
10 This applies to the distinction between Bismarckian and Beveridgean social security, for 
example.
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employment-related social insurance plans.11 A specific issue in this context 
is how to explain the fact that selective anti-poverty transfer programmes 
could secure a broad base of political support in some developing countries. 
Identity politics can help sustain and enlarge social assistance programmes 
in some countries like South Africa or India, but limit them in other con-
texts, as in ethnically divided low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The issue of electoral advantage arising from the perceived effectiveness of 
social assistance is also an interesting issue at this level of abstraction.
The third column takes account of the degree of autonomy of public agen-
cies.12 This level is particularly relevant to issues of implementation and 
scaling up of anti-poverty transfer programmes. The degree of autonomy 
of public agencies is essential to understand the operation of social assis-
tance in the context of decentralized political and programme structures. 
In many low-income countries, process deficits and fiduciary risks are very 
significant and strongly influence the scale and scope of anti-poverty trans-
fer programmes. In the context of transfers which are combined with asset 
accumulation or protection or in the case of anti-poverty programmes, 
horizontal and vertical coordination is central to the effectiveness of the 
programmes. Monitoring and evaluation processes provide measures of 
effectiveness and impact.
The features of the political processes which are important at this level 
include the linkages between different levels of government and the dis-
tribution of political influence and power. In highly centralized countries, 
the responsibility and political gains for social assistance programmes are 
located at the federal or central government level; whereas in countries with 
a decentralized administrative and political structure, the distribution of 
responsibility and potential electoral gains are outcomes from interlinked 
processes. These imply the need to pay attention to public perceptions of the 
effectiveness of the programmes to a greater extent than where programmes 
are heavily centralized. The relative autonomy of public agencies grants a 
stronger influence on technocratic networks.
The final column incorporates civil society organizations and their politi-
cal influence. In developing countries, civil society organizations have 
not had a strong influence on social assistance growth. Trade unions and 
employers, for example, have not been directly affected by the extension 
of the programmes.13 Community and NGOs in some countries are mainly 
involved in ensuring the rights of potential beneficiaries and managing 
11 See, for example, the origins of the Swedish pension system.
12 By autonomy we understand the extent to which public agencies can influence the shape 
of social assistance in line with their own particular preferences or interests.
13 Private sector employers of agricultural labour in India are probably an exception. The 
National Rural Employment Guarantee in India has helped raise market wages in this sector.
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processes of accountability of programme managers. Their engagement has 
some implications for the reform and extension of programmes.
As noted above, the most productive way to apply this framework as an 
analytical tool is to imagine the different columns as parts of a concertina. 
Extending the concertina enables an analysis of the different political influ-
ences on social assistance, which need to be brought together at a second 
stage. Two additional points on the framework are important. Firstly, the 
framework assumes that national politics are dominant in terms of their 
influence on anti-poverty programmes. This can be contentious because we 
find below that local politics sometimes overrides national politics in the 
context of social assistance. In Brazil, we find local-level dynamics more 
clearly. In India too, state-level primacy for the emergence of social assistance 
is clear. In India, separating out design and implementation gives local-level 
politics an overriding importance at the implementation stage. Local-level 
politics might need to be examined separately and then integrated within 
the national level. However, our approach to give primacy for national-
level politics is important since we are attempting to find a workable model 
beyond the case countries presented here. Federal institutions have to be 
treated as context variables that will bring changes to the model presented. 
International political influences, for example, through the Millennium 
Development Goals or through regional commitment and policy diffusion, 
have not been fully incorporated into the model, except through their influ-
ence at the national level.14,15 Secondly, the framework does not specifically 
address any potential political influences over the dynamics of social assis-
tance, except through issues of scale. It will be important in this context to 
pay special attention to social assistance as a whole as opposed to particular 
programmes. The political influences on the institutionalization of social 
assistance programmes are an important research issue.
The revenue side of the framework is in many respects crucial, both to the 
shape and scale of social assistance, and to the quality of the political link-
ages. For example, there are good reasons to hypothesize that those govern-
ments able to rely on revenues from natural resources might have a greater 
degree of autonomy from voters in the design of policy than governments 
reliant on direct taxation. The extent to which revenues are centralized or 
dispersed in deferral political systems largely defines the relative influence 
on the different levels of government and politics. Including the revenue 
14 Global social policy approaches give international organizations a dominant role (see 
Deacon 1997).
15 Regional influences might be significant in certain contexts, especially where clus-
ters of specific types of programmes can be observed at the sub-regional level. In Southern 
Africa, pure transfers to groups considered to be acutely vulnerable are dominant, especially 
non-contributory pensions and child grants (see Devereux 2007). Human development transfer 
programmes are dominant in South America (see Cecchini and Martínez 2011).
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side would require a significantly longer chapter, but perhaps not a great 
deal of change to the framework developed above. Whilst highlighting the 
importance of the revenue side, this is left out of the discussion here.
Comparative Analysis of the Politics of Social Assistance
This section focuses on case studies constructed to map out and analyse the 
political dimension of social assistance growth in India, Brazil, and South 
Africa. These are the main findings.
India
Introduction of social assistance in India can be traced back to British colo-
nial legacy.16 On the one hand formal social security was introduced for 
employees in the formal sector after the European model. In effect, this was 
divisive, as the well-off sections employed in regular jobs were able to gain 
the welfare benefits, and close to 90 per cent of the labour force (primar-
ily in the agriculture sector) was excluded. On the other hand, in its low-
growth period until the early 1990s, central government paid little attention 
to this issue and largely development, particularly rural development, was 
the focus. These anti-poverty programmes aimed to provide food and nutri-
tion,17 supply basic services like education, health care, and housing, gener-
ate employment through public works programmes,18 and improve natural 
resources and rural people’s assets through Integrated Rural Development 
Programmes.19 Anti-poverty programmes, as emerging from the nation-
building discourse, dominated the politics of social assistance.20
The Constitution of India had left the issue of social assistance as a ‘desir-
able activity’ under its directive principles. Therefore, federal states (formed 
16 For a long view, see Osmani (1991).
17 The largest of the programmes, the Public Distribution System, which distributes essential 
food items and non-food items (e.g. kerosene) through a network of fair-price shops, incurred 
expenses close to 1% of GDP primarily as subsidy. This was largely untargeted until 1990s. 
Apart from this, specific nutritional programmes for children and pregnant women were in 
place under an umbrella programme of the Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS).
18 Since the 1960s a large number of public works programmes which provided cash or kind 
in exchange for labour was a predominant mode of relief especially in times of drought in rural 
areas.
19 These sets of programme were initiated in 1952 and the community was consulted while 
designing what kind of programme could bring developmental changes. Thus, intervention 
varied from providing assets such as milk animals, to improving dry land, to providing market 
linkage or finance for small business.
20 There is considerable scholarship studying the advantages accruing to the political class 
from the introduction of such anti-poverty programmes. See for instance, among others, Kohli 
(1989); Harriss (2004).
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according to the regional languages after independence in 1947) undertook 
initiatives to introduce social security measures. The state of Uttar Pradesh 
introduced the earliest programme of old-age pension in 1957.21 Different 
states began to introduce different programmes such as pension for agricul-
tural landless labourers, maternity benefit, disability benefit, relief for edu-
cated unemployed persons, and employment guarantee depending on the 
‘need’ for the same in respective states. Thus, paternalistic and patrimonial 
principles dominated the origin of these programmes more so than right 
to welfare or justice principles (Jayal 2001). Very often, these programmes 
were also introduced as electoral instruments, with the title of the pro-
gramme prefixed with a politician’s name, which would signal who should 
be credited for such a programme. These state-level programmes were aimed 
at workers in the informal sector, primarily agricultural workers on whom 
the political class relied for votes. Thus, welfare regimes in India could be 
classified as ‘clientelist’ or ‘populist’. A couple of exceptional states had the 
influence of left-leaning politics to demand social assistance (Harriss 2004).
In the last two decades, there was a reversal of the story. Central gov-
ernment enacted a number of social assistance measures by systematically 
expanding the fundamental rights (such as the right to life, the right to 
employment) enshrined in the constitution of India. From the social assis-
tance viewpoint, three developments are important. First, in 1995 central 
government introduced the National Social Assistance Programme (NSAP), 
under which five different benefits were provided, which complemented 
what federal states were already providing. These benefits were the Old Age 
Pension Scheme (reaching 8.3 per cent of elderly households), the Widow 
Pension Scheme (6.2 per cent of widow households), the Disability Pension 
Scheme (14.1 per cent of disabled households), the Family Benefit Scheme 
(one-time relief for the families where the main breadwinner died in an 
accident), and Annapurna (food for elderly households).22 What triggered 
this development is very closely tied to the story of liberalization that India 
followed since 1991. Social sector expenditure for the period 1991 to 1995 
showed a distinct decline in state expenditure, primarily since the centre’s 
aggregate transfer to states got reduced (Guhan 1994, 1995; Prabhu and 
Chatterjee 1993) in the process of state retrieval. This provided an oppor-
tunity for bureaucratic–civil society entrepreneurs to argue for direct trans-
fer through initiating social assistance programmes. Introduction of the 
programme in proximity to the next general election and prefixing of the 
21 See Dev (1998) for a list of programmes showing the year they were introduced and the 
states in which they were introduced.
22 The figures for reach are based on the World Bank (2011). General evaluation of these 
programmes concludes that though the benefits are small, it makes a big difference to the 
households (Dutta et al. 2010).
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schemes with the name ‘Indira Gandhi’ are facts worth noting. These pro-
grammes were meant for poor households. The identification process for 
poor households took place every five years, which has been much politi-
cally contested both locally (Hirway 2003) and between the federal state and 
central government in determining the threshold of the number of poor 
people in a state, since that determines the quota of transfer from the centre 
to the state. The poor households identified through the survey, classified 
as ‘Below Poverty Line’ (BPL), are eligible for different NSAP programmes. 
Often, concentration of poverty in particular social categories helped to cre-
ate a clientelist politics of its own through this targeted approach.
Both the second and third important developments took place in 2004 
when the Congress Party government had been voted to power in a coali-
tion with left-wing parties. A wider civil society movement that pressed for 
food security got a significant policy voice through civil society actors who 
were appointed as members of the National Advisory Council. This civil 
society activism was successful in getting the bill enacted by parliament in 
2005 for the Employment Guarantee Act that ensures 100 days of employ-
ment for every rural household.23 The programme reaches approximately 
33 per cent of rural households. Unlike the NSAP of 1995, this was legislated 
as a right and parliamentary scrutiny was very high. Left parties, being in 
coalition, also had pressed for social security programmes for the vast major-
ity of unorganized sector workers. Eventually, in 2009 a Social Security 
Board was legislated. The health insurance programme (Rashtriya Swasthya 
Bhima Yojana), designed particularly for the workforce in the unorganized 
sector, has already provided insurance against hospitalization for forty mil-
lion households.
A key challenge faced when all social assistance programmes were intro-
duced has been the assertion from right-wing advocates that social assis-
tance expenditure is both ineffective and wasteful. The inequality discourse 
has been effective in countering such positions. The growth story of India 
has widened inequality rather than bridging the gap. Therefore, the intro-
duction of social assistance would be helpful as an inclusive instrument for 
the poorer sections of the population. Socio-economic divisions within the 
country demanded programmes that could create support from across dif-
ferent sections. For instance, the NREGA programme has been devised to 
provide labour for wage-seeking households during the lean agricultural sea-
son, without harming the landlord–labourer relationship. However, when 
agricultural wages rose, landlords showed resistance to NREGA itself. At the 
23 It is important to note that the prefix of ‘Mahatma Gandhi’ was introduced to the pro-
gramme after the government was voted to power without coalition forces, particularly left 
parties in 2009.
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same time since the NREGA programme improves community infrastruc-
ture such as roads or irrigation facilities this acted as an incentive for land-
lords. Taxpayers in urban areas were allured by the promise that when rural 
households were provided with employment in the villages, they would 
refrain from migration, bringing ease to the already hugely pressured urban 
infrastructure (Ambasta et al. 2008; MacAuslan 2008).
Lower levels of administration such as district or village government, 
although elected bodies, enter into the politics of social protection when 
the programmes are being implemented. In the interpretation of eligibility 
criteria or selection of beneficiaries, local politics play a critical role (Raabe 
et al. 2010; Shankar et al. 2011). However, in designing the programme 
and finance, it is the politics at federal level and central government level 
which matters. Thus, implementation deficits and corruption in the pro-
gramme indicate an absence of government autonomy from social forces. 
Introduction of the social assistance programmes hugely shapes local poli-
tics since local elites act as brokers to facilitate access for the target popula-
tion.24 This ability to satisfy local elites by the national- or state-level elites 
through the introduction of policies acts as a feedback mechanism.
Acting as a countervailing force to such a nexus between local elites and 
national elites is the role of NGOs and other civil society institutions. The 
politics of civil society organization is primarily about how these organi-
zations are able to score a goal against local politicians and bureaucrats. 
Therefore, being able to provide access to a social assistance programme, 
which was denied by a politician or a bureaucrat, increases the credibility of 
an NGO. In the case of NREGA this has come to the fore when social audits 
conducted by NGOs reached contradictory conclusions to government agen-
cies. In other words, accountability achieved is through the participation of 
citizens as mediated through civil society organizations.
Accountability at the central government level is diffused due to an absence 
of single-ministry or autonomous agency in India. There are over 300 different 
types of anti-poverty schemes spread over thirteen different ministries. There 
is hardly any coherence amongst these programmes. No attempt is made at 
integration at national level. Often, NGOs have been successful in achieving 
integration at local level, since they prioritize the needs of the local popula-
tion and claim for complementary anti-poverty programmes for one particu-
lar locality. This has helped NGOs to remain a sustaining force. On many 
24 Since the elected body of panchayat (village-level government) has control over huge 
amounts of money allocated for NREGA works, panchayat elections in many northern states 
have become more contested (with more money spent by candidates during elections) since the 
introduction of NREGA. A study has shown that participants in the NREGA programme are 
more likely to be selected along caste lines when a member of their caste is elected as head of a 
panchayat. For the same effects on social pensions see Pellissery (2008, 2005).
The Politics of Inclusive Development
160
occasions, the government has used the help of NGOs to carry out this role 
in a concerted manner throughout the state by creating NGO consortiums.25
To sum up, the expansion of social assistance in India through central 
government initiatives has to be seen as a process of change management 
due to economic liberalization and pressures from left parties for inclusive 
growth. A wider social contract is still elusive due to identity politics, and 
linguistic identities are further reinforced by the federal structure. When 
the same elected political party is in power at both central and state level, 
there is synergy for social assistance delivery for brief periods.
Brazil
Brazil provides one of the most important examples of effective delivery of 
social assistance in the developing world (Barrientos 2011). Not only has 
Brazil introduced important innovations in social assistance (Bolsa Escola is 
the precursor of human development transfer programmes in Latin America) 
and important technological innovations in programme implementation, 
like the Single Registry, it has also managed to make a large reduction in 
poverty over time and also to reduce inequality. More importantly, it has 
managed this in the context of, until recently, low growth performance. 
The policy process in Brazil has been intensely political, predominantly in 
a positive sense. The feedback effects from social assistance are also impor-
tant, especially in the electoral success of Lula in 2006.
The starting point in tracing the rise of social assistance in Brazil is the 
1988 Constitution, which followed a long period of right-wing dictatorship 
from 1965 to 1985. The Constitution was intended as a new social contract 
extending citizenship to all. The Constitution enshrined a right to social 
protection, and led to a rethink of the role and scope of social security and 
the role of government to provide it. Prior to 1988, the role of government 
was to support private organizations and NGOs in the provision of social 
assistance (Jaccoud et al. 2009, 2010). The Constitution recognized social 
assistance for the first time as an area of government responsibility. It also 
introduced the citizenship principle behind social assistance, access was a 
right for all Brazilians; in contrast to the dominant contributory principle 
behind the development of social insurance from the 1920s.26
25 The experience of Andhra Pradesh, which leads in the implementation of NREGA, has a 
state-wide NGO consortium where regular monthly meetings are held between NGOs and gov-
ernment agencies at state level, district level, and sub-district level. This has been instrumental 
in coordinating natural resource management and NREGA in the state. On how this helped to 
improve food security in the state see Pellissery and Sanju (2011).
26 ‘What institutions or policies a political system generates depends on the distribution of 
power in society and how political institutions and mobilized interests aggregate preferences’ 
(Robinson 2010, p. 39).
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The Constitution emphasized assistance to vulnerable groups, in particu-
lar older people and people with disabilities living in households in poverty. 
The Constitutional right led to the reform and expansion of two non-con-
tributory pension schemes, the Previdencia Social Rural and the Beneficio de 
Prestacao Continuada. They had been introduced in a different guise in the 
1970s, but with very limited reach and effectiveness. These were re-shaped, 
expanded, and extended. A separate initiative developed from municipal 
activism, it was grounded on minimum-income guarantee proposals com-
bined with education. In 1995 municipalities began to introduce Bolsa 
Escola, transfers with schooling conditions. Their origins are in proposals for 
a guaranteed minimum income, again following the lead established in the 
Constitution, addressing poverty. The Workers Party, and Senator Suplicy, 
the first elected political representative of that Party, campaigned for this 
policy after the fall of the dictatorship. The proposal was taken up in sev-
eral municipalities run by Workers Party politicians, but with an important 
change in connecting direct income transfers with conditions relating to 
schooling. The view was that without the links to basic services, the trans-
fers would have very little effect in the medium and longer run, and much 
less policy and political traction. Bolsa Escola is a hybrid minimum-income 
guarantee and human development instrument, which reflected thinking 
on the left and centre that income transfers were not sufficient in the context 
of persistent intergenerational poverty. Bolsa Escola spread to other munici-
palities and in 1997 the government provided counterpart funding. In 2001 
Bolsa Escola became a federal programme. Scaling up during Cardoso’s presi-
dency was probably because its Plan Real to address hyperinflation had great 
short-term adverse effects, therefore it needed to be balanced by poverty 
activism in the short run. This led to scaling up Bolsa Escola and eventually 
making it into a federal programme.
During the Cardoso administrations in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
addressing poverty through direct transfers became the new orthodoxy, in 
part through political competition within the government (e.g. Jose Serra 
creates the Auxilio Gas to compete with Bolsa Escola), but also competition 
with the Workers Party. This led to a proliferation of transfer programmes, 
with overlapping target populations. Together with other federal transfer 
programmes, it became Bolsa Familia in 2003.
In 2010, the two main non-contributory pension programmes reached 
about ten million households with a budget of around 1.5 per cent of GDP, 
while Bolsa Familia reaches over twelve million households with a budget of 
0.4 per cent of GDP.
Parliamentary oversight and policy formulation has been a signifi-
cant feature in Brazil (Britto and Soares 2010). Parliament’s active role 
in defining policy initiatives in poverty reduction goes back to the 1991 
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proposal for a minimum guaranteed income by Senator Suplicy from the 
Workers Party; since that date several proposed bills and amendments 
have been presented and discussed in Congress every year. The propos-
als and amendments cover the spectrum, from right-of-centre politicians 
attempting to reduce the scope and reach of Bolsa Familia to left-of-centre 
parliamentarians aiming to expand the programme. Few bills successfully 
become law. Parliamentary activism reflects strong public opinion and 
interest in social assistance. There is much less parliamentary attention 
on the non-contributory pension programmes, in large part because their 
constitutional recognition implies that discretion over their implementa-
tion is very limited. Effectively the government is required to provide 
entitlements to all Brazilians who qualify for the benefits. Budgets simply 
reflect these entitlements. In the recent past parliamentary attention has 
made several attempts to change the target population, for example by 
redefining the scope of households for the purposes of defining entitle-
ments, or restricting entitlements to the Previdencia Social Rural to resi-
dents in rural areas.
There are three levels of government in Brazil: federal, estate, and munic-
ipal. In Brazil municipalities are federal agencies with the same standing 
as the federal institutions. The estate level has not been active in social 
assistance. The federal government has influence over policy formulation, 
budgets, and implementation. Relationship between federal agencies and 
municipalities works through agreements and joint financing. An impor-
tant federal tool to stimulate quality and performance is a Decentralization 
Index, which ranks municipalities according to their effectiveness and per-
formance with implications for the federal financing streaming down. The 
Index is both a carrot and a stick (Lindert et al. 2007). It supports municipal-
ities with deficient capacity and penalizes underperforming municipalities. 
The Index is a technocratic response to principal–agent issues, but increas-
ingly modulates the partnership between federal and municipal levels. The 
Single Registry collects information on all households applying to any social 
assistance programme; the database enables the selection of beneficiaries 
and provides information on their progress through time. It also enables a 
stronger coordination among programme agencies, as it can be accessed by 
all agencies involved in the programmes.
The federal government allocates a fixed number of places for Bolsa 
Familia to municipalities. Local politicians and officials are responsible for 
registering potential beneficiaries. The information is assessed by the federal 
government and a score for each household determines eligibility. Local pol-
iticians and officials have some influence over the implementation of Bolsa 
Familia, through adding further interventions to Bolsa Familia or raising 
benefit levels, and also through ensuring the programme is implemented 
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effectively (e.g. whether they have filled the federal government allocations). 
The implication is that feedback effects are significant at the local level 
too. Politicians who can demonstrate effectiveness in implementing Bolsa 
Familia receive electoral support and recognition. Civil society and NGOs 
have a limited role in ensuring accountability of the programme at the local 
level, but the direct political accountability is more significant.
It could be argued that the expansion of social assistance in Brazil, and 
particularly Bolsa Familia, has extended the life of centre-left (Cardoso) and 
left (Lula) ruling coalitions. They are a dominant political force. Importantly, 
the expansion of social assistance developments has been shown to be con-
sistent with fiscal responsibility, and retains a large measure of political sup-
port. Perhaps the most significant feedback effect from social assistance to 
politics is the rise of social policy and social assistance to the top of the 
political agenda. Poverty reduction has a high profile, and delivers electoral 
support for pro-poor politicians.
South Africa
In South Africa, social assistance can be traced back to the 1920s, with 
the introduction of the non-contributory pension for poor whites. Social 
assistance followed the European model of developing income transfers for 
groups of deserving poor facing acute vulnerability, but with the filter of 
racial politics. Social pensions were restricted to whites initially, but later 
incorporated Indians and coloureds and then blacks. The conditions of 
entitlement and benefit levels were differentiated along racial lines, until 
the mid-1990s when discrimination was abolished (Barrientos 2008; Lund 
2008; Seekings 2008; van der Berg 1997). Over time, the range of direct 
transfer programmes expanded to include disability and family grants. By 
the time the first ANC government came to power in 1994, social assistance 
was fragmented due to the homelands policy of apartheid, and acutely 
under-resourced (Lund 2008).
The fall of apartheid led to a new Constitution in 1996 which reaffirmed 
a commitment to social assistance. Section 27 states that ‘everyone has the 
right to access . . . (i) social security, including, if they are unable to support 
themselves and their dependents appropriate social assistance’ (Seekings 
2008; Woolard and Leibbrandt 2010). The ANC government took steps to 
review and strengthen social assistance provision. It established the Lund 
Committee which led to proposals for a Child Support Grant (CSG) to 
replace the Family Maintenance Grant. In 1997 the government also pub-
lished a White Paper on Social Welfare which stated the objective of replac-
ing  poverty relief with a developmental approach to welfare. The CSG was 
initially designed to address child malnutrition and was focused on children 
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up to six years of age. Over time, it was extended to include children up to 
seventeen years of age. These measures led to a significant expansion of the 
reach of social assistance grants (Woolard and Leibbrandt 2010). By 2010, 
one in every two households had a social assistance beneficiary, and the 
budget has doubled since 1994 to over 3.5 per cent of GDP. Social assistance 
is the main policy instrument addressing poverty, vulnerability, and exclu-
sion in South Africa. The grants are widely perceived to be effective in reduc-
ing poverty and vulnerability, to promote social inclusion and equity, and to 
have facilitated a difficult transition from apartheid rule.
The politics of the ANC have dominated the expansion of social assistance 
since 1994 (Nattrass and Seekings 2001). Initially, the challenge for the ANC 
government was to manage the transition from apartheid, while maintain-
ing credible economic policies and fiscal responsibility. The government of 
national unity which directly followed the fall of apartheid in 1994 consti-
tuted more of a compromise than a new social contract.27 However, several 
initiatives which strengthened social assistance like CSG, the constitutional 
recognition of the right to social assistance, and the White Paper on Welfare 
Policy developed within a context of wide-ranging support for transforma-
tion within the parameters of fiscal responsibility.
The next significant political debate around social assistance came 
with the discussions surrounding the Taylor Committee of Inquiry into a 
Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa in early 2000s.28 
A proposal for a basic income was receiving a substantial amount of atten-
tion from researchers and the trade unions. Intriguingly, the proposal for 
a basic income was supported by the National Party and the Communist 
Party (Matisonn and Seekings 2003). The arguments for a basic income in 
South Africa emphasized its advantages as a citizenship instrument, impor-
tant in the context of racially segregated South Africa; as well as the more 
operational advantages of not requiring targeting and complex administra-
tive implementation. The Taylor Committee supported the basic income 
proposal. The ANC rejected the basic income on three main grounds. Firstly, 
the White Paper on Social Welfare had argued for a change in the orientation 
of social assistance in South Africa, from poverty relief to a more developmen-
tal function. The basic income proposal was a step back from this objective. 
Secondly, there was no support within the ANC and outside for extending 
grants to the white population, especially given the large income differen-
tials between them and the black population. Thirdly, maintaining fiscal 
27 The minister responsible for social assistance in the national unity government was in fact 
from the National Party (Lund 2008). The National Party and Inkatha left the Government of 
National Unity in 1996.
28 Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa 
(2002).
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responsibility would have meant reducing the scope and generosity of social 
assistance in order to finance even a low level of the basic income.
Natrass and Seekings argue that while the ANC came to power committed 
to redistribution, and was/is expected to bring to effect significant redis-
tribution, its capacity for redistribution has been limited by ‘policies that 
keep the economy growing along an inegalitarian path, with a large section 
of the poor being shut out of income generating activities’ (Nattrass and 
Seekings 2001, p. 495). There is debate among researchers on poverty trends 
in South Africa, but the general view is that poverty rates have remained 
broadly stagnant since 1994, while demographics has ensured that the num-
bers in poverty have risen (Leibbrandt et al. 2006; Leibbrandt et al. 2010). 
Social assistance has been extremely significant in preventing poverty from 
increasing. Overall, poverty and inequality outcomes remain problematic in 
South Africa, especially taking account of the fact that expenditure on social 
assistance has doubled as a proportion of GDP since 1994.
Right-of-centre politicians and business leaders are increasingly question-
ing the effectiveness of this large component of public expenditure and com-
monly voice concerns about potential dependency effects from the grants. 
Trade unions have pointed out the fact that unemployed groups constitute 
a gap in the social assistance grants system. On the left, some NGOs have 
explored the potential for judicial routes to expanding the grants (Seekings 
2008). This has tested the position of the government on welfare policy. 
The equalization of the age of entitlement to the Old Age Grant to sixty for 
both men and women (it was previously sixty-five for men), for example, fol-
lowed a challenge in the courts over possible gender discrimination associ-
ated with a differential age of entitlement. NGOs like the Black Sash play an 
important role in monitoring and facilitating the implementation of social 
assistance on the ground. They also perform a key role in ensuring welfare 
rights are fully exercised.
The potential for change and reform of social assistance is limited by the 
type of politics which sustain the ANC, and the ANC’s support for the exist-
ing social assistance architecture. Nattrass and Seekings argue persuasively 
that voter loyalty to the ANC depends on partisan identification with its 
role in bringing about political change in South Africa. To date, opposition 
parties are treated with considerable suspicion because of their association 
with apartheid; and few breakaway ANC groups have prospered. As Natrass 
and Seekings (2001, p. 488) put it: ‘Popular discontent over unemployment 
and job creation was partly offset by relatively more positive assessment 
with respect to other issues, including fiscal and social policy, even though 
the electorate regarded unemployment as the most important’. Political con-
ditions therefore preclude any large-scale reform to social assistance, due 
to the strength of partisan support for the ANC. At the same time, social 
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assistance is important in maintaining and strengthening this partisan sup-
port, particularly in rural areas of the country. The feedback effect of social 
assistance on politics is therefore significant.
It is important to round up this assessment with a brief discussion of 
fiscal space. The government of South Africa has benefited from a signifi-
cant improvement in fiscal revenues over time, from a high base. This 
has enabled a large expansion of the grants without affecting other areas 
of government expenditure. There are concerns that further expansion of 
grants expenditure could place pressure on service provision, especially in 
the context of the impact of the financial crisis (Van Der Berg and Siebrits 
2010). Social assistance appears to have hit a ceiling in this respect. On the 
other hand, the government has committed itself to the introduction of a 
Comprehensive Social Security System in South Africa, replacing the patch-
work of occupational pension plans with a government-supported, national, 
social insurance scheme. This large-scale social investment will add to fiscal 
pressures and will have implications for social assistance. It is not surprising 
that support for a national social insurance scheme comes strongly from 
trade unions and urban groups.
Triangulating the Case Studies
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 provide respectively a summary of key differences and 
similarities across the case studies. The cells on top of the diagonal summa-
rize similarities/differences in policymaking and feedback effects. The cells 
below the diagonal summarize similarities/differences in implementation 
and programme dynamics.
The expansion of social assistance from small privileged groups (whites 
in South Africa, organized sector employees in India, those able to afford 
contributory insurance in Brazil) to a broader target population, in line with 
universal principles, involved intense political process in all case countries. 
In India an active civil society movement through the ‘right to food’ cam-
paign formed the medium through which this was articulated. The civil soci-
ety representatives acting as advisors to a coalition government persuaded 
the government from within. In Brazil the fragmented opposition parties, 
such as the Workers Party, came together to campaign for the expansion 
of municipal initiatives to federal level, resulting in constitutional recogni-
tion of social rights for all Brazilians. In South Africa, the ANC, the party 
that spearheaded the transition from apartheid rule, immediately facilitated 
the right to social security to feature in the new constitution. In all these 
democracies, the parliament plays a critical role in steering the given fiscal 
capacity for expanding the social rights to all citizens. Since the right to 
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new stakeholder in all the case countries, and from time to time the govern-
ment is challenged to stand up to the promises.29
At the level of programme implementation there are important lessons for 
each other. Unique features of ranking different municipalities for reach-
ing the target population (holding the politicians accountable) and the 
establishment of an autonomous disbursement agency are powerful tools 
29 In South Africa the judiciary pressed the government to grant equal entitlement ages for 
the old-age grant to be from age sixty for men (from age sixty-five). The government of India has 
been challenged in the court to increase the wages of employment guarantee to take account 
of inflation. In Brazil, the government has been taken to court to make the threshold of social 
pensions one quarter of the minimum wage.
Table 6.3. Differences in political apparatus of social assistance delivery in case 
countries
Brazil India South Africa








NA Political party cam-
paigning in Brazil, 
compared to India 
where civil society 
campaigns, which 
forces introduction of 
social assistance.
Decentralization index 
brings credibility to 
politics as a feedback 
mechanism in Brazil 
compared to demand 
generation through 
identity politics in 
India.
Municipal initiatives 
translated as federal level 
policy in a consolida-
tion process in Brazil. 
In South Africa, social 
assistance is introduced 
at the time of new 
constitution as a strategy 










NA High-level coordination 
under single ministry in 
South Africa compared 
to large number of 
anti-poverty pro-
grammes spread over 




Joint financing by 
local government 
and central gov-
ernment is present 
in Brazil. In South 
Africa, social assis-
tance is centrally 
funded and deliv-
ered by provincial 
governments.
Limited or no autonomy 
for local-level govern-
ment in South Africa 
compared to high 
level of discretion 
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to create credibility politics in Brazil. In India, decentralized elected bodies 
are responsible for the delivery of social assistance, while financing is from 
central government. This has left too much room for manoeuvring policy 
at the implementation level. Thus, evidence on effectiveness is conflicting. 
Social audits conducted by NGOs and government agencies have reported 
conflicting outcomes. The South African system of implementation has a 
high level of coordination at central ministry level, leaving little discretion 
and autonomy to local governments. The NGO role in implementation is 
crucial in India and South Africa, compared to Brazil. In all three countries, 
the role of multilateral agencies is found to be extremely important, espe-
cially in providing technical support for implementation.
At the level of programme dynamics the unique features of case countries 
were more prominent than similarities across case countries. This is to be 
expected since the interaction of programmes with a unique socio-cultural 
context may produce incomparable dynamics. For instance, corruption that 
pervades other segments of life and business in India is also remarkably 
present in all its social assistance programmes. The corruption is politically 
steered and bureaucratically carried out. Corruption structures access to the 
programme. On the other hand, in South Africa, the history of apartheid 
rule and the emergence of ANC leaves limited space for political competi-
tion. The economic inequality prevailing between the white and black pop-
ulation has restricted support for basic-income grant proposals within the 
ANC ranks. In Brazil the political competition between the Workers Party 
and Cardoso’s poverty activism led to the mushrooming of various schemes 
which were later consolidated into Bolsa Familia replacing erstwhile Bolsa 
Escola. Despite these differences, there is commonality on debates around 
the stabilization of social assistance programmes. In all three countries gen-
eral revenue finances the programme. Thus, debate on providing a stable 
finance to social assistance is active.30
In all three cases, feedback politics is significantly high. Although there 
had been initial resistance to the grants (compared to development funds) 
in both South Africa and India, once the programme is introduced, they 
gained huge popular support. In Brazil and India the introduction of social 
assistance has served to overcome anti-incumbency trends in the 2006 and 
2009 general elections. In South Africa, the partisan support for the ANC 
has been strengthened because of social assistance. However, depending on 
30 Comparable is the case of Thailand where significant attempts to introduce social protec-
tion programmes have taken place in recent times. Many have argued that populist policies 
are a structural element of inequality (for instance, see Jitsuchon ‘How can Thailand Escape a 
Vicious Cycle of Populist Policies?’, a paper presented during the World Economic Forum on 
East Asia 2012 during 30 May–1 June in Bangkok). Inequality forces political parties to focus on 
populist policies at the time of elections. In Thailand such loss of macroeconomic prudence has 
left the finances so weak that a comprehensive social welfare system could not be built.
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the architecture of governance, the feedback effect is different on local-level 
politics. Absence of coordination at central level for different social assis-
tance programmes (and anti-poverty programmes) along with local auton-
omy has resulted in huge expenditures without convergence attempts in 
India. This has allowed local elites to turn the resultant divergence into 
political mileage. At the other extreme, there is a high level of coordina-
tion in South Africa by bringing all social assistance programmes under one 
single ministry. This gives no room for any feedback effect on local politics. 
The Brazilian system allows feedback on local politics as long as politicians 
can earn credits for reaching the targeted groups.
Discussion: Does Politics Matter?
In this section we return to the main questions of the chapter, and draw out 
the main conclusions.
Does Politics Matter for the Delivery of Effective Social Assistance?
The conclusions from the analysis in the chapter are that politics has played 
a central role in the expansion of social assistance in the three countries 
selected for detailed examination. This is a two-way process. On the one 
hand, political factors are at the core of the adoption, design, and implemen-
tation of social assistance. On the other hand, social assistance feeds back 
into political processes, helping reshape them.
What is the influence of politics in shaping social assistance in the South? 
Our case studies suggest that the influence of politics is strong. At one level, 
this is an obvious finding. At its core, social assistance is a manifestation of 
solidarity values in particular countries and communities, values which are 
themselves political.31 Social assistance represents institutions established 
with the objective of addressing poverty and vulnerability. Their scale 
and scope reflects shared understandings and the social priority attached 
to poverty. The main reason why this finding has purchase on current 
development discourses arises from the techno-managerial approach often 
employed by international organizations (Devarajan and Widlund 2007). 
This approach often ignores political influences on social protection institu-
tions. The relevance of the politics for social assistance delivery is relatively 
under-researched. Explaining the rapid emergence of social assistance in 
developing countries has to address this knowledge gap.
31 Rawls’s (1971) ‘political conception of justice’ is a comprehensive statement on this point.
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To achieve this, a stronger conceptual framework is needed. This frame-
work will need to separate out, as we do in this chapter, the different dimen-
sions in which politics matter, and the different dimensions of the influence 
of politics on social assistance delivery. The examination of three case coun-
tries in this study reveals that traditional approaches to this question focused 
mainly on investigating incentive structures as a motivation for elected 
politicians and non-elected bureaucrats (Alesina and Tabellini 2004). This 
is too limited as a tool for capturing the political dynamics around social 
assistance in Southern democracies. Social contracts and pacts, key events, 
ideology, and knowledge are important too. Unlike conventional wisdom, 
our case studies suggest several dimensions in which political influences 
need to be studied. A sole focus on elites or on full political competition are 
also limited as approaches to social assistance (Krishna 2006). These differ-
ent dimensions need to be studied separately and then integrated to form a 
more comprehensive picture.
Social assistance institutions also help shape political processes. As noted 
in this chapter, these institutions feed back into political processes at differ-
ent levels and in different ways. Many studies have discussed, and measured, 
the role of social assistance in aligning electoral support for incumbents. 
This dimension, if overemphasized, can reduce social assistance to a purely 
instrumental function (Hall 2008). Social assistance should also be consid-
ered as a legitimate form of aligning party coalitions and political support 
around pro-poor policies (Stokes 2004).
The growing institutionalization of social assistance as rights through 
intense political struggle is the story in all three case countries. This rede-
fines groups in poverty as citizens (social citizens). A deepening of democ-
racy follows. In India, for example, informal labourers had little to give and 
take from the state. Thus, the state’s legitimacy itself was limited. Social 
assistance challenges this relationship and re-establishes legitimacy.
The case studies reveal a complex interaction between local and national 
politicians and the electorate, as in India and Brazil, but also point to the role 
of identity politics and filters, as in South Africa. At a higher level of abstrac-
tion, social assistance can embody, and therefore strengthen and develop, 
shared values and preferences. These institutions can firm up and develop 
social contracts and shared notions of social justice. In many countries, but 
especially in India, Brazil, and South Africa, social assistance is widely per-
ceived as an instrument of inclusion. Just as in low-income countries with 
poorly developed social protection institutions, social assistance can be per-
ceived as an instrument of exclusion. Feedback processes from social assis-
tance and politics have not been studied sufficiently in the literature.
The delivery of social assistance cannot be de-linked from local dynamics 
and politics. Increasingly, political credibility requires procedural fairness. 
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At the implementation stage, efficiency gets redefined as egalitarianism 
once politics takes centre stage as a means to explain the delivery of social 
assistance. New centre–local relations are being created (e.g. joint financing, 
joint monitoring, joint issue-making, joint definition of targets) through the 
politics of social assistance. Leakages due to poor implementation are part 
and parcel of political resistance to redistribution by local elites.
In India there is a stark contrast between the politics of development 
(roads, drinking water, sanitation) and the politics of social assistance (pen-
sion, employment), indicating that politics of social assistance is better con-
ceived as a process than as an arena.
On each component of this two-way process, further research is needed 
to provide deeper insights. Contrasting the autonomy exercised by Brazilian 
institutions for delivering social assistance with that of India and South 
Africa it is important to focus on how effective service delivery strengthens 
political credibility. It is also important to examine in more detail the influ-
ence of identity politics, as observed in South Africa and India, in reducing 
the role of service delivery in affecting credibility-based politics (Keefer and 
Khemani 2003b). Identity politics structures social assistance through strati-
fied mechanisms. Identity politics could also prevent the expansion of social 
assistance. This is an important area for further research, the linkages exist-
ing between (in)effective delivery of social assistance and political credibility.
Decentralization of power to lower levels of administration could intensify 
politics around the delivery of social assistance. In India the highest impact 
of feedback processes is through local politics. In Brazil, though decentrali-
zation is significant, the influence of local politics is reduced through strong 
autonomous institutions at the national level that regulate the delivery of 
social assistance. In South Africa, high level of coordination of social assis-
tance programmes under a single ministry creates an environment through 
which local politics gets distanced. In other words, decentralization has to 
work with other countervailing forces. If not, as in India, the main outcome 
is a situation in which authority diffusion is rampant allowing the capture 
of social assistance programmes by local elites.
Knowledge Gaps
We conclude this chapter by noting some glaring knowledge gaps. 
Conceptual frameworks developed to study redistribution in welfare states 
can provide important insights into the expansion of social assistance in 
developing countries; but they need to be adapted in at least two impor-
tant respects: i) redistributive models, especially those relying on welfarist 
assumptions, are ill suited to the study of non-welfarist poverty reduction; 
and ii) neither ‘ideal’ conditions of political competition nor ‘elite capture’ 
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models are appropriate to the study of the politics of the expansion of social 
assistance in developing countries.
•   There is a literature providing country-specific or programme-specific 
information and discussion of social assistance. The main knowledge 
gap, and a key priority, is the need to develop comparative approaches 
and models.
•   The feedback from social assistance to political processes has been 
studied to some extent in middle-income countries for specific coun-
tries/programmes. The knowledge gap is at the cross-country com-
parative level, and at the cross-state comparative level. Cross-country 
comparative studies can generate knowledge on the role of political 
institutions, democratization, left–right coalitions, and donors, inter 
alia, in the specific processes and outcomes as regards social assistance 
delivery. Cross-country studies, institutional/qualitative/quantitative, 
can support useful generalizations on the role of political institutions 
and processes on the expansion of social assistance. Infra-national 
comparisons can generate information on the relative influence of 
national–local politics and bureaucracies.
•   There is scarce literature on the extent to which social assistance gen-
erates synergies and constraints in the delivery of other services and 
public goods in developing countries. In the context of human devel-
opment conditional transfer programmes and employment guarantees, 
there is a prima facie case for examining these interactions. They have 
also been observed in pure transfer programmes, like South Africa’s 
and Brazil’s social pensions in the context of the bundling of services 
and transfers.
•   There is a need to distinguish, analytically, social contracts and pacts, 
from scaling up and reform and evolution of social assistance, as was 
done in the framework above. Different forms of politics apply to these.
•   Despite the usual ‘development hubris’, effective delivery of social 
assistance and the politics associated can be productively studied in 
high-income countries. Pace the significance of registration (Szreter 
2007); the role of left parties in social assistance (Esping-Andersen 
1990); the shift to ‘active’ labour market policies following persistent 
high unemployment in the 1980s (OECD 2003). It is much less pro-
ductive to focus on welfare states, which at any rate are a post-Second 
World War phenomenon predicated on full employment and ‘stand-
ard’ family structures. It would be useful to take a hard-headed view 
(no nostalgia) on actual social assistance in high-income countries and 
see what can be learned from this by developing countries.
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The Politics—and Process—of Rule of Law 
Systems in Developmental States
Deval Desai and Michael Woolcock
Introduction: The Rule of Law and Politics
That the rule of law matters to development is one of those rare ideas that has 
achieved global consensus across the ideological spectrum in both the global 
North and South (Chesterman 2008). Rarer still, this consensus exists despite 
continuing disagreement about what the rule of law is, its relationship to 
growth and political change, and even the evidence of its accomplishment 
over the last five decades (Carothers 2006). The turn to a political conception 
of the rule of law—a turn founded on a reappropriation of the vernacular of 
the rule of law as a form of political order (e.g. Fukuyama 2011)—is one of sev-
eral approaches that are seeking to rearticulate the nature of the relationship 
between the rule of law and development (Trubek and Santos 2006)—contra, 
for example, the rule of law as secure property rights. We situate the move to 
articulate the rule of law in terms of political settlements as an example of 
this turn, and one which we support as it foregrounds the way in which law 
shapes and is shaped by existing distributions of power.1 In this chapter, we 
develop an account of the role of the rule of law in securing inclusive devel-
opment outcomes (with an emphasis on the poor and marginalized) in the 
context of an evolving political settlement.2 We also offer a friendly critique 
1 The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors alone, and should not be attributed 
to the World Bank, its executive directors, or the countries they represent. We are grateful for help-
ful feedback received from commentators and participants at the ESID review workshop in Delhi.
2 We do not make claims about the rule of law in fragile states in this chapter; we have argued 
elsewhere that these are subject to different donor dynamics and imperatives (see Desai et al. 
2012). Rather, we focus on states with a semi-functioning formal system and the ability to 
resolve disputes, enforce rules, enable political, economic, and social activity, and hold actors 
accountable (Olivier de Sardan 2009, p. 6).
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of the analytical deployment of political settlements, suggesting that the rule 
of law must be understood not only instrumentally but also in terms of the 
legitimacy it derives from the processes in and through which it has emerged 
and, in turn, the value with which it imbues those processes.
The chapter proceeds in eight sections. Following this introduction, the next 
section provides a conceptual overview of debates around the rule of law and 
political settlements, and details our five-part conceptual framework that we 
derive from the literature. In the following five sections we go on to explore 
these five parts : institutional form, institutional function, policy frames, politi-
cal organization and contingent factors. The final section concludes.
Conceptual Overview
It is axiomatic that the rule of law (hereafter ‘ROL’) shapes political, eco-
nomic, and social activity (Dworkin 1986). But diverse meanings abound. It 
can be limited to the willingness of the state or sovereign to subject itself to 
the same rules as everyone else (Raz 1977; Tamanaha 2012). A Rawlsian view 
(Rawls 1999) would emphasize social process, while Dworkin (1986) high-
lights the normative value of outcomes. Trebilcock and Daniels (2008) sug-
gest that ROL exists on a spectrum from ‘thin’ (i.e. judging law by the legal 
validity of the processes giving rise to it and governing its application) to 
‘thick’ (i.e. judging law by the substantive outcomes it produces). The term 
has been used in many other ways besides: Tamanaha (2004) and Carothers 
(2006) note the plethora of definitions, many rooted outside the Western 
tradition. This leads to a proposition that ROL is an ‘essentially contested 
concept’ (Gallie 1956; applied to ROL by Waldron 2002), ontologically inca-
pable of being definitively defined, taxonomized, and catalogued. Indeed, 
a substantial body of literature has arisen highlighting the constant debate 
and dissonance between conceptions of ROL, seeking to stress contest in 
definitions (Bergling et al. 2009).
Two key ideas flow from this. First, ROL is under-theorized in practice. 
Carothers (2009, p. 51) finds that ‘a tendency exists toward uncritical and 
sometimes wishful thinking about [ROL; there are powerful] temptations, to 
believe certain things about the rule of law and its place on the international 
stage that are misleading and sometimes unhelpful’. As a result, develop-
ment practitioners’ use of ROL tends to be driven by institutional models 
and transplantable modes of doing business (raised as early as Trubek and 
Galanter (1974) and a feature of the literature ever since), with a general 
emphasis on securing property rights as a key institutional precondition to 
economic growth (Dam 2006b). For example, analyses of the justice sector 
generally focus on sets of written norms (including Coasean conceptions 
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stressing strong property rights protection), organizational structures, and 
human capacity that affect the efficiency, quality, fairness, consistency, 
and accessibility of judicial processes (Reiling et al. 2007; World Bank 2002; 
Asian Development Bank 2004). This approach is compounded by the lim-
ited methodologies used to inform the evidence base. We do not seek to 
generalize:  studies such as Owen and Portillo (2003) and Dale (2009) are 
robust both in their tools of data-gathering (from case-tracking to end-user 
surveys) and data analysis. Yet Hammergren (2002, 2003), taking an over-
view of analyses of ROL programming (with an emphasis on Latin America), 
sees several flaws: in the main, she argues, analyses are taken too early, have 
weak causality, are not sufficiently robust to alternative specifications and 
interpretations, and rarely operate at a level of local granularity. For exam-
ple, an evaluation of Chilean criminal procedure reform did not gather com-
parable samples, making difference-in-difference impossible, and did not 
control the cases tracked for socio-economic, demographic and criminologi-
cal conditions (Vera Institute 2004). As a result, Peerenboom (2002, p. 48) 
feels free to conclude, for example, that development institutions’ policies in 
China towards ROL have been unsuccessful as they have not taken the time 
to understand its role: in that country context, ROL is neither an essential 
precondition for social order nor for economic growth.
Second, technical understandings of ROL mask political contestation 
around this ‘essentially contested concept’ and its role in shaping poli-
tics, society, and the economy. ROL plays a key role in the development of 
a political system, but one that is subject to political contest rather than 
technical intervention. Ginsburg (2010), for example, finds that independ-
ent courts can be anything from ‘upstream triggers’ for democratization to 
‘downstream guarantors of authoritarianism’, depending on the nature of 
the politics surrounding them. Political contests around ROL also play a 
key role in social transformation: Levi and Epperly (2010) turn to the role of 
group politics in generating, transmitting, and (crucially) upholding social 
norms that shape ROL and economic change (summarized in Santos 2006). 
Importantly for our purposes, this story of contest suggests that ROL does 
not describe a pre-determined end-state of laws and institutions, but rather 
the role law plays in structuring the very politics of distribution, inclusion, 
and marginalization—in short, the development process itself.
Rule of Law and Political Settlements
Having arrayed the inchoate notion of ROL in this way, we can see the value 
of turning to political settlements as both explanans and explanandum. 
We do not attempt to provide an authoritative overview of the literature on 
political settlements. Rather, relying on Di John and Putzel (2009), Khan 
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(2010), and Leftwich and Sen (2010), we use it as a point of departure for our 
exploration of the relationship between poverty and marginalization on the 
one hand, and politics and process of ROL on the other.
A useful conceptual starting point is Kennedy’s (2002) discussion of prop-
erty rights. Following Hohfeld’s (1917) seminal work, he argues that a prop-
erty right is in fact a ‘bundle[s] of rights’ or rules, ‘some of which authorize 
injury and others of which forbid it. Whenever there is a gap, conflict, or 
ambiguity in property law, one side can invoke all the rules in the “bundle” 
that suggest protection, and the other the rules in the bundle that suggest 
freedom of action’ (p. 201). ROL in development, then, could be understood 
as the evolution of power enabling the more forceful invocation of one bun-
dle over another (in stark contrast to de Soto 2000). An allied move might 
be to emphasize the relevance of ROL to development in the way that it 
structures the mobilization of such power by elite groups. In recent insti-
tutionalist literature, ROL emerges as key to equilibria between elite groups 
(North et al. 2009; Hilbink 2007). While North, Wallis, and Weingast see 
ROL as a precondition to modernity (and so take a static view of ROL), Berger 
(2008, pp. 38–46) argues that law needs elite political support to be effec-
tive, but that over time it must respond to broader-based norms as well. This 
understanding places an emphasis on the political dynamics of ROL: that is, 
how it is reconfigured over time so that the benefits of the evolving political 
settlement extend to the poor and marginalized.
The story of these dynamics is complex. Holston (1991, p. 1) sees law as 
a political tool mobilizable by elites. Olomola’s (2010) study of linkages 
between formal and informal institutions in Nigeria’s cotton industry found 
that Licensed Buying Agents—powerful actors in the middle of the cotton 
supply chain—‘are fond of influencing the judicial process and bring[ing] 
any lawsuits against them to a deadlock’ (p. 31), disempowering registered 
farmers. Yet others see law as levelling the political playing field (Trebilcock 
and Daniels 2008; Raz 1977). If we take the relationship between politics 
and ROL seriously in our analytic lens then contests over rules become con-
tests over politics, and contests over politics become contests over rules. Law 
and politics become sites and vernaculars for the performance of each other. 
Thus Chabal and Daloz (1999, pp. 104, 136) find the threat to elites’ patrimo-
nial networks from rule enforcement (such as of anti-corruption laws) leads 
to an empty ‘rhetoric’ of ROL from elite groups.
This provides the starting point for a friendly critique of the political 
settlements literature, and shows what (and how) a politically rich under-
standing of ROL might contribute to a politically rich understanding of 
development. Khan (2010, p. 4) suggests that from a political-settlements 
perspective participation in institutions is instrumental: they must produce 
politically acceptable distributions of benefits, or elites will seek to change 
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their processes and forms. This resonates with a ‘thick’ understanding of the 
rule of law. Yet, as we elaborate below, the strategic mobilization by actors 
of and around law and politics suggests that participation in the legal pro-
cess can itself be transformative in a positive or negative sense, providing a 
platform for identity formation, group mobilization, and inclusion or exclu-
sion (a concept that is uncontroversial across the political spectrum, from 
Foucault (1995) to North et al. (2009)). We do not mean by highlighting this 
to support a ‘thin’ understanding of the rule of law; indeed, we engage with 
the turn to politics in ROL because it is an important corrective to liberal 
formalist understandings of the rule of law that have been prominent in 
much development programming in recent decades. Rather, we raise it as we 
see ROL as simultaneously an instrument of the political order and structur-
ing that order through rules and processes. As a result, we seek to rearticu-
late the value of process in the context of those politics.
Framework
In keeping with our emphasis on process and outcome, we begin with 
Maravall and Przeworski’s (2003, p. 5) notion that ROL is a system that ena-
bles people to discern what they can reasonably expect from others. These 
expectations are often articulated in development terms as all people being 
equal and accountable before the law (Fukuyama 2011). However, this is ill 
borne out in practice: the literature on the role of ROL in supporting rapid 
growth in East Asia has suggested that the arrays of laws, regulations, and 
legal institutions were designed to allow for informal networks and for lim-
ited (or absent) checks on executive authority (Peerenboom 2004; Amsden 
2001, pp. 251–83; noting that critics of this literature tend to find fault with 
the overemphasis on, rather than existence of, such difference: Nelson and 
Cabatingan 2010). Indeed, some states that have very limited or no legal 
scrutiny of the executive can sometimes drive forward inclusive or (nomi-
nally) pro-poor measures. In Malawi, Cammack and Kanyongolo (2010, 
p.  45) found that ‘single-party, autocratic government provided the best 
environment for [an effective legal regime] to emerge, while the immediate 
transition years saw a breakdown in order, a weakening of state control and 
de-professionalizing of the public service coupled with rapid urbanization 
and a higher demand for public services, all of which resulted in less effec-
tive public goods delivery’.
We thus limit ourselves to a relational understanding of ROL, offering no 
preconceived end state for legal frameworks, norms, and their relationship 
to political organization. We explore the dynamics of how elites and end users 
(particularly the poor and marginalized) contest within themselves and between 
each other the shape of legal and regulatory institutions, and are simultaneously 
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shaped by these institutions. We adopt multiple units of analysis: institutions, 
elites, and end users. As a result, we draw on a very broad range of disciplines 
or fields, offering synthetic insights without claiming exhaustiveness (e.g. 
we do not give full treatment to citizenship here). In general, the majority 
of the literature either takes an institutionalist perspective, focusing on the 
impacts of institutional change, or recounts a macro-level political narra-
tive, with little analysis of how that feeds into legal institutional change 
(and how that, in turn, shapes political discourse). The literature does, how-
ever, offer five dimensions along which the politics of inclusion and mar-
ginalization shape and are shaped by ROL: institutional form; institutional 
function; policy frame; political organization; and contingent factors. We 
explore each in detail here.
Institutional Form: Hybridity and Contested Autonomy
We find an emerging trend in the conceptual literature around ROL argu-
ing for function over form, or a move to discredit formalists as lacking an 
understanding of context (Tamanaha 2004; Desai et al. 2012). Similar argu-
ments emerge from the recent push for ‘best fit’ rather than ‘best practice’ 
approaches to institutional reform more generally (Booth 2011a). Yet form 
remains important. For example, Coffee (2001, p. 80) argues that the form 
that a market regulator adopts (such as self-regulation, an independent 
body, a political committee) will, as the market develops, shape the evolv-
ing political consensus between elites. He studies pre-Great Depression 
market regulation and finds that it was state-based (a legacy of the original 
American political settlement); this drove significant unregulated and fraud-
ulent cross-state securities transactions, contributing to the 1929 crash and 
leading to the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1934. 
Clearly in such a line of argument, form is closely linked to function: elites 
looking for certain functions may shape institutions to forms that, for the 
purposes of securing legitimacy for current and subsequent actions, appear 
likely to fulfil (on the basis of experiences elsewhere) those functions.
Hybridity
One way to engage with the politics of form is on the basis of the emerging 
literature on legal hybridity. There, we find two main and often-conflated 
types of hybridity. First, there is hybridity between established models of the 
state and economic activity, such as (neo)liberal versus developmentalist; 
democratic versus autocratic; modern versus pre-modern. In other words, 
developmental states move along their own developmental paths (Fukuyama 
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2010). Indeed, all ROL systems are by their nature hybrid and dynamic, as 
they draw upon a variety of models or sources of legitimacy as a response to 
the changing exigencies of circumstance and context (Adler and Woolcock 
2010). Hybridity requires law to play many such roles, meaning ROL will 
look very context-specific. Cavarozzi (1992), Kurtz and Brooks (2008), and 
Weyland (1996), for example, explore the macro perspective of legal institu-
tions supporting economic growth in South America, especially Brazil, and 
find that the role of law changed rapidly as the state reoriented its inter-
ventionist capacity to tighten political control but reduce state interven-
tion in economic sectors (e.g. by introducing a new Competition Law and 
Innovation Law).
The second form of hybridity derives from the first: hybridity reflecting an 
institution or array that draws on multiple sources of political authority and 
legitimacy to support a hybrid model of the state. Trubek’s (2008, pp. 22–3, 
2009) studies of post-authoritarian Latin America after the 1990s financial 
crises emphasize the political complexity here: as these states emerge, elites 
need both flexibility and stability, arrayed in ways that reflect their existing 
claim on state assets. It would thus be a mistake to see ROL teleologically 
as a formal process of social formalization, although this may be norma-
tively desirable. Dodson (2002, p. 219) and Foweraker and Krznaric (2002, 
pp. 46–7), in their studies of Latin America, find that elite domination can 
lead to hybrid orders such as ‘institutionalized informality’. These are not 
rationalized in all dimensions of the state and some parts of these orders can 
be captured, often to the detriment of the poor and marginalized.
The formation of Township–Village Enterprises (TVEs) in rural or periph-
eral China in the late 1980s and early 1990s provides a useful case study 
for the emergence of pro-poor hybrid ROL institutional forms. A ‘de facto 
alliance of local government and small collective enterprises’ (Dam 2006a, 
p. 40), TVEs were used by local bourgeois entrepreneurs in an attempt to 
avoid a predatory state dynamic. As Peerenboom (2002, pp. 471, 479) puts 
it, ‘if you can’t beat them, join them’. Nevertheless, there was not insignifi-
cant local-level predation in impoverished villages or those had few other 
sources of revenue, and in which officials did not have the material means to 
serve either as patrons or as community benefactors (Unger and Chan 1999, 
pp. 71–2). Peerenboom (2002, p. 486) highlights the hybrid nature of this 
arrangement and the context of its rise and fall:
TVEs reflect a host of context-specific factors, including the deepening of market 
reforms. As markets developed, TVEs faced increasing competition . . . The lack 
of clear property rights also hindered growth and development. Outside inves-
tors were reluctant to buy into TVEs given the lack of clear ownership rights 
and the influence of local government on management decisions. Seeking to 
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minimize unemployment, village leaders would take from the rich to support 
the poor, forcing strong companies to purchase or subsidize weaker ones.
This reflects the lesson from Adler and Woolcock’s (2010) study of the 
Cambodian Arbitration Council that hybrid forms are by their nature 
dynamic over time. Similarly, Guthrie (1998, pp. 281–2) finds that the prac-
tice of guanxi—or personalized networks of influence—in China is declin-
ing in importance, especially in large-scale industry, as competitiveness 
becomes more important.
Legal Pluralism, Informal Norms and Institutions
Understanding the sources of legal hybridity requires an understanding 
of legal pluralism—‘the fact that real social life is prodigal of sovereigns’ 
(Gordon 1984, p. 69), each making their own brand of law that might over-
lap, cooperate, or compete. This emerges as a social fact (Tamanaha 2000), 
lived experiences of which often entail some engagement with ‘informal’ 
legal institutions.3 The hybridity that often results from a multiplicity of 
informal institutions arises as a result of the interaction between different 
layers of institutional spaces (including formal and informal) (Merry 1988), 
and engenders corresponding dynamics of contestation over power and 
resources (Meagher 2010), connecting informal institutions and social net-
works to the politics of the mediation of power.
Thus, on the one hand, the literature portrays locally embedded insti-
tutions whose meaning can be contested by local actors; they are, in that 
sense, inclusive. In rural Karnataka, for example, Ananth Pur (2004) con-
ducted a study of ‘informal local governance institutions’ (ILGIs) and found 
that all the ones surveyed were involved in dispensing justice:
Villagers do not necessarily see dispute resolution by ILGIs as an end point, 
but rather as the first opportunity for justice because it is quick, affordable and 
accessible . . . In most villages, disputes brought before the ILGIs may be taken 
to the police station or to the formal legal system if not satisfactorily resolved 
there. The types of disputes that come before the ILGI are varied [and can range 
from petty theft to land disputes to sexual violence]. (p. 8)
3 While we use ‘informal’ institutions and cognate terms throughout, we are mindful of 
and subscribe to the caution against overly stark dichotomies between state/non-state, formal/
informal, modern/traditional etc. (Tamanaha 2000; Merry 1988, pp. 875–9). The importance 
of the idea of legal pluralism as social fact in the literature requires an understanding of the 
complex interplay of different institutional forms. We simply use the terminology of informal-
ity to indicate arrays of institutions that are not understood to be of the state in the orthodox 
liberal-democratic tradition.
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Furthermore, the interaction between formal and informal institutions—
the hybrid dynamics—has an impact on a broad range of development and 
local governance issues. A report from the Institute of Development Studies 
(2010, p. 52) finds that these councils are moving beyond traditional roles 
and are ‘becoming more active in seeking access to public funds, influencing 
decisions about development projects, and raising matching contributions’.
On the other hand, informal institutions can also be exclusionary or sim-
ply embed a set of norms, values, and behaviours that are hard to dislodge. 
Ghana has a legacy of customary law whose embedded hierarchies were 
strengthened by British indirect rule, which established Native Courts and 
judicial recognition of custom. In the context of this history, Crook et al. 
(2010, pp. 24–7) find that customary land dispute panels are least attuned to 
popular ideas and expectations about how to settle land disputes, catering 
to a relatively narrow and elite set of clients using very formal traditional 
procedures. Panels are too embedded in the power relations of local land 
ownership and social hierarchies to offer adequate settlement. As a result, 
the politics of hybridity can also be exclusionary, relying on vertically inte-
grated patronage networks.
The challenge posed by the literature, then, is to understand how effective 
hybrid arrays of formal and informal institutions come about in develop-
mental states. In some cases, informal institutions may have more legiti-
macy than the state, and exercising state power to remove them may lead to 
political backlash or disengagement. This leads to complexities of the politics 
of state–non-state engagement. In others, the politics of non-state institu-
tions may preclude or impede the state from pursuing inclusive or pro-poor 
objectives. Seeking to array this space of options, Fritz and colleagues (2009, 
p. 45) offer four possible relationships between formal and informal insti-
tutions: complementary; accommodating; substituting; and competing/sub-
verting. Stephens (2009, p. 145) fleshes this out in the context of ROL systems, 
highlighting the politics of each move. Policymakers can expand state con-
trol of the justice system; attempt to enhance the cultural relevance of the 
formal system by aligning it with customary systems; attempt to ‘improve’ 
the quality of informal justice through state oversight and the insertion of 
legal or constitutional human rights standards; or attempt to subjugate infor-
mal processes in a structural hierarchy below the state.
Autonomy
The politics of hybridity in ROL systems play out in one key area of insti-
tutional form:  the autonomy of justice institutions, or the ability of jus-
tice institutions to behave as autonomous political actors in order to carry 
out particular functions (Fukuyama 2011, p. 408). In China, for example, 
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Peerenboom (2002, p. 14) shows that judges are political appointees. However, 
Peerenboom (2008a, p. 5) suggests that putative reformers need to disaggre-
gate the politics of the Chinese state in order to understand how reform 
might occur. Some low-hanging reforms are manageable, such as improving 
case processing times, but reforms really have to be understood as political, 
causing turf battles and conflicts between the component parts of the state, 
each of which have to be understood (at least analytically) as separate and 
distinct power-holders.
A complex understanding of autonomy that takes elite politics into 
account militates against the transplantation of independent ‘forms’; rather, 
it suggests that we should understand autonomy as a contested concept that 
creates political winners and losers, requiring a more focused sociology of 
the actors within justice institutions. Garth (2002) explores the politics of 
expertise in guiding reform directed at autonomous justice institutions:
The first law and development movement . . . left a legacy in Brazil of corpo-
rate lawyers with an expertise in U.S. corporate law and good connections to 
U.S. lawyers. The relatively scarce expertise they possessed became more valu-
able as the economy changed. If we trace the careers of this group, we find 
remarkable success in corporate law, the state, and the financial sector. These 
individuals led the movement to rewrite laws to conform to U.S. standards in, 
among other places, securities and intellectual property. The U.S.  investment 
paid off both locally and for the United States. What did not happen, however, 
was substantial reform of the judiciary or reform of legal education. (p. 393)
Institutional Functions: Accountability  
and Basic Obligations
While the literature on the functions of legal institutions is vast, in provid-
ing a politically rich account of ROL we emphasize here its accountability 
role and support of the state in meeting its basic obligations. Both of these 
functions cut across other dimensions of state policymaking (Fukuyama 
2011), for example enabling the delivery of basic services (Gauri 2011).
Legal Accountability
The literature on accountability refers to the legal ability to hold 
power-holders to account for their actions (Fukuyama 2011, pp.  582–4). 
The politics of movements towards greater accountability are contingent on 
political organization and the pragmatism of the political settlement: that is, 
a deep-seated understanding that moves to bolster elite legitimacy (includ-
ing the ceding of some power) will need to occur as an economy grows 
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(Peerenboom 2008b, p. 5). However, the way in which those politics express 
themselves can differ significantly, from violent to non-violent revolution, 
through to incremental transition. This can be as much a result of histor-
ical contingency and accident as an outcome caused by an effective and 
evolving political settlement; to this end, Fukuyama (2011, pp.  589–606) 
contrasts the Glorious Revolution in Great Britain with the evolution of 
accountability in Denmark, indicating that the lack of violent conflict in 
Norway was a product of historical circumstance (such as the free flow of 
ideas into Norway) as much as design.
This caveat having been established, one message from Latin America is 
that accountability might counter-intuitively involve a greater politiciza-
tion of justice actors—particularly the judiciary and legal profession. In the 
region, there has been a move from seeking to establish positivist, apoliti-
cal justice actors to a situation in which people have increasingly been able 
to bring cases of a political nature—to do with electoral law, or civil and 
political rights—as judges have taken political decisions to rule against the 
government. For example, in Pinochet’s Chile, some Chilean judges made 
anti-government decisions, even though the Supreme Court justices leaned 
towards the government (Correa Sutil 1997). In Venezuela, ‘the judges of 
the First Court for Administrative Contentious matters [sic] issued several 
important rulings against some policies enacted by President Chávez’s gov-
ernment. After several incidents, the government’s special police took over 
the court building and the judges were fired’ (Pérez-Perdomo 2006, p. 187).
As the political settlement broadens, so the politics of legal accountability 
processes shifts. In Kenya, Benequista (2009) finds a combination of three 
factors to be key to understanding how the poor mobilized legal account-
ability institutions to stop evictions perceived as illegal: legal action (injunc-
tions against evictions), media (to expose planned evictions), and local 
politics (strikes, blocking roads, use of District Commissioner). In India, 
a fourth factor—legal education—is highlighted from a campaign against 
evictions and compulsory purchases to support a private thermal power 
plant. Nevertheless, recalling Holston (1991), legal processes of accountabil-
ity often remain limited in their utility to the poor. Newell and Wheeler 
(2006, pp. 15–16) argue that:
Approaches to accountability that rely solely on legal reform are unlikely to 
appreciate the limits of the law, in terms of access and reach, for the majority of 
the world’s poor. For example, constitutionally guaranteed rights (as with the  
right to water in South Africa and the right to health in Brazil) can create new 
possibilities for demanding accountability. Yet the difference in how these rights 
fit into legal traditions is critical. In Brazil, social mobilisation around constitu-
tional provisions has provided an entry point for political struggles over account-
ability because the judiciary does not fill that space, while in South Africa court 
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cases . . . have had a more central role . . . By contrast, in India, despite the fact 
there is a strong tradition of using public interest litigation, there has also been 
resort to mock legal processes such as citizen hearings. And in Mexico, where 
there is little possibility of resolving accountability struggles through legal struc-
tures perceived to be convoluted and corrupt, social mobilisation around political 
objectives is key to increasing accountability. While law often allows for equity 
of treatment, it can also reinforce social inequities. In Bangladesh, the laws cov-
ering workers’ rights date from the colonial period and heavily favour educated 
men. Women, who work almost entirely in the informal sector, do not fall under 
the auspices of these laws in practice. In Kenya and India the colonial Land 
Acquisition Act has been invoked to remove people from their land, often with-
out compensation or redress . . . An apolitical view of promoting accountability 
through law reform, capacity building, training judges and the like is unlikely to 
yield improved access for the poor unless structural barriers and social hierarchies 
that inhibit meaningful use of the law by the poor are also addressed.
Basic Obligations
Basic obligations can be expressed in terms of the ability of civic and com-
mercial actors to exercise state power to enable political, social, and economic 
activity (Fukuyama 2011, p. 601). Such activity is contingent on the formation 
of a political constituency that sees the state as having certain basic obliga-
tions; this can be due to material impacts on people’s lives, implying a need 
for grass-roots mobilization and action. For example, Berger (2008) exam-
ines the use of the courts to compel the state to provide antiretroviral drugs 
to combat AIDS in South Africa in line with the constitutional provisions 
upholding economic and social rights, seeing the law of basic obligations as 
shaping a contest between the poor and the state. However, basic obligations 
can also bear relevance to intra-elite settlements: for example, Coffee’s (2001) 
history of the development of securities markets in the US and UK found that 
a new political constituency developed that desired legal rules capable of fill-
ing in the inevitable enforcement gaps that self-regulation had created.
The ability to participate in the political determination of what constitutes 
a basic obligation can have important impacts on the poor and marginal-
ized. For example, protective laws on the surface appear to provide protec-
tion for women against harmful and dangerous occupational environments. 
However, they can also subvert women’s ability to make choices and operate 
to restrict their access to a wider range of employment opportunities. These 
laws might include total or partial restrictions on women to work at night, to 
accept employment abroad, or to engage in what are considered dangerous 
occupations, such as mining, deep-water fishing, those involving chemicals, 
among others (World Bank 2011b, pp. 234–5).
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Policy Frames: Pragmatism and Equity
Pragmatism
ROL reforms are often framed as pragmatic or bold in the context of their 
political valence. Examining the pace of reform is an instructive example. 
The ROL literature offers a contrast between incrementalism (particularly 
in China: Dam 2006a) and a ‘big bang’ (e.g. in post-Soviet countries: Ford 
2001), with the current trend—albeit not the abiding structures and incen-
tives of large development agencies—favouring incremental reform, not 
least because building political constituencies for ROL reform takes time; 
Pritchett and de Weijer (2010) suggest several decades, even in the fastest 
reforming countries. Godoy and Stiglitz (2006) consider the lessons from 
legal retrenchment in post-Soviet states and their subsequent experience 
with asset-stripping. If a ‘big bang’ opens opportunities for the capture of 
economic resources and political and business elites are closely tied, politics 
may favour the rapid removal of assets even though it will lead to inequality 
and lack of inclusiveness, along with a ROL system that allows assets to be 
exported and competition to be minimized.
There is significant literature in praise of incrementalism, especially 
with regard to the experiences of China and countries in South East Asia 
(Peerenboom 2002; Dam 2006b; Przeworski et  al. 2000; Friedman and 
Gilley 2005). However, incremental reform can also enable elites to sequence 
reform in ways that suit them, and reject reform that might undermine their 
interests even though it might be beneficial to the poor or marginalized. 
Take, for example, forest reform in Andhra Pradesh, in which wealthy lob-
bies worked to undercut reform that would increase regulation and oversight 
and which threatened their economic and political interests (Reddy et al. 
2010, p. 5; Sarin and Springate-Baginski 2010, p. 32).
Finally, the role of international actors in a political settlement affects 
the pace of reform. If they play a key role, the pace of reform may be dis-
torted owing to their institutional imperatives. For example, Dam (2006a, 
pp. 39–40) argues that China may have benefited from a continuation of 
leadership and an ability to resist the international, while post-Soviet states 
lacked the former and so international actors stepped in to fill the gap.
Equity
Adopting equity as a policy frame for ROL entails helping meet the mate-
rial needs of the poor to shore up political support (Newell and Wheeler 
2006), alternatively narrated as using ROL to buy off the disenfranchised 
(Peerenboom 2002). Gauri and Brinks’s (2008) edited collection contrasts 
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South Africa (Berger 2008) and India’s (Shankar and Mehta 2008) approaches 
to economic and social rights. Both allow litigation for economic and social 
rights and thus some judicialization of the policy space. South Africa restricts 
judicial powers of review of government actions to standards of judicial 
review, stopping the judiciary from making specific policy prescriptions: for 
example, in the Treatment Action Campaign case of 2002, the Constitutional 
Court held that the government had to make available free antiretroviral 
drugs to reduce the risk of mother-to-child transmission of HIV, but did 
not tell the government how to achieve this aim nor what any relevant 
thresholds (e.g. of severity) should be. This standard of review limits the 
judicialization of the political space. By contrast, India has generated its own 
standards of review, allowing judges to conduct direct data gathering, to 
appoint investigative commissions, and make specific policy prescriptions 
to the legislature; for example, in the People’s Union for Civil Liberties case, the 
Supreme Court held in 2001 that the government must improve children’s 
nutrition, and must do it through the provision of a hot meal for every child 
at school. Upon frequent delays in implementation, the Court appointed a 
commission in 2003 to investigate bottlenecks and make remedial sugges-
tions to the government (Desai 2010).
As a result, an equitable policy frame for ROL—that is, one that broad-
ens the political settlement through the equitable provision of goods and 
services to the poor and promotion of social mobility (Fukuyama 2011, 
pp. 599–600)—may turn on the politics of the justice actors within the sys-
tem. One consequence of this, at least in India, is the emergence of the 
judiciary as a political class, which is required for the system to continue to 
work in an aggressively pro-poor fashion, but which may cause backlogs and 
reduce faith in impartiality (Dennis and Stewart 2004; Hirschl 2004).
Political Organization: Coalitions and Communication
Coalitions
The nature of coalitions intersects with a range of different tools that have 
influenced the broadening of the political settlement through law and jus-
tice. For example, public interest litigation, often aimed at changing the 
existing political settlement by altering ‘structured inequalities and power 
relations in society’ (Gloppen 2008, p. 344), has opened a judicial space 
in which groups can form and mobilize around specific issues, particularly 
socio-economic claims (which have tended to link the urban and rural poor 
with middle-class activist networks: Gauri and Brinks 2008). Access to infor-
mation laws have opened spaces for new coalitions around specific issues 
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such as rural corruption (linking activists and the rural poor: Jenkins and 
Goetz 1999) and more general issues such as press freedom and government 
accountability (in Mexico, this was driven by coalitions of urban middle-
class activists and intellectuals: Gill and Hughes 2005). Legal empowerment 
tools (‘the use of legal services and related development activities to increase 
disadvantaged populations’ control over their lives’ Golub 2003, pp. 3, 5, 25) 
entail interventions often driven by civil society actors such as legal educa-
tion, legal coalition-building and community paralegal programmes.
The nature of political organization is common across these interventions 
as a factor determinative of the nature of outcomes. Gloppen (2008, p. 348), 
for example, talks about ‘associative capacity’ and Gill and Hughes (2005, 
pp. 126–9) about the ‘formation of a pragmatic and adaptive coalition of 
. . . advocates’. The organization of political groupings plays an important 
role in shaping ROL in two ways: first, direct political support to contests 
surrounding the use of and changes to a particular set of rules and institu-
tions; and second, indirectly shaping and being shaped by ROL institutions 
through the (re)generation, contestation, and consumption of shared under-
standings (see Gauri et al. 2013). As a result, it is important to recognize that 
legal tools that rest on or which are designed to form coalitions cannot be 
considered neutral tools to be wielded by the poor; they must be understood 
as modes of reconfiguring power requiring politics and ideology (contrast-
ing Golub 2003 with Baxi 1982 and Rajagopal 2003).
First, forging direct political support for changes to ROL often entails call-
ing upon a combination of foreign support and domestic coalitions, with 
different sources of legitimacy and different political aims (Daniels and 
Trebilcock 2004). At the domestic level, it also requires some group cohesion 
without mass cooptation (Fukuyama 2011, pp. 562, 598)—thus, in Tanzania, 
Mahdi (2010, p. 4) highlights the importance of organizing representation 
for small coffee growers who operate independently from large cooperatives 
who could otherwise capture regulatory reform. However, this analysis is 
contested by Peerenboom (2008b, pp. 10–12) who juxtaposes India with the 
‘East Asian Model’ (EAM). He argues that India remains democratic, which 
(in this view) has resulted in lower growth; the EAM has followed a path of 
authoritarianism-growth-democratic reform, and indeed Latin America has 
shifted from authoritarianism to patronage through patronage democracy 
to democracy (Daniels and Trebilcock 2004). By contrast, Lele and Quadir 
(2004, p. 3) argue that India remains democratic, as law protects the inter-
ests of the entrenched and dominant classes who hold ’economic, political 
and ideological sway over the subaltern classes’, benefiting from vertically 
integrated political parties coupled to low human development.
As a result, it is important to understand not just the cohesion of groups 
contesting rules, but the broad base and cohesion of possible beneficiaries 
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from rule contests. For example, creating justiciable socio-economic rights 
moves particular social and economic contests to the courts. Gauri and 
Brinks (2008, pp. 335–40) argue that there is a well-documented concern 
about beneficiary inequality (i.e. that only the rich can litigate). However, 
the group of potential beneficiaries from a particular successful challenge is 
vast—for example, in the Treatment Action Campaign case, all maternal HIV 
sufferers in South Africa. Gauri and Brinks go on to argue that ensuring 
the broadest base of potential beneficiaries requires significant civil soci-
ety or state support to participate in such contests. There is thus a strong 
link in the literature between direct political support and indirect shap-
ing—coalitions are relevant to broadening a political settlement through 
ROL inasmuch as they deal with the creation of a cohesive group who share 
a common understanding of the role of the courts in solving their problems. 
Joshi (2010), in a study of recent employment guarantee schemes in India, 
explores essential preconditions for this to happen, which echo the precon-
ditions for broad-based legal accountability discussed above. He finds that:
For the law to work for poor people, at least initially a significant amount of 
energy, time, and resources have to be devoted to pursuing rights through the 
courts. Without a strong membership organization or support from an NGO, 
access to justice for the poor is difficult. Second, a strategy of pursuing litiga-
tion has to be adopted by activist organizations prior to any actual dispute, so 
that robust cases with detailed documentation can be built up for litigation. 
Third, such a formal confrontational strategy can be costly in terms of everyday 
organizational functioning and interactions with the local authorities. Finally, 
although the anticipated material benefits of successful court cases (in the form 
of increased wages) can be a powerful force for mobilizing rural workers, a litiga-
tion strategy may not deliver relief to the aggrieved—the poorest—because of 
the long time the judgments take. (p. 626)
As a result, the internal and external politics of third party participation in 
rule systems clearly have a strong impact on pro-poor outcomes, including 
the legitimacy of their claims to represent the poor. Maiti (2009, pp. 29–33) 
explores this in the context of comparative labour relations in Gujarat and West 
Bengal. In Gujarat, in order to meet significant demand, labour contractors 
(non-political actors) hire a large number of migrant workers from out-of state 
based on informal networks, and most are at-will employees. Contractors are 
comfortably able to bribe labour inspectors if caught. Employees thus remain 
part of their informal network that brought them to work. In West Bengal, 
however, labour unions play this role in a context where alternative employ-
ment options are very low. As political actors, they retain clear constituencies, 
and employees form part of their union as a political unit. As a result, union 
representatives risk action against them in the public domain if such bribery 
were to occur, and thus engage in bribery or similar activity to a lesser degree.
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Third-party participation is complicated by the politics of justice actors 
themselves—the judiciary, lawyers, academics, ombudspersons, and simi-
lar institutional actors—their links to elite-led coalitions, their relation-
ship with the balance of power, and their investment in the status quo. In 
Andhra Pradesh, for example, enforcement of forest regulation through the 
courts has been stymied by the forest regulator itself appearing as an inter-
ested party in cases (Reddy et al. 2010, p. 6). The complex politics of judicial 
independence in China shows the importance of seeing justice actors as part 
of a political process. Reforms to the (Party-appointed) judiciary are highly 
political, causing turf battles and conflicts between component parts of the 
state. The Party is able to adjudicate between these component parts; as a 
result, there is a tension between the proposition that strengthening ROL 
will weaken the Party’s discretion (a ‘good’), and the ability to do so in a 
way that significantly changes the existing power dynamic and creates an 
independent political actor in the judiciary, given that the Party is needed 
to mediate tensions (Peerenboom 2008a, p. 7).
Direct political support for ROL reform also depends on the relative 
power of elites (Fukuyama 2011, pp. 779–80). Following Kennedy’s (2002) 
and Hohfeld’s (1917) understandings of property rights, we understand 
from Holston (1991, pp. 721–3) that the power has to be used to quash 
competing property claims from non-elite groups, or groups not partak-
ing of the political settlement (through litigation, legislation, influencing 
adjudicators, patrimonial networks, etc). As a result, legal education, legal 
empowerment strategies, and mobilization become important—not just for 
group formation and cohesion, but to provide the capabilities to non-elite 
groups to exploit this political tool—as does driving down barriers to access 
to justice from both the supply and demand side (e.g. the provision of legal 
services or lowering barriers to achieving standing in court). For example, 
Adler, Porter, and Woolcock (2008), in a study of Cambodian land titling, 
find that:
Absent formal institutions which are able to deal with major conflict in a way 
which is perceived as fair, the poor use a variety of advocacy strategies to gain 
extra leverage in their negotiations with wealthier or more powerful parties. 
In the most successful cases the poor act collectively to approach powerful 
administrative officials, often district and provincial governors, to intervene on 
their behalf. Appeals to the media, local human rights NGOs and national level 
institutions have also proven useful. When formal law is drawn upon in these 
cases it is to legitimate multi-faceted bargaining strategies rather than with any 
expectation that the state could be relied upon to enforce the law in an equita-
ble fashion. Such strategies clearly have the potential to shift decisions in favour 
of the poor in individual cases. There is, however, little in the way of institu-
tional structure for this sort of bargaining. As such, collective action around 
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land issues tends to be local, ephemeral and targeted at powerful individuals 
within the administration. (p. 3)
Again, civil society is extremely important in framing the effective exploi-
tation of law (Scott 1998, p. 5), but such claims are difficult to make and 
manage, relying on significant presumptions about the public sphere (and 
its legal framing through speech laws, and so on), vernaculars, social rela-
tions, and identity (Wayne et al. 2002; Avritzer 2002; Fung 2003). Thus, 
Hoffman and Bentes (2008) highlight low levels of knowledge about their 
rights among the poor in Brazil, while Berger (2008, pp. 47–8) discusses elite 
action to hoard information and legislate against CSOs in South Africa.
The second dimension of coalition-building around ROL—the shaping and 
contesting of institutions—is achieved through discursive limits imposed by 
ROL that frame the intersubjective meaning of issues—that is, the socially 
generated shared understandings of what ROL is and what it should do, and 
the comprehensible limits of what it might be. These facilitate or hinder the 
formation of groups: for example, Gauri et al. (2013) analyse the World Bank’s 
justice reform project in Afghanistan and show that the Bank is trying to 
shift popular understandings of the citizen-formal justice system relation-
ships in Afghanistan from a dynamic founded on tribal (lack of) engage-
ment with the state to a ‘state service/end user’ dynamic. Hyden (2010, p. 8) 
extends this idea to the self-image held by parliamentarians in Ghana as ‘del-
egates and guardians of their constituents’. He argues that this overshadows 
the role of parliament as a deliberative democratic forum, as parliamentary 
cohesiveness gives way to locally embedded politics.
We draw two main lessons from this. First, we cannot take a static view 
of political settlements and the concomitant ROL system: a constant repro-
duction of meaning and shifts in who shares a particular meaning system 
means that constituencies who can participate (e.g. who can litigate, who 
considers themselves to be an ‘employee’ and thus participate in an employ-
ment tribunal) are constantly shifting. This will have important implica-
tions for analysis, data collection, and monitoring methodologies, project 
design, and so on. Second, there is a similar problematization to be under-
taken of the internal administrative dynamics of a justice system: analysts 
need to understand the politics of justice actors and how they construct 
themselves (Dezalay and Garth 1996, 2002).
Communication
Communication is an important corollary of coalitions: the meaning they 
ascribe to rules requires an appreciation of communicative spaces as areas 
of political contestation about rules and the roles of actors. Thus, Fukuyama 
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(2011, pp. 600–1) argues that a broadly communicated faith in the common 
law of England provides a foundation for high levels of trust in the judici-
ary, while Peerenboom (2008b, p. 7) shows that surveys about the Indian 
Supreme Court show high levels of faith in the institution despite low levels 
of faith in its ability to execute its function, displaying a colonial legacy akin 
to that found by Fukuyama in England. The literature on communication 
also displays a sensitivity to vernaculars that will allow the poor to engage 
with and contest rules and roles (Barron et al. 2011). Benequista (2009) stud-
ies programmes that used theatre to reach out to the poor, while Stefanova et 
al. (2010) explore the use of theatre to build awareness of legal issues relating 
to customary law and land-leasing in Vanuatu. Cornwall and Coelho (2007, 
pp. 22–3) nuance the importance of communication. They argue that con-
text and political culture matter: again, law shapes communicative spaces as 
well as being shaped by them, from regulating the ability to speak (such as 
speech rights for women) to providing physical spaces for such expression. 
When there is divergence and dissonance between elite and local narratives 
and no space to allow for contest between the two, this can lead to low inclu-
siveness and poor access to justice. Scott (2009, pp. 334–7) brings to light a 
strong belief in the effectiveness of state judicial officers at the national level 
in China in the mid-nineteenth century, and the predatory realities of local 
magistrates at the sub-national level.
Contingent Factors
A final, overarching message from this political exploration of ROL is its 
contingency, especially on historical and colonial legacies (an issue raised in 
detail by Bayly et al. 2011; see also Benton 2002 and Harris 2010). Olivier de 
Sardan (2009, p. 12), in a study of local governance in West Africa, addresses 
the history of clientelism in West Africa and the resultant ‘venality of jus-
tice’ in a chief’s judicial/administrative role. Harris (2010, p. 169) finds in his 
comparative study of the Dutch and British East India Companies’ impact 
on ROL that the pervasiveness of contingent factors is so strong that ‘it is 
wise to recognize that conditions are different and that preferences in trade-
offs are different in different localities, and accordingly there should be plu-
rality in policy recommendations’.
Rather than legacies, Lachmann (2002, pp. 174–5) highlights unexpected 
impacts from large-scale historical change in early-modern England. As the 
ecclesiastical establishment in the seventeenth century was weakened by 
the monarch in a political process of rewriting the elite balance of power, 
so the authority of clerical courts was undermined. The gentry were for 
the first time able to turn to common law courts to claim enclosure over 
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manorial land, regarding which clerical courts had previously supported 
peasant claims.
Cornwall and Coelho (2007) and Roque and Shankland (2007) see simi-
lar mutations on a smaller scale and over a much shorter period of time 
as part of specific development projects. In Luanda, Associations of Water 
Committees (ACAs) were formed as representative associations to participate 
in the management of water standposts, which entailed organizing water 
distribution, collecting payment for water from residents, keeping the area 
clean, and carrying out maintenance of the standpost. ACAs decided to fed-
erate to increase their negotiating power with the provincial water company. 
This required them to delocalize—to become independent from their mem-
bership base, breaking the chain of accountability initially established to 
support their representative function and placing in question the legitimacy 
of their supervisory function. The scope for this mutation derived from the 
wider lack of clarity on organizational models and political/institutional 
rules of the game around water in Angola.
Conclusions
There remains a sizeable and enduring gap between the near-universal con-
sensus regarding the general importance of ROL and its conspicuously thin 
record of actual policy accomplishment. Explaining the persistence of this 
gap, and devising effective strategies for narrowing it, must of necessity begin 
with revisiting core theoretical assumptions and the operational frame-
works to which they give rise, even as such frameworks need to be informed 
by—and remain in active dialogue with—more detailed, context-specific 
evidence on whether and how prevailing justice systems ‘work’ from the 
perspective of actual and potential users of these systems, especially the 
poor. This requires a highly critical interrogation of knowledge and method 
from the perspective of societal contingency and a concomitant adjustment 
of the sorts of claims that can and cannot be supported, particularly with 
respect to the teleological (Tamanaha 2011). Having followed here the politi-
cal turn in analyses of ROL, we have had to reach across several disciplines 
and country cases to establish an adequate account of the dynamic relation-
ship between ROL and the political settlement in theory and practice, one 
which displays the importance of both outcomes and participation in—or 
mobilization through—legal process.
Beyond the familiar (and somewhat self-serving) academic conclusion 
that ‘more research’ is needed, we argue that ‘justice’ and ‘the rule of law’ are 
both ‘essentially contested concepts’ whose primary work is done through 
the productive debates to which they give rise in a given political space; 
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which is to say, ‘more research’ as conventionally understood will only yield 
marginal improvements in conceptual clarity and add only incrementally 
to our cumulative knowledge—the political salience, legitimacy, and action-
ability of such concepts must be negotiated anew in each setting, between 
different epistemic groups (professions) and across divides of gender, ideol-
ogy, and class. Such negotiation and deliberation is inherently a contested, 
dynamic process, likely to yield an idiosyncratic outcome that is a unique 
hybrid of local and external inputs mediated through political spaces of var-
ying capability, legitimacy and robustness.
Even on the basis of this preliminary assay, however, some clear implica-
tions emerge for policy and practice. First, scholars and practitioners alike 
need to invest in richer data-gathering exercises, in empirical tasks that 
de-homogenize people based on conceptual as well as material differences; 
this will entail taking history, sociology, and anthropology (especially of 
justice actors) seriously. Second, we need to invest more substantial (and sub-
stantive) resource in the monitoring and real-time evaluation of ROL inter-
ventions; there needs to be constant reassessment, clear articulation of goals, 
with space for practical innovation, combined with modesty about time-
lines, trajectories, and a realistic appreciation of the value of pragmatism. 
Third, greater effort needs to be extended to invigorating communication 
programmes or programmes supporting construction of spaces for public 
engagement and discursive participation. This means not just indicating 
goals or imparting knowledge, but allowing groups (especially women, the 
poor, and marginalized groups) to participate, contest meaning, understand 
benefits, and form coalitions; it means recognizing that ROL reform is inher-
ently a site of contestation, for which enhancing access to it is not just a 
matter of the removal of factors that stop an individual from bringing a case 
(e.g. geography, cost), but removal of obstructions to effective and sustained 
participation (communication, education, awareness). As a result, it requires 
development practitioners and agencies to develop a highly reflexive sensi-
bility—and allied set of epistemological and methodological tools—on the 
ways in which they construct the spaces for and themselves participate in 
these contests.
Part IV




The Gendered Politics of Securing  
Inclusive Development
Sohela Nazneen and Simeen Mahmud
Introduction: Why Gender Matters in Securing  
Inclusive Development
Gender is at the core of securing inclusive development. Women’s right to 
equality with men is accepted and promoted by many states and develop-
ment agencies in development planning and policies. Yet enabling women’s 
representation, participation, and voice in politics and policy processes and 
achieving gender equitable outcomes for women has proven difficult (Goetz 
and Nyamu-Musembi 2008; Mukhopadhyay and Singh 2007; UN/UNRISD 
2005). This chapter explores the gendered politics of securing inclusive 
development through a synthesized review of available evidence1 on the 
gendered nature of politics2 and how this promotes or constrains women’s 
participation and inclusion in decision-making and affects policy outcomes 
in selected case-study countries. By exploring the gendered nature of poli-
tics using feminist political analysis, we examine the different elements of 
political settlement3 through a gender lens and draw conclusions on how 
a gender perspective deepens our understanding of political settlements. 
This is challenging since political settlement frameworks are gender blind 
1 We review different bodies of literature, such as feminist analysis of representative democ-
racy, feminist analysis of the state, women in politics literature, gender and development litera-
ture, literature on women’s/feminist movement’s engagement with state/ international actors, 
feminist organizational analysis, etc.
2 Largely refers to formal politics; we also investigate women’s movement and collective actions.
3 Political settlements refer to a balance of power between contending social groups and 
classes upon which the state is based (Di John and Putzel 2009); and it includes intra elite bar-
gaining, contention between elite and non-elite groups, inter-group contentions (gender, caste, 
race, religious, ethnic, and so on).
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and feminist scholars so far, have not developed a gendered analysis of this 
approach.
Understanding how women’s ‘political effectiveness’4 ensures gender- 
inclusive development requires a deeper analysis of: a) what enhances wom-
en’s individual/collective political agency; and b) the influence of structural 
factors that enhance/constrain women’s agency, such as the nature of the 
state, political competition, relationship between women’s movements and 
civil society. We argue that the following influences women’s inclusion in 
politics and promotion of gender-equitable policies:5 a) the divergent inter-
ests and incentives political and state actors have in promoting/obstructing 
women’s participation and the gender equity agenda in politics and policy 
processes; b) the local, national, and international contexts that create oppor-
tunity structures for promotion of gender equity by these actors (including 
women policymakers and women’s groups); c) how these actors negotiate 
gender equity concerns; d) the competing discourses on gender equity that 
creates opportunities for, or limit promotion of, gender equity in different 
forums. An analysis of the gendered nature of politics in different contexts 
unpacks: a) how states and elites in different political contexts perceive 
women as a development/political constituency, interpret women’s needs 
and gender equity concerns, and how their interpretations influence pol-
icy outcomes; b) how the above interpretations are challenged and at times 
expanded by the women (and their allies) in formal politics and through 
movements and organized activism for securing inclusive outcomes.
This chapter has five sections. For contextualizing the discussion in this 
chapter, we provide a brief discussion on limitations of gender-mainstreaming 
processes and of gender-biased assumptions on representation that exist in lib-
eral political theory. We present country case-study selection matrix and the 
analytical framework in the third section. The fourth section is on the gendered 
politics of securing inclusive development. In the final section we draw con-
clusions on how gender analysis of political settlements can expand political 
settlement frameworks and the current feminist analysis of women in politics.
Context: Limitations of Gender Mainstreaming  
and Gender Bias in Liberal Political Theory
The Politics of the Discourse around Gender and Development Policy
The gender and development arena has always been politically contentious 
because it confronts the basis of social organization in any society, that of 
4 See second section, this chapter.
5 Gender equity takes into account that men and women have different needs, interests, and 
preferences and may require difference in treatments for equal outcomes.
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the relationship between women and men. It has evolved through a difficult 
relationship between the international development agencies and feminist 
scholars and activists. The story of this evolution is well documented but 
worth reviewing for the general development establishment.
Although under certain political contexts women’s inclusion in political 
institutions came about from their active participation in fairly large num-
bers in anti-colonial, anti-authoritarian, and anti-apartheid struggles, their 
‘political entitlements’ (Agarwal 2011) led to mixed outcomes with respect 
to women’s inclusion into policy processes. In India (1930s) this entitlement 
was confined to reserved membership in the local government and party 
membership; in Chile (1990s), despite the establishment of an effective 
national gender machinery, SERNAM, it failed to enable women’s greater 
inclusion into public policy spaces; in South Africa (1990s) women who 
entered policy spaces included gender equity concerns in the policy agenda 
but there were huge accountability failures in implementation.
Within the development community, women first emerged as a distinct 
constituency in the 1970s. Boserup’s (1970) path-breaking book Women’s 
Role in Economic Development demonstrated how conventional development 
activities had bypassed women and the ‘fruits of development were not 
trickling down to women’. Boserup’s critique and the subsequent efforts of 
early women in development (WID) advocates exposed the hitherto unac-
knowledged but powerful assumption of development planners and policy-
makers about women’s family responsibilities and tasks and the subsequent 
promotion of their domestic roles in development policy. This was instru-
mental in shifting the earlier view of women as dependents on men and 
passive recipients of welfare6 to the view of women as economic producers 
who contribute to household and country economies.
Within official development agencies, however, the new focus on 
women soon became linked with poverty reduction and basic needs in 
which women were cast as ‘managers of low income households and pro-
viders of family basic needs’ (Kabeer 1994, p. 7). This approach failed to 
define women’s problems in terms of unequal access to resources. In the 
late 1970s, some feminists distanced themselves from this approach, and 
problematized social and gender relations in developing countries and 
questioned the positivist models of development interventions: education 
and training, employment, agricultural technological change, and so on 
(Jackson and Pearson 1998, p. 3). They rejected the portrayal of women as 
a separate but homogenous category in development literature and empha-
sized that relations between men and women are social and therefore not 
6 Development resources are directed to market-oriented economic growth and the residual 
is welfare assistance for the dependent and vulnerable groups (Kabeer 1994, p. 6).
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immutable. In any historical situation, the form taken by gender relations 
is specific to that context and needs to be constructed inductively (Jackson 
and Pearson 1998).
During the 1980s the efficiency argument of WID policy was reinforced 
by emphasizing women as economic agents in their own rights and that 
women’s exclusion would have an adverse impact on development. But 
such recognition coincided with the shift in the approach of the interna-
tional financial institutions (IFI) (World Bank, IMF) to development itself, 
in which the role of the government as a development agency was required 
to be curtailed to meet the objectives of fiscal austerity, and reduce balance 
of payments deficits and domestic government deficits. The many activi-
ties previously carried out by governments (transport, communications, ter-
tiary health care, higher education) were to be privatized and social services 
(most closely connected to reproductive activities) would be reorganized 
and not-for-profit non-governmental organizations (NGO) would take on 
many of those functions.
The dominant development models also assumed that improvement 
in human well-being including women’s well-being would not be possi-
ble without economic growth; in fact economic growth was seen as syn-
onymous with development. Kabeer (1994) and others diagnosed this as 
confusing means and ends but with a political agenda that postponed redis-
tributive measures and policies to redress inequality, with serious implica-
tions for gender equality. At the same time the tendency to frame gender 
equity concerns at national levels on instrumental arguments (in terms of 
social and economic gains for development) ran the risk of overlooking con-
cerns with gender justice and women’s citizenship entitlements. Feminists 
pointed out the hidden ‘gender trap’ (Kabeer 1994, p. 26) within the market 
solution: increased monetary costs of welfare services and of health and edu-
cation services, increased reliance on women’s unpaid care work, women’s 
entrance into informal unprotected low-paid casual labour to supplement 
dwindling household incomes (Goetz 1995; Molyneux and Razavi 2005).
On the other hand, this new scenario opened up space for women’s organi-
zations and particularly the creation of women’s NGOs, which were believed 
to be more responsive to the needs of people at the grassroots level (Jackson 
and Pearson 1998). Around this time Third World feminists raised concerns 
that economic growth-oriented development overlooked the needs and aspi-
rations of poor women. Southern feminists also countered the WID assump-
tion that it was the prejudice of planners that was primarily responsible for 
women’s marginalization from the development process, and critiqued the 
absence of a deeper examination of structural factors that caused women’s 
subordination in the development process (Razavi 1997). They claimed that 
the clearest lens for understanding the problems of development processes 
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was the lived experience of poor Third World women in their struggles for 
basic survival, arguing that alternative development strategies were needed 
and that women should be targeted as beneficiaries of these new organi-
zations in order to gain access to international development funding (Sen 
and Grown 1988). They also criticized the official language of gender main-
streaming that was adopted by the Beijing Platform For Action, first because 
of its preoccupation with procedures rather than outcomes, and second 
because despite its roots in social feminism, gender had become a techno-
cratic term failing to address issues of power relations. More significantly, 
the lack of accountability of international development agencies (UN bodies 
included) to the Southern women in whose interests they claim to be acting 
is not commonly seen as part of the gendered politics of development (see 
Baden and Goetz 1998, p. 24).
By 2000 there was growing realization about the fragility of an interna-
tional order based on unregulated financial flows. There was a ‘new moment’ 
(Molyneux 2002, cited in Molyneux and Razavi 2005) in the development 
policy agenda of the IFIs: a greater willingness to focus on social policy and 
poverty reduction, good governance through democracy, participation, and 
decentralization, but maintaining the core elements of trade and financial 
liberalization and tight monetary/fiscal policies (Molyneux and Razavi 2005). 
The trade-off between growth and equity was less clear-cut, but did not dis-
appear, highlighting the need for greater attention to structures of global 
and local power and the evolution of gender injustices. The feminist critique 
that poverty analyses of policy are not necessarily adequate for addressing 
gender issues since women’s subordination is not caused by poverty (Kabeer 
1994; Jackson 1999), was validated by assessments of the poverty reduction 
strategy (PRS) process since the late 1990s. Women’s groups and rights activ-
ists were energetic on gaining recognition for the need to bring gender per-
spectives in forums discussing macro-economic policies and forging political 
alliances with governments, NGOs, and social movements (Molyneux and 
Razavi 2005).
Clearly, feminist critiques and activists have been in the forefront of the 
discourse on gender and development, and the selective uptake of gender 
concerns by the IFIs present useful insights into the politics of this dis-
cursive context. One such group were women active within international 
financial and development bureaucracies (like the World Bank, ILO, UNDP) 
in getting women’s interests and gender equality included into the devel-
opment agendas of these agencies. Just as gender and development policy 
discourse has evolved over time, feminist advocates have used diverse strate-
gies to mobilize and influence development agendas within their respective 
organizations. Razavi (1997) concludes that even in the face of persistent 
criticism from feminist scholars, the basic strategy of these transnational 
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actors was to ‘make a range of instrumental arguments that link gender 
equality to more “legitimate” policy concerns, market efficiency, growth and 
human resource development’ to convince hardened bureaucrats (Razavi 
1997, p. 1111). These efforts culminated in a range of high visibility policy 
documents of the World Bank and UN bodies where gender mainstreaming 
was projected as a dominant theme in development policy.7 Later, with the 
advent of the anti-poverty approach feminist policy advocates took advan-
tage of the paradigm shift and resorted to puting emphasis on poor women, 
and poor men, to present the gender equality agenda as less threatening to 
male bureaucrats and programme implementers. In the wake of structural 
adjustment another genre of feminist advocates engaged with mainstream 
economists in the development establishment using neoclassical efficiency 
argument: gender was introduced sometimes as a means for understanding 
the complexities of the adjustment process (i.e. intra-household allocations 
and inequalities and bargaining), and sometimes politically to demonstrate 
how gender biases and rigidities can frustrate adjustment policies (Razavi 
1997, p. 1115). These accounts highlight the institutional constraints within 
which feminist advocates operate. They also point to the significance of 
those working outside the institutional contexts, namely citizen groups, 
feminist scholars, NGOs, who can take advantage of strategic entry points 
and more transformative discourse to influence the policy agenda.
Bringing ‘Gender’ Back into Development Policy
The 1995 UN Conference on Women in Beijing was seen as a landmark in set-
ting a global policy framework to advance gender equality, but post-Beijing 
achievements in gender equality were ‘more ambivalent and the causal influ-
ences more diverse and less unidirectional’ (Molyneux and Razavi 2005, 
p. iv). Dominant development paradigms continued to equate development 
with economic growth and to assume that reductions in gender inequal-
ity in well-being have a linear relationship with development.8 While some 
stark gender inequalities were reduced over time, others remain resistant to 
change or have even taken new forms. There is also considerable variation 
amongst countries with respect to reduction in gender inequality and no 
clear relationship is evident with the pace and level of human development. 
Structural adjustment of the 1980s and 1990s, left gender-specific impacts 
and put the burden of economic reforms relatively more upon women in the 
7 For example, World Bank (1995b) ‘Towards Gender Equality: The Role of Public Policy’; the 
UNDP Human Development Report (1995).
8 The World Bank claimed that countries with higher GDP had greater gender equality, 
implying that promotion of economic growth through liberalization was an important tool for 
closing gender gaps in well-being (World Bank 2001a).
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poorest households. In fact, three decades of development policy focused on 
economic growth and gender mainstreaming has not delivered secure live-
lihoods and an ‘enabling economic environment’, which were considered 
preconditions for attaining gender equality and women’s rights.
While the term ‘gender’ has permeated through to national govern-
ments and policymaking institutions, southern feminists at Beijing asserted 
that the focus on gender rather than women had become counterproduc-
tive as it shifted discussion from ‘a focus on women, to women and men, 
and finally back to men’9 (Baden and Goetz 1998, p. 21). By 2000 there 
was a ‘wave of reassessment of gender mainstreaming which demonstrated 
that the mere narrowing of gender gaps and equality in numbers were not 
enough to remove inequality in access to economic and political resources 
nor dismantle gender asymmetries’. Gender mainstreaming as the primary 
strategy for pursuing gender equity in and through development lost cred-
ibility since concerns with ‘gender equality’ were not enough to ‘redress’ on-
going gender injustices (Mukhopadhyay and Singh 2007). Gender analysis 
was reduced to technocratic discourse and gender mainstreaming via WID 
units had become a technical project, difficult to fit with the political pro-
ject of challenging inequality and promoting women’s rights (Baden and 
Goetz 1998; Mukhopadhyay and Singh 2007). Feminist phrases and con-
cepts for understanding women’s position in the development process were 
co-opted by international development agencies and national governments 
and became filled with new meanings to suit institutional needs. Within 
international and national institutions gender-mainstreaming practice faced 
continued bureaucratic resistance. A review10 of gender-mainstreaming pol-
icy implemented by the World Bank, UNDP, and the ILO found inadequate 
budgeting for the gender component of projects, insufficient development 
of analytical skills, and a general lack of political commitment, both within 
the organization, and at country level (Charlesworth 2005, p. 11). Clearly, as 
Staudt pointed out, there was need ‘to know more about men who dominate 
decision-making in the bureaucracy and how they vary in diverse institu-
tional settings’ (Staudt 1997, p. 4).
On the positive side, however, the fact that social policy, good governance, 
participation, and decentralization are now high on the development policy 
agenda provides a critical moment to bring gender back into the discourse 
and practice in transformative ways. This moment has opened up the possi-
bility of bringing to the foreground gender justice, rights, and citizenship in 
the process of development; created entry points for action to address gender 
injustices. It may also lead to the creation of new spaces for participation 
9 Nighat Khan, Director, Applied Socio Economic Research, Pakistan.
10 See Razavi and Miller (1995).
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by poor people and by women to claim rights, and to raise voices against 
gender specific capacity and accountability failures on the part of the state 
and private sector. But the risk remains that claims of ‘participation’ and 
‘empowerment’ are driven by gendered interests leaving the least powerful 
without voice or choice, and of poor accountability to women’s groups and 
constituencies (Cornwall et al. 2005).
Gender Bias in Liberal Political Theory on Participation  
and Representation
Feminist literature extensively discusses how women have been excluded 
from formal politics and decision-making processes in liberal theory, based 
on assumptions that women lack the rationality required for democratic 
deliberation (Pateman 1988; Okin 1979). Consequently, women’s exclusion 
had been linked to an absence of public deliberation on and from politi-
cal agendas issues such as, child welfare, reproductive health, and domes-
tic violence, and so on. Analysis of women’s exclusion in liberal theory 
led to an intuitive conclusion that the inclusion of women in electoral or 
decision-making bodies would make a significant difference in drawing 
attention to these neglected issues (Dovi 2006). Increased women’s presence 
in public office was identified as a major pathway for promotion of gen-
der equity concerns in policymaking. This led to the emphasis on gender 
quotas, the creation of national gender machineries in gender and devel-
opment discourse (Tadros 2011). However, this linear connection made in 
development discourse between women’s access (consultation in various 
citizen’s/ policy forums and spaces) and presence (representation) in elec-
toral/ decision-making bodies leading to influence has been critiqued by 
many feminists (see Goetz and Nyamu-Musembi 2008 for details). While 
women’s representation and participation in political parties and policy 
places are necessary conditions for gender equitable outcomes, they alone 
are not sufficient.
Analytical Framework and Case-study Selection Method
Analytical Framework
The concept of women’s ‘political effectiveness’—access, presence, and influ-
ence (Goetz and Hassim 2003)—is useful for exploring whether women’s 
inclusion in politics and policy spaces leads to gender equitable policy out-
comes. For analysing women’s access (ability to enter), presence (visibility 
and quality of participation), and influence (ability to present one’s case 
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and influence outcomes) in politics, we use the framework developed by 
Goetz and Hassim (2003). This framework allows us to explore these three 
aspects of ‘political effectiveness’ in three different spheres: the civil society 
arena, the formal political arena, and the state. It allows us to focus on wom-
en’s political agency and also the nature of the mechanisms and processes 
through which women participate and represent.
We use this framework as a common analytical lens for examining 
selected country cases. The framework provides the same sets of indicators 
for examining political effectiveness in each of these spheres. Women’s 
movements’ political effectiveness in civil society is examined using spe-
cific indicators, such as, the depth of the movement, style of leadership, 
size and resources. Women’s access, present, and influence in formal politi-
cal systems is analysed using indicators such as the nature of the electoral 
system, party types, reservations for women, nature of political competi-
tion. Indicators such as the number of different forums that have quotas 
for women; nature of national women’s machineries, and the constitutional 
framework are used for analysing women’s relations to the state. A focus on 
these three institutional spheres unpacks women’s participation as actors 
and inclusion in institutional spaces. This also helps to develop a general 
picture of the gendered nature of political settlement in a country by iden-
tifying which actors and institutional spaces are open to the promotion of a 
gender equity agenda.
The main constraint of using this framework is that how informal/clientelist 
power relations influence women’s inclusion and participation or traditional 
elites influence the way state and political parties promote gender equity or 
not, and bottom-up mobilization by women and other groups for challeng-
ing existing settlements around gender equity, are not made explicit within 
this framework. The role played by gender ideologies and ideas in shaping 
actor’s perceptions (other than party ideology) is also not explicit. We extend 
this framework and include women’s participation and inclusion in citizen’s 
forums, role of women in bottom-up mobilizations and policy spaces, and 
the role played by gender ideologies in shaping actor’s perceptions.
Ten case-study countries are picked from South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, 
and Latin America (see Table 8.1). Our analysis largely focuses on the first 
Table 8.1. Case-study selection matrix
Geographical regions
Political context South Asia sub-Saharan Africa Other regions
Post conflict/revolution Nepal Rwanda Egypt
Stable Bangladesh, India Uganda, South Africa Brazil, Chile, Mexico
Source: Authors.
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two regions and we use the Latin American countries to highlight the points 
we make about the gendered politics of securing inclusive development.
Exploring the Gendered Politics of Securing Inclusive 
Development
This section explores women’s representations and participation in political 
processes, institutions, and policy spaces. This responds to the Goetz and 
Hassim framework and tries to identify first, the overall levels of access, pres-
ence, and influence that women have in civil society, in the formal political 
arena and the state, and then the underlying reasons for this.
Gendered Politics: Women’s Participation and Representation  
in Political Institutions and Processes
Women’s participation and representation in politics are formally endorsed 
by the selected countries. Many of these countries have taken various meas-
ures to ensure women’s access to the formal political arena. Compared to 
Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia performs badly as a region 
when it comes to women’s representation in national parliament,11 local 
government, executive positions,12 and the state administration (UNIFEM 
2008).
The increase in women’s presence in national legislature and local gov-
ernment in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia is a result of 
the following: various affirmative action measures such as quotas and party 
lists, that make women’s inclusion mandatory; support for women’s repre-
sentation among senior party leadership; strong women’s wing and inter-
nal party advocates to lobby for women’s political representation; and party 
ideology promoting gender equity. An increase in women’s representation 
in elected bodies does not automatically enable women representatives to 
be politically effective. The support for and various other measures taken 
to increase women’s presence in these elected bodies are largely a result of 
negotiations between different social and political actors. What influences 
the action taken by these actors are: the actual and perceived interests these 
11 The average value in Latin America is 18% and sub-Saharan Africa is 16% and the highest 
for both is 40% in some countries; in South Asia the average value is 15% and the highest is 34% 
in some countries (UNIFEM 2008).
12 The average value of women in ministerial position in sub-Saharan Africa is 19% and the 
highest value is 45%; the average value of women in ministerial positions in South Asia is 18% 
and the highest value is 20%, the average value for Latin America is 23% and the highest value 
is 50% (UNIFEM 2008).
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actors have in promoting women’s representation; the context within which 
opportunities for promoting women’s representation arises; the strength of 
these actors to negotiate and influence other actors; and the gender dis-
courses that influence actions of these actors.
What Explains an Increase in Women’s Inclusion  
and Presence in Politics?
Various structural factors influence whether a critical mass of women repre-
sentatives will be present in elected bodies and political parties. The type of 
electoral system influences the willingness of the political parties to nomi-
nate female candidates for elections and the probabilities that women can-
didates may win elections. First-past-the-post systems and single member 
constituencies that we see in India, Nepal, and Bangladesh create difficulties 
for women to be nominated for general seats since most political parties fear 
that they may lose these seats (Tamang 2004; Rai 1997; Chowdhury 1994). 
This unwillingness of political parties results from women’s lack of political 
experience, and the male party members’ reluctance to lose their constituen-
cies to women members. Research shows that proportional representation 
and party lists13 lead to a larger number of women being elected as demon-
strated in the cases of Nepal, Peru, Argentina, Costa Rica, Bolivia, and South 
Africa (Araujo 2010; UNIFEM 2008).
In contexts where the parties may be unwilling to nominate women, 
affirmative actions such as quotas, party lists for women, placement man-
dates, and legal sanctions for not implementing these actions ensure that 
a critical mass of women is elected to the parliament and local government 
bodies. All our case-study countries implemented quotas and these meas-
ures have increased the visibility of women representatives in elected bodies. 
The abolishment of gender quotas in the elections held after the revolution 
reduced the number of women in parliament in Egypt. In Nepal, Rwanda, 
Peru, Argentina, Costa Rica, Bolivia, and Paraguay legal sanctions for not 
implementing women’s quotas in party lists and the pressure on political 
parties to implement these led to a large number of women being nominated 
by political parties. These measures also signalled the commitment of the 
state towards ensuring women’s representation (Araujo 2010; UNIFEM 2008). 
Absence of legal sanctions on parties for not fielding women candidates and 
lack of effective support for women candidates may translate into female 
13 In the proportional representation system several candidates are elected in a district. 
Voters choose between parties rather than individuals in most cases and political parties receive 
a share of the seats based on the overall share of the vote. Most systems have closed lists where 
the party determines the rank of the candidates, in open lists the voters may influence the 
order.
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candidates hitting a ‘ceiling of competition’, that is, an increase in women 
candidates nominated as candidates does not lead to an increase in the num-
bers being elected, as demonstrated in the case of Brazil (Araujo 2010).14
Quotas15 are one of the preferred pathways for ensuring women’s repre-
sentation in formal politics but they have been critiqued by feminist schol-
ars as a ‘quick fix’ for addressing the endocentric nature of politics (Tadros 
2011; Phillips 1991) and by others as ‘undemocratic’ (Goetz and Nyamu 
Musembi 2008). Whether quotas are able to create legitimacy for women’s 
representatives and whether they are able to ‘act for’ (Phillips 1991) women 
is partly influenced by how quotas are introduced and whether a clear gen-
der equity mandate exists for these women to act upon. At times, quotas are 
introduced in ways that expand the number of existing seats and women 
are included as ‘add-ons’ so that women’s seats do not disturb existing 
competition for electoral wards or constituencies (e.g. Uganda’s local gov-
ernment; Bangladesh’s local government and parliament). This in effect 
leads to women representing larger constituencies that are also meant to 
be represented by ‘regular’ ward representatives or MPs, and women are 
often sidelined. In Bangladesh, where women MPs are nominated by the 
parties to represent these add-on seats, women MPs have their legitimacy 
as ‘real’ representatives questioned by the people. This add-on approach 
to gender quotas indicates the following: a) reluctance on the part of the 
political elite to disturb the existing organization of political power; b) an 
opportunity to use the add-on seats as patronage for loyal supporters; c) 
increasing credentials as a gender-sensitive regime through making super-
ficial changes. At times, quotas may reach a plateau, especially if these 
are open party lists on potential candidates instead of actual candidates, 
after increasing the number of women representatives in the initial stages; 
and with numbers stabilizing requires reform (Araujo 2010). In fact, the 
Brazilian experience shows that quota laws need to be drafted carefully. 
There also need to be clear guidelines for implementing these. For exam-
ple, in Mexico, the quota laws do not technically apply in districts where 
candidates are selected through primary election (Htun 2005). A strong 
presence of the women’s movement monitoring compliance with the laws 
and rules of affirmative action and gender quotas ensured implementation 
of the gender quota in Costa Rica (Htun 2005).
A direct link to a constituency can be effective in increasing women’s legit-
imacy and presence as representatives. In Bangladesh, at the lowest tier of 
14 There was an initial increase in the number of women in office after party lists were intro-
duced but it reached a plateau (Araujo 2010).
15 Quotas include: candidate quotas where women are required to be nominated to run for 
office; and reserved seats implies women hold a certain number of seats in the parliament or 
local government. In reserved seats women can be directly elected or nominated by others.
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local government, research shows that after the direct elections were intro-
duced in 1997 in the reserved seats for women, women members’ expecta-
tions and how the general public viewed their role underwent a qualitative 
shift (Nazneen and Tasneem 2010). However, being directly elected by a 
constituency does not automatically lead to women representatives acting 
to promote women’s interests. In Uganda, where women have a significant 
presence in District Assemblies, the fact that they do not have a clear gender 
mandate limits their effectiveness. The youth, army, and all other groups 
that have reserved seats are elected by their national organizations which 
create legitimacy and provide a direct mandate to represent the group’s 
interests. The gender quotas in Uganda were introduced to ensure numeri-
cal representation of women; women representatives running in reserved 
seats have to appeal to a narrow male district elite and professing a commit-
ment to gender equity may not appeal to the electoral college which elects 
them (Goetz and Hassim 2003; Tripp 2003). In South Africa, coming in on 
a strong gender equity mandate created space for women representatives to 
raise issues, although the system of party lists created difficulties when at 
times women had to tow the party line instead of promoting gender equity 
(Tripp 2001; Hassim 2003; Fester 2014).
Aside from these affirmative action measures, other factors also influ-
ence whether women are able to participate in electoral and party politics. 
Political parties’ views on gender equity and women’s participation, recruit-
ing and mentoring strategies, internal democracy and mobility within the 
parties and the strength of the women’s wing, all effect whether party pol-
icy debates are accessible to women’s inputs and participation. The Latin 
American experience reveals that though women are present in large num-
bers among party rank and file there are relatively fewer women in leader-
ship positions within these political parties, which limits their ability to 
negotiate demands in party policy debates in leadership spaces (UNIFEM 
2008; Htun 2005).16 A strong women’s wing, such as the African National 
Congress (ANC) women’s league, played a central role in pushing for quo-
tas on party lists and also on the party’s position on gender equity during 
the transitional period in South Africa. The strong link the ANC women’s 
league had with other parties’ women’s wings and the women’s organizations 
allowed them to create pressure within the ANC and parliament to promote 
gender equity issues (Kemp et al. 1995; Fester 2014). If gender equity is for-
mally endorsed by the senior party leadership and the party ideology, as in 
the case of the ANC in South Africa, then pushing for women’s representation 
16 A 2008 study reveals that there is systematic discrepancy between member numbers and 
leadership positions in Latin America. For example, Mexico has an average of 50% women in 
both major parties but they hold only 30% of the executive posts (UNIFEM 2008).
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in formal politics and the promotion of gender equity policies become rel-
atively easier. In Rwanda, endorsement by Kagame and the ruling party 
has somewhat eased the promotion of women’s representation and gender 
equity policies (Burnet 2008).
Whether formal endorsement of gender equity by a party’s senior lead-
ership translates into increasing women’s influence as a group depends 
on the level of institutionalization and the level of command and control 
(centralized or localized) of the party. If the party organization has an 
‘informal-centralized’ model then promotion of gender equity interests 
(including women’s representation) will largely rely on patronage systems 
and dominant individual leaders than on transparent rules-based sys-
tems (Goetz and Hassim 2003; Tripp 2003). All our case-study countries 
in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa have political parties that fit this 
model. These types of parties can promote women’s interests quickly and 
allow for the inclusion of a large number of women in politics, since the 
centralized party leadership is able to overcome resistance from a con-
servative opposition. The influence of women representatives in these par-
ties will depend on their relationship with the top leadership and their 
patronage. Both Rwanda’s Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and Uganda’s 
National Resistance Movement (NRM) had leaderships who were willing 
to promote women’s representation and gender equitable policies, which 
led to measures being taken to increase women’s representation at vari-
ous levels and various policy measures for promoting gender equity. In 
Uganda, NRM leadership was interested in women’s representation mainly 
for the following reasons: a) establishing a vote bank through the crea-
tion of a new constituency; and b) appearing to address a ‘progressive’ 
agenda that enhanced NRM’s legitimacy (Goetz 2003a; Tripp 2003). The 
disadvantage of an informal-centralized model is that once patronage is 
withdrawn, women’s influence inside the party and in policymaking can 
erode quickly, as can be seen in the Ugandan case in the last decade (Tripp 
2003; Goetz 2003b).
Besides party type, the nature and culture of political competition influ-
ence women’s participation in politics. Campaign financing systems and the 
levels of violence and intimidation in political campaigns influence women’s 
participation in politics (Tripp 2003). Women have a weaker resource base. 
In Brazil, where funds are collected by the parties and distributed accord-
ing to priorities, women face significant difficulties (Araujo 2010). Where 
substantial finances are required to run for office and campaign-financing is 
inadequately monitored by the state, women tend to lose out. Rising levels of 
violence and criminal elements in campaigns, as in the case of Bangladesh, 
masculinize political spaces which exclude women. The culture of aggres-
sive political debates in parliaments and in local government bodies (and 
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other political spaces) may also reduce the political effectiveness of women 
who are newcomers in politics, particularly those who are the first genera-
tion to come in through quotas. The lack of knowledge on government or 
parliamentary procedures and expertise on technical matters also contrib-
ute to women’s silence. Research on South African local women councillors 
and MPs, and on Bangladeshi women MPs show otherwise active and vocal 
women being rendered silent in formal meetings (Fester 2014; Mbatha 2003; 
Chowdhury 1994).
What Explains Women Representatives’ Influence in Promoting 
Gender Equity?
Undoubtedly, quotas, party lists, and other forms of affirmative action have 
increased women’s descriptive representation. This form of representation 
has value since it changes social perceptions about women being in politi-
cal spaces and creates possibilities for the articulation of women’s needs and 
gender equity concerns (Mansbridge 1999). Beaman et al.’s (2008) study on 
panchayats in India reveals that as they are exposed to female leadership, 
men’s prejudice against women’s performance reduces overtime, though 
their preference for male representatives may not change. But does inclusion 
in politics lead to political influence?
The empirical evidence on whether descriptive representation leads to 
substantial representation remains inconclusive (Childs and Krook 2009).17 
Many studies show that the presence of women can lead to changes in leg-
islation and policies, while there are others that show little or no differ-
ence between styles and behaviours of male and female leaders. It is argued 
that if a critical mass of women were present in politics and policy spaces, 
they would have a significant impact. Studies show that a critical mass18 of 
women in local-level forest management committees (Agarwal 2011) or in 
parliament, such as in the Nordic countries, have led to women being able to 
influence positive programme and policy outcomes (UNIFEM 2008). Studies 
conducted in the Western democracies reveal that the presence of a critical 
mass of women allows them to raise matters of concern, especially issues 
such as reproductive health, violence against women, policing, and labour 
rights (see Cueva 2004; Weldon 2002). Both Weldon’s (2002) and Htun and 
Weldon’s (2010) research on parliaments using large data sets indicate that 
a critical mass of women in parliament is more effective when there are 
strong links with women’s movements and where an effective national gen-
der machinery exists. The findings of these two studies indicate that there 
17 See Childs and Krook (2009) for a detailed discussion on critical mass theory and how this 
issue has been researched.
18 The popular notion is that one third of the representatives are women.
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is a need to move beyond critical mass theory and focus on how the sub-
stantive representation of women occurs instead of just focusing on when 
women act for women.
The critical mass theory assumes that there is a linear relationship 
between numbers and outcomes and a (yet unknown) tipping point at 
which there is substantive representation (Childs and Krook 2009). This 
linear assumption does not always hold. How women (or male) represent-
atives may choose to act depends on: a) contexts and opportunities for 
raising women’s needs and gender equity concerns; b) the identity and 
interests of the individual representatives; c) how representatives and oth-
ers perceive ‘women’s issues’; and d) the gendered nature of the policy-
making processes. John’s (2007) study on women representatives in urban 
municipalities in India indicates that the presence of a critical mass of 
women may not automatically lead to the promotion of gender equity con-
cerns. The female councillors in these reserved seats acted as individu-
als who were linked to their parties and did not want to be identified as 
representatives of women’s interests or gender equity which put them at a 
disadvantage. They only made exceptions during times of crisis. For exam-
ple, women councillors in Bangalore were active when it came to women’s 
welfare issues, such as widows’ pensions.
In fact, feminist scholars point out that affirmative action measures do 
not automatically reproduce substantial representation (Phillips 1991; Htun 
2004), as the impact of women’s inclusion is mediated by different fac-
tors. Women ushered in through the gender quota by different affirmative 
action measures may not necessarily focus on negotiating gender equita-
ble programme and policy outcomes for women, or have policy leverage. 
Feminist scholars also argue the underlying principle of quotas is essentialist 
as it homogenizes women assuming that all women have the same values 
and that men are unable to represent gender equity concerns (Goetz and 
Nyamu-Musembi 2008).
Some studies conducted in India show that quotas work well for social 
groups that are geographically concentrated with clear group interests, 
particularly for groups based on caste rather than gender (Htun 2004). As 
gender interests are shaped by multiple factors and women in an electoral 
constituency have diverse interests as a social group, representation of these 
through gender quotas taking ‘women as an independent category’ is diffi-
cult (Menon 2000). Research also shows that quotas in many contexts, such 
as in Rwanda, Uganda, Bangladesh, and Egypt (before the revolution) have 
largely benefited educated and politically elite women in accessing politi-
cal office. However, their social legitimacy to represent gender equity con-
cerns or their understanding of women’s group interests may be constrained 
(Tadros 2010; Burnet 2008; Tamale 1999; Chowdhury 1994).
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Though the connection between women’s presence in politics and the 
inclusion of issues in public debate that are perceived as ‘women’s issues’ is 
inconclusive; women representatives do tend to express more concern over 
domestic violence, reproductive health, and women’s welfare compared to 
men (Tripp 2003; Goetz and Nyamu-Musembi 2008). Rai’s (1997) study 
on women parliamentarians in India shows that although women’s issues 
were not high-priority issues for women MPs, most felt the compulsion to 
take up matters of women’s welfare and violence against women, and these 
issues tended to unite women MPs across party lines. In all of the case-
study countries during the transitional period, women representatives have 
focused their energies on reforming or introducing new laws on domes-
tic violence, reproductive health, and property rights. In Uganda, Rwanda, 
and South Africa women representatives were part of constitutional com-
missions and were able to include gender equality clauses in the constitu-
tion despite opposition by traditional elites (Goetz and Hassim 2003; Tripp 
2003; Burnet 2008).
Women parliamentarians in Rwanda, Uganda, South Africa, and Brazil 
have also created cross-party caucuses on gender equality, and in South 
Africa they have created a standing committee in the parliament on women’s 
rights. These caucuses have had mixed success in promoting gender equality 
in parliamentary debates. The Rwandan women’s caucus was instrumental 
in drafting and lobbying for the Inheritance Act in 1999, which allowed 
women to register property and open bank accounts under their own name 
for the first time (Burnet 2008). In Uganda, the women’s caucus was able to 
use the principle of non-discrimination to push through affirmative action 
for women’s representation. However, they were not effective in promoting 
the co-ownership clause in the Land Act 1998 as they could not create a 
common platform as the NRM party leadership was not in agreement with 
this demand (Goetz 2003a; Tripp 2003). In South Africa, the ANC women’s 
caucus created effective links with the male parliamentarians and lobbied 
for change in the Constitution and other gender equitable policies (Kemp et 
al. 1995; Hassim 2003). The women’s caucus in the Brazilian Congress, along 
with feminist lobbying groups, have managed to secure the approval of laws 
against domestic violence and sexual harassment, legislation on women’s 
health and maternity benefits (Sardenberg and Acosta 2014). These findings 
indicate that a closer analysis of the contextual factors within which gen-
der quotas are being introduced is required for understanding the political 
effectiveness of women representatives.
Unsurprisingly, given the entrenched nature of patriarchy combined with 
other class, caste, and racial interests at the local level, women representa-
tives have difficulties in promoting gender equitable programmes and poli-
cies in the case-study countries. Studies on India, Bangladesh, and Uganda 
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show that women representatives face male resistance in accessing develop-
ment budgets, centrally allocated resources, and in chairing important com-
mittees (Hossain and Akhter 2011; Mohanty 2007; Goetz 2003a). Countries 
such as Bangladesh have provisions that stipulate that women should be 
chairs of at least one third of all project development committees and mem-
bers of one third of all project implementation committees and distribute 30 
per cent of the resources allocated by the centre. Though these provisions 
have ensured women’s inclusion into committees, their capacity to represent 
gender equity concerns remains debatable and women members have been 
used by chairs to implement their own projects (Nazneen and Tasneem 2010).
Despite these difficulties faced by women representatives in local govern-
ment, both quantitative and qualitative studies show that women represent-
atives have tried to address complaints filed by women, and the needs of 
women, such as access to water and other common resources and women’s 
employment in government schemes. Comparative research on panchayats 
in West Bengal and Rajasthan provinces in India show that there is a sys-
tematic difference in the complaints and requests filed based on the sex of 
the person filing the complaint. More women than men filed complaints on 
water resource management. The number of drinking water projects were 60 
per cent higher in councils with female heads compared to councils which 
had male sarpanchs. In West Bengal, female-led councils undertook road-
building projects at a higher rate than male-led councils, where jobs were 
likely to go to females. The authors of the study claim that there was no dif-
ference in the type of requests that were made to male- and female-headed 
councils but the difference was in the nature of the response to women’s 
requests (Chattopadhay and Duflo 2004). Admittedly, just because female 
sarpanchs prioritized water or roads does not necessarily imply that these are 
perceived as women’s needs, even if more women have complained about 
these. In fact, Agarwal (2011) points out that many of the female sarpanchs 
perceive these as general issues that are important for both men and women 
in their constituency. Actually, what are considered as women’s needs at 
times may adversely influence what is taken up in the local councils. Female 
representatives may be reluctant to push issues that are perceived as ‘wom-
en’s issues’ or being identified as the women’s representative since this may 
put them at a disadvantage electorally.
There are considerable research gaps in understanding the links between 
women’s inclusion in politics through quotas and other measures and their 
ability to exercise influence and promote gender equity. Systematic and 
comparative research on women representatives is required to explore: what 
type of women enter politics through quotas and other means; what type of 
gender agenda is espoused by them; how do women become critical actors 
promoting gender equity; what strategies do women use to negotiate gender 
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equity interests with their parties and other social actors; when and why do 
other actors facilitate the promotion of gender equity agenda; and so on.
Women’s Representation, Participation, and Influence  
in Bureaucracy and Invited Spaces
The difficulties women representatives face in the formal political sphere 
led women’s movement activists and also the state to focus on ensuring the 
representation of women in other institutional forums. These include vari-
ous government machineries, women’s ministries, gender commissions, and 
so on. We also focus on women’s inclusion and participation in the invited 
spaces (semi-formal) created by the state for engaging citizens at the com-
munity/local levels such as health-watch committees, and policy consulta-
tion processes, such as those for the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS).
National Gender Machineries
All of the case-study countries have created national gender machineries 
for ‘bureaucratized representation’ (Goetz 2003b) to promote gender equity 
in state programmes and policy. In Chile, Servicio Nacional de la Mujer 
(SERNAM), the national women’s machinery, played a key role in advocating 
for legislation against domestic violence, sexual harassment, and gender dis-
crimination, including laws on day care for seasonal workers and maternity 
leave for domestic employees (Waylen 1997). In Rwanda, the Women and 
Gender Ministry played a key role in creating a clear gender focus within 
the bureaucracy and in disseminating women’s demands that emerge 
through the Women’s Councils at the village level and their national secre-
tariat (Burnet 2008). In Uganda, the Women’s Ministry, which had strong 
links with women’s organizations and associations, acted to promote their 
demands (Goetz 2003a).
For Bangladesh, Uganda, Rwanda, and Nepal, the discussion in inter-
national UN women’s conferences on state gender machineries facilitated 
the establishment of national gender machineries. In the sub-Saharan 
context—for example, Rwanda and South Africa—these national gender 
machineries, such as the Gender Equality Commission (South Africa) 
and the Ministry of Women and Gender (Rwanda), were also products 
of negotiations between the women’s movement and the transitional 
government, where the latter wanted to signal its commitment to gender 
equity. In Chile, the democratic transition and women’s participation in 
the democratic movement, and pressure by the women’s movement on 
the state and political parties created space for the creation of SERNAM 
(Frohman and Valdez 1995).
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The effectiveness of ‘bureaucratized representation’ by these gender 
machineries depends on their: expertise, budgets, ability to review policies 
formulated by other departments, ability to co-ordinate different policies on 
gender, and ability to sanction other departments if they fail to promote gen-
der equity in their policies. In Bangladesh, though the Ministry of Women 
and Children’s Affairs (MOWCA) co-ordinates the affairs of other ministries 
using gender focal points, it has limited influence since it cannot sanction 
any government body for not addressing gender equity in their policies or 
programmes (UNIFEM 2008). Resource constraint is a major drawback; in 
South Africa the Gender Equality Commission’s work was stretched in terms 
of time, staff, and money, which created difficulties for fulfilling its mandate 
(Fester 2014). In Chile, SERNAM’s activities have been constrained by lack of 
finance, lack of autonomy, close ties with political parties, and an absence of 
institutional power to influence other ministries. At times SERNAM’s goals 
that threaten gender relations have been overtly opposed by other minis-
tries and government bodies (Waylen 1997).
The political and international contexts may also affect these national 
machineries’ ability to perform. The work of the Commission on the Status 
of Women in India (CSWI) attracted attention during the UN women’s 
decade (1975–85), which led to a concerted effort to study the impact of 
various development measures on poor and rural women in India. CSWI’s 
work also gained importance in the 1970s because the emergency period 
imposed by the Congress Party created a context where work on women’s 
issues was not considered as politically dangerous as other subjects (Kumar 
1995). Many of the national gender machineries had gained momentum 
and support from the state around the time of the Beijing conference 
(UNIFEM 2008), which points to the role played by international dis-
courses for creating space.
Women in Bureaucracy
Bureaucracy is a gendered hierarchy where women occupy the lower ranks; 
and inclusion of women in higher positions creates the possibility for change 
(Randall and Waylen 1998). Uganda and Rwanda have taken affirmative 
action for including women in the cabinet and also in high-level bureaucratic 
positions. Whether women’s inclusion in bureaucracy through quotas and 
in higher positions changes how it addresses gender equity depends on which 
women are incorporated through affirmative action and whether they have 
interests in promoting gender equity. Goetz (2003b) point out that women 
in the cabinet or chief executives are less likely to be feminists promoting 
gender equity. Even if they had strong links with the women’s movement, 
as Goetz’s study (2003a) on Uganda shows, feminist women in Museveni’s 
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cabinet were unable to speak for incorporation of the co-ownership clause 
since they had to adhere to the collective responsibility of the cabinet.
Top bureaucratic officials may act as ‘femocrats’ (i.e. feminist bureaucrat) 
to advance gender equitable policies (Kardam 1997) through skilful mobi-
lization of facts, accurate identification and cultivation of allies within the 
bureaucracy, and ensuring fit between the suggested policy changes and the 
goals of the specific bureaucratic organization.
Women’s representation in public bureaucracies can be increased through 
affirmative action. For example, Bangladesh has a 15 per cent quota for 
women in bureaucracy. These quotas can help women to overcome barri-
ers to entry but they may also stall further recruitment (as in the case of 
Bangladesh) and undermine the perceived merit of women who were hired 
to fill quotas. In Bangladesh, women bureaucrats are also concentrated in 
higher numbers in ‘softer’ sectors such as education and health, which then 
reduces the possibilities of women’s representation in important sectors such 
as finance, infrastructure, and agriculture (Sultan, n.d.). Studies conducted 
in the US show that bureaucratic officials, irrespective of gender, are willing 
to promote gender equity concerns when: a) there is room for manoeuvre 
within the organization to raise gender concerns; and b) when address-
ing gender concerns would not lead to sanctions and would advance their 
careers (UNIFEM 2008). These indicate the importance of the design of the 
institutional systems that incentivizes promoting gender equity concerns.
The presence of women in larger numbers in specific sectors may create 
scope for increased responsiveness to women’s needs at the front-line level. 
Studies are inconclusive about whether the gender of the staff influences 
how front-line workers address women’s needs. Goetz’s (1997) study on state 
microfinance institutions show that women clients are more comfortable 
in raising issues with the female front-line workers given the gendered hier-
archical nature of the relationship between the worker and the client. In 
fact, women workers were more willing to use their discretionary powers to 
address these concerns raised by their clients. Although these understand-
ings did not translate into systematic action on behalf of the front-line work-
ers since the incentive, monitoring, and performance measurement systems 
did not include addressing gender equity concerns as a performance meas-
urement indicator.
Women’s Participation in Invited Spaces and Citizen’s Forums
Contemporary measures for enhancing responsiveness of the state include 
the creation of gender-sensitive local government processes, the inclusion of 
women in local citizen’s councils, the establishment of new spaces for con-
sultation on service delivery and policy processes. However, implementation 
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of citizen’s councils or state-created consultative forums are conducted in a 
ritualistic manner, which limits their effectiveness. For example, Kerala and 
Madhya Pradesh provinces in India require one third of the participants in 
village meetings to be female to reach quorum. Kerala also requires local 
councils to earmark 10 per cent of the development funds they receive from 
the state for ‘women’s development projects’ and all female subgroups of 
the village assembly are in charge of planning for and spending this fund. 
However, there are cases reported in Kerala where women have been coerced 
into diverting these funds for other purposes. Local councillors have tried 
to influence which type of women are present in village assemblies to make 
the 30 per cent quorum (Goetz 2003b).
Studies show that the extent to which women’s needs and gender equity 
concerns are represented in citizen’s forums and invited spaces depends on 
the following: a) who (including which women) enters these spaces and 
their ability to voice demands; b) how representation of women’s needs and 
gender equity is facilitated in these spaces; c) if these spaces have authority 
to influence the way service is delivered; and d) whether women and other 
actors willing to act on behalf of women are able to establish horizontal and 
vertical links with other groups and state actors (Cornwall and Coleho 2007). 
Mohanty’s (2007) research on watershed project committees in Rajasthan, 
India illustrates these points. She found elite men (based on caste and class) 
decided which women were included in these committees and the men con-
trolled the agenda. Interestingly in the same area the women’s participation 
in the Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) was high and effective. 
Women participating in these schemes were recruited from the community 
by government officials, which rendered a form of ‘professional’ status on 
women. This demonstrates that the institutional design of these forums and 
local gender ideologies have strong influences on whether women are able 
to participate effectively.
The lack of an institutionalized place in policy/service delivery discus-
sions and formal rights to redress may constrain the quality of women’s 
participation in these invited spaces. Goetz’s (2003b) analysis of joint moni-
toring of the Public Distribution Scheme (PDS) in Mumbai, India illustrates 
these points. The Regional Controller of Rationing had invited civil society 
groups, including women’s groups, to participate in official monitoring and 
preventing corrupt practices, but women had no formal rights. However, 
upon his departure, women lost access to this official space.
Interests of traditional and ethnically defined local elites may constrain 
how women’s participation and gender equity is addressed within local 
citizen’s forums. For example, traditional authorities objected to the intro-
duction of democratic councils and women’s representation in councils in 
South Africa (Mbatha 2003).
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Community gendered norms and power relations at the local level may 
limit how much space women have for voicing their demands and the role 
they play. Agarwal’s (2011) comparative research on Joint Forest Management 
(JFM) groups in India and Nepal found that communities were resistant to 
women’s representation in these spaces created by the state. In community 
forest groups where external actors, such as gender-sensitive state officials 
and NGOs, have stipulated conditions on women’s inclusion in committees 
and focused on distributional equity issues, women’s participation in the 
Community Forest Groups (CFGs) changed. Effective links with women’s 
movement organizations or social movement oriented organizations with 
a strong focus on gender brings women’s interests to the forefront in these 
spaces.
Most of the research discussed above has focused on: how various struc-
tural factors limit women’s participation; specific programme or case anal-
ysis of where women have successfully negotiated for change in delivery 
of services; and how women’s sense of citizenship emerged from being 
engaged in ‘invited’ forums (Agarwal 2011; Cornwall and Coleho 2007). 
A political-settlement perspective may allow us to trace in a context-specific, 
historical manner how these different methods used for women’s inclusion 
into these state-created forums, lead from development of a sense of citizen-
ship towards a redrawing of social contracts with the state by women as a 
collective group?
Women’s Movements Representing and Influencing  
Gender Inclusive Development
Women’s movements in developing countries have a long history; wom-
en’s groups and associations have been a part of anti-colonial movements, 
independence struggles, anti-authoritarian movements (Basu 1995; Waylen 
1996; Molyneux 2001). Women’s participation in these independence or 
anti-colonial struggles, revolutions, or wider political movements have 
allowed women during critical moments of state formation to make claims 
over being included in political institutions and policy.
Despite being vibrant and innovative, the women’s movement has had 
fewer successes in terms of engendering political processes and institutions 
(even taking into consideration the introduction of quotas) in the last cen-
tury (Basu 2010).19 The movement has been successful in pursuing legal 
19 This does not imply that women’s representation in politics was not highlighted in the femi-
nist agenda. By the time the second wave of the feminist movement started in the 1960s in most 
Western democracies, women had the right to vote and other formal political rights, though the 
gender bias within political institutions remained. Given this context, when agendas were drawn 
up for action, they were influenced by the context within which women’s issues were being debated.
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reforms and bringing about changes in state policies in particular areas 
such as reproductive health, education for women, child welfare, and labour 
rights. Feminists also point out that these policy changes were facilitated by 
the instrumental needs of the state, such as controlling population growth 
and increasing productivity. In fact, feminists have been more successful in 
bringing discursive changes in how women are thought about as a devel-
opment category compared to tangible policy gains (Mukhopadhyay and 
Singh 2007).
At the national level, mobilization around policy processes in particular 
has been led by women’s groups which are largely composed of profes-
sional middle-class and elite women. The elite and middle-class compo-
sition of women’s/feminist groups and their leadership in mobilization 
around policies have led to debates about the elite bias/focus in women’s/
feminist movements. It has also raised questions about whether wom-
en’s groups effectively represent the interests of grassroots members and 
about their accountability to this constituency (Basu 2010). For example, 
in Bangladesh, women’s movements have been successful in mobilizing 
around violence against women and legal reforms but have failed to mobi-
lize around issues that are pertinent to poor rural women, such as migra-
tion or equal wage in the informal sector. In Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, 
feminism took the form of ‘popular feminism’ only when the movement 
was able to bring into the fold concerns of urban and rural working-class 
women (Lamas et al. 1995; Frohman and Valdez 1995; Soares et al. 1995). 
The elite and middle-class bias in the women’s movement and whether 
it is able to represent the interests of poor women or create strong alli-
ances with grassroots and working-women’s groups is a debate that is per-
tinent for unpacking political settlement around gender from a feminist 
perspective.
At the local level, grassroots women’s groups have usually mobilized 
around women’s needs, such as the quality of service delivery by the state 
with the focus on holding the state to account (Macpherson 2008; Molyneux 
2001). These movements focusing on local concerns have allowed women to 
contextualize their concerns within the wider social/political context and 
also integrate a gender analysis. While some of these movements are focused 
on specific or singular issues, such as women’s protests against price hikes 
in India or Kenya; or protests against the dismantling of state services as in 
Peru or Chile (Basu 1995; Waylen 1997), but some of these local movements 
also addressed gender inequity. For example, the anti-alcohol movement in 
Andhra Pradesh, India by local women’s groups, not only focused on ban-
ning alcohol and violence against women and created space for raising differ-
ent issues, it also instilled a sense of citizenship among women and demands 
for wider participation (Goetz and Nyamu-Musembi 2008). Grassroots 
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membership organizations, such as Self-Employed Women’s Association 
(SEWA) in India, which aimed at organizing informal women workers, have 
been successful in creating structures and strategies that allow them to negoti-
ate workers’ wages and working conditions at the local level and also in national 
policy spaces (Kabeer 1994). The domestic women workers’ association in Brazil 
(Sardenberg and Acosta 2014) and the membership-based migrant women work-
ers’ association in Bangladesh started off as small associations (Nazneen and 
Sultan 2014) and later evolved into larger organizations advocating national 
strategies and policies that would serve the interests of their members.
Women’s groups use diverse strategies for mobilizing and negotiating 
around gender equity concerns at different political and social forums. 
Analysis of women’s movements in our case-study countries shows that 
these movements by grassroots, policy advocates, and other organiza-
tions use the following common strategies: a) build coalitions within the 
movement on particular issues; b) form alliances with other civil soci-
ety organizations (CSOs) and the media; c) target selective parts of the 
state bureaucracy, including local government, concerned ministries, the 
national gender machinery; d) cultivate allies among women representa-
tives and also among male politicians; e) use international women’s rights 
discourse/human rights discourse to package their demands; and f) estab-
lish and highlight their expertise and experience on the particular gender 
equity issue around which they are mobilizing (Nazneen and Sultan 2014; 
Randall 1998).
These strategies have produced mixed results in legitimizing women’s 
demands and generating responsiveness from the state and political actors. 
The issue-based coalitions and alliances have raised the visibility of wom-
en’s activism within the civil society arena, and also helped to project 
the strength of their demands. For example, the Ugandan Land Alliance 
was crucial in raising women’s demands for co-ownership (Tripp 2004; 
Kawamara-Mishambi and Ovonji-Odida 2003). However, these coalitions 
suffer from internal power struggles. Usually the well-resourced, national 
groups tend to dominate how agendas are set and the activities of the coali-
tions, and marginalize the grassroots organizations. This has implications 
for whether coalitions are seen as being representative of a wider constitu-
ency around a particular issue. The Convention on Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination (CEDAW) ratification coalition in Bangladesh is a good 
example of this particular legitimacy problem (Nazneen and Sultan 2014). 
Discussions in previous sections on Uganda and South Africa show that 
allies within the state bureaucracy and political parties, particularly men, 
and the strong links between women’s movements and women representa-
tives created scope for the movements to raise their issues in various forums 
(Goetz 2003a; Mbatha 2003; Hassim 2003; Htun and Weldon 2010). These 
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coalitions and alliances also demonstrated a clear constituency for which 
the ‘femocrats’ and sympathetic representatives were working.
Targeting by women’s movements of selective parts of the state which are 
responsive to women’s rights has produced results in representing women’s 
rights issues in different state forums. In the case-study countries women’s 
movements have targeted particular ministries or different levels of the gov-
ernment depending on the nature of the demand and the context within 
which issues are being raised. This indicates that there are plural entry 
points in dealing with the state and that opportunities for women may 
vary across different state institutions (Randall 1998). Comparative studies 
of how these entry points vary and in-country analysis of when and how 
women’s movements have been able to access different state institutions 
need to be conducted.
The space available to women’s groups to promote a gender equity 
agenda in politics may vary depending on political opportunity structure 
context. States that are going through a transitional phase, where the sta-
bility of elite alignments is in flux, may create opportunities for women’s 
movements to participate in the negotiation processes and promote gender 
equity concerns (Castellijo 2011). Immediately after independence or in the 
post-revolutionary period there is a high level of interest in women’s posi-
tion and condition among the political elite. These issues are closely tied 
to the modernizing/nation-building agenda which lends them legitimacy 
(Waylen 1996). Women’s movements are able to establish effective links 
with the political leadership and state during this period, but this interest 
in improving women’s status among state and political actors wanes as time 
passes (Molyneux 1985; Goetz 2003b).
These observations hold true for some of our case-study countries. The 
state and the political leadership took a keen interest in women’s representa-
tion and gender equity in Rwanda and Uganda immediately after the transi-
tional period and women’s movements in these countries were able to access 
the party leadership, voice their demands, create a new discourse around 
women’s rights, and resist traditional authorities (Tripp 2003; Goetz 2003a; 
Burnet 2008). The inclusion of women in politics through use of quotas, 
women’s active engagement in incorporating the gender equality clause in 
the constitution in Uganda and South Africa, and changes in inheritance 
law in Rwanda, all happened during this period. In South Africa, during the 
period of transition from the apartheid regime, women had the greatest voice 
and influence on the political leadership and the state machineries (Hassim 
2003). In Bangladesh, the women’s movement exerted the most influence 
during the decade of the 1990s when transition from an authoritarian phase 
took place. Women were able to gender mainstream the national five-year 
development plans, ensure direct elections for women in local government, 
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and secure legal/policy changes on violence against women (Nazneen and 
Sultan 2010). In Chile, Brazil, and Mexico, the anti-authoritarian move-
ment created scope for large-scale activism by women, particularly when 
they mobilized to demand answers for those who had disappeared under 
the authoritarian regimes (Kemp et al. 1995; Lamas et al. 1995; Soares et al. 
1995). This created ‘political entitlement’ which women’s groups claimed 
during the transitional phase to democracy, however, the space became frag-
mented as these countries entered a more stable phase and women formally 
entered policy spaces (Molyneux 2001; Basu 2010).
The international discourses on women’s rights and gender equity have 
played an important role in creating space for women’s movement groups 
to access the state and be consulted on various issues (Tripp 2012). In 
the case-study countries, for example, in Bangladesh and Rwanda, the 
UN international conferences and CEDAW shadow reporting processes 
have created the need for the state to consult women’s movements on 
these issues/processes so that they are able to legitimize states’ positions 
(Burnet 2008; Nazneen and Sultan 2010). In fact, discourses are important 
features of women’s political opportunity framework. Competing ideolo-
gies and discourses may influence openings for women’s participation in 
political processes and institutions or place limits on the representation 
of women’s claims (Rai 1996). A key gap in using political-settlement 
literature for understanding the politics of securing gender-inclusive 
development is that the political-settlement framework does not include 
how different ideologies and discourses on gender influence political and 
social actors.
What Can We Say about the Gendered Politics of Securing  
Inclusive Development?
The analysis presented above using the extended Goetz and Hassim (2003) 
framework shows that there are different reasons why women’s participa-
tion and representation in politics is supported by different actors. For 
women’s rights activists, some women representatives, and male political 
leaders, the support of women’s representation and participation is ideo-
logical. However, most of the actors, particularly political party leaders and 
the state, have instrumental/pragmatic reasons for including women in 
political processes and institutions. It is important to unpack these inter-
ests and incentives and how these interests are negotiated for understand-
ing whether women’s inclusion in politics translates into electoral and 
policy leverage.
The nature of political opportunity structures, that is, the openness of 
the political institutions to women’s demands, the presence of elite allies 
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in different state and political arenas, and whether states represses wom-
en’s demands, all have implications for women’s effective participation in 
political processes. Our analysis shows that coalitions and alliances and 
strong links between women’s representatives and the women’s movement 
may have different degrees of influence in promoting women’s interests in 
politics depending on the nature of the political opportunity structures.
Also the discussion in the previous sections of this chapter show that dur-
ing critical moments of state formation, women were able to claim political 
inclusion because of their participation in independence or anti-colonial 
or anti-authoritarian struggles and armed conflicts. Women’s roles in these 
struggles created ‘legitimized’ entitlements for their inclusion into politics 
and representative institutions. For India and South Africa, women’s active 
participation and role in sustaining the national struggles influenced how 
women came to demand inclusion in electoral bodies or political institutions 
when both these nation states were reforming political structures (Agarwal 
2011). In Rwanda and Nepal, women’s participation in armed conflict pro-
vided legitimacy for claiming equal constitutional rights and also for quotas 
in the system in the post-conflict scenario (Burnet 2008; Tamang 2004). 
In Bangladesh, Chile, Uganda, Brazil, and Mexico transition to democracy 
and women’s participation in anti-authoritarian struggles created scope for 
women to demand inclusion in political institutions (Nazneen and Sultan 
2014; Goetz and Hassim 2003; Waylen 1997; Basu 1995).
These findings are summed up in Table 8.2.
Conclusions
Based on our post hoc analysis of the nature of gendered political and state 
institutions in different country contexts, the following factors play impor-
tant roles in determining how gender equity concerns are represented and 
decided upon in politics and policymaking:
1. The interests and incentives of the political and social elites in promot-
ing/obstructing gender equity concerns in political and policymaking 
processes.
2. The relationship and negotiations that take place between the feminist 
constituency and these actors on gender equity.
3. The political opportunity structures that create or limit space for mak-
ing claims around gender equity.
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Undeniably, our analysis is limited both methodologically20 and empirically. 
But it shows how different elements of political settlements21 could be used 
for understanding the link between women’s inclusion in political processes 
and gender-inclusive outcomes. But does exploring the gendered politics of 
securing inclusive development using a political-settlement lens adds value 
to what we know from feminist political analysis? Are there synergies that 
exist between the two bodies of literature?
Possibilities of Political Settlement Perspective: What Are the Gaps  
in Gender/Feminist Analysis and New Questions Emerging?
The political-settlement perspective focuses on structure, agency, and their 
interaction. This makes political settlement a useful perspective for under-
standing how women as actors are included and women’s needs and gender 
equity concerns are negotiated in politics and policymaking and the subse-
quent outcomes. Different elements of political settlement, such as focus on 
political and social elites (including traditional elites) and their interests and 
incentives for addressing/hindering gender equitable policies and develop-
ment outcome and how different political/institutional arrangements facili-
tate their power to do so, may help in unpacking the opportunities and 
limits of women’s participation in politics and the possibilities for securing 
gender-inclusive development. The framework also allows us to identify the 
challengers who negotiate and redraw the boundaries. It allows us to develop 
a template identifying incentives, interests, institutional nature, and where 
centres of power lie in negotiating gender equity concerns.
Using this lens to analyse the gendered politics of securing inclusive 
development in developing countries may contribute to furthering our 
understanding about gender in Third World politics and development in 
the following ways.
First, research into women’s political representation and policy effective-
ness in developing countries has important gaps (Goetz and Hassim 2003). 
Research on gender analysis of policies focuses on outcomes of policies on 
women; for example, the impact of health or education policies. These anal-
yses rarely take into account the particular relationships that exist between 
the state and political and social elites that lead to certain forms of policies. 
A political-settlement perspective may be helpful in unpacking these rela-
tionships and why certain forms of policy measures are undertaken.
20 We did not conduct a rigorous comparative study. We used a common framework to 
explore the gendered nature of women’s inclusion in formal politics and their policy influence 
in the selected case-study countries based on existing literature.
21 For example, various actors, interests, and institutions; see Di John and Putzel (2009) for a 
detailed discussion of various elements.
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Second, feminist research on women’s representation extensively debates 
how women are not a homogenous social group and the difficulties this 
poses in representative democracies. There is less focus on how, when, and 
why electoral and policy elites consider women an important constituency. 
When and how can women (including women’s groups), who in many 
cases are excluded by elite or non-elite actors, through collective mobiliza-
tion challenge existing political settlements on gender? These issues can be 
explored through this political-settlement perspective.
Third, the gender and development research has focused on the impact 
of quotas on the promotion of gender equity interests. There is less focus 
on who (which women) come in through quotas and how that influences 
policy choices. Little research exists on women in formal political parties 
and how they negotiate with different political or social constituencies on 
gender equity concerns. A  political-settlement perspective may allow for 
a more nuanced link between the politics of inclusion and the politics of 
influence, particularly focusing on how women (and men) become critical 
actors promoting gender equity concerns.
Fourth, much of the development research on gender and women’s inclu-
sion in politics does not use a context-specific and historical analysis of how 
women as a collective group were able to secure ‘political entitlement’, espe-
cially during moments of state formation and how this interpretation of 
entitlements affects women’s collective ability to secure inclusive develop-
ment. A political-settlement perspective may be effective in analysing policy 
areas by focusing on how women initially gain inclusion and trace the effect 
of these political entitlements on women’s ability to influence and secure 
inclusive development.
Fifth, while feminists acknowledge that patronage and clientelist poli-
tics limits women’s political effectiveness and the state’s accountability 
to women (and for promoting gender equity concerns, Goetz and Jenkins 
2005), there are very few studies that unpack the gender impact of clientelist 
and patronage-based politics, exploring women’s representation in politics, 
policymaking, and the outcome that results in these contexts.
How Does a Gender Lens Strengthen the Political Settlement 
Perspective?
A gender lens brings in dimensions that may strengthen the 
political-settlement framework. The political-settlement framework focuses 
on incentives and interests and is based on a rational choice analysis that 
leaves out the role played by ideologies. Gender ideologies play a key role in 
motivating the behaviour of the actors, both of political and social elites, 
excluded elites, oppositional non-elites, and women who may want to 
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contest these ideologies. In fact, competing ideologies and discourses around 
these ideologies influence the nature of the political opportunity structure 
within which women’s interests and gender equity concerns are negotiated. 
But can political-settlement frameworks accommodate this discursive ele-
ment around gender ideologies?
This question has relevance for other marginalized groups and non-elite 
groups if the political-settlement perspective is used for capturing bottom-up 
negotiations around inclusive development. How we think about inclusive 
development and interpret the needs of marginalized groups and are chal-
lenged by the alternative interpretations forwarded by the marginalized 
groups (or those actors who promote their interests) and these alternative 
interpretations do influence the way policies are framed; though these discur-
sive changes may not necessarily lead to a tangible change in policy outcomes.
Second, analysis of how gender-inclusive development is secured allows 
for deepening our understanding of the following factors in achieving and 
sustaining a political settlement, such as actions by non-elite groups, use of 
bottom-up strategies by marginalized/excluded groups, and how participa-
tion at the local level may create scope for influencing the actors/discourses 
at the national policy level. It also creates the possibilities for expanding 
political settlement’s focus on the role played by policy coalitions and trans-
national actors (generally ignored in political settlement), the significance of 
informal relations between different actors (intra-elite negotiations, negotia-
tions with excluded elite/oppositional non-elite) in negotiating an outcome, 
(generally ignored in PS frameworks) and in influencing the inclusive nature 
of political settlements.
Where Are We Now?
In sum, both a political-settlement approach and feminist political analysis 
stand to gain from closing the gap between these two bodies of literature. 
Given that there are no studies that analyse political settlements from a gender 
perspective in the developing world, research in this area embodies possibilities 
for generating new knowledge. In this chapter we went about addressing this 
issue in a roundabout manner focusing on different bodies of literature that 
may provide information on different elements of political settlement. Our 
discussion on gendered politics and existing feminist political analysis show 
that there are knowledge gaps in understanding gendered politics of inclusive 
development. In order to move forward we need to focus on addressing the 
dilemmas that arise from what the political-settlement framework excludes 
(ideology, discourse, bottom-up strategies) and expand the parameters.
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Ethnicity, State Capacity, and 
Development: Reconsidering  
Causal Connections
Prerna Singh and Matthias vom Hau
The relationship between identity, and more specifically ethnicity, and state 
capacity has received increasing attention in the social sciences.1 Scholars 
have developed sophisticated arguments about how variations in the qual-
ity and reach of state infrastructure and services have shaped ethnic-based 
identification and mobilization (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Lieberman and 
Singh 2012; Loveman 2005; Wimmer 2002). Similarly, there is a growing 
literature on how ethnic identities influence state capacity outcomes. Most 
prominently, a large and influential body of scholarship in political econ-
omy argues that ethnic diversity impedes public goods provision. Cross-
national studies in this tradition, most prominently the seminal article by 
William Easterly and Ross Levine (1997), suggest that ethnically heterogene-
ous countries usually suffer from inadequate public goods such low-quality 
schools, poor roads, and insufficient electricity grids (see also Rafael La Porta 
et al. 1999). Sub-national studies come to comparable conclusions, whether 
in developed or developing contexts.2 The much-cited article by Alberto 
1 The order of authorship is alphabetical. The chapter is part of a larger research initiative on 
ethnicity and state capacity. We are grateful to the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (MICINN) 
in Spain, the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs (WCFIA) at Harvard University, and 
the Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) Research Centre at the University of 
Manchester for their generous funding of this endeavour. We would like to especially thank 
Fulya Apaydin, Jorge Dominguez, Sam Hickey, Steve Levitsky, Kunal Sen, Hillel Soifer, and all 
the participants of the 2013 workshop on ethnicity and state capacity in Cambridge, MA, for 
their helpful comments on the argument developed so far. All errors are our own.
2 Ken Jackson (2013), for example, identifies ethnic diversity as leading to inferior public 
goods provision in sub-Saharan Africa.
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Alesina, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly (1999) is just one of a large litera-
ture arguing that more ethnically diverse cities and counties in the United 
States are less invested in core public goods.3 Broadly similar findings have 
been reported for developing countries. For example, Abhijit Banerjee and 
his co-authors (2005, 2007) find support for the ethnic diversity and public 
goods provision hypothesis in India, while Edward Miguel and Mary Kay 
Gugerty (2005) show how local ethnic diversity in Kenya is associated with 
lower-quality public goods.
This chapter pursues a critical reassessment of the ethnic diversity and 
public goods provision scholarship. Our main line of critique concerns 
the causal mechanism supported by this literature. Most of the works in 
this research tradition focus on inter-ethnic cooperation. Specifically, they 
hypothesize that ethnic fractionalization leads to conflicting preferences, 
which in turn prevent inter-ethnic cooperation, either to generate desired 
goods or to pressure the state to provide them. Yet, an exclusive focus on 
inter-ethnic cooperation ignores a wider range of other plausible causal 
pathways through which ethnicity might influence public goods provision. 
The main thrust of this chapter builds towards filling this gap. We review a 
broader literature that does explore, or at least gives us some useful implicit 
insights about, the effects of ethnicity on state capacity. Against this back-
drop we identify and develop distinct theoretical mechanisms through 
which ethnicity shapes the ability of states to provide public goods.4 The 
chapter thus uses various bodies of work as a springboard to distil a larger set 
of possible causal pathways that move beyond the idea that collective action 
across different ethnic groups has a direct impact on state capacity. Those 
mechanisms include the mobilizing efforts by a particular ethnic group, the 
behaviour of other collective actors, and institutional change.
In particular, our first broad set of mechanisms focuses on the ways in 
which the actions of ethnic groups directly affect state capacity. Within this 
set, an initial batch of mechanisms emphasizes the link between inter-ethnic 
cooperation and the ability of states to provide public goods. Another batch 
highlights the link between mobilization by a particular ethnic group and 
state capacity. Here the focus is on how the level of ethnic inclusion can 
affect ethnic mobilization, which can have positive or negative effects on 
state capacity, depending on, most importantly, the type of ethnic-based 
collective action.
3 Other major studies on ethnic diversity and public goods provision in the context of the 
United States include Goldin and Katz (1997), Lieberman (1993), Luttmer (2001), and Poterba 
(1997). See Costa and Khan (2003) for an overview of this literature.
4 Tilly (2001), McAdam et al. (2001), and Rueschemeyer (2009) are important inspirations for 
treating the development of causal mechanisms as key to theoretical advancement.
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A second set of mechanisms puts the analytical spotlight on the ways in 
which ethnicity shapes state capacity by affecting the interests and behav-
iour of other collective actors. One group of mechanisms in this line of rea-
soning focuses on the alliance strategies of societal elites. In particular, they 
hypothesize that distinct forms of ethnic exclusion or ethnic mobilization 
entail different types of coalitions between these elites and subordinate sectors 
and/or the state, which in turn shape the extractive capacity of states. Another 
batch of mechanisms in this line of reasoning emphasizes that the effects of 
ethnic exclusion or ethnic mobilization on state capacity are mediated by state 
elite preferences, whether derived from political survival considerations or 
informed by broader cultural understandings of ethnic groups, official nation-
alist narratives, and collective memories of prior ethnic conflict.
Our chapter further suggests that institutional change—through both 
formal and informal institutional arrangements—constitutes a third major 
causal pathway by which ethnicity shapes state capacity. Within formal 
institutional arrangements, we explore how ethnic mobilization can result 
in the inclusion of ethnic groups through existing representative institu-
tions (e.g. in the form of quotas or power-sharing arrangements) and how 
this influences state capacity through feedback effects on ethnic-based col-
lective action. We also examine how ethnic mobilization can prompt the 
creation of new formal institutional arrangements, which can in turn affect 
the territorial reach of a state and its capacity to provide public goods. In 
addition, we also analyse how the inclusion of mobilized ethnic groups 
through informal institutional arrangements is likely to entail the biased 
distribution of state resources.
Taken together, and summarized in Table 9.1, this chapter identifies 
three broad sets of mechanisms through which ethnicity might influ-
ence state capacity. The next section provides a conceptual background 
discussion of the key concepts. The subsequent sections develop in more 
detail how inter-ethnic cooperation, the mobilization of ethnic groups, 
Table 9.1. How ethnicity affects state capacity: causal mechanisms
Causal mechanism set
(A) Actions by ethnic groups
  •  Inter-ethnic cooperation
  •  Mobilization by particular group
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the alliance strategies of societal elites, the interests and perceptions of 
state officials, and formal/informal institutional change operate as causal 
mechanisms that link ethnicity to state capacity. In the concluding dis-
cussion we try to foreshadow possible implications of this chapter for an 
alternative approach to the influential ethnic diversity and public goods 
provision hypothesis.
Conceptualization and Measurement Strategies
Both ethnicity and state capacity are much-debated concepts that have gen-
erated a large and often controversial literature on how to conceptualize and 
measure them.5 In this review chapter we flag major differences and simi-
larities in the conceptualization and measurement of these two concepts, 
which allows us to situate political economy works on the ethnic diversity 
and public goods provision hypothesis within the broader literature and put 
different bodies of scholarship into dialogue.
Ethnicity
At the most basic level, ethnicity refers to relations of membership struc-
tured around a belief in a shared culture and common ancestry. These 
relations are considered significant by members and outsiders, and are 
constituted through processes of self-identification and external ascrip-
tion (Barth 1969; Jenkins 1997).6 Yet there exist a variety of different 
approaches on how to disaggregate this conceptualization of ethnicity and 
make it operational for empirical research (Lieberman and Singh 2012; 
Wimmer 2012a).7
The majority of studies that examine the ethnic diversity and public 
goods provision hypothesis approach ethnicity in demographic terms. This 
research tradition is primarily concerned with the relative size and number of 
distinct ethnic groups within a unit of analysis (a country, or a sub-national 
unit, whether metropolitan areas or municipalities). Accordingly, its 
5 See, for example, Chandra and Wilkinson (2008) and Lieberman and Singh (2012) for 
distinct approaches to the conceptualization and measurement of ethnicity. Hendrix (2010), 
Soifer (2012), and Saylor (2013) are recent methodological discussions on the measurement of 
state capacity.
6 This conceptualization avoids compartmentalization by treating ‘race’ and nationhood as 
subtypes of ethnicity, and not as analytically distinct phenomena (Wimmer 2008, 2012). The 
fusion of beliefs in a common culture and shared ancestry with claims for national sovereignty 
and the control of a state is characteristic of nations, while the association of phenotype with 
common descent delimitates racial groups and categories.
7 Here we follow Adcock and Collier’s (2001) distinction between root concept and fully 
specified conceptualization.
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measurement strategies seek to identify the extent of ethnic fragmentation 
or heterogeneity. In so doing, studies usually rely on an ethnic fragmen-
tation index, which measures the probability that two randomly selected 
individuals in a given country, city, or county belong to different ethnic 
groups. Specifically, cross-national analyses in this line of work tend to focus 
on ethnolinguistic fragmentation (ELF) and employ various data sets, most 
importantly the Atlas Narodov Mira (Atlas of the Peoples of the World), an 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization index first developed by researchers in the 
Soviet Union during the 1960s, which increases its value with the number 
of different language groups and the relatively equal size of these groups 
(Easterly and Levine 1997, pp. 1218–23; La Porta et al. 1999, p. 238). Other 
studies construct an ethnic fractionalization index based on self-identified 
racial identity from census data (Alesina et  al. 1999, pp.  1254–5) or sur-
veys (Luttmer 2001, pp. 502–5). Sub-national studies of ethnic diversity in 
developing countries equally replicate the ELF-based approach and build 
ethnic fractionalization indices based on their own survey data (Miguel and 
Gugerty 2005, pp. 2341, 2364) or on existing census data (Banerjee et al. 
2005, pp. 641–3).
Yet, this is not the only way to operationalize ethnicity. A  compre-
hensive look at the literature reveals that there are at least two other 
major approaches to conceptualization and measurement. One of them 
combines ethnic demography with a focus on relative group power. This 
perspective compares ethnic groups in terms of their control over eco-
nomic and socio-political resources (Baldwin and Huber 2010; Cederman 
et al. 2010; Cederman and Girardin 2007; Chandra and Wilkinson 2008; 
Lieberman 2003; Østby 2008)  and differentiates between the extent of 
ethnic exclusion that prevails in a given social arrangement. Another 
body of scholarship focuses on ethnic mobilization, which broadly refers 
to collective action that draws on a sense of shared origins and identi-
fication with a joint way of life as the basis for political claims-making 
(McAdam et  al. 2001; Olzak 1983; Yashar 2005). Ethnic mobilization 
manifests itself in a variety of institutional and organizational vehicles, 
including political parties, social movements, civic associations, and the 
like. Meaningful variation at the aggregate level can be traced to differ-
ent intensities in the collective action of ethnic groups, distinct strategies 
(e.g. violent and non-violent tactics), but also differences in the nature 
of demands and geographical location (e.g. rural vs. urban) of ethnic 
mobilization.
Taken together, there are at least three contrasting approaches to move 
from root concept to a more specified conceptualization of ethnicity. As we 
will show below, each of these approaches tends to lead to distinct causal 
mechanism hypotheses about how ethnicity affects state capacity.
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State Capacity
There is also a general consensus about the basic definition of state capacity. 
Most of the relevant literature refers to state capacity as the ability of states 
to penetrate society and implement their decisions (Saylor 2013; see also 
Besley and Persson 2009; Mann 1984; Migdal 1988; Stepan 1978; Soifer and 
vom Hau 2008). Scholars further agree that the concept is multidimensional 
and needs to be further unpacked (vom Hau 2012; Soifer 2008, 2012).
We identify two broad approaches to the disaggregation of state capacity. 
One perspective centres on the outputs of state activities in order to detect 
variations (e.g. Alesina et  al. 1999; Algan et  al. 2011; Baldwin and Huber 
2010; Miguel and Gugerty 2005). Specifically, the focus is on the aggregate 
level, distribution and geographic coverage of public services and goods, 
whether those are policing, education, health care, or transport infrastruc-
ture. This conceptual approach characterizes most of the political economy 
scholarship on ethnic diversity and public goods provision. These works 
usually combine some measure(s) of education with other measures of pub-
lic goods. For instance, Easterly and Levine (1997, pp.  1211–12) focus on 
educational attainment, together with a measure of telephones per worker.8 
Alesina et al. (1999, pp. 1256–7) trace public goods provision by examining 
the share of spending on education, roads, and sewage and trash collection 
in different cities and metropolitan areas of the United States. Banerjee et al. 
(2005, pp. 644–5) concentrate on the extent to which similar kinds of public 
goods are available in Indian villages, while Miguel and Gugerty’s (2005, 
pp. 2341–7) measurement strategy is equally concerned with education and 
examines local school funding collected per student and maintenance fees 
for water wells. Taken together, this brief sketch illustrates that schooling (in 
combination with indicators of infrastructure) is the most prominent meas-
urement strategy in an output-centred approach to state capacity.
Another body of work, however, puts the emphasis on inputs, or the particu-
lar organizational characteristics that underpin the ability of states to pursue 
their projects (Soifer and vom 2008; vom Hau 2012; Giraudy 2012). Works in 
this line of research usually highlight (one or more of) the following features 
as distinctive of high-capacity states. One is administrative competence, which 
is indicated by an effective bureaucracy associated with meritocratic recruit-
ment, standardized procedures, predictable careers, and a strong esprit de corps 
among state officials.9 A second feature is territorial reach, or the spatial spread 
8 The telephone indicator is cross-checked against other indicators, for which there is less 
systematic evidence available: the percentage of paved roads, and percentage of power losses in 
the electricity system (Easterly and Levine 1997, pp. 211–12).
9 Works establishing this position include Carpenter (2001), Evans and Rauch (1999), Gorski 
(1995), and Weber (1978).
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(or unevenness) of state infrastructure across national territory.10 A third one is 
extraction, or the ability of states to extract resources from society, which has 
long been at the forefront of the study of state capacity.11 Combining input- and 
output-centred perspectives on state capacity enables us to bring these distinct 
literatures into dialogue and identify a range of causal mechanisms by which 
ethnicity influences the ability of states to implement their policy choices.
Causal Mechanism Set (A): Actions by Ethnic Groups
How does ethnicity then affect state capacity? Different bodies of scholar-
ship identify a number of possible causal pathways. This chapter groups 
them into three broad sets. As shown in Table 9.2, the defining characteris-
tic of the first set is that those mechanisms hypothesize a direct effect of the 
actions by ethnic groups on state capacity.
(A1) Ethnic Diversity and Inter-ethnic Cooperation
Within the first mechanism set, one batch focuses on inter-ethnic coopera-
tion. Most of the political economy scholarship on the topic squarely fits 
there. Specifically, this literature argues that ethnicity, conceptualized as 
ethnic diversity, impedes public goods provision.
The starting point is the idea that the provision of public services such 
as roads, schools, or health clinics requires ethnic groups to cooperate with 
each other. In order to obtain public goods, individuals from different 
ethnic backgrounds must act together, whether they generate these goods 
themselves or lobby the state to provide them. Yet, collective action for pub-
lic goods cannot be taken for granted, especially not in ethnically diverse 
settings. This is for at least two reasons. One, as suggested by Alesina et al. 
(1999, p. 1244), is that because of their culture or their socio-economic posi-
tion, ethnic groups differ in their preferences for particular public goods. 
Another is that members of an ethnic group prefer the benefits of a particu-
lar public good to remain among their co-ethnics and therefore undervalue 
it if members of other ethnic groups can also access it.
In fleshing out this mechanism, many works in this research tradition focus 
on the way in which ethnic diversity impedes the capacity of communities 
to engage in collective action to provide public goods (Khwaja 2008; Miguel 
10 Important theoretical contributions to this perspective on state capacity are Mann (1984, 
1986), O’Donnell (1993), and Herbst (2000). See also Soifer and vom Hau (2008).
11 Major contributions to this literature are Bräutigam et al. (2008), Levi (1988), Lieberman 
(2003), Tilly (1992), and Slater (2010). For an excellent overview see Lieberman (2002); for a 
critical stance on taxation as an indicator of state capacity see Fukuyama (2004).
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and Gugerty 2005; Algan et al. 2011; Fearon and Laitin 1996). The capacity 
of communities to act together, for example, to raise funds for schools, col-
lect garbage, repair roads, clear drains, and maintain other public infrastruc-
ture projects, is clearly a very important channel for the provision of essential 
social services. Across most parts of the world the provision of public goods is, 
however, perceived as, and remains primarily, a state responsibility. Contrary 
to the assumptions of many of these political economy models, the provision 
of public goods is more a product of state interventions rather than collective 
action on the part of communities. Access to public goods, as emphasized by 
Banerjee et al. ‘seem(s) to have nothing to do with “bottom-up” forces . . . and 
instead reflect(s) more “top-down” interventions’ (2007, p. 3117).
This said, within this research tradition there are studies that implic-
itly focus on the ‘top-down’ dynamic of state provision of social services. 
The main argument here is that ethnic divisions generate conflicting pref-
erences, which leads governments, for example, in US cities, to devote a 
lower share of expenditure to public goods (Goldin and Katz 1999; Poterba 
1997; Alesina et al. 1999). While these studies do not specify this clearly, 
the way in which this ‘preferences in common’ (Habyarimana et al. 2009, 
p. 8) mechanism might be inferred to work is that conflicting preferences 
on the part of different ethnic groups leads to difficulties in coordinating 
collective action to pressure the state for the provision of public goods.12 
Describing this mechanism, Habyarimana et al. (2009, p. 8), for example, 
write that:
12 In their experiments in Kampala, Habyarimana et al. (2009) do not find that individuals 
from different ethnic groups have different preferences, but studies by Trounstine (2013) in the 
US and by Lieberman and McClendon (2013) in sub-Saharan Africa find evidence of substantial 
preference divergence across ethnic groups.




Causal mechanism Affected dimension(s) of state 
capacity
(A1) Ethnic diversity Inter-ethnic cooperation (–)
(lobbying for public goods)
Public goods provision (–)
(A2) Ethnic exclusion Inter-ethnic cooperation (–)
(lobbying for public goods)
Public goods provision (–)
(A3) Ethnic exclusion Ethnic mobilization (+)
(violent tactics by ethnic group)
Public goods provision (–)
Administrative competence (–)
Extractive capacity (–)
(A4) Ethnic exclusion Ethnic mobilization (+)
(non-violent tactics by ethnic 
group)
Public goods provision (+/–)
Administrative competence (+/–)
Distribution of public goods (+/–)
Source: Authors.
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If residents . . . can lobby together for funding . . . then the likelihood of a posi-
tive response from the local government increases. But if community members 
are unable to coordinate their lobbying—if, for example, some residents want 
better policing but others prefer that the government allocate its resources to 
improve local schools or transport infrastructure—then the likelihood that the 
government will increase its support for local defense units diminishes.
A similar mechanism is proposed by Algan et al. (2011) who argue that more 
diverse communities are likely to face more trouble in coordinating collec-
tive action to demand better social services from the government.13 In sum, 
then, this body of scholarship hypothesizes that the extent of ethnic diver-
sity undermines public goods provision by affecting the ability of a commu-
nity to act collectively either to provide the goods themselves or lobby the 
state for the provision of the services.
It remains unclear, however, under what conditions a ‘bottom-up’ or ‘top- 
down’ path is chosen. We can imagine that whether a community decides 
to provide the public goods by itself or petition the state to provide these 
services is a deliberate decision that is contingent on various factors includ-
ing the perceived effectiveness of the ethnic groups’ ability to provide ser-
vices, which are in turn likely to depend on the strength and structure of 
leadership and/or the organizational framework of ethnic groups;14 whether 
they have a tradition of service provision15 as well as expectations of the 
state’s willingness and ability to provide public goods, which are in turn 
influenced by the prevailing ‘political culture’,16 world historical time,17 and 
previous legacies of state development.18
Another issue with the political economy literature on diversity and pub-
lic goods provision is the following: the hypothesized positive relationship 
13 Algan et al. go a step further to suggest that this result may be supported in equilibrium 
through recognition by the government, in their case, the housing directorate in French cities, 
that ‘in ethnically or religiously heterogeneous apartments, it can permit the decline of facili-
ties, knowing that it will not face collective action from its residents demanding better services’ 
(2011, p. 4).
14 For example, Ann Swidler (2006) emphasizes the crucial role of ethnic/tribal leaders in 
encouraging or discouraging the provision of HIV/AIDS-related health services in sub-Saharan 
Africa.
15 For example, Brokerhoff and Hewett (2000) point to significant differences in how dif-
ferent ethnic groups in sub-Saharan Africa deal with child health care, while Ben Ansell and 
Johannes Lindvall’s (2013) cross-national study observes substantial variations in how different 
religious groups provide education.
16 For example, whether the state is characterized as individualistic or liberal when compared 
to corporatist or social democratic ideological orientations (Esping-Andersen 1990; Hall and 
Soskice 2001).
17 Most prominently, the period after the Second World War was characterized by heightened 
global expectations of service provision by the state (Meyer et al. 1997).
18 Based on a comparative historical analysis of Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Colombia, Hillel 
Soifer (2013) shows that in relatively more effective states, the population subsequently expects 
more from the state and pressures it to do more, while in comparatively weaker states, the popu-
lation relies more on self-help mechanisms for public goods provision.
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between ethnic homogeneity and public goods provision ignores the pos-
sibility that the majority ethnic group could have preferences for, and mobi-
lize in support of public goods provision that benefits their ethnic group but 
is detrimental to the welfare of the minority groups, for example, by open-
ing schools that do not have provisions for minority language education. In 
this case, ethnic homogeneity might not in fact be supportive of state capac-
ity, especially if conceptualized not in terms of public goods provision in the 
aggregate, but instead in terms of equal access to public goods.
An additional more broadly shared concern about this body of scholarship 
is its conceptualization and measurement of ethnicity in terms of fractionali-
zation indices. This methodological approach violates key constructivist find-
ings about the fluid, multidimensional, and socio-politically manufactured 
nature of ethnic identity (Chandra and Wilkinson 2008; Laitin and Posner 
2001). It also makes the problematic assumption that demographic diversity 
necessarily leads to political divisions between ethnic groups (Singh 2011).
(A2) Ethnic Exclusion and Inter-ethnic Cooperation
In order to address this issue a recent body of scholarship starts off, very 
self-consciously, from a different conceptualization of ethnicity not just as 
ethnic diversity but as relative group power. As such, this literature has made 
an important move beyond purely demographic fractionalization indices 
to instead develop group-based measures that focus on the degree to which 
ethnic groups are disadvantaged in terms of access to economic resources 
(Østby 2008; Baldwin and Huber 2010; Cederman et al. 2011) and politi-
cal power (Cederman and Girardin 2007; Chandra and Wilkinson 2008; 
Cederman et al. 2010). This shift, based on the general premise that ethnic 
diversity is more likely to have adverse political effects when demographic 
divides align with deficiencies in economic or political power, is clearly a 
significant advance in the study of ethnic politics.
The mechanism by which ethnic exclusion is posited to impact state 
capacity is, however, virtually the same as the one described earlier, through 
which ethnic diversity is hypothesized to work. Baldwin and Huber (2010), 
for example, explicitly draw on Alesina et al. (1999) and other studies to sug-
gest that economic disparities between ethnic groups will lead to different 
preferences for public goods, which will make it more difficult for the ethnic 
groups to reach agreement on and mobilize for public goods and that this 
will affect ‘governance’, in particular, government provision of public health, 
education, public infrastructure and even a government’s taxing capacity.19
19 It is interesting that Baldwin and Huber (2010, p. 645) also suggest that ‘under such cir-
cumstances politicians may try to win reelection by providing private goods for each group, 
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More generally, we believe that both the scholarship on ethnic diver-
sity and ethnic exclusion leave unaddressed a major question about their 
implicit causal logic. The core claim underlying studies that conceptualize 
ethnicity either in demographic terms or in access to economic-political 
power is that this influences the likelihood that individuals across different 
ethnic groups will cooperate and mobilize collectively for state provision 
of public goods. If we reverse the logic, however, while the heterogeneity 
or economic-political inequality of ethnic groups reduces the chances of 
inter-ethnic collective action, it increases the likelihood of mobilization on 
the part of particular ethnic groups. As already noted, according to the eth-
nic diversity and public goods provision literature, common traits facilitate 
the formation of shared preferences and thus the propensity for collective 
action—an argument that applies not just to mobilization across distinct 
ethnicities but also among members of a specific ethnic group. Similarly, the 
experience of economic-political inequality might lead to a sense of relative 
deprivation (Gurr 1970) and ethnic opportunity hoarding, that is, attempts 
to concentrate status and wealth within a group’s network boundaries (Tilly 
1998),20 thereby increasing the likelihood of ethnic-based collective action. 
In turn, such mobilization by specific ethnic groups could either enhance 
or impede state capacity, and therefore, requires further exploration in its 
own right.
(A3) Ethnic Exclusion and Violent Mobilization by Ethnic Groups
The mechanisms that follow are therefore less concerned with inter-ethnic 
cooperation and instead focus on ethnic mobilization, which broadly refers 
to collective action that employs a belief in a shared culture and common 
ancestry as the basis for group membership and political claims.21 In turn, 
the impact of ethnic mobilization is traced across different dimensions of 
state capacity, including public goods provision, but also bureaucratic pro-
fessionalism and extraction.
For identifying the specific effects of ethnic-based collective action, we 
draw on a major distinction made in the literature in ethnic politics and 
especially when the number of groups is not too large’. We discuss this distinct mechanism of 
how ethnicity might affect state capacity through the informal institution of patron–client 
relations later in the chapter.
20 Opportunity hoarding occurs ‘when members of a categorically bounded network acquire 
access to a resource that is valuable, renewable, subject to monopoly, supportive of network 
activities, and enhanced by the network’s modus operandi’ (Tilly 1998, p. 91).
21 See McAdam et al. (2001) and Olzak (1983). Ethnic mobilization can manifest itself in a 
variety of organizational forms. Most importantly, social movements, political parties, and 
civic associations constitute important ‘carriers’ of ethnicity and provide a crucial platform for 
the articulation of ethnic-based demands.
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differentiate between violent and non-violent forms of ethnic mobilization.22 
Whether or not ethnic-based collective action takes on a violent form is con-
tingent on a whole host of factors, an analysis of which is beyond the scope 
of this chapter. For our purposes it is sufficient to highlight two important 
findings. First, recent studies of ethnic violence have largely discredited the 
view that ethnic diversity is associated with violent ethnic mobilization. 
There is little or no evidence that ethnic factionalization directly affects eth-
nic violence (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Second, 
a number of recent studies have, however, demonstrated an association 
between the exclusion of, especially demographically large, ethnic groups 
from state power and the incidence of civil war (Cederman and Girardin 
2007; Cederman et al. 2010). The causal mechanism suggested by this body 
of work moves from political exclusion to grievances to collective action. 
More excluded groups are more likely to perceive their situation as directly 
contradicting the nationalist principle of political legitimacy (i.e. ethnic likes 
should rule ethnic likes), and the resulting sense of injustice and resentment 
constitutes a crucial mobilization resource for organized violence against the 
state.23
There is a long tradition in comparative politics and political sociology 
that links the rise of high-capacity states to organized violence.24 The argu-
ments of this ‘bellicist approach’ (Centeno 2002) have, however, been pri-
marily made for inter-state conflict. Different kinds of organized violence 
have different, sometimes even contrasting, consequences for state capac-
ity. Another literature shows that civil war, and intra-state conflict, has a 
devastating impact on the competencies of states to extract resources and 
provide public goods (Kalyvas 2006; Thies 2005). This form of organized 
violence often pits civilians against civilians and usually does not involve 
22 In the next mechanism set (B), we also disaggregate ethnic mobilization in terms of its 
geographical location and the nature of demands. For our current purposes the distinction 
between violent and non-violent forms of ethnic-based collective action suffices. Organized 
ethnic violence includes systematic threats, harassment, anti-group demonstrations, the delib-
erate destruction of property, physical attacks on people, and communal rioting, and might 
even turn into guerrilla warfare and civil war. Non-violent forms of collective actions pursued 
by ethnic groups and their political representatives include electoral campaigns, lobbying, but 
also public demonstrations and rallies, vigils, pickets, and boycotts, strikes, road blocks, and 
other forms of symbolic confrontations. For a social-movements perspective on different pro-
test strategies, see Diani and Bison (2004).
23 Obviously the motivation of excluded ethnic groups to engage in violent collective action 
against the state needs to be complemented by the organizational capacity to do so. Past 
patterns of ethnic conflict also contribute to the propensity for violent ethnic mobilization 
(Cederman et al. 2010).
24 According to this perspective, war (or the threat of war) induced economic elites to pay 
taxes and accept other controls on their behaviour (Levi 1988; Tilly 1975). Similarly, war pushed 
rulers to build an administrative machinery capable of mobilizing the resources necessary for 
the deployment of armies and the acquisition of military technology (Downing 1992; Ertman 
1997). Finally, with the imposition of conscription state leaders became more responsive to 
citizen-soldiers and their demands for social provision (Hobsbawm 1990; Skocpol 1992).
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mass military conscription and the coordination of large armies—the main 
causal processes highlighted by the bellicist approach as driving the positive 
relationship between violent conflict and state capacity. Seen in this light 
then, ethnic violence is almost certain to undermine the administrative and 
extractive competencies of states.
(A4) Ethnic Exclusion and Non-violent Mobilization by Ethnic Groups
The picture is less clear-cut for non-violent forms of ethnic mobilization. On 
the one hand, collective action of ethnic groups, in particular, minorities 
and/or excluded ethnic groups, for access to public goods or official recogni-
tion of historic injustices may place new issues on the political agenda and 
generate more targeted state policies (Banting and Kymlicka 2007, p.  17). 
For example, one of the major achievements of indigenous movements and 
ethnic parties in Latin America has been to bring previously marginalized 
ethnic groups into the political arena and turn their demands for recog-
nition and inclusion into legitimate political issues, thereby changing the 
policy priorities of state leaders (Van Cott 2005). In turn, more targeted state 
policies could further the welfare of these groups and by doing so, promote 
the provision of public goods. A related argument emphasizes that ethnic 
mobilization can also help to establish new ‘information linkages’ (Tendler 
1997) between the state and (previously) excluded groups that provide offi-
cials with more accurate knowledge about local needs and what kinds of 
public services work, thereby enhancing state administrative competence.
By the same token, however, non-violent ethnic mobilization could also 
prove to be detrimental for state capacity. Ethnic-based collective action 
may also focus on gaining control over state personnel and placing ‘their 
own’ within the state apparatus. If successful, this ‘ethnicization of state 
bureaucracy’ (Wimmer 1997, 2002) impacts state capacity through at least 
two major channels. One is administrative competence, or the extent of 
bureaucratic professionalism found among state agents. The recruitment of 
potentially less qualified co-ethnics might compromise the formation of a 
bureaucratic esprit de corps. The other concerns public goods provision. As 
illustrated by post-conflict Lebanon (Cammett 2011), ethnicization of the 
bureaucracy can also involve the biased and discriminatory use of public 
services. Under these circumstances, welfare provision can turn into a pre-
mium for political support, which in turn impedes universal access to these 
collective goods.
In sum, our discussion so far has shown that the impact of ethnic diversity 
or ethnic exclusion on public goods provision is not limited to the under-
mining of inter-ethnic cooperation. Ethnic mobilization, or the collec-
tive action by a particular ethnic group, constitutes another crucial causal 
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pathway through which ethnicity shapes state capacity. We have further 
demonstrated that the effects of ethnic mobilization—whether violent or 
non-violent—are not limited to public goods provision and also impact on 
other dimensions of state capacity, most prominently administrative com-
petence and extraction.
The primary causal link in all the mechanisms discussed so far are the 
actions of ethnic groups, whether in the form of inter-ethnic cooperation or 
mobilization by a particular ethnic group. It is useful, however, at this point 
to move beyond the notion of a direct causal pathway between ethnic-based 
collective action and state capacity and broaden our analytical lens.
Causal Mechanism Set (B): Actions by Other Actors
A plausible alternative is to consider how the dynamics of ethnicity influ-
ence state capacity through the (re)actions of other collectivities. Our start-
ing point is the observation that distinct patterns of ethnic exclusion or 
ethnic-based collective action are likely to elicit distinct responses from 
other collective actors. In this section we therefore focus on ways in which 
ethnicity transforms state capacity by shaping the behaviour of other actors. 
Building on the recent emphasis on elites as a major determinant of state 
capacity25 we concentrate on two sets of elite actors—societal elites and state 
officials.
(B1) Ethnic Exclusion and Alliance Strategies by Societal Elites
As shown in Table 9.3, the first batch of mechanisms in this set focuses on 
the interests and behaviour of the upper classes of the dominant ethnic 
group.26 In the subsequent paragraphs we show that—whether instigated by 
the salience of ethnic exclusion or ethnic mobilization—the alliance strate-
gies of these societal elites constitute another major causal pathway linking 
ethnicity to state capacity.
One mechanism variant puts the analytical spotlight on cross-class alli-
ances. In this perspective ethnic exclusion influences the propensity of upper 
groups from the dominant ethnic group to form a coalition with lower-class 
co-ethnics, with different types of these alliances then shaping the ability 
of states to pursue their projects. More specifically, stark ethnic boundaries 
might lead the economically privileged to ally with subordinate sectors of the 
25 Amsden et al. (2012) and North et al. (2009) are prominent examples for this trend. See 
vom Hau (2012) for an overview.
26 Those elites include, most importantly, the economically privileged sectors, but also civil 
society leaders.
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Causal mechanism Affected dimension(s) of state 
capacity
(B1) Ethnic exclusion Alliance strategies by societal 
elites (upper classes of domi-




(B2) Ethnic mobilization Alliance strategies by societal 
elites (upper classes of domi-
nant ethnic group ally with 
state)
Extractive capacities (+)
(B3) Ethnic mobilization Alliance strategies by societal 
elites (upper classes of domi-




(B4) Ethnic exclusion Political survival considerations 
of state elites (state caters to 
included ethnic groups)
Territorial reach (–)
Distribution of public goods (–)
(B5) Ethnic mobilization Political survival considerations 
of state elites (state accom-
modates most powerful ethnic 
groups)
Public goods provision (+)
Territorial reach (+)
Distribution of public goods (–)
(B6) Ethnic mobilization Ideas held by state elites (state 
response shaped by perceived 
level of cultural difference or 
ethnic threat)
Public goods provision (–)
Territorial reach (–)
Source: Authors.
same ethnic group and support the state’s extractive efforts. Put differently, 
the exclusion of a common ethnic ‘out-group’ promotes a greater sense of 
solidarity on the part of economic elites towards members of their ‘in-group’ 
and induces them to form a cross-class coalition with lower sectors, leading to 
greater elite willingness to make economic concessions and pay taxes. In con-
texts of less explicit forms of ethnic political exclusion, however, economic 
elites are less likely to pay taxes on the grounds that these payments benefit 
their co-ethnics. The rise of distinct tax states in South Africa and Brazil 
illustrates this mechanism variant. In apartheid South Africa, the political 
exclusion of blacks led to the emergence of a cross-class coalition among 
whites and a ‘politics of collective sacrifice’ (Lieberman 2003, p. 254) among 
the economically privileged, while in Brazil, with a relatively less institution-
alized racial order, white upper groups were less inclined to form a cross-class 
alliance, because they perceived both poor blacks and poor whites as distinct 
from themselves. The consequence was comparatively less tax compliance 
with the state (Lieberman 2003; see also Marx 1998).
Another version of this argument is equally concerned with cross-class alli-
ances between elites and lower sectors of the same ethnic group. It equally 
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suggests that the explicit exclusion of an ethnic out-group motivates economic 
elites to ally with their poor brethren from the ethnic in-group. Yet, in this per-
spective cross-class alliances induce elites to pressure the state to accommodate 
their new alliance partners. And a likely underpinning of these broad coali-
tional arrangements is the distribution of side payments to new ethnic con-
stituencies (Waldner 1999, pp. 37–49), especially in the form of patronage-based 
recruitment into the state bureaucracy, which often has a negative impact on 
the administrative competence of states. The bottom line is thus a proposed 
negative relationship between explicit ethnic exclusion and state capacity. 
Inspiration for this mechanism variant comes from arguments about coalition 
dynamics and state capacity found in recent writings on the developmental 
state, a literature that is not directly concerned with ethnicity. Most prom-
inently, the studies by Atul Kohli (2004) and David Waldner (1999) sug-
gest that ‘narrow coalitions’ of states with capital-owning groups, such as 
in mid-twentieth-century South Korea, are generally more effective in pro-
moting industrialization, while states with ‘broad coalitions’, such as in 
mid-twentieth-century Turkey, need to accommodate a variety of often con-
tradictory citizen demands, and are therefore more likely to exhibit a politi-
cized bureaucracy.
(B2/B3) Ethnic Mobilization and Alliance Strategies by Societal Elites
A second batch of mechanisms in this set centres on state–elite alliances, 
that is, on coalitions between societal elites and the state. Our starting point 
is ethnic mobilization and we analyse how differences in the demands and 
location of mobilized ethnic groups can affect the alliance strategies of soci-
etal elites vis-à-vis the state. Specifically, when ethnic mobilization involves 
redistributive claims and unfolds close to urban centres, which is where eco-
nomic elites are more likely to be concentrated, then these upper classes are 
likely to see it as especially threatening to established property relations and 
to their economic status. These concerns about the potential loss of their 
privileged position make it more likely that economic elites will seek an alli-
ance with the state against ethnic contenders. Upper groups are willing to 
pay higher taxes in exchange for the provision of security and the repression 
of popular threats. The alliance with the state thus helps societal elites to 
maintain their economic and political privileges, while enhancing the state’s 
extractive capacity. On the other hand, when ethnic mobilization does not 
make class-based demands and occurs in relatively distant rural areas it poses 
much less of a threat for the established elites and they are less likely to seek 
an alliance and cooperate with the extractive efforts of the state.
Dan Slater (2010) develops and tests this mechanism for the context of 
South East Asia. In mid-twentieth-century Indonesia, ethnic mobilization 
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was class based and took place in cities prompting societal elites to form 
encompassing ‘protection pacts’ with the state, which greatly enhanced the 
state’s extractive capacities. Ethnic rebellions in the Philippines, by contrast, 
unfolded in remote provinces and were not redistributive in their demands, 
societal elites felt less threatened and formed flimsy elite pacts with the 
state, ultimately resulting in a state with relatively poor extractive capacities.
The effect of ethnic mobilization on elite–state alliances might also, how-
ever, be the reverse, with ultimately negative implications for state capacity. 
Economic elites who find their positions threatened by ethnic mobilization 
that advances demands for redistribution and the reordering of political 
power structures might be more inclined to withdraw their support from the 
state, reduce their tax payments, and instead focus their efforts on retaining 
their elite status by establishing private security measures and/or promoting 
the territorial reorganization of the state. Kent Eaton’s (2007, p. 2011) study 
of Bolivia and Ecuador provides a particularly stark example of this mecha-
nism variant. In these two countries, characterized by sharp geographical 
divisions between the centres of economic activity and the political capital, 
economic elites are greatly concerned about the recent rise of indigenous 
politics. In response, elites push for greater territorial autonomy among the 
economically most prosperous regions and the devolution of tax author-
ity to these sub-national units, thereby undermining the extractive compe-
tence of the central state.
Taken together, the mechanisms developed in this section so far link eth-
nicity to state capacity outcomes via the alliance strategies of societal elites. 
Distinct patterns of ethnic exclusion or ethnic mobilization result in differ-
ent cross-class alliances (i.e. coalitions between upper and lower strata of the 
same ethnic group) and/or elite–state coalitions (i.e. pacts between powerful 
economic forces and the state), which in turn shape the extractive capacity 
of states. The next section continues the focus on how ethnicity influences 
state capacity through its impact on collective actors but shifts the focus 
away from societal elites to state elites.
(B4) Ethnic Exclusion and Political Survival Considerations  
by State Elites
Our discussion so far has treated the state as a ‘black box’. When analysing 
the causal impact of ethnicity on state capacity, the previous mechanisms 
all assumed that different social pressures on the state translate into distinct 
forms of public goods provision, administrative competence, or extractive 
capacities. This perspective remains incomplete, however, without taking 
another plausible causal mechanism into account. In this section we argue 
that ethnic exclusion or ethnic mobilization might affect state capacity 
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by shaping the preferences and perceptions, and consequently the strate-
gic actions of state elites. This emphasis on the agency of state leaders and 
high-level bureaucrats builds on a substantial literature that treats states as 
potentially autonomous actors with a self-directed agenda independent of 
civil society pressures or dominant economic interests.27
The first batch of mechanisms within this perspective focus on how eth-
nicity influences the fundamental interests of executive authorities and 
high-level bureaucrats: the maximization of state resources28 and staying in 
power. Specifically, we trace how political-survival considerations of state 
officials shape the geographical coverage of the state and access to public 
services across state territory.
Explicit forms of ethno-political exclusion, especially from executive posi-
tions in government, might reduce the motivation of state elites to expand 
territorial reach and establish public services across national territory. When 
ethnic groups lack political representation and consequently, political voice, 
state authorities are less inclined to provide universal services, and can instead 
focus their efforts on providing public services to their preferred ethnic group(s) 
(Wimmer et  al. 2009). As powerfully illustrated by the case of Iraq before 
2003, the systematic political exclusion of an ethnic group (e.g. Shia Arabs) 
may give way to the territorial and social concentration of state infrastructure 
with the ethnic group(s) that has political representation in the ranks for the 
state (e.g. Sunni Arabs), coming to enjoy most of the public benefits provided 
(Wimmer 2002). By contrast, in instances of greater ethno-political inclusion, 
state elites might be more inclined to expand the state’s territorial reach and 
provide public goods to the whole population, largely because their political 
survival is more likely to depend on support across ethnic boundaries.
(B5) Ethnic Mobilization and Political Survival  
Considerations by State Elites
State elites’ preferences for political survival and resource maximization are 
influenced equally by patterns of ethnic mobilization. In this perspective, 
the decision of state leaders and high-level bureaucrats to expand the territo-
rial reach of the state and provide public goods depends on the political and 
economic strength of mobilized ethnic groups. When an ethnic group is in 
control of desirable economic resources and is able to powerfully advance its 
collective demands, state officials might be more inclined to establish state 
infrastructure and invest in public services, largely because they feel threatened 
27 Evans et al. (1985) represents the classic appraisal of a statist approach. For recent over-
views of this research perspective see Vu (2010).
28 Whether these resources are used for their direct personal benefits or the ‘sake of the peo-
ple’ is another question and of less importance for our current purposes.
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by the mobilization and want to keep it under control. We extrapolate this 
argument from Catherine Boone’s (2003) work on state capacity in Western 
Africa. Boone suggests that state elites are more likely to expand the territorial 
reach of the state and invest in the construction of local infrastructure (such 
as building roads, hospitals, or schools) when they feel challenged by an eco-
nomically and politically powerful rural society (Boone 2003, p. 30–1).
Both of the mechanism variants discussed so far posit an impact of eth-
nic exclusion or ethnic mobilization on state capacity via the political sur-
vival and resource maximization strategies of state elites. State responses to 
ethno-political inequalities and ethnic collective action might also, how-
ever, depend on the preconceived ideas state officials hold about a particu-
lar ethnic group. In this line of reasoning, cultural representations, official 
national narratives, and collective memories mediate the effects of ethnic-
ity on state capacity by shaping how executive authorities and higher-level 
bureaucrats perceive an ethnic group, and based on that what kind of reac-
tions to ethnic-based mobilization they consider appropriate.
(B6) Ethnic Mobilization and Ideas about Ethnic  
Groups Held by State Elites
Cultural representations of an ethnic group play a notable role in the 
response of state elites to ethnic mobilization. Of particular importance 
appears to be the perceived level of cultural difference. When state offi-
cials view a particular ethnic group as amenable to assimilation into the 
larger society, they might be more compelled to channel public resources 
to expand the territorial reach of the state and provide public goods. This 
decision is primarily motivated by the expected returns following assimi-
lation, in the form of political loyalty and/or economic contributions as 
new taxpayers. By contrast, perceptions of stark cultural differences might 
discourage state leaders and higher-level bureaucrats from investing exten-
sively in state infrastructure or fiscal efforts. This mechanism expands 
on George Steinmetz’s (2007) study of distinct types of German colonial 
state-building during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
German officials, inspired by dominant ethnographic representations, 
deemed the indigenous populations of South West Africa as having the 
potential for entering their ‘civilization’, and therefore responded to eth-
nic mobilization (i.e. local revolts) by combining severe repression with 
the expansion of territorial reach and the provision of public goods.29 By 
29 Other examples for a state expanding both its repressive apparatus and public goods pro-
vision (e.g. roads, health clinics) are Nazi Germany before the Second World War (1933–9) or 
Chile under Pinochet (1973–90).
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contrast, ethnographic representations that portrayed Samoans as noble 
and endangered savages whose cultural survival was at stake, led colonial 
state officials to respond more mildly to local revolts and refrain from 
extensive infrastructure-building and public goods provision. For our pur-
poses, Steinmetz’s analysis reveals that dominant cultural representations 
of ethnic groups shape possible state responses to ethnic-based mobiliza-
tion, with major implications for state capacity.
A similar argument can be made for official national narratives. In this 
perspective, state responses to ethnic collective action are influenced by 
the role state-sponsored nationalist discourses assign to a particular ethnic 
group. When state leaders and high-level bureaucrats see an ethnic group as 
a major security threat to state sovereignty and stability (and, by extension, 
their own political survival), they might be less likely to accommodate the 
demands of this group. In these instances, state infrastructure and public 
goods provision are not extended to parts of the state territory inhabited by 
the supposed threat-posers. A powerful example for this mechanism comes 
from Turkey. Official narratives that identify the Kurds as an imminent 
threat to the territorial integrity of the Turkish nation has led to a deliberate 
limitation of territorial reach and public goods provision in areas predomi-
nantly populated by ethnic Kurds (Yeğen 2006).
Another variant of this mechanism emphasizes the central role of collec-
tive memory in shaping state elite perceptions of mobilized ethnic groups. 
How state leaders and high-level bureaucrats remember past patterns of eth-
nic mobilization has major ramifications for their interpretations of contem-
porary ethnic collective action. Often, elite threat perceptions are coloured 
by historical experiences of ethnic conflict. When state authorities maintain 
a historical memory of a group as a threat to their political survival, they 
might be less likely to accommodate (or even acknowledge) demands from 
this group. As Paul Brass (1994) illustrates for postcolonial India, state leaders 
such as Nehru were more likely to positively consider demands made by dis-
tinct linguistic groups. By contrast, ethno-religious mobilization was treated 
with suspicion, to a large extent because of the looming history of the parti-
tion of India. This line of argument thus stresses that state elite perceptions 
of particular ethnic groups are tinted by the memory of past interactions 
and conflicts, and that these memories influence state elite responses to eth-
nic mobilization.
In sum, this batch of causal mechanisms helps to open the black box of 
the state. In this perspective, ethnicity influences state capacity by shaping 
the actions of state elites. Whether directly driven by concerns about politi-
cal survival and state resources, or mediated by cultural representations, 
official national narratives, or collective memories of past ethnic conflict, 
it is via the preferences and perceptions, and consequently behaviour, of 
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state officials that ethnic exclusion or ethnic mobilization impact on state 
capacity.
Causal Mechanisms (C): Institutional Change
The focus on the alliance strategies of societal elites and the strategic actions of 
state officials in the previous section provides an important corrective to the 
idea that ethnic-based collective action, whether in the form of inter-group 
cooperation or ethnic mobilization, automatically affects state capacity. As we 
have shown, there are many instances in which collective ethnic demands 
influence state capacity through less direct means. As summarized in Table 
9.4, in the remainder of the chapter we turn to institutional change as another 
major indirect causal pathway. Institutions have long been treated as crucial 
to account for state capacity (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Mahoney 2010; 
North et al. 2009). Specifically, a growing literature treats institutions as both 
the means and end of political struggle, because they ultimately routinize 
power asymmetries (Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Wimmer 2012b). Building 
on this ‘power-institutional’ approach, we first turn to the nexus between 
ethnic collective action and formal institutions. We explore how mobilized 
ethnic groups might challenge and even change formal state institutions and 
how, in turn, these transformed institutions can influence state capacity.
(C1) Feedback Effects between Formal Representative  
Institutions and Ethnic Mobilization
A first batch of mechanisms identifies an iterative relationship between eth-
nic mobilization and existing formal representative institutions as a major 
driver of state capacity. In this perspective, ethnic groups are centrally con-
cerned with formal recognition and inclusion. In order to change existing 
institutional arrangements ethnic groups frequently push for new legisla-
tion that establishes or advances their representation (see Amenta et  al. 
2010). Their demands include, but are not limited to, federalism, asymmet-
rical federal structures, consociationalism, but also affirmative action, quo-
tas, and other special group rights in education, employment, health, and 
electoral systems. While the debate about what forms of ethnic mobilization 
are particularly influential in shaping representative institutions remains 
inconclusive,30 there appears to be a consensus that, once introduced, these 
30 The literature on political parties points to a variety of factors that determine electoral 
success and, by extension, impact on institutional change. Scholars emphasize party appeals 
(e.g. exclusionary vs. populist-inclusive) (Chandra 2007; Madrid 2012), party organization 
(e.g. Levitsky 2003), ties to ethnic movements (Van Cott 2005), and political context, most 
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institutions have major feedback effects on ethnic collective action. There 
are at least two rival models that map out the relationship.
On the one hand are those who argue that the expansion of formal repre-
sentative platforms to incorporate ethnic groups has negative implications 
for state capacity. Drawing on case studies from eleven Southern African 
countries, Evan Lieberman and Prerna Singh (2012) find that the institution-
alization of ethnic representation deepens ethnic cleavages and ultimately 
leads to an increased proclivity for ethnic violence, thereby undermining 
the administrative competence and fiscal capacity of the state. On the other 
hand, the literature on ethno-political exclusion (Cederman et  al. 2010; 
Cederman and Girardin 2007; Chandra and Wilkinson 2008)  suggests 
almost the opposite. In this perspective, the institutionalization of formal 
ethnic representation can potentially overcome power differentials among 
rival ethnic groups. This, in turn, leads to lower instances of mobilization 
and, potentially reduces the likelihood of ethnic violence.
(C2) Ethnic Mobilization and the Introduction of New Formal 
Representative Institutions
Another institutional mechanism variant also suggests that, ceteris pari-
bus, mobilized ethnic groups push for recognition and inclusion via formal 
Table 9.4. Causal mechanism set (C): institutional change
Conceptual approach to 
ethnicity
Causal mechanism Affected dimension(s)  
of state capacity
(C1) Ethnic mobilization Feedback effects between 
formal representative 
institutions and ethnic 
mobilization (+)
Public goods provision (+/–)
Administrative competence (+/–)
Extractive capacity (+/–)
(C2) Ethnic mobilization Introduction of new 
formal representative 
institutions (+)
Public goods provision (+/–)
Administrative competence (+/–)
Territorial reach (+/–)
(C3) Ethnic mobilization Informal control over 
(parts of) state  
apparatus (+)
Distribution of public goods (–)
Administrative competence (–)
Source: Authors.
prominently party-systems (Kitschelt 1988)  and other institutional factors (Horowitz 1985). 
Echoing the literature on political parties, the main debates on ethnic movements centre on 
the conditions under which movements influence policy (Amenta et al. 2010). Some research-
ers stress that mobilization in itself is sufficient to induce policy change (McCarthy and Zald 
1977), others point to particular forms of movement organization (e.g. Andrews 2004), move-
ment strategies (e.g. Cress and Snow 2000), and the broader political context, particularly the 
support of powerful allies (Kitschelt 1986; Amenta 2006). Similar arguments have been made 
in the literature on civic associations (e.g. Skocpol 2003; Varshney 2003).
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institutions. Yet, in contrast to the emphasis on feedback effects, the focus is on 
how new representative institutions transform the state apparatus. The imple-
mentation of these institutions usually entails novel bureaucratic procedures 
and structures, with varying effects on state capacity. Existing approaches are 
again divided about the expected benefits of these rearrangements.
On the positive end, recent studies of affirmative action in the United 
States and Brazil (Htu 2004; Sowell 2004)  suggest that the construction 
of new state agencies facilitate the provision of services and infrastruc-
ture across wider segments of the society. Similarly, the decentralization of 
political authority via federalist or consociationalist arrangements might 
lead to new bureaucratic structures and competencies, with largely benefi-
cial effects on the administrative competence and territorial reach of the 
state apparatus. On the other hand, the same representative institutions 
might also generate unexpected problems for state public goods provision. 
For example, affirmative action or federalist arrangements often intro-
duce new veto points into the policymaking process, thereby impeding 
the effective provision of public services (Gerring et al. 2005; Huber and 
Stephens 2001).
(C3) Ethnic Mobilization and Informal Control Over (Parts of) the State 
Apparatus
Another mechanism in the institutional tradition focuses on informal 
institutions and puts the analytical spotlight on patron–client relations to 
explore how ethnic mobilization exerts influence on state capacity.31 The 
emphasis here is on the inclusion of ethnic groups within the state via per-
sonalistic ties and tolerance for graft, and the effects of these arrangements 
on bureaucratic professionalism and the reach of public services.
Even though recent revisionist scholarship contends that state bureau-
cracies characterized by clientelism may still manage to ignite substantial 
economic growth (e.g. Kelsall et al. 2010; Darden 2008), a rather large litera-
ture remains sceptical. In this dominant view informal ethnic favouritism 
and patronage politics ultimately undermine state capacity (e.g. Knack and 
Keefer 2003; Kuhonta 2011; Lange et al. 2006; Lange 2009; Mahoney 2010; 
Sacks and Levi 2010). We therefore suggest that when mobilized ethnic 
groups gain control over (certain parts of) the state apparatus, they might 
31 The agenda-setting work on informal institutions is Helmke and Levitsky (2006). Works 
on the nexus between informal institutions and state capacity are not limited to patron–client 
relations, but also explore the role of customary law and norms of communal reciprocity and 
solidarity in shaping the administrative competence and territorial reach of states. See MacLean 
(2010), Tsai (2007), and Van Cott (2005, 2008).
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exploit their newly acquired powers and use their position to systematically 
favour co-ethnics, with negative consequences for public goods provision 
and state territorial reach. For example, in the cases of post-conflict Lebanon 
or Uttar Pradesh in India, highly mobilized sectarian parties and move-
ments employ welfare provision as premium for political support. The result 
is a highly unbalanced geography of public goods provision (Cammett 
2011; Singh 2010). Similarly, the prevalence of informal ethnic favourit-
ism among state elites generates strong disincentives for excluded groups 
to pay taxes and share resources (Wimmer 2002; Wolfe and Klausen 1997).
In sum, mobilized ethnic groups seek to achieve recognition and inclu-
sion through the transformation of established institutional arrange-
ments. Once implemented, formal representative institutions transform 
state capacity by providing opportunities for subsequent rounds of eth-
nic mobilization, and introducing new bureaucratic arrangements, while 
informal patron–client relationships usually entail a biased distribution 
of state resources.
Conclusion
This chapter has situated the political economy literature on ethnic 
diversity and public goods provision within a larger body of scholar-
ship on the effects of ethnicity on state capacity. In its almost exclusive 
focus on inter-ethnic cooperation, or collective action across different 
ethnic groups, this literature neglects other plausible causal pathways. 
In response, we have identified a broader range of causal mechanisms 
through which ethnicity might impact on state capacity. Specifically, we 
have developed three sets of mechanisms and have shown how collective 
action by ethnic groups (whether in the form of inter-ethnic cooperation 
or ethnic mobilization), the actions and perceptions of other collective 
actors (whether societal elites or state officials), and institutional change 
(whether of formal or informal institutions) shape the ability of states to 
provide public goods.
Our critique points to the need of revisiting and nuancing the political 
economy scholarship. As a matter of fact, the chapter highlights the need 
for an alternative approach when exploring the effects of ethnicity on 
state capacity. Such a framework would: (a) start from the political salience 
of ethnicity rather than ethnic diversity per se, and connect public goods 
provision to the concept of state capacity; (b) develop a novel set of causal 
mechanisms that focus on state responses and institutional change rather 
than the actions by ethnic groups when tracing how ethnic mobilization 
impacts on state capacity outcomes; and (c) take a historical approach 
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32 On mechanism complementarity and scope conditions see, for example, Matthew Lange’s 
(2012) study of the impact of education on ethnic violence.
33 See Rueschemeyer (2009); Elster (1985).
that would incorporate the crucial role of states as identity-shapers into 
explanations of ethnic-based collective action rather than treating ethnic 
divisions as a given demographic fact.
Such a novel framework would also explore interactions among mecha-
nisms. It is likely that the presence of one mechanism has major implica-
tions for the effect of another, resulting in complementary, or sometimes 
contradictory effects on state capacity.32 For example, strong urban-based 
ethnic movements are expected to engender broad alliances between soci-
etal elites and the state, and, as a result, lead to a greater tax base, while 
the same movements might also foster ethnic favouritism among state 
officials. The framework would also accommodate the context-depend-
ency of causal mechanisms.33 Ethnic diversity, exclusion, or mobilization 
only affect state capacity in certain social and political environments. It 
is therefore crucial to explore how specific contexts activate, intensify, or 
otherwise shape the directions of causal mechanisms. Particular impor-
tant scope conditions include the historical legacies of ethnic exclusion 
(Lange et al. 2006; Mahoney 2010; Tilly 1998), the density of civil society 
(Varshney 2003; Wimmer 2002), and political regime forms.
More research is also required to revisit the empirical foundations of the 
ethnic diversity and public goods provision hypothesis and further develop 
a plausible alternative that addresses its major conceptual and theoretical 
shortcomings. What this chapter already indicates, however, is that ethnic-
ity should be taken seriously when analysing state capacity. Ethnicity, and 
identity more generally, is not just the outcome, but also a possible determi-









The Politics of Aid Revisited: A Review  
of Evidence on State Capacity  
and Elite Commitment
Arjan de Haan and Ward Warmerdam
Introduction: The Impact of Aid in Political Perspective
There is little analysis of how donors, even where they do start adopting a 
political perspective, influence local institutions and the people they work 
with. This chapter, the result of a systematic review of the impacts of aid, or 
international development cooperation, on state capacity for and elite com-
mitment to sustainable development, highlights that a better understanding 
of—and indeed reconceptualization of—the ‘impact of aid’ has the poten-
tial to directly inform practices of international development. This requires, 
inter alia, better empirical insight into the way donors interact with formal 
and informal institutions in the countries where they work. This is particu-
larly relevant in aid-dependent countries, but knowledge about interaction 
between national and international institutions from other countries may 
prove relevant too. Moreover, it is critical to see aid as part of a spectrum of 
international exchange, rather than in isolation.
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section provides a birds’ 
eye view of the existing literature and field of study, including of recent 
large research programmes. The literature on the impact of aid tends to be 
polarized, and fragmented, and hence the second section shows the differ-
ent strands, and how the fragmentation of perspectives potentially impacts 
research and findings on the impact of aid. The third section refers to the 
de-politicization of aid, and its analysis, and discusses the role of political (or 
political–economy) analysis on the practices of donors. The fourth section dis-
cusses the more technocratic literature on aid, including on conditionalities, 
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which we argue can be conceptualized in the form of implicit contracts, dif-
ferent aid modalities, and donors’ efforts to support revenue generation and 
taxation. The conclusion pulls together the emerging findings, and argues 
the need to go beyond a conceptualization of ‘the impact of aid’, and inte-
grate the continued presence of donors in the analysis of local politics.
Scanning the Field
The existing literature tells us relatively little about how aid impacts state capac-
ity for and elites’ commitment to sustainable development, despite oft-repeated 
assertions of the importance of these attributes. Particularly the question of 
how aid affects elite commitment, is not well researched. A  word search of 
our one-hundred-page annotated bibliography (Warmerdam and de Haan 
2011) does not give a single score on ‘elite commitment’. The word commit-
ment appears sixteen times, but only in three cases does this have analytical 
content (as opposed to reference to, say, morally inspired calls) (Nelson 1984; 
Killick 1997; Savun and Tirone 2011).1 Given the investment in research on 
governance over the last decade or more, this is surprising (OECD 2010; World 
Bank 2007, 2008),2 and it is important to discuss the emphasis in this research.
Following the growing attention to governance during the 1990s, DFID 
made significant investments in research to better understand ways in which 
improving governance can contribute to better development outcomes.3 
It funded three major research initiatives for a period of ten years:  the 
Crisis States Research Centre (at LSE), the Centre for Future States, and the 
Citizenship, Accountability and Participation programme.4 The Oxford-based 
Centre for Research on Inequality and Ethnicity was less squarely focused on 
governance, but its focus on structural inequalities is of relevance for this 
review (Brown and Stewart 2006).5 This set of programmes was followed 
by the Africa Power and Politics Programme, which focuses on identifying 
diverse sets of governance that promote development (Booth 2011a) and 
which emphasizes ‘working with the grain’ as a step beyond the good gov-
ernance agenda.6 The studies present casual observations regarding donors’ 
1 Nelson (1984), Killick (1997), and Savun and Tirone (2011).
2 OECD (2010), World Bank (2007, 2008).
3 Main findings that emerged from this are summarized in the DFID (2010) synthesis paper 
‘The Politics of Poverty: Elites, Citizens and States’.
4 See Gaventa and Barrett (2010) for a meta-case study on the ten-year research programme, 
analysing effects of citizen participation.
5 This argues that the reduction of inequalities (between culturally defined groups), should 
inform aid policy.
6 Booth (2009, 2011a) and Kelsall (2011a); the APPP work by Olivier de Sardan is even more 
averse to generalizations, focusing on practical norms governing behaviour (quoted in Booth 
2009, p. 12).
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barriers to seriously engage with politics, but the impact of aid on politics was 
not a major topic of research.
This research, in DFID’s Research and Evidence Division Staff’s summary, 
generally reaffirmed the primacy of politics, and political settlements for all 
development (including for economic growth), as ‘driver of change’. It empha-
sizes the importance of informal institutions, and donors’ misplaced emphasis 
on formal institutions alone—a further shift towards understanding informal 
institutions is desirable, including for the understanding of the impact of aid. 
Citizens’ engagement with the state was shown to be instrumentally relevant 
for development. It concluded that taxation is central in building effective 
states,7 as this provides the legitimacy of states vis-à-vis its citizens and reduces 
aid dependency.
Research at the University of Oxford Global Economic Governance 
Programme focuses on the politics of donor–recipient interaction, particularly 
the issue of ‘ownership’, how this is negotiated, and the effect the constant dis-
cussions with external players regarding development policy have on recipient 
state institutions, democracy, and politics (Whitfield 2008). This argues that 
‘ownership’ remains weak in many aid dependent countries, and policy deci-
sion-making processes dominated by donors, not only due to supply-side politics 
of aid, but also demand-side politics, especially where recipients are dependent 
on aid inflows to supply public services and any reduction in aid inflows could 
reduce the political legitimacy of the government (de Renzio et al. 2008). This is 
particularly problematic when policies are more in line with domestic demands, 
but are not supported by donors, resulting in aid reductions. A number of studies 
of the GEG Programme elaborate on differing political dynamics have allowed 
donors to either embed themselves in government, such as in Ghana (Whitfield 
2006), or not, as in Ethiopia (Furtado and Smith 2007), and how this and other 
factors such as recipient ideology, size, and history have an influence on the 
negotiating abilities and strategies of recipient governments.8
There is more knowledgement about the role of aid on state capacity than 
on elite commitment. However, this is insufficiently understood, partly because 
the literature stresses the negative impact of aid and failures of capacity-build-
ing, paying too little attention to how decades of aid relationship have become 
ingrained in the day-to-day politics in some countries.9 There is no consensus 
about the links between governance and development: these are of course 
7 See also the discussion by Mick Moore at <http://www.ids.ac.uk/news/what-s- so-exciting-a
bout-tax-and-development-a-new-global-focus-on-tax-policy-aid-and-good-governance> 
accessed 29 May 2014.
8 Also de Renzio and Hanlon (2007) on Mozambique, Fraser (2007) on Zambia, Harrison 
and Mulley (2007) on Tanzania, Hayman (2007) on Rwanda, and Bergamaschi (2008) on Mali.
9 Arguably, the literature also tends to under-emphasize the cases where aid has contributed to 
enhanced capacity, such as in China (World Bank, 2007; the common view that there has been 
no donor engagement in these areas appears mistaken), Taiwan and Botswana (Bräutigam, 2000).
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context dependent, and recent experience suggests that the link is more con-
tingent than may have been assumed earlier (Andrews 2008; Leftwich and 
Sen 2010).10 The contested field of capacity-building, discussed below, similarly 
highlights that many questions remain regarding the impact of aid, and that 
it may be necessary to rethink the way the question—particularly that of ‘aid 
effectiveness’—is approached.11
Quantitative cross-country studies have looked at the impact of aid on 
growth,12 despite doubts about data (Anderson et  al. 2005), and some of 
these include a variable on governance. Bräutigam and Knack (2004) found 
a robust statistical relationship between high aid levels and deteriorations in 
governance, as well as a relationship between higher aid levels and a lower 
tax share of GDP, while increases in GDP per capita correlate with improve-
ments in governance. The analysis does not allow us to discern the reasons for 
these correlations, but the authors suggest that institutional weakening and 
perverse incentives do play a role, and note the high transaction costs that 
accompany aid programmes.13 Rajan and Subramaniam (2007) are pessimistic 
about the impact aid can have on growth because it may constrain the growth 
of the manufacturing sector due the effect of aid on exchange rates. The study 
concludes that aid may weaken governance, ‘because aid inflows reduce the 
need for governments to tax the governed or enlist their cooperation’.
There is thus a significant gap in terms of empirical research on the impact 
of aid on capacity and, particularly, commitment. This absence may be unsur-
prising, given what we know about the depoliticization of aid, and the fact 
that the politics of aid has only recently entered into the mainstream of stud-
ies, following a period where ‘good governance’ research surged, but remained 
by and large technocractic.14 On the other hand, the absence is puzzling, as 
there are very strong views on whether aid works or not, as we discuss next.
Half a Dozen Views on Aid
Hugely differing perspectives on aid exist, with at least half a dozen posi-
tions. To start, there are many who claim that not enough aid is given. Calls 
10 Andrews (2008), Leftwich and Sen (2010).
11 Lancaster (2007) notes that the effectiveness of aid is measured as if human motives were 
the only objectives, thus ignoring in its assessment that there are various political and histori-
cal drivers of aid.
12 Recent studies and overviews include Killick and Foster (2011), Arndt et al. (2009), 
Roodman (2007), McGillivray et al. (2006), and Doucouliagos and Paldam (2005).
13 Collier (2002) builds on quantitative analysis (Collier and Dollar 1999) to develop meas-
ures to make aid smarter.
14 Leftwich (1994); de Haan and Everest-Phillips (2010). Hughes and Hutchinson (2012) argue 
that aid interventions have failed to shift modalities, as they have an inadequate conception 
of politics.
The Politics of Aid Revisited
263
for increased aid have been common at least since the Second World War, 
and there have been various waves of attention since. The immediate post-
war period witnessed large-scale funding through the Marshall Plan, and 
growing aid to developing countries, focusing on technical assistance and 
cooperation. In 1951 a UN commission recommended an increase of aid, to 
about $5 billion a year, to help countries increase economic growth to 2 per 
cent (Riddell 2007, p. 27). The report ‘Partners in Development’ was one of 
the first and subsequently most-commonly quoted official reports arguing 
for an increase in aid (Pearson 1969), calling for rich countries to devote 0.7 
per cent of their Gross National Income (GNI) to international development 
by 1975, but also to increase the efficiency of aid.
The optimism around 1970 was followed by ‘structural adjustment’ and 
stabilization of economies, and ‘aid fatigue’, even though throughout the 
1980s there were calls for increasing aid. The 1990s, with the end of the 
Cold War, and economic and budgetary constraints in donor countries 
like the US and Japan, witnessed sharp reductions in ODA. The amounts of 
aid to allied countries declined, and donors may have reduced their atten-
tion to (potential) conflicts and violence in developing countries, which 
changed sharply with 9/11. More attention started to be paid to the use of 
aid for governance reforms in the former USSR, and for democratization 
in Africa.
From the late 1990s onwards, calls for increasing aid again became stronger, 
accompanied by a sharpened focus on poverty reduction as the over-arching 
goal for development,15 illustrated, for example, in UN and World Bank pub-
lications. The Monterrey Conference became a symbol of reversal in views 
on aid, including the surprise announcement by the US President.16 The UN 
Millennium Development project calculated the amount of aid that would 
be required to achieve the MDGs, showing a great deal of trust in the impact 
of aid.17 Commitment to reach agreed levels of aid were reconfirmed after 
the financial crisis, but the political change particularly in Europe and the 
continued economic crisis since suggest we have once again entered a phase 
of aid fatigue, which is accompanied by the emergence of new donors and 
potentially a new aid paradigm.18
15 An important OECD report in 1995 signalled a turnaround of the pessimism. The change 
of government in the UK in 1997 led to the formation of a new and separate ministry, and con-
tributed to greater political interest.
16 Monterrey Consensus Report of the International Conference on Financing for 
Development Monterrey, Mexico, 18–22 March 2002: <http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/monterrey/ 
MonterreyConsensus.pdf> accessed 1 September 2014.
17 UN Millennium Project 2005; Sachs 2005.
18 So far, the attention to new donors seems to have developed as a separate field, and not 
entered ‘mainstream’ research programmes. For example, the ‘Africa, Power and Politics’ did 
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Three issues emerging from this body of literature are important for 
understanding the impact of aid on politics. First, views on aid remain 
informed by a moral commitment to help, and by the international poli-
tics that drives leaders to be (seen to be) responsible global actors. Second, 
these commitments have never been binding,19 and arguably therefore the 
aid relationships remain couched in a charitable form, rather than strong 
(enforceable) international commitment. Thirdly, the way the commitments 
emerge—supply-driven, by and large (and combined with continued and 
increased donor fragmentation) continue to feed the problem of disburse-
ment pressure.20
A second set of views, at the opposite end of the spectrum, stresses that 
too much aid is given. Public opinion often holds that too much money 
goes to foreign aid, and that very little positive effects are achieved, often 
because of corruption of the rulers of poor countries. Moyo (2009), who has 
received global attention, including from leaders like Rwandan President 
Paul Kagame, is particularly critical of the dependency that aid has created.21 
Easterly phrases the position in polemic style: Jeffrey Sachs ‘thinks aid can 
end poverty and I think it cannot . . . The end of poverty comes about for 
home-grown reasons, as domestic reformers grope their way towards more 
democracy, cleaner and more accountable government, and free markets’ 
(in Harman 2007), and the ‘tragedy in which the West spent $2.3 trillion 
on foreign aid over the last five decades and still had not managed to get 
twelve-cent medicines to prevent half of all malaria deaths’ (Easterly 2006, 
p. 4). According to him, the main problem of aid has been the emphasis 
on grand plans and the domination of ‘planners’, and the limited ability 
to motivate people to carry out such plans; increased commitments would 
again be dominated by these planners, and fail to learn from past mistakes.
Among the fiercest critique of aid derives from the idea that aid fuels cor-
ruption.22 However, corruption has been looked at very closely by donor 
agencies over the last decades—for some perhaps even too closely as there is 
not include collaboration with Chinese researchers or explicitly look at the impact of China. 
The role of new donors is analysed in  Chapter 11 by Mohan, this volume.
19 The UK’s International Development (Reporting and Transparency) Act 2006 provides an 
exception. This commits the Secretary of State to report annually on expenditure on inter-
national aid, and progress towards the UN ODA target. The commitment to increased aid is 
combined with commitments to enhance effectiveness and transparency.
20 Interviews at Sida found two-thirds of staff felt that disbursement rates were actively 
monitored in the day-to-day business (Ostrom et al. 2002); this study documents the agency’s 
internal incentives and how this affects aid effectiveness and particularly sustainability. Also 
Ebrahim and Herz (2007, p. 6).
21 Fischer and Kappel (2005), for example, describe how despite rent-seeking—which was the 
main obstacle to reform rather than low capacity—in Tanzania, donors continued to provide 
aid.
22 Cooksey (2002) reviews corruption within donor agencies and among recipients, with a pes-
simistic but only partially substantiated review of reforms and attempts to address corruption.
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recognition of the role this plays as an ‘informal institution’. Conventional 
wisdom notes that aid is more effective in less corrupt states, which can 
be considered a variant of the notion put forward by Alesina and Dollar 
(2000) and others that aid is more likely to be effective in better-governed 
states. Tavares (2003) showed through cross-country regression that foreign 
aid is associated with lower corruption (which he highlights does not imply 
a causal effect), and this may have been because of the rules and conditions 
associated with aid, and the ability to pay salaries may reduce the corrup-
tion of officials. But there is increasing research that modifies generalizing 
statements (Dietrich 2010).
A third set of views represents a middle position between these opposites, 
focusing on the ways in which aid is provided, and on the need for better 
assessment (Riddell 2007; Manor 2005). Advocacy for more aid often goes 
together with calls for improving the quality of the aid system. Former Dutch 
development minister Jan Pronk (2001), reviewing the earlier aid literature 
and more recent analysis of aid–growth relationships, argues that aid should 
and can work as ‘catalyst’, rewarding for good development governance.
A number of arguments are put forward in this context. There is debate 
on what institutions to work with:  for example Eyben and Ladbury (2006) 
argue that too much support has worked directly with the state, whereas in 
their view there is evidence that working with non-state actors has been effec-
tive. Another argument emphasizes that aid could be better targeted, that too 
much money is spent in countries that are not the poorest. There are powerful 
historical, political, and strategic reasons why aid is given to countries that 
are not poor. Many bilateral organizations have tried to focus their aid on the 
poorest countries, but the pull of other political considerations remains large 
(notably, since 9/11).23 Burnside and Dollar (2000) showed that aid is effective, 
if its recipient governments have the right policies, particularly good fiscal, 
monetary, and trade policies.24 Collier and Dollar (1999) combined an argu-
ment about the need to move aid to the countries with the largest numbers of 
poor people, with an emphasis on ability to use aid effectively.
Concerns about and analysis of aid dependency are relevant here (Fraser and 
Whitfiield 2008). Particularly in Africa, donor-funding formed half of some 
government budgets, often for extended periods of time. Donor-funding can 
undermine local accountability (Uvin 2004). New funding often leads to 
the setting up of new agencies, and this can detract from solving, and even 
23 A former USAID administrator criticized the European aid programmes for failure to align 
their aid to foreign policy concerns (Natsios 2006). See also Woods (2007). Kurlantzick (2007, 
p.  202) describes the recent Chinese aid programme as the core element of China’s global 
‘charm offensive’.
24 See further Dollar and Levin (2006) and Knack et al. (2010) who rank thirty donors on four 
indices, including aid selectivity.
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worsen problems of existing public policy institutions.25 A similar argument 
against increasing aid refers to what is commonly called ‘absorptive capac-
ity’. It is argued that recipient governments lack the administrative or policy 
capacity to effectively use increased aid flows, particularly when these are 
disbursed in a short period of time. Economists warn for the implications 
of large financial inflows on the economy, and the possibility that this may 
cause ‘Dutch Disease’, an appreciation of the exchange rate and resulting 
decline in competitiveness of national industries.26
A related argument stresses donors’ habits, the patterns of behaviour and 
incentives that limit aid effectiveness.27 Current aid is commonly compared 
with the Marshall Plan, which disbursed large sums of money in a short 
period of time; current aid is much more long-term with relatively small 
sums of money. Studies show that donor procedures tend to be cumbersome 
and time-consuming,28 aid flows are often unpredictable, they often follow 
financial cycles on the side of the donors rather than demand by recipients, 
and donors’ priorities change frequently. Many studies highlight that there 
are too many donor agencies, working in uncoordinated ways.29 Some argue 
that donors’ attitudes may have the potential to undermine progress, and 
aid has the potential to contribute to rather than reduce conflict (Browne 
2007, p.  32). Tied aid, the use of foreign aid for commercial purposes, is 
generally thought to restrict its efficiency. While there has been widespread 
commitment to untie aid,30 many donor countries continue to make col-
laboration with or purchase from their national companies a condition for 
the provision of aid.31
A fourth strand of literature focuses on the inner workings of aid agencies, 
often from a critical perspective. In an ‘ethnography of aid and agencies’, 
Mosse and Lewis (2006, p. 8) state that development policy is characterized 
by an incongruence between a seductive mix of ‘development buzzwords’ 
and a ‘striking lack of progress in relation to a wide range of development 
25 Morss (1984) discusses the impact of donor and project proliferation on recipient govern-
ment institutions.
26 There is some agreement among economists that a foreign aid contribution of about 20% 
to the national budget does not have negative effects, and the economic impact can remain 
positive.
27 Birdsall (2004) describes seven ‘deadly sins’.
28 This is strikingly described for USAID by Andrew Natsios’ as ‘the clash of the 
counter-bureaucracy and development’ (2010).
29 See Acharya et al. (2006) and Morss (1984) who provided an early warning that was appar-
ently not heeded. Booth (2011b) identifies piled-up donor initiatives as one of the causes for 
poor outcomes of service provision.
30 In May 2008 OECD expanded the list of countries by eight to thirty-nine Highly Indebted 
Countries that will receive aid in untied form. <http://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3343 ,en_
2649_201185_40660248_1_1_1_1,00.html> accessed 29 May 2014.
31 The OECD DAC statistics provide information about status of tying aid (table 23 and table 
24 of the Statistical Annex of the Development Cooperation Report; <http://www.oecd. org/gen-
eral/searchresults/?q=development%20cooperation%20report> accessed 1 September 2014).
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indicators’.32 Curtis (2004), building on cultural theory and stressing the 
various ways of thinking within donor agencies, highlights discrepancies 
between donor objectives and recipient needs or priorities in donor-funded 
programmes of civil service training. Eyben (2008) stresses the importance 
of personal relations within aid agencies, against the increasingly strong 
drives to focus on outputs. Hilhorst and Jansen (2010) emphasize how 
‘humanitarian space’ separates aid practices (in this case, humanitarian 
operations) from its political environment. Much of the literature in this 
genre of critical analysis emphasizes and critiques donor practices, but does 
not extend to an analysis of the impact the projects did have on its trainees 
or institutions they supported.
Fifthly, another set of critical perspectives focus on the role that aid plays 
in maintaining global power relations. Much of the popular critique, par-
ticularly against the World Bank and in support of the agendas of subalterns 
and social groups in the South, obtains these forms of expression, but UN 
organizations like IFAD do not escape criticisms that aid institutions cause 
development problems. The Poverty Reduction Strategies Papers (PRSPs) pro-
cesses have been interpreted as a means to maintain neo-liberalism (Porter 
and Craig 2004; Craig and Porter 2006).33 Support to democracy and govern-
ance reforms is seen, by some authors, as consistent with this paradigm, for 
example with respect to the spread of a specific (neo-liberal) form of govern-
ance practices.
Finally, there is a set of arguments that puts aid in perspective, empha-
sizing that other policies and interests are more significant. As reflected 
strongly in writings originating in the US, aid is an instrument of foreign 
policy or diplomatic purposes.34 Aid has been provided as a tool in Cold War 
competition, French aid has been instrumental in maintaining a sphere of 
influence, and Japanese aid was strongly motivated by commercial consider-
ations (Hook 1995). The recent re-emergence of Chinese aid can similarly be 
interpreted as one of its diplomatic tools used to fulfil domestic commercial 
and economic development considerations, as well as global political and 
geo-strategic goals (see discussion in  Chapter 11). Also, aid flows of the ‘old’ 
donors are rapidly becoming a smaller part of total financial flows: private 
capital flows have multiplied while official aid flows have stagnated (pri-
vate charities have become important, too), and the financial contributions 
32 Mosse and Lewis (2006, p. 8). The reference to buzzwords in development practices is from 
an article by Cornwall and Brock (2005), also Cornwall (2007).
33 Porter and Craig (2004) and Craig and Porter (2006).
34 Alesina and Dollar (2000) based on quantitative analysis of bilateral aid confirm that for-
eign policy and strategic considerations (alongside economic needs and historical links) have a 
big influence on which countries receive aid. See further Berthélemy (2005), Dollar and Levin 
(2006), Hout (2007), Neumayer (2003), and Younas (2008).
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of migrants from the South outstrip development aid (recent estimates put 
remittances at about US$ 300 billion or more, about triple that of official 
aid flows). The conclusion that aid isn’t really all that important is critically 
important: it implies we may need to revise and broaden the question of 
the ‘impact’ of aid, or at least see aid as part of a continuum within broader 
international exchange.
The variety of views on aid are accompanied by little evidence-based con-
clusions about either the success or failure of aid. For example, Browne’s 
(2007) conclusion that donors appeared ‘at the wrong times and with the 
wrong attitudes’ is only weakly substantiated with reference to three very 
different cases of ‘fragile states’: Burma (with boycott as the main question, 
coupled with the emergence of non-DAC donors), Rwanda (with the well-
recognized failure to intervene before the genocide), and Zambia (where 
the question of Washington-Consensus prescriptions is key). How donors 
undermined development progress is not clear (except of course in cases 
where aid was grossly misused for Cold War purposes), at least not in the 
two cases where failure to engage may be the most important consideration. 
Moreover, there appears to be a disconnect between research and practice. 
For example, the overview of the last five years of the Centre for the Future 
State (IDS 2010) directly address development practitioners, arguing that 
they ‘need to close off their mental models about governance and devel-
opment that are rooted in OECD experience’ (Unsworth 2010, Executive 
Summary). However, a political analysis of donors’ actions seems to be 
lacking.35
Thus, the diversity of perspectives on aid, which are often left implicit, 
and particularly the polarization, is likely to influence our understanding 
on the impact of donor agencies. Moreover, simplification about agency 
staff ability to apply political analysis may be creating additional barriers. 
In fact, officials within donor agencies often do recognize that they are 
political agents as part of broader international politics, and they do posi-
tion themselves in the local politics—even emphasizing a technical role is 
taking a political position. Future research can make an important contri-
bution in closing a gap in the knowledge of the impact of aid, which has the 
potential to inform both the academic literature and development practice. 
This could entail a conscious reflection on and articulation of the perspec-
tive through which ‘aid’ is conceptualized, based in local narratives of the 
role of aid/donors—in their diversity—in local politics. This in turn would 
require ‘internalizing’ the role of donors as a ‘permanent’ feature of these 
local politics.
35 See also Booth (2011c) on donors’ recent emphasis on research uptake, and the barriers that 
continue to exist, in the case of public service provision in Africa.
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Depoliticization of Aid: What Does the Literature Tell Us?
Political analysis remains poorly represented in international development 
debates. For example, in the writings of Jan Pronk on aid as catalyst, where 
one would expect an analysis of policies (and political change), much of the 
analysis draws on cross-country aid–growth regressions, and his conclusion 
that ‘what is required is a special focus in aid policy on social harmony, 
political stability and peace’ (Pronk 2001, p. 628) remained unsubstanti-
ated.36 At the same time, a lot of the political analysis has remained a safe 
distance from much of the international development debate, and certainly 
from international development practices; this perennially leads to calls to 
bring politics back into development.
Authors like Escobar, Ferguson, Ignacy, and Sachs have argued that 
the development discourse is Western created, imbued with dichotomies 
of Western superiority, justifying an interventionist and disempower-
ing bureaucracy.37 An oft-cited work is Ferguson’s (1990) The Anti-Politics 
Machine, an ethnography of the aid industry in Lesotho (a highly aid-
dependent country) that constructed the idea of Lesotho as a peasant soci-
ety, in an attempt to justify the development agencies’ own existence.38 
Chang’s (2002) critique of international collaboration, more broadly, is that 
promotion of good governance implies pushing poor countries into adopt-
ing institutions that were non-existent in their own countries at similar 
stages of development.
Over the last ten years the role of politics in development has received 
increasing attention. This is demonstrated in the sequence of a perceived 
failure of the technocratic approach to adjustment in the 1980s, to the rise of 
an ambitious governance agenda,39 of good governance, and of good enough 
governance, which opened up the space and need for better understand-
ing of the role of institutions and politics within development. Booth and 
Golooba-Mutebi (2009) distinguish three types of political economy analy-
ses, illustrating the diversity of perspectives that have emerged over time. 
First, Drivers of Change and similar analyses emphasize the constraints 
36 This was raised in a comment in the same journal Development and Change by Petras and 
Veltmeyer, for a realist political perspective, to which Pronk (2003) responded; in our reading 
again failing to provide evidence of aid impact on politics or the ability to influence policy-
making. James Boyce, in response to Pronk, argued for the need to unpack both sides of the aid 
relationship (Pronk 2003, p. 387).
37 Uvin (2004, p. 32). A related, anthropological, approach focuses on describing ‘the interac-
tion of ideas and relationships in development arena’ (Mosse and Lewis 2006, p. 5).
38 See Tania Li (2007) on the establishment of a national park in Central Sulawesi criticizes 
donors for analysing livelihood challenges as only technical problems; also Chhotray (2011).
39 In the broader literature, this is reflected in the growing emphasis on institution in the 
work of North (1990). Cross-country regressions by Acemoglu et al. (2001), and the work of 
Mustaq Khan (2006) received much attention in the development debate.
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that countries’ histories and institutions impose on changes supported 
by donors.40 Second, internal World Bank political economy approaches 
use stakeholder analysis and a range of public-choice and game-theory 
approaches. A third conceptual approach focuses on the room for manoeu-
vre, and ‘change against the odds’ as pioneered by Grindle in social sector 
reform in Latin America. In their own view, a (‘layered’) political economy 
approach to an explicit problem may be more likely to influence action than 
more generic forms of analysis, and they highlight the potential for donors to 
support third-party facilitation in reform processes. Additionally, as referred 
to earlier, their work emphasizes different forms of neo-patrimonialism, and 
the need for ‘working with the grain’.41
Another politicized development practice is aid to promote democracy, 
which has been the subject of a fair number of studies, including as a vari-
able in regression analysis. Kosack (2003) concluded that aid does not show 
a positive impact on quality of life, but it does show a positive sign if com-
bined with a variable of democracy, and is ineffective in the case of autocra-
cies—thus providing an argument for (though not ways in which) donors to 
enhance aid effectiveness while promoting democratization. Kalyvitis and 
Vlachiki (2010) use data for fifty-nine aid recipients during 1972 to 2004, 
using three categories of political regimes, and show a positive impact on 
democratization. Quantitative analysis has been used to assess the role of 
‘democracy aid’ (Savun and Tirone 2011).
There is a recent growing interest in the role of elites in (economic) devel-
opment.42 Birdsall believes that Africa’s institutional trap is related to the 
small share of income of its independent middle-income population, and 
that ‘a robust middle-income group contributes critically to the creation and 
sustenance of healthy institutions, particularly healthy institutions of the 
state’ (2007, p. 2).43 Therefore, it is important to be more aware of the risks 
that (increasing) aid poses for this middle class (still poor, by international 
standards), through, for example, the labour market for skilled workers, 
interest rates, domestic investor confidence, and taxes. However, except in 
analysis of community-based development, the role of aid does not appear as 
a critical theme (e.g. Robinson’s 2010 analysis of transnational elites). It does 
feature in the analysis of Mozambique’s elite by Hanlon (2010), including 
40 For example, Duncan et al. (2002) with reference to Bangladesh.
41 Kaminski and Serra (2011); this stresses that the nature of reforms went against a 
Washington Consensus, but does not explore the interaction with donors. Booth and Golooba-
Mutebi (2011) analyse Rwanda’s ruling party’s relationship with Tri-Star investment and high-
lighting this has been controversial with donors.
42 See, for example, <http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/projects-by-theme/ development- 
and-finance/en_GB/Elites-and-Economic-Dev-Conf/> accessed 29 May 2014.
43 See also the article on middle classes in the edited volume that describes declining inequal-
ity in parts of Latin America (López-Calva and Lustig 2010).
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how structural adjustment led to reduced incomes of public services work-
ers, and how aid money was used in privatization that benefited elites,44 but 
this remains rather superficial and pays little attention to the different posi-
tions taken by different donors, and contradictions that presumably existed 
within donors’ prescriptions.45
Naomi Hossain’s (2005) work on elite perceptions of poverty in Bangladesh 
has been one of the few that directly touches on the question posed here, 
but this too was generally not linked to aid. She concluded that poverty was 
not a high priority for the Bangladeshi elite, not because they were ignorant 
or callous about poverty, nor because they failed to see a self-interest in 
tackling poverty, but simply because it did not have priority: poverty is not 
perceived as a threat, the elite thought much action was already undertaken, 
and their distrust of the state reduced appetite for further state-led action. 
The edited book by Reis and Moore (2005) Elite Perceptions of Poverty and 
Inequality, similarly concludes that many countries lack the kind of com-
mitment that was behind the growth of welfare states in the nineteenth 
century.
Thus, there is an increasing body of political analysis in the field of devel-
opment studies, and particularly in the area of commissioned research, that 
is required to have direct policy relevance. But calls for political analysis 
continue to increase, ever since the disappointment with reforms during the 
1980s. Our observations confirm that of Unsworth that there continue to 
be barriers for more informed political analysis to inform practice. She con-
cluded that for political economy analysis to endure, donors have to change 
the way they operate:
The impact has been quite fragmented within agencies, and what [the Political 
Economy Analysis] hasn’t done is induce any kind of fundamental rethink 
about how development happens and what the role of external players might be 
. . . [and] isn’t affecting key decisions agencies make about how they recruit and 
deploy staff and train and use them. 46
There is little empirical analysis of how donors, even where they do start 
adopting a political perspective, do influence local institutions and the peo-
ple they work with.
44 Hanlon (2010), building on earlier work (Hanlon 2004), shows how donors promoted 
corruption through their choice of elites to work with. Hanlon (2010) ends his analysis of 
Mozambique with reference to the possibility that Mozambique is now becoming a develop-
mental state, which includes resistance to donors’ prescriptions.
45 World Bank, Social Development Department (2006) highlights and defines the need for 
analysis of political context to inform development planning, but with very little evidence of 
what the impact of these are on the ground.
46 See <http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/eu-working-group-land-issues/article/ understand 
ing-politics-development> accessed 29 May 2014; see further Unsworth (undated, 2009).
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Of Aid Modalities and Conditionalities
Aid is provided in many different ways, in different ‘aid modalities’, a term 
used in particular to highlight differences between the project-mode of 
development that had become increasingly unpopular and sector-wide and 
national approaches like PRSPs.47 The impact and how this is measured is 
substantially different for each of the modalities, and the choices between 
modalities also are critically important. The literature in each of these areas 
is large; this section discusses the lessons of each for the way we can under-
stand the impacts of donors.
Project mode of aid delivery, road-building, livelihoods projects, and so 
on have generally been the most apolitical, and heavily criticized, includ-
ing because of the ‘islands of excellence’ that resulted, the lack of scaling up 
of good practices, the proliferation of projects and possible drain on local 
administrative capacity.48 At least implicit in this critique has been a notion 
that projects tend to be immaterial to broader politics and commitments 
(with the use of LogFrames as an illustration of this), and could possibly 
unintentionally reinforce power differences.
Technical cooperation, and capacity-building, is an example of project 
mode of approaches, and has a large body of technical literature of itself, 
and a body of critique.49 Kühl (2009) argues that the concept of capacity 
development functions to meet the legitimacy requirements of aid organiza-
tions. Land et al. (2009) argues capacity development is (still) premised on 
planned technocratic interventions, without due attention to the political 
(and social–cultural) dimensions of change needed for sustainable outcomes. 
Similarly, Bergström (2005) highlights two critical conditions for successful 
(institutional development) projects: ‘real’ determination to achieve change 
on the part of the partner, and understanding of local context; neither of 
these were facilitated by Sida procedures.50
Project and technical cooperation can happen in a non-political or unre-
flective manner, but it can also be placed at the heart of political interven-
tions, such as training of police, financial management, strengthening 
media, and electoral reform.51 Project reviews and evaluations tend to look at 
47 Foster and Leavey (2001) discuss choices between aid instruments; also Irish Aid (2008) 
research report on good governance and aid modalities.
48 The majority of aid is still delivered as projects (Riddell 2007, p. 180; see de Haan 2009, 
 chapter 4).
49 See for example Aron (2003) for post-conflict situations.
50 James and Wrigley (2007) describe the ‘mystery’ of capacity building, which needs meth-
ods that strengthen ownership; are people-centred, engage with peoples’ values and emotions, 
and adapt to context.
51 The multi-donor support to Ethiopia may be an interesting case study of explicit and 
strongly worded attempts to improve governance and accountability.
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‘impacts’, without much reflection—as far as we have seen—on the impacts 
on people and attitudes of the long-term international exchange people 
have become part of (and that would include scholarships).
A popular form of projects, because they provide benefits to poor people 
directly and immediately, are community-driven projects. There is a body 
of knowledge that has looked at the impact of community-driven models 
of aid delivery. Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2009), for example, analyse 
the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund, highlighting problems of intra-
group conflict, lack of capacity to manage resources, and bad practices of 
group facilitators. They argue that community-driven models fail to engage 
seriously with predominant power and political relations, an issue that has 
been acknowledged by World Bank analysts as well.52 They also suggest that 
(parallel) funding mechanisms like this may actually ‘undermine the role 
and accountability of the state’ (Gooloba-Mutebi and Hickey 2009, p. 33),53 a 
question that runs through much of the literature and review of social funds 
(De Silva and Sum 2008).
The project modalities described above are distinct from the donor engage-
ment at a more macro level, which have become important in the donor and 
academic literature since the adjustment approaches emerged. Public sector 
reform became the dominant mantra of the aid community, as a second step 
after the stabilization programmes that followed financial and economic cri-
sis. The literature on this is large and often critical, while practices of reforms 
have continued and may be under-studied. Hirschmann (1993), for example, 
argued that the first generation of structural reforms led to ‘collateral dam-
age’, emphasizing ‘the complex inter-relationship between weak capability, 
task enormity, conditionality, aid fatigue, absorptive capacity and sustain-
ability . . . the very people who were threatened by these policy reforms were 
the ones who were expected to carry them out’ (quoted in Boesen 2004, p. 
4). Public sector reform that has focused on formal arrangements is seen 
to have failed to produce real changes in behaviour, even though reforms 
sometimes succeed against the odds.54
The field of public sector reform is broad, and it is unlikely that general 
conclusions will emerge. Even individual and respected experts—deeply 
52 Mansuri and Rao (2004); Gaspart and Platteau (2006) explicitly warned against the ‘per-
verse effect if cheap aid money’ in the context of community-driven development. Wong 
(2010) describes two different models and paradox of engaging elites in projects in Bangladesh 
and Ghana.
53 See also Hickey (2010) ‘The Government of Chronic Poverty’ (Hickey 2010) in the special 
issue of The Journal of Development Studies, on new potentials in moves to emphasize citizenship, 
but not much evidence on impacts of aid.
54 Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2009); Harrison (2004) discusses the emergence of ‘govern-
ance states’, and the role of the World Bank in shaping governance in Mozambique, Tanzania, 
and Uganda.
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involved in donor-‘driven’ reforms in context over an extended period of 
time—may be very critical of donor approaches, their tendencies to pre-
scribe templates, and increasingly unrealistic reporting requirements 
(Schiavo-Campo 2008), but would also be able to narrate stories of success, 
in difficult circumstances. Public financial management has received much 
donor (but less academic) attention, and is regarded as a key element of 
governance required for economic growth, and for absorbing donor funding 
(Hedger et  al. 2007). Andrews (2010) reviews public finance management 
assessments of thirty-one African countries, and finds that much change 
has taken place, but that (de jure) budget preparation has been stronger than 
(de facto) budget implementation. Civil society engagement was generally 
well developed. Success in reforms tended to be larger when there were 
fewer actors involved. There were predictably substantial differences across 
countries, with growing and stable countries having stronger processes, and 
‘fiscal states’ have better systems than ‘rentier states’. Country characteris-
tics matter a great deal, emphasizing the need for support to be based in 
local realities, and to create ‘reform space’; but the review does not analyse 
whether donor organizations have practised this.55
While tax reforms have been part of many public sector reform pro-
grammes, donor support to revenue generation through improvements in 
tax collection have not generated much analysis. There is common reference 
to the lack of attention to revenue generation, and possible disincentives that 
aid programmes lead to.56 A critical question is whether taxation would con-
tribute to stronger state–citizen relations, and the channels through which 
this would occur. McDonald and Jumu (2008) support the argument that 
taxation is better, in that respect, than both aid and natural resources57—
which makes them conclude both that aid should be made more like tax, and 
that tax systems should be strengthened. Systems of taxation are diverse, 
and often follow colonial histories. There are various options for reform, 
the most common probably being the shift from indirect to more direct 
taxes. Forms of revenue generation or taxation are also central to relations 
between central governments and their local authorities, and donors can 
play a role in this, as Fjeldstad (2001) demonstrates for Tanzania. Sources 
of revenue also can impact types of expenditure: Hoffman and Gibson’s 
55 A  recent overview paper commissioned by the African Capacity Building Foundation 
(Hove and Wynne 2010), providing a ‘balance sheet’ of Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
(MTEF) and an Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) by and large 
confirms this.
56 Important exceptions are Bräutigam et al. (2008), Moore (2007), Di John (2010a, 2010b, 
2006), and Moss et al. 2006. Chapter 3, this volume, by Paul Mosley is much more detailed on 
the subject and can usefully be read in conjunction with this one.
57 However, the literature indicates that natural resources are not necessarily a curse, and 
national institutions mediate the way resources are managed and redistributed.
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(2005) comparison of Tanzania and Zambia concludes that a government’s 
sources of revenue strongly affect its public expenditures. Local governments 
started to produce more public services as their budget’s share of local taxes 
increased, while the revenue that local governments receive from sources 
outside their boundaries was spent more on employee benefits and admin-
istrative costs.
Another approach that arose explicitly out of the critique of projects 
as well as perceived need for public sector reform was that of sector-wide 
approaches, particularly in health and education. These imply that ‘all signif-
icant funding for the sector supports a single sector policy and expenditure 
programme, under government leadership, adopting common approaches 
across the sector and progressing towards relying on Government procedures 
for all funds’ (Foster 2000, p. 9). This approach was a response to three issues 
that are relevant for this review: the fact that conditionalities did not work, 
the need for institutional change, and the need to overcome fragmentation 
of budgeting. Closely linked to sector-wide approaches are donor approaches 
to general budget support, which were popular for some time as cutting 
edge to enhance aid effectiveness but more recently have given away (again) 
to project modes, partly because of donors’ needs to see results and partly 
because the conditions for governance were found lacking. Budget support 
involves financial transfers to recipient countries’ treasuries, combined with 
‘policy dialogue’ and various forms of capacity-building. Molenaers et  al. 
(2010) analyses the type of policy and political dialogue in the context of 
budget support, in the case of two political crises, illustrating the ambitious-
ness of this agenda (evaluation of UK budget support to Uganda had high-
lighted questions regarding assumed political commitment).
There is perhaps no area of donor intervention which generated more anal-
ysis than the Poverty Reduction Strategies Papers (PRSPs), which brought 
together international NGOs, the ‘like-minded’ donors, and the IFIs. There 
was a great deal of optimism—driven by very different constituencies—that 
PRSPs would imply a substantial change in aid relationships. While criti-
cized from the start by various people, particularly regarding whether this 
implied at all a change from the Washington Consensus, from the middle 
of the 2000s critiques also started to appear from circles closer to the aid 
practitioners. The literature has become generally critical of the question 
whether PRSPS have really changed aid relationships (e.g. Booth and Piron 
2004; Booth 2010). Booth et al. (2006) conclude PRSPs were unsuccessful 
in generating political buy-in for poverty reduction, similar to many of the 
findings on budget support. Moreover, the PRSP approach required a change 
in donor practices, and harmonization and alignment have come to the cen-
tre of attention under the Paris Declaration/Consensus, giving rise to a sub-
stantial amount of donor-focused literature. The conclusion of dissonance 
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between donors’ insistence on ownership, and the ways this is interpreted 
by recipients,58 is relevant to understanding the dynamics of donor impacts.
The question of conditionalities is central to many of the questions about 
and choices for different aid modalities. We refer to modalities not in terms 
of the policy prescriptions that have obtained a highly charged reputation 
under the Washington Consensus, but in terms of the technical prescriptions 
regarding improvement of governance, including reducing corruption. The 
question of conditionalities had become a much-debated issue in the 1990s, 
after a decade of experience with structural reforms. Montinola (2010), using 
data from sixty-eight countries during the 1980s and 1990s, argues that con-
ditional aid (the impact of IMF and World Bank aid on fiscal reform) can be 
effective depending on recipients’ levels of democracy. The author suggests 
that aid can help democratic governments stay in power. Killick’s analysis 
of the role of conditionalities, or ‘pre-commitments’ in aid relationships,59 
confirms the common wisdom that conditionalities do not work, but with an 
important emphasis: he argues that donors are ‘often unable to put in place a 
system of rewards and punishments sufficient to overcome the frequent per-
ceived conflicts of interest between themselves and recipient governments’ 
(Killick 1997, Abstract). Instead, he argues, ‘donors should recognize that 
their main contribution to policy reform in developing countries has been 
through influence on the contemporary intellectual climate, and persuasion 
of governments through regular contacts’ (1997, Abstract).60
Again, general conclusions and cross-country quantitative studies are 
unlikely to tell the full story. We believe, and experience indicates, that 
agreed ‘conditionalities’ can work, but they arguably are no longer condi-
tionalities according to the definition of Killick that emphasizes that they are 
a commitment that would not be made in the absence of aid. For instance, 
in China, the ‘conditionalities’ of aid on the one hand were resisted, but on 
the other hand the type of conditionalities that suited policymakers’ reform 
agendas were actively embraced.
The debate on conditionalities is deeply politically charged, and may 
form a core part of the national poverty politics.61 Further, the practice of 
58 Booth (2010) highlights that debates on country ownership remain technocratic, and pro-
vide no answers to what donors should do if governments do not take the necessary leadership. 
See further Browne (2007), Kanbur (2000), and Uvin (2004).
59 Killick (1997) may be the most systematic exploration of the issue, based on evidence from 
twenty-one countries that had undergone structural adjustment. See also Dijkstra (quoted in 
Pronk 2003, pp. 396–8) emphasizing limited effectiveness.
60 Killick’s (1999) assessment of the impact of adjustment on poverty is relevant in this 
respect; in his view the link between the two is less strong than is commonly asserted. See also 
Buira (2003) on IMF conditionality, and Hayman (2011) on freezing budget support.
61 Opposition parties in Orissa in the early 2000s organized a ‘Quit Orissa’ demonstration, 
against World Bank and DFID prescribing budget and staff cuts (which in the donors’ views 
were in line with Finance Ministry prescriptions).
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conditionalities is now challenged by the ‘cash-on-delivery’ ideas that have 
emerged, particularly from the US. Finally, debates on conditionalities are 
increasingly shaped by the emergence of China and other ‘new’ donors; their 
insistence on non-conditionality and fear of wanting to be seen to engage in 
internal politics is particularly and increasingly important for understand-
ing the impact of aid on capacity and elites (see  Chapter 11). Therefore, a 
political analysis of conditionalities appears significant, and conditionalities 
could usefully be conceptualized as an implicit contract between recipients 
and donors (who are among the first to realize when their conditionalities 
are working or not).62
Conclusion
This chapter is the result of a literature survey that was designed to provide 
insight into the relationship between aid and recipients’ state capacity and 
elite commitment. While it is impossible to cover all the literature, including 
because of the emergence of ‘new’ donors and because aid practices are once 
again being rethought, we did establish that there is relatively little literature 
that directly addresses the question of how aid impacts state capacity for, 
and (particularly) elite commitment to, sustainable development.
Answering the questions on the impact of aid is complicated by four fac-
tors. First, aid is only one part of broader international policy, including 
bilateral relations, and ‘other’ objectives can significantly influence the 
implementation of aid commitments. This poses questions on assessing the 
success of aid, but also whether looking at the impact of aid alone limits or 
even distorts a perspective on local ‘aid relationships’.
Second, views on aid are very diverse, fuelled by theoretical but also strong 
moral considerations, and often poorly substantiated critiques of aid—this 
makes interpretation of the findings of the impact of aid problematic—
future research thus should build in a critical reflection of these differences, 
and integrate this into understanding aid relationships at local level.
Third, the governance–development link is disputed, for example, illus-
trated by moving academic emphasis of ‘good governance’ to ‘good-enough 
governance’ (Grindle 2004), and from a more state-centric focus to an 
emphasis on the interaction between state and non-state actors, between 
formal and informal institutions (IDS 2010; Hyden 2008), from drivers of 
change to ‘politics of development’ (Leftwich 2007), and finally a focus on 
62 To conceptualize this contract, we can draw on texts on aid negotiations, including those 
using game theory, principal–agent models, new institutionalism, and a political economy 
(Fraser and Whitfield 2008).
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the neo-patrimonial state (Kelsall et al. 2010). This chapter has not directly 
covered the growing governance literature, nor has it addressed the question 
of aid to deliver services more broadly. We assume the importance of govern-
ance—in its broadest and dynamic sense63—for sustainable development, 
and note the diversity of governance–development links, and have looked 
primarily at the impact of aid on aspects of governance. Developing local 
narratives of aid relationships are essential to inform this ongoing debate, 
including regarding how the differing views and approaches within and 
across donors lead to unexpected outcomes.
Fourth, the practices of emerging donors are still under-researched. 
Evidence is needed on how the new players are influencing the aid dynam-
ics, and the impact aid has on capacity and commitment. There are many 
ways in which this can be approached, but it is critical to link this to an 
enhanced understanding of the dynamics of the internal transformations of 
these emerging economies and their concomitant foreign policy objectives.
Further, there are questions about the interaction between research and 
development policy that are relevant here, contributing to complicating 
answering the questions for this review. The literature suggests the existence 
of barriers for more informed political analysis to inform practice; in any 
case, there is little analysis of how donors, even where they do start adopting 
a political perspective, do influence local institutions and the people they 
work with. Much of the literature provides a critique of aid practices, but it 
does: a) not seem to be based on in-depth understanding of what donors do; 
b) lack political analysis of why donors do—and present—what they do (for 
example, choices between aid modalities); and c) arguably miss a main point 
about how interaction with donors have structured practices, politics, and 
attitudes in the countries that donors work in.
The review thus confirmed our initial hypothesis that there is (even before 
the emergence of new donors) insufficient evidence regarding the role of aid, 
and regarding the specific impact on specific elements of governance (law, 
bureaucracy, elections, business regulation), and on the possible trade-offs 
(e.g. strengthening teachers while weakening PTAs). We conclude that in the 
specific contexts where aid has played a significant role, even if negative, a 
better understanding of aid dynamics is necessary. Future research can make 
a conceptual contribution by moving beyond questions of the ‘impact’ of 
aid, to a consideration of the role of international exchange in the articula-
tion of local political economy.
63 See Everest-Phillips (2007) for an emphasis on the need to move beyond technocratic 
approaches. Bräutigam, now the best-informed observer of Chinese aid, in a 2000 report high-
lighted the role of strong institutions in the successes of Taiwan and Botswana, and obstacles 
within aid systems to promote governance reform.
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China in Africa: Impacts and Prospects  
for Accountable Development
Giles Mohan
Introduction: Asian Drivers and Effective States
Development cooperation is changing as rising power donors (re)enter the 
fray. While a growing body of evidence explores some of the economic trends 
(e.g. UNCTAD 2007), we know little about the impacts of new (and predomi-
nantly Asian) drivers of development on state capacity-building and elite 
commitment to development in poor countries, especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Africa is a key site given existing problems of economic development 
and governance, but crucially it is emerging as a strategic region in terms of 
resource access, trade, investment, aid, and migration (Alden 2007). Of the 
rising Asian countries China remains the largest player in Africa, and for 
this reason is the main focus of this chapter (Brautigam 2009). This chapter 
reviews the existing evidence on China’s engagement with Africa and maps 
out a future research agenda in this area.
Over the past decade Africa has gained in international importance and 
the Chinese are among a number of rapidly industrializing nations that see 
the continent in strategic terms (Carmody 2011). Moyo (2009, p. 120) argued 
that the emergence of China is a ‘golden opportunity’ for Africa offering 
the continent a ‘win-win’ alternative to the scenario of an ‘aid-dependent 
economy’ by focusing instead on trade and investment and by providing the 
infrastructure that will enable Africa to ‘move up the development curve’ 
(Moyo 2009, p. 122). This ideal of ‘help for self help’ is underpinned by an 
accompanying discourse of development ‘cooperation’ rather than aid and 
donor–recipient relations (Rampa and Bilal 2011).
While Moyo (2009) is one of the optimists, the pessimists focus on the aid–
governance nexus where the Chinese are accused by some of unscrupulous 
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behaviour that undermines good governance (Manning 2006; Phillips 2006; 
Tull 2006; Naim 2007). Others (Marks 2006; Trofimov 2007) have taken this 
focus on aid further to argue that China is essentially a neo-colonial power, 
where African resources are ‘plundered’ by Beijing which cements the long-
standing uneven division of labour between Africa and the rest of the world. 
In some ways the ‘China threat’ in Africa reflects a more general concern 
about China’s challenge to US hegemony (Campbell 2008b).
The Political Effects of China in Africa
While we noted that most analysis of China in Africa has focused on the 
economic ties, and where studies have dealt with politics (e.g. Broadman 
2007)  it is a normative analysis about how to smooth flows of trade and 
investment. Recently there have been more critical attempts to analyse the 
politics of these relationships. Tull (2006) concludes his piece by arguing 
that ‘China’s massive return to Africa presents a negative political devel-
opment’ (p.  476) and his thesis usefully examines this in broad political 
economy terms—something I return to below.
The tendency of China to exacerbate African governance problems is seen 
by some as an extension of China’s own lack of concern for human rights 
and accountability at home—the Chinese export the capitalism they know 
best (Henderson 2008). In terms of putting Chinese aid in the wider context 
of ‘older’ donors, Dreher et al. (2010, p. 18) point out that new donors ‘do 
not generally exhibit a stronger bias against better governed countries’, the 
corollary being that older donors, despite their criticisms of China, have also 
been willing to support corrupt and authoritarian states.
Although there have been useful contributions over the past few years 
as better data has emerged (e.g. Brautigam 2009), they still tend to attrib-
ute the power to China at the expense of Africa. For example, the ‘Asian 
Drivers’ agenda (Kaplinsky and Messner 2008), which we adapt later, is 
premised on a conflation of all Asian countries as sharing some essential 
characteristics and that they do the ‘driving’, which denies African agency. 
This is echoed in Carmody et al.’s (2011) analysis of Chinese ‘geo-govern-
ance’ in Zambia which argues that the Chinese state projects its power into 
Africa as part of a broader goal of shaping globalization, although they are 
among the few analysts to factor in African political agency (see also Large 
2009; Haglund 2009).
Structure and Argument
The chapter starts by setting out an analytical framework, which identifies 
the channels through which China engages with African development. To 
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avoid seeing these channels as dominated by Chinese agendas I use work 
around the African state to produce an analytical grid that factors in domes-
tic politics. The chapter then looks at the actual impacts on governance by 
applying this framework to three case studies, although other cases are men-
tioned. The cases are selected as emblematic of the African state types iden-
tified in the framework and are not intended to be an exhaustive review of 
all African cases. I conclude with an outline of emerging trends and future 
research themes for the short to medium term.
The argument is that China impacts on African development in multiple 
ways that go well beyond the Western focus on aid. On one hand we have to be 
much more aware of the multiple interests and actors on the Chinese side com-
bined with an awareness of African agency on the other. However, a common 
trait of this engagement is inter-elite brokerage, which has tended to bypass 
domestic channels of debate and accountability and so tends to undermine 
good governance. That said, in most cases it delivers much needed infrastruc-
ture which benefits wider society and so could kick start economic growth that 
in turn might spread benefits. Crucially, as civil society and political processes 
in Africa have started to contest this elitism and Chinese practices we are see-
ing slightly more transparent attempts to negotiate the relationship though 
these are relatively ad hoc and nascent. Moreover, China’s entry to Africa is 
also through independent businesses who lie outside of Chinese state direction 
and whose impacts on local development could be significant in terms of job 
creation, although their political involvement will be limited in the short term.
Analytical Framework
In this section I elaborate an analytical schema for assessing the political impacts 
of China’s development cooperation. It has two basic elements—the chan-
nels through which China impacts on domestic political processes based on 
an amended version of the framework developed by Kaplinsky and colleagues 
(e.g. Kaplinsky and Morris 2009; Kaplinsky 2008). As noted in the Introduction 
the emphasis on Asian actors ‘driving’ relationships tends to downplay African 
political agency and in practice this framework was used to examine economic 
linkages rather than political aspects. To address this we use the work of Alden 
(2007) and Tull (2006) who have developed classificatory schema of African 
regime types to hypothesize the possible impacts of China on African politics.
Asian Drivers
The first element is identifying the channels of interaction and impact. The 
framework distinguishes different channels of impact transmission, the 
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distinction between complementary and competitive impacts, and between 
direct and indirect impacts. These channels are contingent and change 
over time, and vary in significance depending on such things as location, 
resource endowment, trade links, and geo-strategic significance. Six key 
channels stand out in importance:  trade links, investment flows (Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) and portfolio investments), aid, governance, flows 
of migrants, and environmental spillovers (see Table 11.1). I will elaborate on 
each of these later in the chapter. As a heuristic it is also important to stress 
that these channels are clearly not discrete.
In each of these channels of interaction, there will be a mixture of comple-
mentary and competitive impacts. For example, with regard to trade, China 
may both provide cheap inputs and consumer goods to sub-Saharan Africa and 
be a market for African exports. On the other hand, imports from China can 
displace local producers. In relation to FDI, China can be a direct source of 
inward FDI into sub-Saharan Africa and perhaps crowd-in FDI into Africa from 
third countries as parts of extended global value chains. These are complemen-
tary impacts. But China may also compete with other economies for global FDI.
In terms of thinking through the developmental and political impacts, 
the key aspect of these interactions is the ‘for whom’ component. Countries 
may be affected differentially—in some cases, for example, the export of 
fabrics from China to Africa may feed productively into a vibrant clothing 
and textile value chain; in other cases, it may displace a country’s exports 
and production for the domestic market. However, these effects are not just 
felt at the national level, but affect groups within countries differentially. 
For example, cheap clothing imports from China may displace clothing and 
textile workers, but cheapen wage goods and hence reduce wage costs for 
producers in other sectors. These impacts on a complementary–competitive 
axis may also change over time, and most importantly, they will vary for 
different classes, regions, and groups within economies.
Table 11.1. A framework for assessing the impact of China on sub-Saharan Africa
Channel Impacts
Complementary Competitive










The complementary–competitive axis of impacts is generally quite well 
recognized and understood. Less widely acknowledged is the distinction 
between direct and indirect impacts, partly because indirect impacts are dif-
ficult to measure. Indirect impacts occur in third-country markets and insti-
tutions. For example, China’s trade with the US may open or foreclose the 
opportunities for African economies to export into that market. Similarly, 
China’s high savings rate has had the effect of lowering global interest rates, 
indirectly facilitating investment in Africa. As in the case of the complemen-
tary/competitive access, the impact of the direct and indirect impacts can be 
gauged either at the country level, or at intra-national levels. Yet impacts are 
not just conditioned by the needs of the Chinese actors ‘driving’ this pro-
cess, but are realized relationally through the ways in which these channels 
interact with African states and societies.
Making Sense of the African State
The second element is the nature of the political system with which these 
channels interact, which is largely but not exclusively a state-centred issue 
given the bilateral and elite nature of the way China engages with Africa 
(Taylor 2006, 2007). Carmody and Taylor (2010) use the term ‘flexigemony’ 
to capture the more dynamic interactions between China and a differen-
tiated landscape of African politics. For them flexigemony denotes how 
‘Chinese actors adapt their strategies to suit the particular histories and 
geographies of the African states with which they engage’ (p. 497). From an 
African perspective, the ‘emerging’ powers give recipient countries some lev-
erage, what has been termed the ‘revival of triangulation’ (Large 2008). On 
the face of it China’s interests do not radically alter the role Africa plays in 
the global division of labour (Tull 2006) but what is interesting to analyse is 
whether individual African states are able to harness this hegemonic rivalry 
for their own ends. How can we conceptualize African state agency?
In order to systematically analyse the relationships between Chinese 
channels of engagement and African polities we can use the typologies gen-
erated by Alden (2007). Alden sets out a broad typology of states—pariah 
states, illiberal regimes and weak democracies, and democratic countries 
with diversified economies. Tull (2006) also focuses on three groups of 
states—democratizing, mineral-rich, and post-conflict—which cover some 
of Alden’s concerns. Alden’s schema has an implicit scaling of democratiza-
tion and his first two groups are essentially resource-rich states. Moreover, 
post-conflict tells us little about the underlying political economy and rarely 
covers whether China has a peacekeeping role.
With pariah partnerships China is seen as a source of stability and pro-
vider of FDI and development assistance which is denied by other avenues. 
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Examples are Chad, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, with Angola dropping in and 
out. The details will be explored below, but these cases show that while the 
Chinese will pursue interests in the face of glaring governance and rights 
abuses there are times when they draw the line for pragmatic reasons or 
through international pressure. So, it is wrong to characterize the Chinese 
as endlessly cynical in such cases.
The illiberal regimes with weak democracy cover much of the rest of SSA, but 
notably include Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia. The relationships 
with the Chinese are brokered at elite levels to access strategic resources. But 
at the same time Chinese investments are more diverse and so bring much 
needed FDI and development aid, but this can compete with indigenous firms 
which can cause conflict. There are also strong ties between political elites 
and leading local firms so that foreign investments can proceed relatively 
quickly compared to states with stronger and more accountable institutions. 
In these states the Chinese are willing to secure leverage via self-aggrandizing 
symbolic infrastructure projects which impact on regime legitimacy.
The democracies with diversified economies are few and far between, but 
South Africa is the notable (and powerful) example. Alden includes Namibia, 
Botswana, and Ghana, though these are more debatable cases in terms of the 
diversification of their economies. In these states the relationship is complex 
and varies according to the local business interests and policy coherence 
of the state. There may be competition with local firms but the possibility 
exists for strategic guidance that could create more local benefits. Here local 
CSOs are more likely to exist and be able to voice dissent in policy arenas, 
which could affect the direction and nature of Chinese investment and aid.
As illustrated in Table 11.2 combining the two frameworks produces an 
analytical grid to track the political effects.
Before analysing specific exemplar case studies I will flesh out the six 
channels in more detail and assess aggregate trends at a continental scale.
Trade
Chinese trade with Africa stood at US$817 million in 1977 just before the 
major reforms that liberalized the Chinese economy, but from 2000 to 2009 
bilateral trade rose from US$10.6 billion to US$91.07 billion (CAITEC 2010). 
In the first half of 2011, China–Africa imports and exports totalled US$79.01 
billion, an increase of 29.1 per cent year-on-year (Chinese Custom 2011). 
African states have benefited from commodity exports such as oil, miner-
als, cotton, and logs; building of infrastructure, for example, transport and 
construction of public buildings which are a means of assuring social gains 
such as education and health care in the future; imports of machinery and 
auto-parts; and welfare gains from consumer imports from China. However, 
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competition with local industries resulted in some closures of local enter-
prises and job losses, especially around clothing and textiles (Amankwah 
2005). This in turn contributed to losses in export to third-country markets 
and further capacity losses in terms of labour and management deskilling 
(Kaplinsky and Messner 2008).
As a means of stimulating trade and facilitating inward investment the 
Chinese have recently initiated a series of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 
across Africa (Brautigam and Tang 2011). It is expected that these proposed 
SEZs will focus on value-added industries and provide liberalized invest-
ment environments for investors (China Economic Review 2011). According 
to Davies (2010, p.  26), the zones will create employment opportunities 
and generate foreign exchange reserves through more diversified sources 
of income. Although these zones are largely invested in and built by 
Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), their main occupants are small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), amounting to 85 per cent of the busi-
nesses (Tang and Zhang 2011).
FDI
China’s direct investment in African countries reached $1.44 billion in 2009 
(Han 2011), in which non-financial direct investment soared by 55.4 per cent 
from the previous year (China Daily 2010). In 2008, nearly 1,600 Chinese 
enterprises had started business in African countries (Wen 2009). Some 180 
of these companies were spearheaded by the ‘going out’ policy and have been 
designated by the Chinese state to benefit from preferential finance, tax con-
cessions, and political backing in order to become true multinationals.
In terms of China and Africa one of the important differentiating fac-
tors is the scale and type of Chinese enterprise (Gu 2009). While we talk 
Table 11.2. Political impacts framework
Channel Impacts by state type
Pariah states Illiberal regimes and 
weak democracies
Democratic countries with 
diversified economies
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about packages of aid and investment it largely relates to the ties between 
key Chinese ministries, development banks, and large SOEs (Hubbard 2008). 
These projects are often spatially enclaved with relatively few multipliers 
in the local economy or ‘deep’ linkages to local society. By contrast we see 
Chinese private transnational corporations (TNCs) entering under ‘open’ 
commercial contracts, where they lack any of the protection afforded by the 
tying of loans to investment. And finally there are the myriad small Chinese 
private firms that date back, in some cases, to the colonial period (Mohan 
and Tan-Mullins 2009). Each type of firm has different levels of engagement 
with local capital, the state, and society and we will explore these differ-
ences through our case studies.
A recent policy vehicle for enhancing FDI in Africa is the China–Africa 
Development Fund (CADFund) established under the 2006 Africa Policy. 
The CADFund is the first equity investment fund in China focusing on 
Africa (Tradeinvest Africa 2009). Other than providing funds for companies, 
CADFund provides various consultancy services and information-sharing 
for investment in Africa, partner-sourcing, finance-structuring, and environ-
mental and social issues (CADFund 2014). By the end of 2009, the CADFund 
had earmarked US$700 million for over thirty-five projects (CAITEC 2010).
Aid
One of the problems of assessing Chinese aid is that it is not measured in the 
same way as DAC aid (Glosny 2006; Lancaster 2007; Jacoby 2007; Kragelund 
2008)  and a lack of domestic transparency compounds the uncertainties, 
although the publication of an aid White Paper in April 2011 went some 
way to clarify these issues (Xinhua 2011). China does not separate Official 
Development Assistance from economic cooperation or investment as long 
as the intent is to expand local capacity. This is much more about mutual 
benefit than a discourse of charity or of ‘catching up’ (King 2010).
Many of the features of China’s contemporary aid-giving were laid down 
during the Cold War period. Today, much of the aid is bilateral and delivered 
through three modes of grant aid, interest-free loans, and concessional loans 
(Davies et al. 2008). Aid is also project based (often turnkey) rather than 
sectoral or programme aid as encouraged by the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (Glosny 2006). One of the contentious elements is that much 
of China’s aid and concessional lending is tied (Kragelund 2008). Hubbard 
(2008, p. 225) asserts that the Chinese insist that the Chinese contractor 
appointed by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) should ‘purchase and 
import from China as much equipment, technology and services as pos-
sible’, which is similar to the earlier Japanese model. This goes against the 
OECD’s efforts to untie aid, although despite these efforts many DAC donors 
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still have significant proportions of tied aid (Brautigam 2009). A similar 
issue is raised around export credits which are the preferred currency used 
by ExIm bank and potentially allow for more tying (Manning 2006), but 
Reisen and Ndoye’s (2008) study for the OECD suggests that China’s lend-
ing is not ‘imprudent’. As Dreher et al. (2011) conclude ‘we find little reason 
to blame new donors for using aid as a means to promote commercial self-
interest’ (p. 1961).
Governance
As already noted, China’s engagement with Africa has often been reduced 
to a question of exacerbating governance issues. Yet China’s impacts on gov-
ernance and politics are multi-layered. Given its insistence on ‘non-interfer-
ence’ and a respect for sovereignty the Chinese would argue that they do not 
have a direct impact on African politics, yet even if this were true, China can 
impact through multilateral institutions and, importantly, at the ideational 
level. These various channels will be discussed in turn.
First, the reason why China exercises some commentators and activists 
is that it seemingly attaches no conditions to its loans and therefore under-
mines the work of Western donors around governance (Naim 2007). Yet 
Dreher et al. (2011) found relatively little difference between ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
donors in terms of their aid-allocating behaviour despite ideological differ-
ences alluded to by analysts. While China publicly distances itself from inter-
nal political issues, the backlash against its role in Sudan saw a weakening 
of its ‘non-interference’ line (Large 2008). Holslag (2011) found that China is 
flexible and pragmatic in its political engagements with Africa. Additionally 
Glosny (2006) argues that the Chinese are aware they need to understand 
local institutional cultures to maximize the benefits from their interven-
tions, something analysed in Eisenman’s (2008) study of the Communist 
Party of China’s International Department (CPC-ID). While this is not the 
same as direct influence it suggests that the Chinese have a series of ‘quieter’ 
foreign policy mechanisms (Shambaugh 2007).
Secondly, China’s influence in Africa is also felt through its roles in mul-
tilateral organizations. Gu et al. (2008) note that China’s role as an interna-
tional actor has grown as a result of its economic rise. This occurs through 
a range of channels: its imports of energy and resources have shifted prices 
and ushered in a renewed period of geopolitical anxieties around security of 
supply; its currency reserves impact on other countries’ financial markets, 
notably—but not exclusively—the US; it is a significant player in the WTO 
and other trade and investment forums; and as a polluter it impacts on cli-
mate change. In essence these are economic drivers with political effects 
but China also plays an increasing role in purposive political processes and 
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institutions. While China still engages in bilateral diplomacy, it is leading 
the way towards what some have argued is a multipolar world (Wade 2011) 
that will reduce the influence of the US-dominated order of the past seventy 
years (Ikenberry 2008).
A third important political influence of China is at an ideational level. 
This revolves around, first, a post-colonial solidarity based on shared his-
tories of colonization and, second, the potentially powerful demonstration 
effect of the ‘China model’. Six (2009) argues that a key difference that 
China and India bring to the aid and development agenda is they occupy 
a ‘dual position’ (p. 1110) being both of the developing world but also key 
drivers of growth in the global economy. This means they do not need to 
fall back on teleologies of emancipation bound up in Western development 
discourse but are freer to be honest about their interest-based engagements 
with African countries. Six’s insistence on the transparency of China’s 
interests is fair although questions of ‘solidarity’ that are the watchwords of 
China’s discourse of development cooperation also need to be empirically 
tested rather than taken at face value.
Obiorah (2007) argued that China provides a powerful development 
model, which has a number of possible effects on African development 
debates. First, he argued, African leaders can use this model to deny political 
rights to their people. Second, China exports its model via growth-oriented 
aid and overlooks the social impacts of its actions under the banner of 
non-interference. Ultimately so Obiorah feels it is the duty of African civil 
society to debate and discuss China’s role, because rentier regimes will not 
engender such debate. While Obiorah is rightfully circumspect about the 
political (ab)use of the ‘China model’, problems arise in exactly what we 
mean by the ‘China model’ since arguably there are multiple models in 
different provinces, something acknowledged by both non-Chinese (e.g. 
Mittelman 2006) and Chinese analysts alike (Junbo 2011).
Migration
While most observers accept that China has sent an increased number of 
workers to Africa in the past decade, a major problem is that data are specula-
tive (see Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2009). To assess the impacts on Africa of 
this migration requires what Mung terms a ‘triangular’ perspective in which 
‘the Chinese diaspora does not only relate to China, but also interacts with 
the society where it has settled’ (p. 105–6). One upshot of increased trade and 
migration with Africa has been a rise in political responses to it, largely within 
civil society (Alden 2007; Davies 2007; Campbell 2008). A number of Africa 
trade unions and business associations have led the critique of China’s role in 
national economies (Baah and Jauch 2009; Human Rights Watch 2011).
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Moreover, there is some evidence of Chinese migration becoming politi-
cized. Despite the tangible evidence of modernization that Chinese pro-
jects bring there are growing signs of disaffection with the Chinese among 
Africans (Trofimov 2007)  though this has often been whipped up by 
Western media and varies between countries (see Sautman and Yan 2009; 
Gadzala and Hanusch 2010). Overall surveys that exist suggest a relatively 
high approval rating for the Chinese (e.g. Ngome 2009), but exceptional 
cases exist where the Chinese presence is used to fire nationalist sentiment.
Environment
As noted, much of the use of the Asian Drivers framework has been to analyse 
economic interactions to the relative exclusion of other development chan-
nels. A more complete approach to studying China’s development footprint 
might draw on the insights of ‘political ecology’ (Peet and Watts 2004; Bryant 
and Bailey 1997). For a study of China and Africa relations natural resources 
and the environment are key for a number of reasons. First, given the resource 
focus of much Chinese activity, what are the implications for ecosystem sus-
tainability in areas where new exploitation is taking place under conditions 
of lax regulation (Haglund 2009)? And are the Chinese any better or worse 
than other multinationals in this regard (Chan-Fishel 2007)? Second, China 
and other rising powers are moving into agriculture, which has huge implica-
tions for access to land, and thereby impacts upon the livelihoods of the poor 
(Mahmoud 2010). Third, China is a major producer of greenhouse gases which 
indirectly impact on low-income economies through climate change so that 
export production in China for Western markets has impacts on the poor in 
the developing world (Watts 2010). In turn this creates complex global gov-
ernance problems where the relatively powerless developing-country govern-
ments have little say.
Analysis of Existing Engagements
The preceding analysis has identified the channels through which China 
engages with Africa and the nature of the states that in turn mediate these 
engagements and ultimately determine the developmental impacts. These 
two dimensions were captured in an analytical framework and in this sec-
tion we use that framework to analyse the impacts across the three types of 
African state.
Table 11.3 provides an overview of the findings and the subsequent sec-
tion gives detail of each case. Gaps in the table below indicate either a lack 
of knowledge (Unknown) or a weak relationship (Limited impact).
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Angola
As an illiberal regime with weak democracy, Angola’s post-war economy 
required huge amounts of social and infrastructural investment and so 
sought external financing. It was in this context that China, in need of 
energy resources, sought to offer Angola a series of oil-backed credit lines 
with little conditionality (Corkin 2011a). China’s ExIm Bank provided the 
first funding for infrastructure development in 2002 and a ‘framework agree-
ment’ for new economic cooperation was signed by the Angolan Ministry of 
Finance and the Chinese Ministry of Trade in 2003, whilst in March 2004 
the first US$2 billion financing package for public investment projects was 
approved.
Two additional ExIm Bank loans of US$500 million and US$2 billion were 
made in 2007 with the repayment terms increased to fifteen years with a 
revised interest rate of Libor plus 1.25 per cent (Campos and Vines 2008). 
A further $1 billion loan from the China Development Bank was granted 
in March 2009 (rising to US$1.5 billion in 2010) with a view to support-
ing the development of Angolan agriculture. In the first official estimate of 
Chinese credit to Angola, the Chinese Ambassador said in early 2011 that 
an estimated US$14.5 billion in credit had been provided since the end of 
the war from the three Chinese state banks (Power et al. 2012). These credit 
lines have opened up well over a hundred projects in the areas of energy, 
agriculture, water, health, education, telecommunications, fisheries, and 
public works including key elements in the government’s post-war National 
Reconstruction Programme. Project proposals identified as priorities by 
the respective Angolan ministries are put forward to the Grupo de Trabalho 
Conjunto, a joint committee of the Ministry of Finance and the MOFCOM 
(China). For each project put to tender, the Chinese government proposes 
three to four Chinese companies and all projects are inspected by third par-
ties not funded by the credit line while sectoral ministries are in charge 
of managing these public works and making sure that sufficient staff are 
trained.
Additionally, oil-backed loans amounting to as much as US$10 billion 
have been provided by a private equity firm based in Hong Kong called 
the China International Fund. Further, some Chinese businesses based in 
Hong Kong have been a key feature of China’s push into African markets. 
Levkowitz et al. (2009) have shown many of the Chinese companies cur-
rently operating in Angola have the same Hong Kong address at which a 
handful of individuals control over thirty firms. Key personnel involved in 
CIF have ties to Chinese state-owned enterprises and state agencies including 
China International Trust and Investment Corporation, Sinopec and pos-
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creates numerous companies within a complicated organizational structure 
to invest globally, thereby enabling the Group to acquire assets ‘unnoticed’. 
This credit facility has been managed by Angola’s Reconstruction Office, 
the Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional (GRN), which has been exclusively 
accountable to the Angolan presidency and originally managed most of 
the major infrastructure projects. In the major government reshuffle of 
March 2010 (in which the President called for a crackdown on corruption) 
a replacement was sought for the GRN in what was widely seen as a vote 
of no confidence in the agency and later in the same year the President 
announced that a company called Sonangol Imobiliária [Sonangol Real 
Estate] would be taking over responsibility from the GRN for implementing 
various projects relating to construction and the rehabilitation of infra-
structure (Power 2011).
The Angola case points to the ‘China–Africa’ relationship being organized 
through hybrid and enclaved yet spatially diffuse institutions which are 
detached from national democratic processes. Agency on the part of selected 
Chinese and Angolan actors has produced in the CIF–GRN an institutional 
assemblage that sits within the state apparatus but is only connected to 
selected and clandestine elements within the state. As Corkin (2011a) argues 
this might be a response on the part of the Chinese to Angola’s rampant cor-
ruption in which direct ties are seen as better than diffuse budget support. 
The creation of unaccountable enclaves within states echoes the Structural 
Adjustment era when ‘parallel governments’ (Hutchful 1989) were set up, 
mainly in finance ministries, by appointed technocrats. However, in con-
trast to the adjustment era there is no obvious political conditionality, rather 
a diffuse form of authority based on a small number of powerful actors.
Given that such a small part of the state is actively acting in this relation-
ship is it meaningful to talk about ‘the state’ at all? Social collectivities–like 
states–that are driven by a small number of actors can have agency if they 
are given the authority to act by wider society. It is debatable if the Dos 
Santos regime has such a social contract yet the delivery of much-needed 
infrastructure not only deepens (or seeks to deepen) the regime’s legitimacy 
but might benefit wider Angola society. In Dos Santos we see an active and 
single-minded leader who exercised his agency to create institutions to 
channel inward investment in particular directions.
Ghana
While I use Ghana as an example of a democratic country with a diver-
sified economy it is noted that the economy is not hugely diverse. The 
presence and intensity of Chinese involvement is less evident in Ghana 
compared to Angola, largely due to the lack of strategic minerals although 
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this has changed with the discovery of offshore oilfields in late 2007. 
Although China has had a long-standing relationship with Ghana since 
the 1960s, it is only in recent years that the relationship has been taken 
to a higher level.
Over the years, Chinese aid has been used to build physical infrastruc-
ture like roads (e.g. the Ofankor-Nsawam section of the Accra-Kumasi 
road) and buildings (the National Theatre). It was in 2004/2005 when rela-
tions improved and Ghana began to receive grants and interest-free loans 
directly from China such as a US$24 million debt relief on interest free loans 
(Interview with Xi, counsellor, 2008). In the 2006 FOCAC, Ghana and China 
signed six agreements, including a US$66 million loan for the expansion of 
Ghana’s telecommunication infrastructure and a US$30 million concession-
ary loan for the first phase of the National Fibre-optic and E-government 
project. The project was executed by the Chinese telecom giant Huawei and 
aimed at linking all the ten regional capitals and thirty-six townships on 
fibre routes (Daily Graphic, 15 August 2007).
In general the process is similar to Angola in which the Chinese sign a 
framework document for construction and then engage their own con-
tractor from China and procure the materials from the mainland. Upon 
completion, the Chinese effectively donate the building to the Ghanaian 
government (Interview with Xi, counsellor, Ghana). There is a perception 
amongst ministers and think tanks in Ghana that the Chinese are serv-
ing genuine infrastructure needs. As one think-tank told us, the ‘Chinese 
also got it right from the beginning as countries must get infrastructure in 
place before any development can take place’ (Interview, Private Enterprise 
Foundation 2008).
Undoubtedly the most significant Chinese engagement with Ghana is the 
Bui Hydroelectric Dam. Like many Chinese-funded infrastructure projects 
the majority of the money comes from ExIm Bank. The Bui Dam will cost 
US$622 million of which US$288 million is from buyer credits and US$298 
million is a commercial loan, the interest on which is repayable after 
September 2012. It should bring 400 MW of electricity to Ghana’s strug-
gling grid and even allow some to be exported to West African neighbours. 
This revenue will be paid into an escrow account and funds used to service 
the debt. In addition there is a special arrangement with the Ghana Cocoa 
Board to supply cocoa as part payment of the debt.
Chinese corporations in general do not encourage trade unions, and origi-
nally did not allow for it at Bui. But a deputation from the Ghana TUC 
argued that it was enshrined both in Ghanaian law and the contract and so 
had to (Baah and Jauch 2009). More broadly this highlights an important 
issue for the developmental impacts of China in Africa. Where local laws are 
well elaborated and, more importantly, enforced then expropriation is more 
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difficult although the trade-off may be lower levels of absolute investment. 
An example of weak adherence to the planning process and environmental 
standards around the Bui Dam reveals both obedience in some areas and 
noncompliance in others (Hensengerth 2011). This process suggests that 
where the Ghanaian state is determined to see a project realized then regu-
latory short cuts can be taken. While not confined to Chinese investments 
these large, elite-brokered projects are likely to encourage this flouting of 
due process in favour of the Chinese (Haglund 2009).
Sinohydro and other Chinese firms are looking to deepen their foot-
print in Ghana and Africa more broadly. Although the Chinese seemed 
to have got a foothold in Africa through these Chinese-government-
supported projects they are now competing more openly for tenders and 
as one European aid official told us ‘winning in straight fights’ (see also 
Corkin 2011b). Furthermore, in terms of energy, oil reserves were discov-
ered in 2007 in Ghana (McCaskie 2008). Estimates of revenue are difficult 
to determine but the IMF calculates around $20 billion over twenty years, 
peaking between 2011 and 2016. The oil producers soon began arriv-
ing. Initially the discovery was through a UK–US consortium—Tullow 
and Kosmos—but before long a range of applicants was seeking drilling 
blocks. Importantly in 2010 the Chinese state-owned enterprise China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation sought to purchase part of Kosmos’ 
stake for a reported $5 billion on the basis of its Ghanaian and Ugandan 
oil discoveries.
The danger is that with a high budget deficit the government will be 
tempted to emulate the ‘Angola model’ by collateralizing the oil in return for 
credit. Major multilaterals are urging the government of Ghana to sort out 
its underlying structural problems first rather than simply use the windfall 
rents to shore up budget deficits which will re-emerge once the boom ends. 
Additionally there are worries about a ‘Dutch-Disease’ scenario where this 
resource exportation discourages investment and taxation in non-oil sectors 
(Oxfam 2009). Agriculture is one of the key sectors likely to suffer under this 
scenario.
Importantly, with the discovery of oil in Ghana the Chinese announced 
in 2010 a US$15 billion fund for oil-related infrastructure development 
which was negotiated at the highest levels, with Ghana’s President Atta-Mills 
eschewing a high level meeting in New York about the future of aid to stay 
on in Beijing for the signing ceremony. This signals the changing power bal-
ance in African development relations and the established donors in Ghana 
have expressed concern about the transparency of these deals (Ghanaweb 
2010). However, this situation appears to be changing with greater parlia-
mentary scrutiny in Ghana over a $3 billion loan from China for an oil and 




Sudan is key to China’s African oil interests but also a pariah regime. While 
the Chinese government may be an ‘old friend’ of Sudan based on the idea 
of non-interference, in practice China has played a deep and critical role 
in Sudan’s politics. In late 1995 China’s ‘energy cooperation’ with Sudan 
gathered momentum when President Bashir visited Beijing and secured a 
reduced rate loan with an agreement between China’s Exim Bank and the 
Bank of Sudan to finance oil development (Ali 2007).
The turn to China by the National Islamic Front’s (NIF), later re-named 
the National Congress Party, was born of necessity. Its renewed war against 
the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) continued, pros-
ecuted as part of a project of Islamist transformation in Sudan. Having poor 
relations with the IMF and World Bank, Sudan also became the object of 
sanctions by the UN (1996) and the US (1997) so that turning to China was 
pragmatic given Beijing’s political dependability and willingness to invest. 
China viewed Sudan as a friendly state with a more open oil market not, as 
elsewhere in Africa, dominated by established Western corporations.
From early 1997 the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) 
has operated a 40 per cent share in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating 
Company (GNPOC), the main oil consortium in Sudan. However, oil produc-
tion in southern Sudan had been constrained by the lack of a proper infra-
structure. So, a CNPC subsidiary was involved in constructing a 1,600-km 
buried pipeline for GNPOC to connect oil production with the international 
market. The Khartoum oil refinery was built as a CNPC–Ministry of Energy 
joint venture with an investment of some $638 million and became opera-
tional in February 2000. Following GNPOC, the second major oil consor-
tium in Sudan, Petrodar, was created in 2001. By 2006 China was by far 
the most important external economic actor in northern Sudan, whose 
oil-fuelled economic boom saw real GDP growing by 12 per cent in 2006.
The successful running of Sudan’s oil industry by CNCP and other foreign 
oil companies amidst the civil wars demonstrated a willingness to side with 
Khartoum, despite the principle of ‘non-interference’. China’s ‘blind-eye’ 
support for the NIF has been the wellspring of grievances in many quar-
ters in Sudan. Forced civilian displacement in southern Sudan continued, 
though largely overshadowed by Darfur, and the oil sector was targeted by 
the SPLA and other groups. Oil rich regions generate considerable revenue, 
but there have been negligible improvements in service delivery for affected 
civilian populations. Grievances concerning oil practices, the environmen-
tal impact of oil, and employment policies of oil companies abound. China 
has supplied arms to Sudan and helped develop northern Sudan’s arms man-
ufacturing industry in the late 1990s.
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The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 inaugurated a formal 
peace between northern and southern Sudan but the Chinese retained the 
ties they had built up over the years. Even before the CPA, the Chinese had 
identified its post-war reconstruction market as an area of expansion, espe-
cially given that sanctions restricted Western investment. Oil activity has 
expanded after the CPA and CNPC signed new concessions in 2007. Besides 
oil, key areas for expansion include construction, agriculture, mining, man-
ufacturing, and importantly an assortment of transport infrastructure and 
energy projects. Most controversially, the Merowe Dam in northern Sudan 
being led by a Chinese consortium has generated conflict and displacement 
(Bosshard 2009).
China’s diplomacy on Darfur became more publicly engaged from 2006 
to the point where its efforts to ‘influence’ the Sudanese government on 
Darfur blurred the boundaries of non-interference. Beijing underestimated 
the political risk posed by Darfur to its interests within Sudan, as well 
as its standing in Africa and on the international stage. More proactive 
engagement on Darfur was evident before China’s role in Sudan was con-
nected to a ‘genocide Olympics’ campaign by activist groups in the US. 
The appointment of a new special ambassador, Liu Guijin, in May 2007 
was part of China’s efforts to bolster its image and contribute to solutions. 
For example, more aid was given to Darfur. Such moves also enabled China 
to promote its own interests through more vocal diplomacy and participa-
tion in multilateral forums and initiatives on Darfur. But China’s more 
proactive diplomacy was accompanied by continuity in defending the sov-
ereignty of Sudan and arguing against further sanctions, as well as deepen-
ing economic links. Thus, for this ‘pariah state’ the impact of oil has been 
to further concentrate wealth rather than achieve broader development, 
and this seems likely to worsen even if, as a result of diplomacy, it may lose 
some of its pariah status.
Discussion
Elites and Inclusion
The case studies suggest that regardless of the nature of the African state the 
dominant mode of engagement between China and Africa is at the elite level. 
State capacity on the African side clearly exists, even if it is not always in the 
form that Western liberal donors would wish for (see Kelsall 2013). It may even 
be that this selective and sometimes autocratic state capacity delivers forms 
of development—it may not be inclusive but it is effective by certain criteria.
China in Africa
297
China’s preference for bilateralism encourages negotiations between sen-
ior officials which often occur outside of domestic accountability structures. 
In Ghana, for example, earlier Chinese investments such as the IT spine 
had very little discussion with telecommunications companies or within 
government and in Angola the GRN was effectively insulated from public 
scrutiny. In Ghana inputs to the Bui Dam were given to a company owned 
by a cabinet minister and in Namibia Chinese scholarships went to the chil-
dren of high-ranking officials suggesting that China’s entry may do little 
to alter existing forms of patrimonialism. That said, as Davies (2007) notes, 
the Chinese claim that their project focus as opposed to modalities like 
direct budget support reduces the chances of malfeasance since there is less 
free-floating cash to be siphoned off. Again, evidence of such arrangements 
is sparse and arguably part of the Chinese argument is to justify its tying of 
loans to Chinese SOEs.
Legitimacy and Policy Space
But whether these arrangements are elite-based and relatively unaccount-
able is somewhat different to whether they build legitimacy and contribute 
to a longer-term view of development. At one level the Angola and Sudan 
cases show that policy triangulation is possible with African states playing 
donors and investors off against one another. With resource security a global 
agenda, Africa’s abundance of strategic minerals has given selected countries 
on the continent a degree of space to negotiate. And in this regard it is vitally 
important not to fixate on China since a raft of new investors are entering 
these markets (such as India in Sudan and Korea in Ghana). But as the Busan 
HLF noted that while these actors and economic relationships may provide 
enhanced markets for African exports they do not alter the structural posi-
tion of these economies and do little to kick start broader industrialization. 
It is here that purposive policy on the African side is vital if developmental 
gains are to spread beyond mineral rents. Investment in training, for exam-
ple, is important if more local employment is to be generated by this new 
investment.
In terms of regime legitimacy, Tull (2006) and Holslag (2011) note that 
Chinese investments have enhanced the legitimacy of recipient regimes. 
This is more than the aid-based vanity projects, such as ministries and 
stadia, but much-needed transport and energy infrastructure (Foster et al. 
2008). While it is too early to say definitively, this infrastructural develop-
ment might not only enhance the legitimacy of incumbent regimes but will 
have multiple, indirect benefits to citizens through such things as enhanced 
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mobility and information flows. Moreover, effective transportation and 
communications can only increase the ability of the central state to reach 
and administer its territory, although how this plays out depends on the 
intentions of the regime that controls the system. In Sudan, for example, 
Chinese-owned infrastructure was used by the Sudanese army to mount 
attacks in the south so we need to be attuned to the progressive and regres-
sive uses of technology and infrastructure that the Chinese bring.
Labour and Environment
The evidence around investment and labour suggests that labour impor-
tation varies according to the nature of the project, the Chinese firm 
involved, and the labour market conditions in Africa (Chen and Orr 2009). 
In Ghana, for example, Chinese labour was limited and firms had relatively 
little trouble finding semi-skilled labour, although the conditions and pay 
of this work are not high. That said, research by the author in Nigeria 
revealed that while local employees acknowledged the lower wages they 
were also grateful for the resilience of Chinese firms. Where a number of 
major Nigerian employers had gone bust the Chinese firms were still oper-
ating. By contrast the post-war labour market of Angola was poor so that 
labour importation is higher despite local content clauses (Corkin 2011b).
Moreover, the extension of the ‘China Inc.’ assumptions into Africa tends 
to suggest that ethnic economies are internally coherent and enclavic—
the Chinese only look after their own. But this is clearly misplaced as our 
evidence showed hard capitalist logics determining business behaviour as 
opposed to favouring of co-ethnics. That is not to say that these business 
relationships are random, but that ethnicity and nationality are overdeter-
mined in the literature on Chinese migrant businesses, which in turn diverts 
attention from the potential benefits to African economies. For example, 
recent research in Zambia (Fessehaie 2011) and Angola (Corkin 2011b) sug-
gests that the Chinese are not as enclaved as earlier reports suggested and 
local firms have secured a growing number of contracts.
In all cases the environmental impacts are poorly understood and the 
focus has been on high profile cases, such as the Merowe Dam in Sudan. 
Again, there are issues around the contracts underpinning these invest-
ments, which go beyond a simple China–Africa logic. In the case of the 
Merowe Dam it is the German consulting firm that is being prosecuted 
which suggests that mitigating negative social and environmental impacts 
is a matter of complex arrangements between multiple actors, although as 
the Ghana and Angola cases show local laws are poorly enforced around 




Emerging Issues and Research Gaps
The foregoing analysis suggests that China and other Asian powers are 
changing the political landscape of African states though not as drastically 
as Western sceptics would believe. As a recent report noted ‘There is a clear 
opportunity for Africa to grab now, since both traditional and “new” play-
ers are in an important phase of reforming (e.g. Europe) and designing (e.g. 
China, India, and Brazil) their development policy towards Africa’ (Rampa 
and Bilal 2011, p. VIII). To capitalize on this opportunity requires a series of 
coordinated responses across African, BRIC, and multilateral political spaces.
Changing China
China’s domestic development has been the driver of its overseas engage-
ments so as it changes there are likely to be implications for Africa. Kaplinsky 
and Farooki (2011) show that China’s and India’s high levels of commodity 
demand are likely to continue for at least twenty-five years which means that 
Africa will remain a strategic commercial interest. Despite the global reces-
sion and a slight drop in China’s growth rate, China honoured its aid com-
mitments to Africa. Yet the Chinese model is clearly imperfect with large 
and growing domestic inequality and environmental damage (Shirk 2007; 
Watts 2010). As international scrutiny and the influence of policy norms 
deepens it is likely that Chinese SOEs and policymakers will adopt more sus-
tainable approaches and we are already seeing CSR agendas amongst some 
policy banks and SOEs. But as Chinese firms proliferate, diversify, and inter-
nationalize it becomes ever harder for the Chinese state to monitor and reg-
ulate them (Reilly and Na 2007), while the large numbers of smaller private 
firms never even enter these regulatory mechanisms. Hence, we are likely to 
see some high profile firms voluntarily adopting better practices but for the 
majority it will be business as usual unless and until African states have the 
capacity and willingness to regulate.
We are also seeing an evolution of Chinese firms, especially SOEs. Most 
come in under tied arrangements linked to state-backed concessional loans, 
which reduces the risk to these firms, even if the absolute levels of profit are 
thin. However, there is emerging evidence (Corkin 2011b) that once estab-
lished in an African market these firms operate like any other TNC and ten-
der for open contracts which they are increasingly winning.
The cases reviewed in the third section of this chapter showed that despite 
China branding itself as ‘non-interfering’ this has always been a flexible 
discourse. The Sudan case showed a growing involvement in domestic poli-
tics and the Libyan evacuation of 2011 suggested that a priority for China 
is ensuring the safety of its nationals, which is linked to stability of the 
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political operating environment. Hence, we are likely to see growing direct 
involvement in African governance. This is likely to be below the radar 
rather than through public governance programmes.
Despite the long-standing discourse around ‘South—South’ cooperation 
and the distancing of China from mainstream donors, there is growing 
self-awareness of China as an international development actor. The White 
Paper on aid in May 2011 was relatively light on details (Provost 2011) but 
was significant for using the term ‘aid’ and acknowledging, despite its frag-
mentation, that China has an evolving aid ‘system’. Other institutional 
reorganization identified in the White Paper and the establishment of the 
State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development 
(Davies 2007) suggest that a reflexive analytical move within China’s aid 
system is under way and noises are being made about closer convergence 
around international development norms.
African States
Many of the issues that China in Africa raises are not unique to this specific 
relationship. As Broadman (2007) notes many of the issues around Africa’s 
engagement with China concern long-standing problems of policy coher-
ence, political stability, and border controls which pre-date China’s entry. As 
such this raises a much wider series of questions about the African state and 
political economy, which are beyond the scope of this chapter.
One of the key issues at the interface of accumulation and inclusion is around 
the use of African labour. We noted that use of African labour varies according 
to labour market conditions and nature of the project, but that it is generally 
quite high. However, much of this African labour is relatively unskilled and 
so skills transfer is low and few African governments are investing in voca-
tional training (Okonjo-Iweala 2010), which creates a self-fulfilling prophecy 
of the Chinese requiring the importation of skilled labour. However, we have 
seen companies like Huawei setting up training centres in Africa (Chang et al. 
2009) as it is aware that local workers have certain advantages over Chinese staff. 
A similar issue is around linkages to local firms. We have seen in the cases of 
Angola and DRC that local content clauses were part of the agreements around 
loan packages but that adherence is uneven. There is emerging evidence that 
Chinese investment is creating local linkages to African firms though the jobs 
created in these firms tend to be relatively low skilled (Teka 2011) and in the 
case of Angola contracts are skewed towards firms owned by the ruling party 
(Soares de Oliveira 2007). These studies also show that local policy can make 
a difference and so while, for example, Angola has set up joint-venture clauses 
that encouraged foreign firms to partner with local firms much of the rest of the 




The previous sub-section argued that it is long-standing structural issues 
within recipient states that need to be addressed rather than simply reform-
ing the mode of entry of the new donors. While the Chinese White Paper 
on aid echoed some of the concepts and makes some concessions to inter-
national norms, it is unlikely that the Chinese state will wholeheartedly 
throw itself into these institutional processes. Their own development mod-
els are too powerful and different for them to, for example, suddenly start 
championing civil society, but as noted there is space for consensus around 
business-led growth (Chaponniere 2009). So, there is likely to be some con-
vergence with Western donors around issues which do not threaten China’s 
own growth or domestic political agendas, such as greener technologies 
and investments in technical capacity-building and social infrastructure. 
However, if the ‘China model’ is used ideologically by recipient states in 
Africa to oppose liberal reforms then this could become a site of conflict 
between Chinese, Western, and African actors.
The need for ongoing dialogue and learning (European Commission 
2008; Davies 2010) between new donors, old donors, and recipients is still 
high on the agenda, as evidenced by debates at the 2011 Busan HLF on Aid 
Effectiveness. In comparison to the Paris and Accra meetings (these were the 
meetings of the HLF – High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness) the new donors 
were much more prominent although the debates were salutary. While they 
recognized the benefits that South—South cooperation could bring to LDCs 
they noted that terms of trade are generally not altered by these relation-
ships and Africa still largely imports manufactured goods while exporting raw 
materials. In the case of China they noted that the 2009 Forum on China–
Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) meeting did pledge technical training and this 
might be one area where African states can use the commodities boom to 
upgrade skills levels, but this requires concerted and coordinated policy.
Research Gaps
The chapter will conclude with a series of research gaps in terms of the 
impacts of Chinese and Asian involvement on elite commitment to develop-
ment and state effectiveness in Africa.
Development Discourses
A recurring theme within the major Chinese projects is that the Chinese get 
things done and that what they provide is important, notably infrastructure. 
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In terms of questioning notions of ‘effectiveness’ the issue for international 
development actors is more around development effectiveness than aid 
effectiveness per se (Rampa and Bilal 2011; Chaponniere 2009). The Paris 
Declaration usefully focuses on aid effectiveness but for recipient states the 
entry of China has refocused the debate around what is needed for devel-
opment since the causal link between more/better aid and development is 
inconclusive. Sachs (2007) argues that China has forced the ‘nuts and bolts’ 
of development back on the agenda after a period in which liberal institu-
tionalism fixated some policymakers. The China model, such that it exists, 
is one in which legitimacy is built on sustained growth and while its social 
and ecological effects are problematic it has recalibrated the wider debates 
around what development means.
Emerging issue: What is development effectiveness and how does China 
effect a change in this understanding? How do other actors respond to this 
changing discourse?
Elites and Inclusive Development
The analysis above suggests that recipient states and regimes can play a 
determining role in how relations with new donors play out, how far broader 
development priorities are negotiated with their respective polities, and who 
ultimately benefits from this new phase of development cooperation. Under 
all three regime types discussed in the second and third sections of this 
chapter we see elite compacts evolving in unaccountable ways. However, 
domestic and international scrutiny is growing as is China’s own sense of 
‘social responsibility’ for its development and investment projects. Despite 
this lack of accountability to domestic societies, these engagements with 
Africa do not necessarily make them anti-developmental if the effective-
ness of these arrangements is directed at social and economic infrastruc-
ture which might benefit broader society. Moreover, if these investments 
stimulate economic growth and produce socially useful tax revenue then 
the developmental gains could spread further.
Emerging issue:  Does China’s preference for elite brokering undermine 
moves to democratic and open government? If new investments stimulate 
growth will these gains be channelled to broader developmental goals?
Governance Interventions
While the Chinese, for example, stress ‘non-interference’ we have seen that 
this was always something of a myth and is now breaking down. If this 
proves to be the case then this has major implications for politics in these 
countries, as well as for relations between the rising powers and ‘established’ 
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powers that have long held trusteeship over these states (Kornegay and 
Landsberg 2009). At the same time as China’s power within multilateral 
organizations grows we are likely to see influence brought to bear in more 
indirect ways that will affect pan-African and national policy processes.
Emerging issue: What forms of more direct and multilateral political inter-
vention in Africa are the Chinese engaging in? To what extent does this 
conflict with established powers on the continent?
New Actors
Despite the importance of China in Africa there is a lack of analysis on coun-
tries operating in Africa besides China. Hence, we need much better data 
on who the new actors are, where they operate, how they operate, and with 
what impacts on development and politics in those countries. While we can 
hypothesize that new donors share certain characteristics and are different 
is some regards to DAC donors there is nothing substantive on how these 
play out on the ground in Africa.
Emerging issue: To what extent are new actors stepping up their African 
engagements? How is this organized and with what impacts?
Environmental Impacts
Another emergent issue noted in the analysis of the third section of this 
chapter is that we know very little about the environmental impacts and 
questions of land rights in Africa. In the past these have proven to be impor-
tant political issues but have hardly been touched upon in the existing work 
on China and the Rising Powers in Africa. However, there is no primary or 
comparative work on these issues, with some rather sloppy causal analy-
sis implying that the Chinese export the capitalism they know best and 
so overlook environmental consequences. Certainly, China’s domestic envi-
ronmental record is not good though neither have been the records of other 
countries that have industrialized in the past. And the Chinese have made 
a concerted and rapid shift to greener growth so it is not possible to simply 
project bad practices on to Chinese overseas operations. Rather we need sys-
tematic and comparative studies which assess whether Chinese firms are 
in fact worse than other nations’ firms, which require a sample of different 
types of sizes of firms.
Emerging issue: What are the environmental impacts of Chinese activity in 
Africa and to what extent is this different to non-Chinese actors? What are 
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